We'd probably talk about tactics more if Reid were the coach, but I suspect we would still be overrating them. How many NFL head coaches would you take over Reid right now? Maybe five? Maybe not quite that many?crystalline said:
Carroll's Call
- Thread starter DennyDoyle'sBoil
- Start date
I guess the only thing I would wonder is whether, when you get to this level of success, those little things do matter.Super Nomario said:
Carroll, Reid, Belichick, the Harbaughs -- all of them are incredibly talented coaches who will coach their players well and field competitive teams. In that case, do these strategic decisions have more of an impact, especially in the playoffs when your season often comes down to managing the clock and making the right strategic decision in the final drive(s)?
In most close games, there are a bunch of plays where you can flip the outcome and potentially get a different result. The tactical ones stand out (as do bad calls or obvious physical errors like drops or missed tackles), but that doesn't make them more important. Obviously I'd rather have a tactically sound coach than a tactically incompetent one, but I think that's only a small part of the head coach job description.dynomite said:
FWIW, Jim Harbaugh's on a podcast (around the 21-minute mark) and said that:
(1) he thought it was an "insightful" call against a goal line defense (of course, this is the guy who didn't give the ball to Frank Gore near the goal line when given the chance to win a SB, so...); and
(2) he thought Butler's play was amazing -- particularly that he was able to catch it rather than just breaking up the pass.
(1) he thought it was an "insightful" call against a goal line defense (of course, this is the guy who didn't give the ball to Frank Gore near the goal line when given the chance to win a SB, so...); and
(2) he thought Butler's play was amazing -- particularly that he was able to catch it rather than just breaking up the pass.
Reiss just posted a full quote:
To me that sums it up. As more and more people weigh in the less and less I understand the criticism as what will happen to anyone who bucks status quo common wisdom -- if it works a gutty genius if it doesn't omg how could you not do what everyone expected? The flip on BB and the non-time-out. Seattle scores and we have a thread longer than Ballghazi on that. It works and vague insinuations that it brilliantly unsettled Seattle (which is unbelievable nonsense, by the way -- they were perfectly settled and the pass meant they had time to run 3 plays (1 pass, 2 runs) rather than possibly only two runs (or a very discombobulated 3rd play). The only thing that could ruin that play call was an incredibly low low percentage of an INT happening. And Butler just made an all-timer play to make that happen. "All credit to him for making it." As. Simple. As. That.
To me that sums it up. As more and more people weigh in the less and less I understand the criticism as what will happen to anyone who bucks status quo common wisdom -- if it works a gutty genius if it doesn't omg how could you not do what everyone expected? The flip on BB and the non-time-out. Seattle scores and we have a thread longer than Ballghazi on that. It works and vague insinuations that it brilliantly unsettled Seattle (which is unbelievable nonsense, by the way -- they were perfectly settled and the pass meant they had time to run 3 plays (1 pass, 2 runs) rather than possibly only two runs (or a very discombobulated 3rd play). The only thing that could ruin that play call was an incredibly low low percentage of an INT happening. And Butler just made an all-timer play to make that happen. "All credit to him for making it." As. Simple. As. That.
Well, it was A goal line call. There were only 3 DBs in the game, they were just all corners. There were 4 DL and 4 LB in the game against 5 blockers. The Pats had 7 guys on the LOS. I would have passed too.DrewDawg said:
Smiling Joe Hesketh said:
Belichick has said that if Seattle had lined up in a true heavy goalline formation, he would have called timeout and fielded more linebackers. The very fact of subbing Butler is is indicative of them not going as heavy as they might--though one might still consider it a "goalline" D as it's not rigorously defined.
I really don't agree with the consensus in this thread at all regarding BB's decision not to call a timeout. It was a mistake. As tempting as it is we shouldn't consider the results of the decision when we evaluate the decision.
What does calling the timeout change?
1) the pass/run decisions a bit for seattle
2) the amount of time seattle has remaining in the event of a pats penalty giving Seattle extra downs (eg DPI that leads to Seattle being able to run FIVE goal line plays after 2nd and 1).
3) the amount of time the pats have the ball on offense in the event Seattle scores
What does it by and largely NOT affect?
4) the ability of Seattle to run up to 3 offensive plays (plus a fourth if they had an dpi as time expired) from 2nd and goal at the 1
In my opinion #1 is negligible. All the stats suggest the odds of a fumble and interception there are very, very similar and very remote. If you don't think Carroll made the wrong call then you pretty obviously agree with this. The narrative that BB calculated super fast in his head that not calling a timeout would force a pass which was much more likely to be intercepted sounds like fantasy to me. As is the suggestion that Carroll was tricked into a bad play call. I'm with Harbaugh. Good play call, unbelievable play by Butler. #1 is of negligible value to the Pats.
My number 4 is obvious but something most people don't seem to consider. In most scenarios they would be able to run three offensive plays regardless of Pats timeout. Either seattle would score early and NE would have the ball or they would fail to score, ON DOWNS (/fumble/int but less likely) and the pats get to take a knee. The Pats calling a timeout in all likelihood would not have significantly affected SEA's odds to score because it was unlikely to affect the biggest component: the number of downs Seattle had to score*. Plus, as I said, it wouldn't impact the odds of a turnover as both were about equally unlikely/negligible
So with pretty much everything else being negligible you're left comparing the odds of #2 (giving them time for extra downs they wouldn't otherwise have time for) vs #3, the value to the Pats of having time/more time if SEA scores. I don't know where to get the value of each scenario but feel very comfortable saying you bet on Tom Brady there.
Bill is the best in-game tactician in the NFL AND it worked out so it's tempting to give him the benefit of the doubt but ultimately I think he made potentially the biggest mistake of his career. Thankfully he got away with it. I'm open to new opinions here but thus far it's tough for me to see an argument to the contrary. BB himself has certainly suggested that he knows he didn't make the optimal decision (but he doesn't really care because they won).
But really I'm just happy it all worked out and he didn't end up being known for his single biggest mistake in an area of coaching that is otherwise one of his greatest strengths. As SN said, the real coaching win on that drive happened in practice with Butler.
*I'd also note that while the pats had a good run D package in there it was man coverage and vulnerable to a pick play...which Seattle had already used to score with the ref...plus all the power stats are not on Pats side here anyway. I don't think there's much value in maintaining the matchup.
What does calling the timeout change?
1) the pass/run decisions a bit for seattle
2) the amount of time seattle has remaining in the event of a pats penalty giving Seattle extra downs (eg DPI that leads to Seattle being able to run FIVE goal line plays after 2nd and 1).
3) the amount of time the pats have the ball on offense in the event Seattle scores
What does it by and largely NOT affect?
4) the ability of Seattle to run up to 3 offensive plays (plus a fourth if they had an dpi as time expired) from 2nd and goal at the 1
In my opinion #1 is negligible. All the stats suggest the odds of a fumble and interception there are very, very similar and very remote. If you don't think Carroll made the wrong call then you pretty obviously agree with this. The narrative that BB calculated super fast in his head that not calling a timeout would force a pass which was much more likely to be intercepted sounds like fantasy to me. As is the suggestion that Carroll was tricked into a bad play call. I'm with Harbaugh. Good play call, unbelievable play by Butler. #1 is of negligible value to the Pats.
My number 4 is obvious but something most people don't seem to consider. In most scenarios they would be able to run three offensive plays regardless of Pats timeout. Either seattle would score early and NE would have the ball or they would fail to score, ON DOWNS (/fumble/int but less likely) and the pats get to take a knee. The Pats calling a timeout in all likelihood would not have significantly affected SEA's odds to score because it was unlikely to affect the biggest component: the number of downs Seattle had to score*. Plus, as I said, it wouldn't impact the odds of a turnover as both were about equally unlikely/negligible
So with pretty much everything else being negligible you're left comparing the odds of #2 (giving them time for extra downs they wouldn't otherwise have time for) vs #3, the value to the Pats of having time/more time if SEA scores. I don't know where to get the value of each scenario but feel very comfortable saying you bet on Tom Brady there.
Bill is the best in-game tactician in the NFL AND it worked out so it's tempting to give him the benefit of the doubt but ultimately I think he made potentially the biggest mistake of his career. Thankfully he got away with it. I'm open to new opinions here but thus far it's tough for me to see an argument to the contrary. BB himself has certainly suggested that he knows he didn't make the optimal decision (but he doesn't really care because they won).
But really I'm just happy it all worked out and he didn't end up being known for his single biggest mistake in an area of coaching that is otherwise one of his greatest strengths. As SN said, the real coaching win on that drive happened in practice with Butler.
*I'd also note that while the pats had a good run D package in there it was man coverage and vulnerable to a pick play...which Seattle had already used to score with the ref...plus all the power stats are not on Pats side here anyway. I don't think there's much value in maintaining the matchup.
He's wrong. He had a minute. He could have taken less than 35 seconds to get a call in. It's not like the super bowl was on the line.There is no Rev said:
Edit: plus literally nobody believes they couldn't have gone pass/run/run or run/pass/run in 30 seconds. Or pass/run/pass.
Edit 2: plus, they had a timeout. Just not a valid point.
What you seem to be overlooking is that the Pats might not have been confident that they could get into field-goal range with a minute or however many seconds to play. They are not an offense built around huge vertical gains, and the Seahawks defense is best suited to stop this kind of play anyway, so it might have simply come down to Bill feeling most comfortable winning the game with his defense, and there every little advantage helps - such as putting pressure on Seattle to make the decisions more quickly.
First, Seattle wanted the clock stopped and they were counting on NE to stop it for them. To me, that alone suggests that BB did the right thing by letting the clock run.
Second, in no way do I believe that Belichick had the whole thing mapped out in his head in exact detail. I think it was a gut feeling on his part. Maybe he saw Seattle scrambling a bit and thought "If I don't stop the clock, THEY might." Certainly if Seattle called time there that would have been a win for Belichick.
At some level, Belichick had to bet on his defense or his offense. Either decision would have been defensible IMO, but he chose to bet on his D. I think the mistake would have been trying to do both. The right move was either an immediate time out followed by letting them score (put the game in Brady's hands) or betting everything on a goal line stand.
Yes, it would have sucked if Seattle had been able to punch it in with just 1-2 plays left on the clock. But you know what would have sucked even worse? Calling the time out, letting Seattle score, and then failing on offense. There's something to be said for making Seattle win the game instead of gift-wrapping it for them.
Edit: And it absolutely was a great, great play by Butler. One that almost never happens no matter who the CB is. Even if Butler goes on to be a Hall of Fame caliber corner, he'll probably never make another play that good. Butler is the one, far more than BB, who deserves the credit for that play. Anything less than perfect execution there and it is an incompletion or even a TD.
Second, in no way do I believe that Belichick had the whole thing mapped out in his head in exact detail. I think it was a gut feeling on his part. Maybe he saw Seattle scrambling a bit and thought "If I don't stop the clock, THEY might." Certainly if Seattle called time there that would have been a win for Belichick.
At some level, Belichick had to bet on his defense or his offense. Either decision would have been defensible IMO, but he chose to bet on his D. I think the mistake would have been trying to do both. The right move was either an immediate time out followed by letting them score (put the game in Brady's hands) or betting everything on a goal line stand.
Yes, it would have sucked if Seattle had been able to punch it in with just 1-2 plays left on the clock. But you know what would have sucked even worse? Calling the time out, letting Seattle score, and then failing on offense. There's something to be said for making Seattle win the game instead of gift-wrapping it for them.
Edit: And it absolutely was a great, great play by Butler. One that almost never happens no matter who the CB is. Even if Butler goes on to be a Hall of Fame caliber corner, he'll probably never make another play that good. Butler is the one, far more than BB, who deserves the credit for that play. Anything less than perfect execution there and it is an incompletion or even a TD.
amarshal2 said:
This also fails to ignore the counter-situation to #2, which is Seattle committing a penalty (holding or something?) that pushes them back and prevents them from getting off enough plays to finish the drive.
At the end of the day, as you sort of pointed out, all of these decisions are splitting win probabilities down to 1% or 0.5%. The difference between a rush and a pass in terms of chance of turnover? Negligible. The difference between getting the ball back with 20 seconds vs. 50 seconds while needing 50+ yards? Not huge. Saying that Belichick definitively made a mistake on calling a timeout vs. not calling a timeout seems silly to me. The Pats chances of winning would not have been very high regardless if Seattle had punched it in there.
I'm not overlooking it. I don't know what value to put on it but I clearly said that the value of TB12 with the ball and time is worth more to me than the value of Sesttle potentially getting extra downs. You really don't think Tom could have earned 40-50 yards with a minute? 30 seconds?JohnnyK said:
To your first point, no! They have said many times they didn't want to give the pats the ball with time. While this doesn't prove my point, it supports it. Pete Carroll seems to agree with me.Eddie Jurak said:
I don't think it was a bet on his defense or his offense. I think he bet on only his defense when calling a timeout would have allowed him to bet on both.
Could have? Sure I think he could have. I'm just saying that I believe Bill thought the chances of them stopping Seattle where greater than the chances of them going down the field again.amarshal2 said:
I don't think 1 is negligible. His decision forced the potential composition of the three plays to at least one pass. Interception v. fumble is not the only advantage there, if you think the odds of converting on a pass are lower than converting on a run. Let's say you believe the odds of converting on a pass from the one yard line are 60/40 and that converting from a run are 70/30. That takes your 3-play stop percentage up from 2.6 to 3.7 percent. If you take into account that most goal line passes unless on fourt down (even Carroll said he thought it was a wasted play) 60/40 is generous. On the goal line, there are lots of bodies in the end zone, and if you start to say pass is 50/50, then the play calling composition nearly doubles your chance of a goal line stand. The second component of making them have to choose pass as one of their plays is predictability if they run on second down, taking down the odds of conversion.
One other thing you're not taking into account is that in a three run scenario, the Patriots would have no time left anyway, so if the whole reason to call time out after the first Lynch run is to preserve yourself time, you can only stop the clock one more time. So, if what you're hoping for is to make a goal line stand instead of letting them score, you can call both your time outs and still lose on fourth down.
You're also not considering that not calling time out reduces Seattle's time and options if they commit a penalty.
The other thing nobody is seeming to break down other than one what seemed to be flawed study on 538 is what chance calling time out really gives the Patriots. The presumption seems to be "Patriots, Tom Brady, fuck yeah!" If they score on second down, I would think there is like a 15 percent chance of scoring a field goal and then a 50 percent chance of winning over time. Add in a very minor chance of a TD and you're looking at what? 8.5 percent. If the Seahawks score on third down, that number goes down significantly, because the Patriots have less time and probably have used their last time out. If the Seahawks score on fourth down (or draw a penalty and then score on later downs) your win percentage is close to zero, even if you take the time out. To me, if you call time ou, you're pretty much choosing to try to win on offense, so you have to let them score at that point. So really the decision is not time out or no time out, it's let them score or don't.
I am willing to accept that not calling time out lowered the win percentage, but some of the media idiots suggesting an equivalence between Carroll's decisions and Belichick's are off base to me. Belichick was deciding between a host of very, very shitty options. Maybe we all think that if a robot would choose the 4.5 percent option over the 3.3 percenter, that's what a coach should do. To me, in that circumstance, there is room for playing a hunch or using ne's experience.
I also think the result is not always irrelevant to making a judgment about whether the decision was a sound one. The defense knew what they were going to do on the play, decreasing the chance it would be successful. Carroll and Wilson didn't have a chance to talk, and it resulted in a poor decision by Wilson. If you don't believe that the possibility of chaos leading to a poor second down play was something BB was thinking about once he saw Carroll was not going to call time out, I just don't think you're giving him enough credit.
Edit: well in the time I took to compose the discussion has covered some of this stuff already
One other thing you're not taking into account is that in a three run scenario, the Patriots would have no time left anyway, so if the whole reason to call time out after the first Lynch run is to preserve yourself time, you can only stop the clock one more time. So, if what you're hoping for is to make a goal line stand instead of letting them score, you can call both your time outs and still lose on fourth down.
You're also not considering that not calling time out reduces Seattle's time and options if they commit a penalty.
The other thing nobody is seeming to break down other than one what seemed to be flawed study on 538 is what chance calling time out really gives the Patriots. The presumption seems to be "Patriots, Tom Brady, fuck yeah!" If they score on second down, I would think there is like a 15 percent chance of scoring a field goal and then a 50 percent chance of winning over time. Add in a very minor chance of a TD and you're looking at what? 8.5 percent. If the Seahawks score on third down, that number goes down significantly, because the Patriots have less time and probably have used their last time out. If the Seahawks score on fourth down (or draw a penalty and then score on later downs) your win percentage is close to zero, even if you take the time out. To me, if you call time ou, you're pretty much choosing to try to win on offense, so you have to let them score at that point. So really the decision is not time out or no time out, it's let them score or don't.
I am willing to accept that not calling time out lowered the win percentage, but some of the media idiots suggesting an equivalence between Carroll's decisions and Belichick's are off base to me. Belichick was deciding between a host of very, very shitty options. Maybe we all think that if a robot would choose the 4.5 percent option over the 3.3 percenter, that's what a coach should do. To me, in that circumstance, there is room for playing a hunch or using ne's experience.
I also think the result is not always irrelevant to making a judgment about whether the decision was a sound one. The defense knew what they were going to do on the play, decreasing the chance it would be successful. Carroll and Wilson didn't have a chance to talk, and it resulted in a poor decision by Wilson. If you don't believe that the possibility of chaos leading to a poor second down play was something BB was thinking about once he saw Carroll was not going to call time out, I just don't think you're giving him enough credit.
Edit: well in the time I took to compose the discussion has covered some of this stuff already
But of course there's a chance that even if you call time out, Brady never gets a chance.amarshal2 said:
First, I don't think there is a wrong call there. Just too close to me to say either way is wrong.
However, not calling timeout didn't just affect pass/run decisions but also the actual play call. Timeout allows Seattle to discuss play call.
Big factor to me is that Seattle twice on that drive had to call timeout when the game clock was stopped because they didn't get the play in on time. That suggests they weren't totally in sync and the game was moving fast for them.
When your are talking about such small changes in probabilities the human element can be the overriding factor.
However, not calling timeout didn't just affect pass/run decisions but also the actual play call. Timeout allows Seattle to discuss play call.
Big factor to me is that Seattle twice on that drive had to call timeout when the game clock was stopped because they didn't get the play in on time. That suggests they weren't totally in sync and the game was moving fast for them.
When your are talking about such small changes in probabilities the human element can be the overriding factor.
This is good thinking and logic but I don't buy a 20% gap. The numbers I remember from the grantland piece above suggested it was about 5%. Nobody really knows the odds of these teams in this situation so I think it comes down to a matter of opinion. The actual trade off is 1 run vs 30 seconds of game clock (they had time for 2 runs either way). Pete Carroll thought the 30 seconds was worth more. I agree.DennyDoyle said:
Sure. But I'm referring to the option value. My entire point is that they have third and forth down regardless so you might as well call time out to have the option in case they score.
fair enough.
Edit: I should also point out that the Pats had TWO timeouts so the points about the value to offense only being there if Seattle scored on second down was incorrectly over stated above.
In an effort to not sound like I was repeating myself and being unreasonable I agreed to a couple points that were factually wrong.
Man, we're out to secondary, tertiary and (what's the next ...ary?) considerations on the decision making on play calls and to call a timeout vs. not to call a timeout, etc.
I watched what's maybe the best one hour summary of XLIX, Sound FX on NFLN again last night, and was reminded again of Collinsworth's shaking his head "I can't believe that call." Give it to Lynch, who also doesn't fumble much. Well, looking up his stats, he does fumble some (19 Fum, 10 Lst in 7 years). Some of those may be due to his extraordinary second, third, etc. effort. Still, remember Darrell Royal's mantra on passing (when you pass, three things can happen, and two are bad). Well, Darrell, passing is very often a good thing, but I wouldn't have there.
I watched what's maybe the best one hour summary of XLIX, Sound FX on NFLN again last night, and was reminded again of Collinsworth's shaking his head "I can't believe that call." Give it to Lynch, who also doesn't fumble much. Well, looking up his stats, he does fumble some (19 Fum, 10 Lst in 7 years). Some of those may be due to his extraordinary second, third, etc. effort. Still, remember Darrell Royal's mantra on passing (when you pass, three things can happen, and two are bad). Well, Darrell, passing is very often a good thing, but I wouldn't have there.
The Patriots played the heaviest lineup they could reasonably play. Did they play a jumbo goal line front with six DL, four LB, and a safety? No, because that would be incredibly stupid against three WR. I doubt there is any team in the league that would ever run a jumbo group against three WR, even on the goal line. Most of the time, defenses will combat a three-WR look with nickel personnel - 5 DBs. The Patriots used only 3 DBs, which makes it a very heavy look relative to the offensive personnel group. It's a matter of semantics whether you consider this a "true goal line" package or not, but what should not be in dispute is that Seattle's personnel matchup favored passing and did not favor running.DrewDawg said:
That's a 100% correct, SN.
This makes very little sense. It was an extra play, so an incomplete is the same as not having time to run on 4th down. And, as you say, interception/fumble chance is roughly equal. So where's the downside on the call?
The only story on this play is that Butler made a fucking hell of a play.
Al Zarilla said:
This makes very little sense. It was an extra play, so an incomplete is the same as not having time to run on 4th down. And, as you say, interception/fumble chance is roughly equal. So where's the downside on the call?
The only story on this play is that Butler made a fucking hell of a play.
Running through the scenarios is an interesting mental exercise, but this is the 100% truth of the matter. There's no grey area here for me. I want to change my screen name to "Malcolm Go!"Tony C said:
amarshal2 said:
Well, ok, then maybe he's wrong. But it's worth noting that Pete Carroll thinks that, isn't it? I mean, he is the guy who was coaching the team at the time.
Also, your times are taken in vacuums but, in reality, those points are endogenous to the decisions made--even beyond the point made that they needed to burn two timeouts in the final two minutes at times that seemed like they should have been unnecessary.
Seattle has the ball with 01:06 at the 5. Beast Mode goes to the 1, and it's whistled dead at 1:01. NE has 2 TOs, SEA has 1. Everyone thinks NE will call a TO. Announcers are talking about it.
So if SEA takes TO here, yes, they have 1 minute for three plays. Camera on Carroll on the sideline shows Carroll saying basically nothing to anybody.
Ultimately, the ball is snapped with a mere 25 seconds to go.
That’s the key.
Belichick not calling the TO and Carroll not realizing it in time dropped the clock from 1:01 for three plays to 25 seconds for three plays. Obviously, we have no idea when Carroll put the play in and why, but it’s not correct to say that the Seahawks had a minute to run three plays because that would be dependent on one of the two teams calling a timeout, and that didn’t happen.
As per above, there is no way of knowing when Carroll realized the Patriots were not calling a timeout, but we do know for a fact that they ran the play clock down to 5 seconds, which tells us basically by definition that they were not ready (or willing) to implement a strategy that involved three runs. With 25 on the clock, even with the time out if they run they have only one sure fire additional run.
Certainly letting time run out with a down to go because they couldn't get the final play off in time would be one of the cardinal sins of coaching. Hence the attempt, as Carroll has stated, to put in a throw-away play to burn a bit more clock, thereby time optimizing a two-run-on-three-plays strategy.
As Belichick said, calling a TO wouldn't have been the wrong decision either. Each has pros and cons. In economics--which we know Belichick studied and continues to get insight from--the theory of rational expectations tells us that momentary/temporary gains can be gotten by acting outside of the expectations. These gains are not sustainable because people then alter their expectations, but can be grabbed in single instances.
In this case, not calling the TO when expected ran off enough clock that it altered the possible set of plays Seattle could call. That is fucking awesome.
There is no Rev said:
I agree completely with this analysis. I think the odds might have slightly favored taking a TO if NE took it straight away at 1:01. But once they didn't, there was no reason for Belichick to take a TO while the clock was running: 1) as Rev said, 25 seconds for 3 plays means Seattle's play choices become slightly more predictable; and 2) perhaps more importantly, the formation that Seattle was lining up in was recognizable as a pass formation, and one that Belichick specifically had his team prepare for. (As Belichick said, he would have taken a TO if the Seahawks were showing run.) That likely increased the probability of an interception or some other positive though less favorable outcome such as an incomplete pass. These outcomes would have still been more unlikely than not, but I think they significantly shift the odds in favor of not taking the TO once the initial no-TO decision was made.
If you're talking about my post, I don't think it was factually incorrect, although of course it's not for me to say what you thought you were agreeing with. I think my points were based on the Patriots only having two time outs. I don't think I said calling the TO only has value if they score on second down. But I did say it has little value if the Seahawks score on fourth down assuming three more runs. If the Patriots call a time out after Lynch's run on first down, Seattle has at least three potential downs left (more are possible with a defensive penalty) and the Patriots have the ability to stop the clock only one more time. So, the possibility that Brady never gets the ball back or gets it back with virtually no time is a real possibility even if Belichick calls time out after the first down play, in which case the time out hurt you for no benefit. In the three run scenario, if the Seahawks score on fourth down they leave virtually no time left unless the third or second down run goes OOB. If they score on third down, the Patriots have about :50 left with no time outs in the three run scenario.amarshal2 said:
A pick play with a ref is a different animal than a designed pick play that requires two receivers to run precise routes, something that the Seahawks receivers (other than Baldwin, not involved in the play) struggle with. I certainly wouldn't go so far as to say that Belichick baited Seattle into running the exact play knowing Butler could pick it (that would be crazy), but it seems reasonable to me that he felt better about the 4-4-3 matching up with three WR than he would have matching up a jumbo set against a power look, for instance. Seattle ran effectively out of 3 WR earlier in the game, but not against a heavy group, and their passing game in general struggles with precision plays in structure.amarshal2 said:
And then the question becomes, if you do like the matchup, how much do you have to like it to make it worth not calling timeout? Leaving aside turnovers and using a round 60% figure, Seattle has a 94% chance of scoring from second-and-goal at the one, but that drops to 84% if you can force third-and-goal. If a favorable matchup changes the Seahawks' odds of scoring on the second-down play from 60% to 40%, that drops their chances of scoring the TD from 94% to 90%, which is probably a bigger effect than how much calling time out would raise the chances of a response TD.
A lot of these are pulled-out-of-my-butt numbers, but it seems to me that it's justifiable to decide not to call time out if you like the matchup on the field. It certainly would have been justifiable to call time out, too. They obviously should have called time out if they didn't like the matchup or felt neutral about it.
Why? There continues to be this nonsense about how they were unsettled. I see nothing in how that play was run that shows that. Wilson re-directed guys as he wanted, they got the look they wanted, they did what they wanted, they had the time they wanted for 2 additional plays....but Browner made a really good play and Butler a great play. Not sure why anyone insists it's anything more...some sort of voodoo woodoo spell put on Seattle is just silly.
One component of the non-timeout call by Belichick that I haven't seen mentioned is that in SB42, the amount of electronic equipment that migrated to the field in the last minute or so resulted in the radio communications going down. He mentioned this on WEEI, and was counting on the same issues for the Seahawks. It was a high stakes gamble, but if it did actually happen, or if it would have on 3rd or 4th down, it would cause major confusion. Here's a link to Reiss summarizing it:
http://m.espn.go.com/general/blogs/blogpost?blogname=nflnation&id=160890&src=desktop
http://m.espn.go.com/general/blogs/blogpost?blogname=nflnation&id=160890&src=desktop
If they scored on second down, they wanted to leave the Patriots with as little time as possible.DrewDawg said:
Belichick was valuing an immediate benefit (having the defense he liked against the package they had) more than a speculative potential future benefit. This made it a very zen decision, which is both what he looked like at the time, and how he described it afterwards. Carroll on the other hand defended the call as being all about future benefits.
I view Belichick's comments about the merits of calling a timeout not as an admission that he "made a mistake," but as an acknowledgement that he made an unorthodox decision based on very unique circumstances. And I don't think you have to believe that he cast a spell on Carroll to think that Seattle's difficulties being "in the moment" in the preceding couple minutes might have had something to do with Belichick's decision to let it ride.
I view Belichick's comments about the merits of calling a timeout not as an admission that he "made a mistake," but as an acknowledgement that he made an unorthodox decision based on very unique circumstances. And I don't think you have to believe that he cast a spell on Carroll to think that Seattle's difficulties being "in the moment" in the preceding couple minutes might have had something to do with Belichick's decision to let it ride.
I think what gives the idea that they might have been unsettled more credence to me is i) the needless burning of their timeouts earlier in the drive, which showed a lack of composure, and ii) the fact that Greg Cosell, who's watched more tape than almost anyone, saw the Seahawks as being ever so slightly unsettled. Which is not to take away anything from Butler's play - as Cosell said, it still required Butler to make an extraordinary play to win the game.Tony C said:
I agree about the needless burning of time-outs earlier in the drive.
I don't even understand this. They had plenty of time and they took it -- this is just inventing a non-issue. If the pass is a TD they want as little time left on the clock as possible. If it's an INC, then they have 20 seconds left with the clock stopped. They would run, all seem to agree, on 3rd down. If they still don't make it they call a TO. And then it's 4th down with 10+ seconds on the clock. It's pretty much perfect time management.
How would have running the play clock less given them more options? If they wanted to pass on 3rd or 4th down they would have had time for that, too.
As for why Wilson redirected his players....again, I don't even understand the premise of your point. If the accusation is that the 'Hawks were unsettled, it's just not borne out by the facts. Baldwin was either sent in motion to give Wilson a read on the defense or he set up out of position, in which case Wilson directing him to the right spot shows he was perfectly calm and settled, able to get his guys in position before he ran the play.
These are just red herrings that, as I've said, take away from the essential: the play Butler made or, more expansively, Browner, too. And could add that Wilson could have thrown a slightly better pass (lower, further in to Lockette's body) or picked up on Butler and thrown it away.
The bottom-line is the game was decided by players on the field, mano-a-mano (or whatever), the way it ought to be. But in an ESPN culture that wants to do anything but talk about the sport itself -- so immediately tries to fixate our attention on a made-up controversy -- all efforts are made to turn attention away from (even great) play and toward something that Stephen A. Smith-style talking heads can pontificate about self-righteously.
DrewDawg said:
I don't even understand this. They had plenty of time and they took it -- this is just inventing a non-issue. If the pass is a TD they want as little time left on the clock as possible. If it's an INC, then they have 20 seconds left with the clock stopped. They would run, all seem to agree, on 3rd down. If they still don't make it they call a TO. And then it's 4th down with 10+ seconds on the clock. It's pretty much perfect time management.
How would have running the play clock less given them more options? If they wanted to pass on 3rd or 4th down they would have had time for that, too.
As for why Wilson redirected his players....again, I don't even understand the premise of your point. If the accusation is that the 'Hawks were unsettled, it's just not borne out by the facts. Baldwin was either sent in motion to give Wilson a read on the defense or he set up out of position, in which case Wilson directing him to the right spot shows he was perfectly calm and settled, able to get his guys in position before he ran the play.
These are just red herrings that, as I've said, take away from the essential: the play Butler made or, more expansively, Browner, too. And could add that Wilson could have thrown a slightly better pass (lower, further in to Lockette's body) or picked up on Butler and thrown it away.
The bottom-line is the game was decided by players on the field, mano-a-mano (or whatever), the way it ought to be. But in an ESPN culture that wants to do anything but talk about the sport itself -- so immediately tries to fixate our attention on a made-up controversy -- all efforts are made to turn attention away from (even great) play and toward something that Stephen A. Smith-style talking heads can pontificate about self-righteously.
I'm not claiming they players didn't win that game. I *am* saying that I think Seattle 100% expected BB to call a timeout and when he didn't they reacted to that slower than they might have.
After Lynch was tackled, Seattle had about 60 seconds and 3 plays to win the Super Bowl. I don't think taking essentially every possible second on second down was the best idea. That's all. And I think that partially came from BB not calling TO like Seattle expected.
That takes absolutely nothing away from the play the DBs made.
Tony C said:
Yeah, I think someone (Carroll?) mentioned that Baldwin goes in motion and Revis follows, showing that the Pats are in man. (Although, I suppose it should have been obvious with 3 CB, but whatever.) So they run the pick play, because it's a man-beater.