Carroll's Call

[CSteinhardt]

 
This would never, ever happen.
 
Two years ago, for example, John Harbaugh had about 14 seconds left in the Super Bowl and a 5 point lead, and he wanted to take a safety, but instead of just snapping it out of the back of the end zone, he instructed his players to just grab hold of all the 49ers jerseys and hold them, tackle them, do whatever in order to waste as much time off the clock as possible. That's because the worst case scenario there was...a safety, which was what they were going for anyway. It let the punter run around for 10 seconds in the end zone before stepping out, and made the return on the free kick the final play of the game.

 
That's a bit different because the offense got the worst possible rulebook result, a safety.  There is no provision at all for awarding a touchdown to the team on defense.  
 
It's not something referees would do for a simple pass interference, not at all.  The point that it would be called is the point at which you start doing something that no longer looks like what we think of as an attempt to play defense.  So, you could probably get away with pass interference if your defensive back just obliterates the guy the moment the ball is thrown his way, but if you just go and tackle all of their eligible receivers at the snap, I wouldn't be surprised to see the call made.  I think if you actually drew 5 holding flags, say, they'd award the touchdown, and I'd have been especially unsurprised to see that call if it's the Patriots who were doing it.

 

[Mystic Merlin]

How on earth could they 'award the touchdown'?

 

[Super Nomario]

How on earth could they 'award the touchdown'?

This is the most famous instance - an Alabama player came from the sidelines to tackle a Rice player that was cruising for a touchdown. The refs do have the authority to award a touchdown in cases like this (even in the NFL):
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BoCf3WqVyx4
 
I don't think there's any chance they'd do that for a hold / PI play in the end-of-half situation, though.

 

[Mystic Merlin]

Thanks, that's the first I've heard of such a scenario or rule.  Good stuff.
 
I don't see how they award a TD it if the DBs simply hold the eligible receivers, though.  It's conduct that's not exactly outside of the framework of play like a guy coming off the sideline to blow up a play, or a coach tripping a ballcarrier (see: Tomlin).  Enforcement would become a boondoggle. 

 

[Al Zarilla]

This is the most famous instance - an Alabama player came from the sidelines to tackle a Rice player that was cruising for a touchdown. The refs do have the authority to award a touchdown in cases like this (even in the NFL):
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BoCf3WqVyx4
 
I don't think there's any chance they'd do that for a hold / PI play in the end-of-half situation, though.

Dicky Moegle was the runner for Rice. 

 

[Steve Dillard]

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palpably_unfair_act
That "officials deem has clearly and indisputably deprived a team of a score."
"Thus, the palpably unfair act rule is generally only enforced when the penalty for a particular rule violation is insufficient to offset the effect of the act on the play."

A defensive holding or even pi call does not clearly deprive someone of a score. Further, the penalty, either a five yard for holding and more so placing it at the one would not be deemed insufficient. Seattle could accept and take advantage of the penalty by significantly increasing their chances of a TD.

 

[dynomite]

Right.

In short: Ryan should have fouled, 0% chance TD is awarded, Seahawks forced to kick FG with only 2 seconds left.

For "palpably unfair" to have been called essentially Belichick would have needed to snap and run into the field to foul Matthews himself.

Edit: Great video and background, though. Another time it should have been called that the old timers mentioned in the thread about the old Pats: didn't the Boston Patriots beat Houston (?) in the early 60s when some fan in a trench coat (rumored to be the owner) literally ran into the end zone and defensed a pass?

 

[Kevin Youkulele]

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palpably_unfair_act
That "officials deem has clearly and indisputably deprived a team of a score."
"Thus, the palpably unfair act rule is generally only enforced when the penalty for a particular rule violation is insufficient to offset the effect of the act on the play."

A defensive holding or even pi call does not clearly deprive someone of a score. Further, the penalty, either a five yard for holding and more so placing it at the one would not be deemed insufficient. Seattle could accept and take advantage of the penalty by significantly increasing their chances of a TD.

In the situation where you go from somewhat more than 6 seconds to go to less than 5 seconds to go as a result of the penalized play, I do not think chances of a TD significantly increase because you then only get one more shot at it whereas you had two beforehand.
 
A more appropriate rule might be that under some low amount of time on the clock (10 seconds? 15?), a defensive penalty results in no time elapsing on the play in addition to the yardage and first down awarded.  That would stop this kind of opportunistic/strategic holding/PI from being rational.  

 

[phrenile]

Another time it should have been called that the old timers mentioned in the thread about the old Pats: didn't the Boston Patriots beat Houston (?) in the early 60s when some fan in a trench coat (rumored to be the owner) literally ran into the end zone and defensed a pass?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PPRCAb56JSo&t=15s

 

[MentalDisabldLst]

I'm sorry if this has already been posted, but I just recently read this 538 analysis of both coaches' key decisions at the end of the game.  Morris does an excellent job of accounting for variables and showing his work while not being too pedantic.  I was prepared for his first conclusion - that Carroll's call wasn't that bad - but surprised by the conclusion that Belichick not using a timeout was in fact a bad one.
 
Some people here - I forget in which thread - had posited a few other reasons for why Belichick might have chosen to let it ride at that moment.  I think one was that he could see that Seattle's O was confused and he wasn't going to do them a favor by calling time to let them get their house in order.  Morris doesn't get into such things, partly because they can't really be assessed by probabilities.  But I'm very surprised at the win-probability difference between hoping for a stop on 2nd-and-1 vs hoping for a FG when receiving a kickoff with 1 minute remaining.  15% to get a tying FG, even for Brady and Gostkowski?  Interesting stuff.

 

[Reverend]

I'm sorry if this has already been posted, but I just recently read this 538 analysis of both coaches' key decisions at the end of the game.  Morris does an excellent job of accounting for variables and showing his work while not being too pedantic.  I was prepared for his first conclusion - that Carroll's call wasn't that bad - but surprised by the conclusion that Belichick not using a timeout was in fact a bad one.
 
Some people here - I forget in which thread - had posited a few other reasons for why Belichick might have chosen to let it ride at that moment.  I think one was that he could see that Seattle's O was confused and he wasn't going to do them a favor by calling time to let them get their house in order.  Morris doesn't get into such things, partly because they can't really be assessed by probabilities.  But I'm very surprised at the win-probability difference between hoping for a stop on 2nd-and-1 vs hoping for a FG when receiving a kickoff with 1 minute remaining.  15% to get a tying FG, even for Brady and Gostkowski?  Interesting stuff.

It seems like they don't consider the possibility of endogeneity.

If Belichick not calling a TO led to the pass play that the Patriots had prepared for, then Belichick ate Carroll's lunch.

 

[Morgan's Magic Snowplow]

I'm sorry if this has already been posted, but I just recently read this 538 analysis of both coaches' key decisions at the end of the game.  Morris does an excellent job of accounting for variables and showing his work while not being too pedantic.  I was prepared for his first conclusion - that Carroll's call wasn't that bad - but surprised by the conclusion that Belichick not using a timeout was in fact a bad one.
 
Some people here - I forget in which thread - had posited a few other reasons for why Belichick might have chosen to let it ride at that moment.  I think one was that he could see that Seattle's O was confused and he wasn't going to do them a favor by calling time to let them get their house in order.  Morris doesn't get into such things, partly because they can't really be assessed by probabilities.  But I'm very surprised at the win-probability difference between hoping for a stop on 2nd-and-1 vs hoping for a FG when receiving a kickoff with 1 minute remaining.  15% to get a tying FG, even for Brady and Gostkowski?  Interesting stuff.

Its a minor point but is his Footnote 4 a joke? If so, its an odd one to throw into the mix at the end. If not, that's one of the dumber pieces of football strategy that I've seen suggested by any analyst, statistical or otherwise.

For the record, it reads: "And that’s not even counting the possibility that the Patriots may have avoided this whole situation if they had intentionally missed the extra point one drive earlier, therefore not encouraging the Seahawks to go for a touchdown."

 

[crystalline]

It seems like they don't consider the possibility of endogeneity.

If Belichick not calling a TO led to the pass play that the Patriots had prepared for, then Belichick ate Carroll's lunch.

 

I'm sorry if this has already been posted, but I just recently read this 538 analysis of both coaches' key decisions at the end of the game.  Morris does an excellent job of accounting for variables and showing his work while not being too pedantic.  I was prepared for his first conclusion - that Carroll's call wasn't that bad - but surprised by the conclusion that Belichick not using a timeout was in fact a bad one.
 
Some people here - I forget in which thread - had posited a few other reasons for why Belichick might have chosen to let it ride at that moment.  I think one was that he could see that Seattle's O was confused and he wasn't going to do them a favor by calling time to let them get their house in order.  Morris doesn't get into such things, partly because they can't really be assessed by probabilities.  But I'm very surprised at the win-probability difference between hoping for a stop on 2nd-and-1 vs hoping for a FG when receiving a kickoff with 1 minute remaining.  15% to get a tying FG, even for Brady and Gostkowski?  Interesting stuff.

 
First, snark out of the way:
The conclusion is "his mistake would have cost Seattle only 0.3 percentage points, while under the assumptions most favorable to Belichick, his error cost the Patriots 2.1 percent.".  0.3 and 2.1 percent are for statistical purposes with this sample size identical to zero i.e. the article claims to find a difference between options, and the difference he shows is not supportable.
 
 
With that done, here are three things the article does not take into account:
 
1. (what Rev said)  Belichick had far better odds than average on second down, because he knew he had a good call against that offense.
 
2.  The Pats offense had no ability to throw deep in this game.  This was not the average offense against the average defense, this was the Patriots with Brady running a short-pass gameplan against one of the best defenses in the game against the long pass. This makes the option  "Seattle scores but Pats get the ball back and score" far too high.  He has it at 6%.  Let's say it's 3%.  That flips the conclusion of the article.
 
3.  Lynch scored on around 50% of short goal-line situations this year.  He's not a big heavy knock-you-down runner, he's a fast and elusive runner.  That may be a disadvantage when the field shortens – there is less space to find holes because the defense occupies a smaller space.
 
 
Put those three together and I say it's a no-brainer that Belichick did the right thing.
Belichick chose  option A: Trust the defense, run the clock down, forget about another possession vs. B: Let them score, save clock, put the onus on Brady.

 

[Super Nomario]

 
 
First, snark out of the way:
The conclusion is "his mistake would have cost Seattle only 0.3 percentage points, while under the assumptions most favorable to Belichick, his error cost the Patriots 2.1 percent.".  0.3 and 2.1 percent are for statistical purposes with this sample size identical to zero i.e. the article claims to find a difference between options, and the difference he shows is not supportable.

My takeaway is that the tactical stuff is overrated. Butler made the play because Belichick outcoached Carroll, but it has nothing to do with timeouts or run / pass ratios or whatever. He outcoached him because Belichick (and the assistant coaches) had studied Seattle's tendencies - and was able to communicate those tendencies to a rookie such that he instantly recognized it - and because Carroll and Bevell were unwilling or unable to alter those tendencies. That's almost the single most impressive thing a coach could possibly do - and yet people are focused on the tactical stuff that's easy to see. That stuff is a small, small part of the role of the head coach and the coaching staff.

 

[singaporesoxfan]

 
 
First, snark out of the way:
The conclusion is "his mistake would have cost Seattle only 0.3 percentage points, while under the assumptions most favorable to Belichick, his error cost the Patriots 2.1 percent.".  0.3 and 2.1 percent are for statistical purposes with this sample size identical to zero i.e. the article claims to find a difference between options, and the difference he shows is not supportable.

I'll say the headline is more egregious in making it out to be a bad call, but I totally agree with this. Using the Advanced Football Analytics Win Probability Calculator, a 2.1% difference is roughly the same as the difference between starting the game on the 20 and starting the game on the 30. That's negligible. http://wp.advancedfootballanalytics.com/winprobcalc1.php

 

[crystalline]

My takeaway is that the tactical stuff is overrated. Butler made the play because Belichick outcoached Carroll, but it has nothing to do with timeouts or run / pass ratios or whatever. He outcoached him because Belichick (and the assistant coaches) had studied Seattle's tendencies - and was able to communicate those tendencies to a rookie such that he instantly recognized it - and because Carroll and Bevell were unwilling or unable to alter those tendencies. That's almost the single most impressive thing a coach could possibly do - and yet people are focused on the tactical stuff that's easy to see. That stuff is a small, small part of the role of the head coach and the coaching staff.

 
Oh, I agree.
Belichick outcoached Carroll and one of Belichick's greatest strengths is preparation and teaching ability.
 
 
The tactical decisions are still important though.  Belichick not calling a timeout put pressure on Carroll, and that exact pass play probably doesn't get called if Belichick does the standard thing and calls timeout.  Belichick took a calculated gamble with that tactical decision, and won. 

 

[Leather]

Its a minor point but is his Footnote 4 a joke? If so, its an odd one to throw into the mix at the end. If not, that's one of the dumber pieces of football strategy that I've seen suggested by any analyst, statistical or otherwise.

For the record, it reads: "And that’s not even counting the possibility that the Patriots may have avoided this whole situation if they had intentionally missed the extra point one drive earlier, therefore not encouraging the Seahawks to go for a touchdown."

There is a study out there (I cannot find it at the moment) from this season that came to the conclusion that teams leading by 3 late in the 4th quarter have a higher historical rate of winning than teams leading by 4.

Basically, it concluded that teams needing a touchdown (and where a tie is off the table) play much more aggressively and succeed more often than teams that are tempted into conservative play calls for, at best, a chance for OT.

 

[tims4wins]

That is definitely believable

 

[Morgan's Magic Snowplow]

There is a study out there (I cannot find it at the moment) from this season that came to the conclusion that teams leading by 3 late in the 4th quarter have a higher historical rate of winning than teams leading by 4.

Basically, it concluded that teams needing a touchdown (and where a tie is off the table) play much more aggressively and succeed more often than teams that are tempted into conservative play calls for, at best, a chance for OT.

 
That's interesting and semi-believable (although I'd want to see the study) when talking about the entire universe of NFL teams, which includes a lot of incompetent and cowardly coaches.
 
But Bill Belichick wasn't coaching against the entire universe of NFL teams.  He was coaching against one of the better guys in the league, who is known as a fairly aggressive decision maker.  The idea that you might want to purposely take points off the board in the hope that it might induce Pete Carroll to only play for the FG on that drive is completely ridiculous.  And all the more so given the way that game had played out (the Seahawks were going to be aggressive throwing the ball downfield no matter what, since that's the only way they moved the ball all game).

 

[MentalDisabldLst]

Brandon LaFell probably doesn't have a coaching job in his future.  He says after the Kearse catch, he was hoping Belichick would let the Seahawks score.

 

[DJnVa]

Actually, 25+ other NFL coaches would have likely done that. Seems like a decent future is out there.

 

[TheoShmeo]

Brandon LaFell probably doesn't have a coaching job in his future.  He says after the Kearse catch, he was hoping Belichick would let the Seahawks score.

On the contrary, the best coach in professional sports did exactly that under like circumstances in Super Bowl 46.

Not that I think LaFell will be or wants to be a coach, but he did strike me as being rather thoughtful and intelligent. His explanation of how he would have run the route that Lockette ran -- by squaring his body up and thereby not allowing the defender to jump by him -- was interesting, if not earth shattering.

 

[MentalDisabldLst]

if you think those were the same circumstances as SB 46, I have some beachfront property in Mongolia to sell you.

 

[DennyDoyle'sBoil]

There is a study out there (I cannot find it at the moment) from this season that came to the conclusion that teams leading by 3 late in the 4th quarter have a higher historical rate of winning than teams leading by 4.
Basically, it concluded that teams needing a touchdown (and where a tie is off the table) play much more aggressively and succeed more often than teams that are tempted into conservative play calls for, at best, a chance for OT.

Interesting. I think part of the aggression is that it forces you into four downs for the whole field, causing you to make higher percentage decisions that coaches are often too afraid to make because it can lead to criticism. I've always said, in hundsight, that I wished Randy Moss had dropped the TD in 42 and we kicked a FG. No way NYG go for it on fourth and short from their half of the field, and they punt with a minute left in a tie game. Nor is Eli running around chucking up desperation balls that might get picked off. Not that you can say they would have played it the same, but still that's the gist. I was thinking about this late in 49 and clearly this is only a hindsight sort of thing, because I definitely wanted 7 not 3 on the last Pats drive.

 

[TheoShmeo]

MDL, you ought to hold onto your beach front property. 
 
The circumstances were similar in that BB in SB 46 was faced with limited time at the end of the game and chose to allow the opposing team to score in order to maximize the time that his offense would have to answer.  That is generally like what he was confronted with in this year's game, even if it doesn't line up on all fours. 
 
More to the point, I don't think LaFell was suggesting something that many other coaches would have at least considered, if not actually done.  Seattle scoring there seemed inevitable with Lynch in the backfield, and it wasn't insane to think that you should just let them do it and then allow Tom maximum time in which to drive for a FG or even a TD.  Now obviously, it all ended up mind numbingly well without that taking that path, but LaFell didn't disqualify himself from being coach material by saying what he did.

 

[DennyDoyle'sBoil]

Giants were in position to take virtually all the time off the clock with two kneel downs and a chip shot field goal.  I think the Patriots only chances of winning in that game were either missed field goal or TD on the kick off return assuming they can preserve two or three seconds for the kick off.  I don't know how to begin researching it, but that seems considerably more desperate than making a goal line stand, where three stops, fumble, interception, false start, holding, stuffed run for negative yards, etc. all are possibilities.  I'm not saying that letting them score wasn't the right call, but it was a much harder decision than in Super Bowl 46.  
 
Plus, the significant question is when?  Surely not when they are at the 5 yard line, right?  We're only talking about letting them score once Lynch gets to the one yard line.  At that point, it's 50 something seconds and the clock is running, so you have to call time out if you want to let them score, because once the clock gets under 30 seconds letting them score is no longer a very viable option to me.  If they score, so be it.  But at that point, you try to play defense.  
 
So, really, it goes back to the same question of whether or not BB should have called time out with the clock running and what he thought was a favorable matchup on the field. 

 

[TheoShmeo]

DDB, the situations were clearly not identical.  And I agree that this decision would have been more difficult than in SB 46.  That said, there are common aspects, and I don't think that anyone suggesting that BB should have let them score quickly (like on Lynch's run from the five) is off his rocker or not a candidate for a coaching position. 

 

[DennyDoyle'sBoil]

DDB, the situations were clearly not identical.  And I agree that this decision would have been more difficult than in SB 46.  That said, there are common aspects, and I don't think that anyone suggesting that BB should have let them score quickly (like on Lynch's run from the five) is off his rocker or not a candidate for a coaching position.

Oh, yeah, no doubt it's a legit question. To me, the difference in the situation was big enough to make a different decision -- in other words I agreed with both decisions and don't think not letting them score in 49 was inconsistent with letting them score in 46. But I can see where reasonable people would disagree.

Clock running and having to decide which of two shitty decisions is the slightly better one is no job for the meek, and while one can agree or disagree with his choices, in the moment I'm sure glad we have the guy we have making them.

 

[Hagios]

 
Yeah, I watch a lot of Seattle, tho obviously not nearly as much as NE. But still remained shocked by Wilson who I thought/and still think is terrific. Was disappointed (in a happy way) both in terms of the play itself -- he never should have thrown that ball, has to be a throwaway if there's any doubt, and if he did throw it he needs to have had it lower/on inside shoulder -- but just how clueless he seems throughout. And the way he passive aggressively took blame -- but didn't really - -during the post-game was just...just kind of weird. Really spoke to a young QB, which is obviously not that surprising, but he's always come off as more mature than his years. But I guess not so much. I mean, he really fucked up: blew TOs, was slow getting his team to the LOS, and obviously made a throw he shouldn't have made.
 
On the flip, he sure as hell did throw some beautiful long balls during that game.

 
Isn't that the knock on mobile quarterbacks? They typically have great arm strength and accuracy and throw a great long ball. And their legs typically give them enough time to throw the long ball. But they don't always have the ability to make split-second decisions to the degree that modern pocket passers do. The real-time information processing, or the Wayne Gretzky "skate to where the puck is going to be" sense. Brady would have known that the pick was blown, and would have seen the "flash of the defender" (as one former NFL QB said regarding slants) and gone to someone else or thrown it away. Obviously Brady has had dumb interceptions (including in the SB), but overall that's the pattern.

 

[Soxy]

I'm not sure letting them score is ever a viable option when the opponent needs a TD to tie or take the lead. If a FG wins it for them and they can run the clock down for a gimme chip shot, sure. But up 3 or more, I think you have to play defense and hope they stop them, barring really unusual circumstances.

As others have noted, there's also the fact that the Patriots offensive game plan was to string together long, 10+ play drives using short passes. Which they would not have had time to do, obviously. Letting Seattle score and hoping for a Patriots scoring drive with under a minute left seems like it would have a low probability of success, given the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Seattle defense and the Patriots offense. Thankfully, we'll never know if it would have worked out or not. But it seems unlikely.

I think playing for a goalline stand was the right move there.

 

[dynomite]

Giants were in position to take virtually all the time off the clock with two kneel downs and a chip shot field goal.  I think the Patriots only chances of winning in that game were either missed field goal or TD on the kick off return assuming they can preserve two or three seconds for the kick off.  I don't know how to begin researching it, but that seems considerably more desperate than making a goal line stand,

All of this is basically correct.

In SB 46, the Giants got a 1st and goal at our 7 with 1:15 left, when the Pats had 2 timeouts left. According to PF-Ref, the Pats had a 3.9% chance to win at this point (which went up to 5.7% after the TD). Assuming the Giants were going to hit the ~24 yard FG, Belichick's options were:

1) Force a FG -- Get the ball back down 1 with no timeouts and ~ :15 seconds left. (Win probability = 5% according to the advancedfootballanalytics.com calculator, which seems VERY high)

2) What happened -- Get the ball back down 4 with 1 timeout and :57 left. (Win probability = 10%)

Part of them problem was that the Patriots actually stopped the Giants on 1st and goal and used their 2nd timeout. This meant that even though the Pats got to their 44 with :27 left they couldn't spike the ball until :17 left. Probably wouldn't have made a difference.

(Incidentally there was a play at this point that could pose a rule dilemma that I don't remember anyone talking about -- the Giants got flagged for having 12 men on the field on the next play. It was a 5-yard penalty, but it was only a 5-yard penalty and ran the clock down to :09. No one on the Giants was trying to run off the field. In my opinion, it was a clever and fairly dastardly strategy. What's to stop them unless you reset the clock?)

Edit: All of this is to say it was a very different calculation than the one in this Super Bowl.

 

[Harry Hooper]

dynomite, the NFL changed the rule in response to that game. 12 defenders intentionally on the field is now a dead ball penalty.
 
LINK

 

[tims4wins]

RE: too many men on the field, I think the league made a rule change after the game
 
Beaten by milliseconds!

 

[DJnVa]

Obligatory "I can't believe the Giants used the letter of the rules against us and the media didn't call it shady like they would have if the Patriots did it!!!!" post.

 

[dynomite]

dynomite, the NFL changed the rule in response to that game. 12 defenders intentionally on the field is now a dead ball penalty.
 
LINK

Whoa, learn something every day.

Wow. I guess my ESPN/NFL media blackout for the next month or 3 was fairly successful, huh?

 

[tims4wins]

Imagine if it was the Pats that did the same play, and then the rule was changed. I can't even fathom the level of hate.

 

[singaporesoxfan]

Greg Cosell was on the Ross Tucker Football Podcast today and was asked about the call. He said that based on the film that the interception was 99% due to Butler's execution rather than a bad call. Thought Seattle expected a walk-in TD except that Butler broke so early. Cosell also mentioned that it appears Seattle expected the Pats to take a timeout and were a bit rushed, based on the fact that Wilson had to adjust both Baldwin and Lynch for the play.

 

[Eddie Jurak]

Greg Cosell was on the Ross Tucker Football Podcast today and was asked about the call. He said that based on the film that the interception was 99% due to Butler's execution rather than a bad call. Thought Seattle expected a walk-in TD except that Butler broke so early. Cosell also mentioned that it appears Seattle expected the Pats to take a timeout and were a bit rushed, based on the fact that Wilson had to adjust both Baldwin and Lynch for the play.

i think this is exactly right. I'm still amazed by the number of commentators who criticize the clock management of Carroll AND Belichick.

 

[TheoShmeo]

I can understand the criticism of Belichick.  It worked out well and we can now see what he was doing.  Seattle indeed appeared to be rushed and caught of guard by his gambit. 
 
But if Seattle had scored with 20 seconds to go, Belichick would be getting a lot of heat for leaving Brady and the offense with so little time to answer.  It would have been a dream scenario for all the Haters and a reasonable topic of conversation for everyone else.
 
Bill has on several occasions admitted that calling a time out might have been the thing to do there.  I don't think he's being falsely modest or is otherwise not saying what he means when he makes that comment.  I think he is legitimately acknowledging that calling time out in order to give the offense the maximum time possible in the event Seattle scored would have been a reasonable course of action.  Undoubtedly, it's one he considered and rejected.
 
The fact that the Pats' entire offense game plan was built around short passes and anything but quick strike drives is consistent with the path he chose and suggests that BB didn't have great confidence that they would score or get into field position if they got the ball with around 40-60 seconds remaining.
 
Said differently, I think it's pretty obvious that Bill's course of action proved wise but it was an all in, high stakes move.  I'm incredibly glad that he made it.  It only adds to my respect and really awe of the man.  But I can understand how a non-Hater could think that the better move would have been to preserve the offense's time to respond.

 

[MentalDisabldLst]

Bill's words to Letterman were:
 
"Yeah I did [consider calling a timeout].  And I don't think that would have been a mistake.  I just kind of felt at the time, the way it was going, that we were better off just playing through it."
 
Also, last Tuesday on WEEI, he said:
 

"We certainly gave some consideration to taking a timeout there and leaving some time on the clock,” Belichick said Tuesday on WEEI’s “Dale and Holley.” “I don’t know if that would have been a bad thing to do. It might have been a good thing to do, but it just seemed in the flow of the game we were OK with where we were."

 
I think he recognizes that he might have made a mistake in not calling one, but doesn't believe it was that big a one, and had some justification for not taking the TO.  Compared with the game- and clock-management struggles of most head coaches, I ain't got nothing bad to say.

 

[Eddie Jurak]

I think Bill went on gut feeling there. Sensed that Seattle wanted the time out so didn't oblige them.

 

[crystalline]

My takeaway is that the tactical stuff is overrated. Butler made the play because Belichick outcoached Carroll, but it has nothing to do with timeouts or run / pass ratios or whatever. He outcoached him because Belichick (and the assistant coaches) had studied Seattle's tendencies - and was able to communicate those tendencies to a rookie such that he instantly recognized it - and because Carroll and Bevell were unwilling or unable to alter those tendencies. That's almost the single most impressive thing a coach could possibly do - and yet people are focused on the tactical stuff that's easy to see. That stuff is a small, small part of the role of the head coach and the coaching staff.

Also let me say: it's easy for us to say tactical decisions are overblown being a fan of Belichick's team. Were Andy Reid coaching this team, we'd all think that tactical decisions were very important. Belichick rarely makes bad choices and we are pretty spoiled.

Pretty awesome that you can trust Belichick to avoid bad decisions and discussions can focus on how he teaches during practice.

 

[tims4wins]

Also let me say: it's easy for us to say tactical decisions are overblown being a fan of Belichick's team. Were Andy Reid coaching this team, we'd all think that tactical decisions were very important. Belichick rarely makes bad choices and we are pretty spoiled.

Pretty awesome that you can trust Belichick to avoid bad decisions and discussions can focus on how he teaches during practice.

 
In fairness there has been plenty of discussion regarding the end of the first half vs. Miami, the end of the 4th quarter vs. Baltimore, and the end of the Super Bowl (and going back in time, 4th and 2, etc.). But in every single one of these instances, at worst Belichick made a defensible decision. Unlike the Andy Reids of the world.

 

[crystalline]

Exactly. Sometimes when there are two basically-equal options, Belichick chooses one and people debate the other.
(For the record I LOVED the 4th and 2 call and nearly seized in happy* agreement when Belichick said post-game that he had more confidence in the offense to convert than the defense to stop Manning).
I am so impressed with the guy's decision making.



*as happy as is possible after that crushing defeat.

 

[tims4wins]

Yeah I said it in the Best of BB thread but 4th and 2 was my all time favorite BB decision, failure be damned.

 

[MentalDisabldLst]

Carroll has plenty of first-rate coaching moments, probably none bigger than going with Wilson over the recently-signed-to-a-big-FA-deal Matt Flynn in 2012.  Or the ballsy fake-FG in the NFCCG.  In a thread about a fateful decision he made, it deserves mention that he's probably a top-3 coach, easily a top-5 coach, routinely out-maneuvers opposing coaches, and basically had no discernable errors in the super bowl until the last meaningful play.  What fanbase, other than New England's, wouldn't swap coaches with Seattle?
 
His call led to the biggest swing in super bowl winning probability ever, but the consensus emerging here is that it probably wasn't all that bad a call, ex-ante.  Which is nice - it gives me hope history will judge him less harshly, and just view it as "the Malcolm Butler play".

 

[tims4wins]

Right, good points all. Look no further than the end of the first half. That could have easily backfired on Carroll but Wilson and Matthews both made great plays. Carroll should get some credit for that, but most of the credit should go to Wilson and Matthews (and some blame to Logan Ryan). Same for the end of game - Carroll should get a tiny blame, Wilson should get a tiny blame, Butler should get the lion's share of credit.

 

[TheoShmeo]

That whole last drive reflected Carroll's style and how he otherwise coaches.  Other than the first down pass to the 39 when Logan Ryan was giving way too much cushion, every throw down field was a home run ball.  They just kept going for huge chunks or a TD, as they did on the game winning throw against GB.
 
Criticizing the call to throw from the 1 is a classic example of cherry picking, especially by Seattle fans.  That coaching mentality explains how the ball got to the 5 in the first place.

 

[Mugsy's Walk-Off Bunt]

Yeah I said it in the Best of BB thread but 4th and 2 was my all time favorite BB decision, failure be damned.

Agree, especially considering that it's arguable they got the first down if not for a bad spot (IMO).

 

[tims4wins]

Agree, especially considering that it's arguable they got the first down if not for a bad spot (IMO).

 
Pretty much exactly the same play as the 3rd and 6 on the Seahawks first TD drive, except Seattle got a favorable spot.