The X Man Cometh said:
Maybe? Keep in mind Brandon Workman had a PRP injection this spring and was on the operating table for Tommy John two months later, though the initial injury diagnoses were different.
The unprojectable Clay Buchholz
- Thread starter iayork
- Start date
Maybe? Keep in mind Brandon Workman had a PRP injection this spring and was on the operating table for Tommy John two months later, though the initial injury diagnoses were different.
czar said:
He just tore his UCL in his first start back from the DL. Every injury is different, but this list is not heartening.
It's good in theory but no-one has ever really proven that it works. Worth a try, thoughMuzzyField said:
Thanks DRS...DaveRoberts said:
View attachment 1205
I prefer to pay the co-pay/deductible in Gammo's
Attachments
For some reason I keep thinking about this argument that you've been making in a couple of different places. I think you may be making a less sweeping argument than I'm reading into it, but I'm still curious. If "selling high" isn't a thing, do you believe it is possible to "sell low" on a player?czar said:
kieckeredinthehead said:
Why do you interpret czar's argument as meaning that "selling high" isn't a thing? It reads to me more like a critique of the idea that at this point in Buchholz' career, a 2-month hot streak is enough to materially affect his market value. Everybody knows how good he is when he's good. Everybody also knows how much trouble he has had maintaining that performance for a whole season.
DaveRoberts'Shoes said:
I am curious as to why they say PRP will delay the time in which Clay comes back . If it promotes healing wouldn't he come back earlier? Or are they treating something they suspect but don't really have evidence for (eg small UCL tear), in other words, being super conservative?.
kieckeredinthehead said:
That's a good question.
I should clarify that I could see two types of "sell high."
The first, is what many people here embrace. "Player X is HOT, we should trade him before he cools off." I only half-jokingly think that some of this is due to things like trading with friends in fantasy football, where you can certainly exploit arbitrages on people who aren't paying attention. But other major league teams act as at least somewhat rational players, and anecdotally, it seems that this rationality is increasing with time, likely due to advanced analytics permeating all FOs and the advent of 24-hour, on-demand communication (gone are the days where you looked at a guy's BA/HR/RBI and called a couple scouts to see whether or not it's worth it).
The second is more viable (and the "sell high" that is likely more prevelant in baseball). This is where you may not get equal present day value back for something, but since you devalue present-day value (perhaps your team sucks), it doesn't matter. Ex: say you have a player locked up for 5 years, but he's 30 and you expect his season-by-season WAR to be 5-4-3-2-1 over the next 5 years. If you don't think you are going to compete until year #4, it may be prudent to trade for a guy who is locked up for 6 years (i.e, a prospect) who you anticipate seeing 1-1-1-3-5 WAR. In this case, you are selling a superioer player, but the arbitrage you lose is somewhat meaningless since the guy you are trading isn't marginally helping you in the immediate future.
FTR, re: trading Buchholz, I stated the latter was certainly viable. He's essentially under team control through 2017, but if you are starting a three-year rebuild, keeping him around doesn't make a whole lot of sense. My issue was with the notion of "he's pitched well for 2 months and isn't hurt. We know he's going to suck and get hurt, so why don't we fleece somebody now?" Because if that was truly the thought process of the Red Sox, the other 29 (mostly smart) franchises likely had someone saying "wait a minute..." I'd also argue that, until Buchholz went down, this team was back to around a 25-30% chance of making the playoffs by most metrics, so even if the team really wanted to move Buchholz, they were likely forced to gamble on him given that they weren't prepared for a full rebuild until he got hurt.
As for selling low, I think it cuts the same way a bit. You can certainly "sell low" on future value of a hotshot prospect if you need big league talent now (think of the 1-1-1-3-5 team selling above), and I'd argue that's the MO for a lot of teams at the trade deadline. I think the efficiency argument is a bit different, because "selling low" means you can engage a single team and achieve arbitrage in their favor, whereas it's a lot more difficult to engage a single team and gain value.
I'd also argue that if you tried selling low on Player X, but opened bidding you all big league teams, the value of the offers would essentially rise that, you might still be selling a bit under value, but not of nearly the same magnitude if you called up the Yankees and said "hey, this Xander Bogaerts guy slept with my wife -- we'll take Drew back, thank you very much."
Thanks, I figured it was more subtle than what I was reading into it. The Buchholz case is a little ironic because, while I agree with you that Buchholz's perceived value probably didn't change that much between late April and late June (which is I think what you were arguing), in retrospect his value really has plummeted from late June to late July. And that kind of gets back to the point you were making, which is whether the collective analytic systems of all major league teams appropriately calculated the risk of a Buchholz collapse, or of the people who follow the team on a daily basis for years were more able to see it coming.
I'll put it another way, because this is really what I've been thinking about since you made this argument. I think there are two models of how trades are made. The first is probably the more popular conception, one that is at least more entertaining, which let's call "the steal." In this system, teams build excess value by having better analytic systems than the teams with which they're trading. They trade away players who end up being worse than expected, and they acquire players who end up being better than expected. The goal is to develop a model, through some combination of quantitative stats and qualitative scouting, that maximizes predictive ability. Example: the Lackey trade.
The other model is what you're describing, the time-based value model. Call it the "futures market." Here, teams have a mutual goal of trading approximately equal value, but one where value is placed differently by different teams either because of positional or temporal need. I think this is what journalists are talking about when they talk about "fit." Example: the Peavey-Iglesias trade.
"The steal" model is really the basis for Moneyball. If the market were perfect, the A's should be dead last every year. Somehow they are able to capitalize on inefficiencies that other teams can't recognize. As you say, this is increasingly less likely as teams generate better analytical models. Further, there's a game theory component to it. If you become known as the GM who only makes "steal" type trades, nobody's going to trade with you. Under this system, as teams become more advanced analytically, the game becomes about figuring out weaknesses in individual team's models. Rather than exposing a player to a competitive bidding process which would utilize some kind of wisdom of crowds thing to arrive at actual value, you try to figure out which single team would most overvalue the player based on assumptions in their model. The way to get at this is have lots and lots of trade talks with lots and lots of teams to try to reverse engineer their models. Or save the passwords when your scout moves on and hack into their server.
The "futures market" system is a gentler, kinder MLB. Less purely capitalistic. Trade partners are identified by mutual need and everybody wins. In this system, you might be more likely to see GMs who develop good working relationships with a handful of other GMs who they trust to make reasonable trades for both sides.
Under the "steal" model, each team's estimates of each player's value should be constantly in flux. After every good start, confidence in Buchholz's value should increase (even a tiny amount) and every bad start should decrease his value. And I'm using good and bad in the broadest sense to encapsulate whatever the model deems good or bad. A start where Clay gives up 10 runs but strikes out 27 might be a good start in some models and a bad start in others. But ultimately two months of sustained good pitching should increase his value. I actually think this is where you were disagreeing with posters about the increase in Buchholz's value because it was your position that Clay had been having "good" starts the entire season but he was merely unlucky. In fantasy baseball, most of the board would have basically given you Clay for a bag of Puntos in early May (including me). None of us know how much individual major league teams incorporate FIP vs. ERA vs. scouting (physical, mental, spiritual...) and so we don't really know how much his value rose or fell during the first half of this season. We also can't even say how much his trade value fell after the arm injury because we don't know how much each team expected him to get injured beforehand. My guess is that Boston (if their fans are any indication) was on the high end of estimating his probability of getting injured, although the effect was probably small. Under the "steal" model, the team should have tried to find a team that they felt was underestimating Clay's probability of an injury and traded him a few weeks ago, maximizing their return. Under the "futures market" model, a trade like that would have ruined their relationship with the other GM because it was based on a premise that they knew he was going to be injured more than the other guy did. Who would trade with you again after that?
I don't know, maybe this is all really obvious to anybody who's taken a negotiating class and I'm reinventing the wheel, but I'm curious what other people think. In some ways the Red Sox would probably be better off relying on the futures model because they can afford to pay the market rate for a win. The problem comes when they think they're in a futures negotiation and it turns out the other GM is trying to steal. Witness Lackey. The real problem, though, is that they can't seem to decide which model they're operating under. A real futures model would target a season when they're going to compete and make trades for that time. Unfortunately they can't seem to decide what year that is.
I'll put it another way, because this is really what I've been thinking about since you made this argument. I think there are two models of how trades are made. The first is probably the more popular conception, one that is at least more entertaining, which let's call "the steal." In this system, teams build excess value by having better analytic systems than the teams with which they're trading. They trade away players who end up being worse than expected, and they acquire players who end up being better than expected. The goal is to develop a model, through some combination of quantitative stats and qualitative scouting, that maximizes predictive ability. Example: the Lackey trade.
The other model is what you're describing, the time-based value model. Call it the "futures market." Here, teams have a mutual goal of trading approximately equal value, but one where value is placed differently by different teams either because of positional or temporal need. I think this is what journalists are talking about when they talk about "fit." Example: the Peavey-Iglesias trade.
"The steal" model is really the basis for Moneyball. If the market were perfect, the A's should be dead last every year. Somehow they are able to capitalize on inefficiencies that other teams can't recognize. As you say, this is increasingly less likely as teams generate better analytical models. Further, there's a game theory component to it. If you become known as the GM who only makes "steal" type trades, nobody's going to trade with you. Under this system, as teams become more advanced analytically, the game becomes about figuring out weaknesses in individual team's models. Rather than exposing a player to a competitive bidding process which would utilize some kind of wisdom of crowds thing to arrive at actual value, you try to figure out which single team would most overvalue the player based on assumptions in their model. The way to get at this is have lots and lots of trade talks with lots and lots of teams to try to reverse engineer their models. Or save the passwords when your scout moves on and hack into their server.
The "futures market" system is a gentler, kinder MLB. Less purely capitalistic. Trade partners are identified by mutual need and everybody wins. In this system, you might be more likely to see GMs who develop good working relationships with a handful of other GMs who they trust to make reasonable trades for both sides.
Under the "steal" model, each team's estimates of each player's value should be constantly in flux. After every good start, confidence in Buchholz's value should increase (even a tiny amount) and every bad start should decrease his value. And I'm using good and bad in the broadest sense to encapsulate whatever the model deems good or bad. A start where Clay gives up 10 runs but strikes out 27 might be a good start in some models and a bad start in others. But ultimately two months of sustained good pitching should increase his value. I actually think this is where you were disagreeing with posters about the increase in Buchholz's value because it was your position that Clay had been having "good" starts the entire season but he was merely unlucky. In fantasy baseball, most of the board would have basically given you Clay for a bag of Puntos in early May (including me). None of us know how much individual major league teams incorporate FIP vs. ERA vs. scouting (physical, mental, spiritual...) and so we don't really know how much his value rose or fell during the first half of this season. We also can't even say how much his trade value fell after the arm injury because we don't know how much each team expected him to get injured beforehand. My guess is that Boston (if their fans are any indication) was on the high end of estimating his probability of getting injured, although the effect was probably small. Under the "steal" model, the team should have tried to find a team that they felt was underestimating Clay's probability of an injury and traded him a few weeks ago, maximizing their return. Under the "futures market" model, a trade like that would have ruined their relationship with the other GM because it was based on a premise that they knew he was going to be injured more than the other guy did. Who would trade with you again after that?
I don't know, maybe this is all really obvious to anybody who's taken a negotiating class and I'm reinventing the wheel, but I'm curious what other people think. In some ways the Red Sox would probably be better off relying on the futures model because they can afford to pay the market rate for a win. The problem comes when they think they're in a futures negotiation and it turns out the other GM is trying to steal. Witness Lackey. The real problem, though, is that they can't seem to decide which model they're operating under. A real futures model would target a season when they're going to compete and make trades for that time. Unfortunately they can't seem to decide what year that is.
I don't mean for this to sound as insensitive as it'll probably come out, but I think it'd be better for this organization if Buchholz had Tommy John (which he may end up having anyway); he's out for the year, and you use that money to go out and get somebody who while not better than Buch during those ace-like stretches, perhaps provides you with more reliability.
It's like we're hostage to his tantalizing upside and the relatively affordable salary; those ~10 games during the season where he's pitching like an ace, so you're kind of scared that if you don't pick up the option he'll go somewhere else and do that for a whole year. So you keep him on, you have to slot his $13m on the budget to be great for 1/3 of the season, terrible for 1/3 and injured for the last third.
Going into another season banking on the enigma that is Clay Buchholz is just looking for trouble. He's like a recurring reclamation project, a rich person's Masterson in terms of what he actually gives you. It's ok if you have 2-3 better, solid other guys in there (like Lester and Lackey) - but if he's you're counting on him to be your #1 or #2, then you'll not go anywhere IMO.
It's like we're hostage to his tantalizing upside and the relatively affordable salary; those ~10 games during the season where he's pitching like an ace, so you're kind of scared that if you don't pick up the option he'll go somewhere else and do that for a whole year. So you keep him on, you have to slot his $13m on the budget to be great for 1/3 of the season, terrible for 1/3 and injured for the last third.
Going into another season banking on the enigma that is Clay Buchholz is just looking for trouble. He's like a recurring reclamation project, a rich person's Masterson in terms of what he actually gives you. It's ok if you have 2-3 better, solid other guys in there (like Lester and Lackey) - but if he's you're counting on him to be your #1 or #2, then you'll not go anywhere IMO.
Snoop Soxy Dogg said:
Well, for starters, while he may end up having TJS, every word we've heard so far is that his UCL is intact, and that he is (currently) on the same path Chris Sale was on last year (flexor strain, PRP, rest).
Second, it's in no way better for this organization if he needs TJS (or other major surgery). The team can decline his option either way, but assuming he pitches again this season, he almost certainly would be worth more than not picking up his option on the trade market. If the team decides "we should just move on from him" wouldn't you rather get something in return?
And finally, as I've intimated before, Clay Buchholz's existence has not and does not preclude this team from getting another pitcher. This team still paid Justin Masterson nearly $10m and they still paid Rick Porcello $20m and they still doled out an absurd amount of cash to two players who many on this board filled redundant roles (Sandoval/Ramirez) with Buchholz on the payroll. Unless we magically turned into the Royals, I doubt $13m is a large impediment to another top-shelf pitcher. More realistically, the Sox did not acquire a top-shelf pitcher this offseason thanks to their organizational philosophy, not financial constraints.
Snoop Soxy Dogg said:
Somebody like Ric Porcello coming out of 2014 maybe? The idea that Buchholz is more inconsistent or injury prone than anyone else you'd consider paying and be able to sign for $13 million is silly.
Plympton91 said:
Well sure. If the choice is between Ric Porcello and Buchholz, I guess we're all screwed then. I suppose I just don't get the attachment to somebody who's given you an average of 130 innings over the past five years, a third of which have been excellent, and another third downright awful. If it's not possible to get somebody else who for $13m gives you a consistent 170 to 200 innings+, then sure, this is all moot. I just don't have as much tolerance for high-priced mediocrity, though that may well be the MLB standard now, with Masterson making $10m. It's one of the reasons the Sox are where they are today.
czar said:
Yeah, this is fair. I don't know about this part though. It seems to me that if Buchholz is there, you have Buch-Porcello-Miley-Ed Rod in the rotation. You can probably add an ace to that group. But assuming they want to stay under the tax threshold, adding somebody else who makes $20-25m isn't going to be that simple. And with Buch, you have a lot of uncertainty with 3 of your starting staff (Buch, EdRod (rookie) and Porcello).
It has nothing to do with attachment--Plymptonnis saying that no such guy you imagine for the money exists, so Buchholz is still the better option.Snoop Soxy Dogg said:
Also, not sure why you're recommending TJS for a guy who we don't at this time have reason to believe needs it, so frankly, none of this makes any sense to me.
There is no Rev said:
I was hardly recommending TJS (I’m not qualified to render that type of diagnostic). I was merely positing that “if” he did have TJS, it wouldn’t be the worst thing for the team in my view. Absent that, they'll probably pick up the option and I expect that we'll get pretty much what we've come to expect from Clay. My posting probably wasn’t clear in that respect, but that’s all I meant.
I was quite puzzled by the bolded. Over the past four years (or 3.5/ 2012 to July 2015), the following pitchers have pitched more innings (Liriano ~20 or so fewer), have lower ERAs and make less or equal money than Clay does.
Kazmir
Gallardo
Iwakuma
Fister
Bartolo Colon
Francisco Liriano
Even allowing for the fact that as free agents, they’ll get multi-year contracts, Liriano signed for 3/$39 last year, so such short-length deals are not unprecedented. You can probably get Colon for less (not arguing that you should).
So I’ll just agree to disagree on the notion that there is nobody out there who can provide you with the same, or better performance than Clay Buchholz does for that $13m salary slot. Unless of course we ascribe more value to the fact that Clay has a one-year deal/option to his actual performance during that one year.
I think the Red Sox will pick up the option, but I can understand the thinking behind not picking it up, a move that isn't as unreasonable as some people are making it out to be.
(1) Buchholz will get hurt next year -- he gets hurt every year -- and his injuries are now more arm related than ever before (shoulder/neck in 2013 and elbow in 2015). If he misses a significant portion of the 2016 season, that 13 million won't seem like such a bargain.
(2) There is a performance issue involved as well. He pitched well for part of the 2015 season, but he didn't perform at a high level in 2014 and who knows when the 2014 Buchholz will again show up at the Red Sox's doorstep.
(3) Thus, Buchholz isn't overly dependable from a health perspective or performance perspective. Relying on Buchholz to play a significant and leading role in your rotation is not a good idea. Frankly, it's the kind of thing I would expect to see on a last place team. If you can bury Buchholz in the 4th or 5th spot in the rotation, you have less to worry about, but then again Brian Johnson can handle that role too and won't cost 13 million dollars.
Sure, they will probably pick up the option, but it is a gamble that may not work out for them.
(1) Buchholz will get hurt next year -- he gets hurt every year -- and his injuries are now more arm related than ever before (shoulder/neck in 2013 and elbow in 2015). If he misses a significant portion of the 2016 season, that 13 million won't seem like such a bargain.
(2) There is a performance issue involved as well. He pitched well for part of the 2015 season, but he didn't perform at a high level in 2014 and who knows when the 2014 Buchholz will again show up at the Red Sox's doorstep.
(3) Thus, Buchholz isn't overly dependable from a health perspective or performance perspective. Relying on Buchholz to play a significant and leading role in your rotation is not a good idea. Frankly, it's the kind of thing I would expect to see on a last place team. If you can bury Buchholz in the 4th or 5th spot in the rotation, you have less to worry about, but then again Brian Johnson can handle that role too and won't cost 13 million dollars.
Sure, they will probably pick up the option, but it is a gamble that may not work out for them.
FanSinceBoggs said:
And we know Brian Johnson can handle that role after he got knocked out in the 5th inning of his only major league start, because...
And just looking at the list that was posted above based on the stats for the past 3 seasons proves the point further. Iwakuma was much better and more durable than Buchholz over 2012-2014, and then he missed the entire first half of this season with an injury. Fister was much better and more durable than Buchholz of 2012-2014, and he's been either injured or awful for all of 2015 to date. Bartolo Colon has an ERA+ of 80 this season. It's easy to go back and find the players who did better over the past 3 years, but as this exercise shows it's much harder to find the players who will do better over the next 3 years.
So if you randomly signed one of those 6 people in that list, you had a 50/50 chance of getting more value than Clay Buchholz, assuming he doesn't throw another pitch all season. Liriano's 3/$39 contract is a great one, and would have been a good gamble, as would have Edinson Volquez who got 2/$20 from KC. Either of them would have fit into the $12 million in the 2015 budget that was allocated instead to Justin Masterson and Craig Breslow.
I don't disagree that there's a case for not picking up Buchholz option, but I don't think it should be done with the intention that you're going to spend the same $13 million and guarantee yourself better performance going forward. I'd decline the option (or as others have said, pick up the option and trade him for a prospect to clear the payroll) only if it were necessary in order to use that $13 million of cap space toward acquiring a $25 million a year ace. That's what the team needs, and if they need to clear some payroll to get one, so be it.
I've said this a few times in this thread, but if healthy, Clay Buchholz is easily worth 1/$13 (with option) on the open market, so even if the team decides they don't want Buchholz/contract, it's unclear why they would decline the option. The most logical solution is to pick up the option and trade him somewhere, getting some value in return (as opposed to nothing if you decline the option).
Clay seems like one of those guys, who actually is often a useful player on the roster & outperforms his contract but frustrates so many fans because of inconsistency and/or injuries. The most comparable guy in my memory who was so divisive was JD Drew.
ALiveH said:
I think comparing him to JD Drew does a disservice to JD Drew.
My big problem with Clay is that sure, his contract looks team friendly — if he manages to pitch a complete-ish season of above average pitching. He's done that once, and even that year he only pitched 173 innings.
Is $13 million a good deal for either half a season of good pitching or a full season of mediocre to bad pitching while he recovers from injuries? I don't know, but I feel like no.
That doesn't mean some other team won't / shouldn't take a flier on him — as someone said to me, if Masterson is worth $9 million, Clay certainly should get more in the open market. But you know, I can see why Masterson got some interesting — he actually managed to pitch full, complete, above-average seasons twice, which is one more than Clay. Obviously with his velocity gone, he's cooked, but I just don't see any reason to think Clay will give us a good season at this point, given that he's barely ever been able to do it. Let him be someone else's problem.
donutogre said:
I continue to struggle to wrap my head around the idea that people continue to say "I'd rather have a mediocre pitcher go for 220 IP than have Clay be elite for 110 and have his arm fall off." Like, we have ways to quantify that. Clay Buchholz's abbreviated 2015 has been approximately as valuable as Masterson's last three seasons combined. Of the 66 SP who threw 180 IP last year, 39 of them provided less value to their team (in those 180+ innings) than Clay Buchholz's abbreviated 2015
In a perfect world, you'd love to have 220 IP of this year's Clay Buchholz -- but those guys are named Kershaw, Kluber, Hernandez, and Price (going by last years rates). And there are definitely situations where a slightly lesser pitcher for 220 IP is better than Clay Buchholz (110 IP) + replacement P (110 IP). But I don't think people are grasping how insignificant having a pitcher go 220 IP if they aren't very good is.
Czar, I take your point — but you're misrepresenting what I said. I didn't say I wanted 220 innings of mediocrity. I'd love to see 180 innings of above average pitching. Key words (which you in fact bolded) are above average. But, based on what you're showing me, it seems that's not all that likely a thing to get from Clay or anyone else if only 66 pitchers even made it to 180IP.
That said, man, that's crazy about the value of a short season of great pitching like we've got from Clay this year. I did not realize that, and I can see now that it maybe makes sense to roll the dice with his pretty reasonable extensions and hope you get at least a good half-season from him. You just need to go into the year not expecting to get more than a half season from Clay and have a good back-up plan for that likelihood.
That said, man, that's crazy about the value of a short season of great pitching like we've got from Clay this year. I did not realize that, and I can see now that it maybe makes sense to roll the dice with his pretty reasonable extensions and hope you get at least a good half-season from him. You just need to go into the year not expecting to get more than a half season from Clay and have a good back-up plan for that likelihood.
czar said:
Yeah but it's not like when Clay stops pitching after 110 innings the Red Sox get to just not play those games any more. You still have to replace him if/when he goes down. So you get 18 games started by Clay (~3 WAR) and 15 games started by... Steven Wright? Brian Johnson? If the team is in a position where they have a bunch of high-level starting pitching in AAA that's ready to go when Clay gets injured, then that's a perfect situation. If when he inevitably takes weeks/months off they have to call up Rubby De La Rosa, or have to trade away an All Star shortstop to fill the gap, he ends up not being quite as valuable. If Kelly and Masterson had worked out and Rodriguez was the guy they called up for Clay, that would've been perfect.
kieckeredinthehead said:
Well, that's why I said "replacement level" (which, I feel like Brian Johnson and Steven Wright are the textbook definition of).
This, of course, is the reason why Buchholz is not Felix Hernandez or Corey Kluber or whoever. But 200 IP of a combination of Clay Buchholz (110) + replacement (90) will likely finish in the top 30 big league pitchers this year (if we go by the 2013-2014 distribution of WAR). That is not bad production out of that rotation slot, even if it is insanely frustrating that you only get elite production for half the year.
I mean, the only quibble you can really make about the fact that if you are sure Buchholz will only give you 100 IP (which I'm still not sure of, but we'll roll with that) is that is sort of forces the Red Sox to carry another SP behind him (and this is a valid concern, I think), but there is no requirement that that SP has to be a 3 WAR/100 IP, either.
The 2015 Red Sox will still come out ahead paying Buchholz for 110 IP and Steven Wright for 90 IP for ~$12m, and that's assuming Buchholz is done for the year. That "slot" will be way, way down the list of "slots the Red Sox whiffed on this year."
It's actually likely better to have a temperamental but elite ability pitcher like Buchholz, because if you get him healthy for the playoffs he is far more helpful than a decent, durable starter. It's also far easier in a playoff hunt to acquire a Jake Peavy type to shore up depth due to injury from a talented but injury-prone Buchholz than find a guy with front-line stuff to upgrade from a mediocre but durable starter.
Plympton91 said:
FanSinceBoggs said:
Good points across the thread. I'm not a huge fan of Buchholz, but I understand the value arguments. I have a preference for a Miley-type reliable, if mediocre stability, rather than the boom-and-bust you get with Buchholz, but you can't quibble with the net value as presented above. Ultimately, I'm really with the two arguments above.
1)If you don't pick the option, put that money towards one of those $25m top guys, so as to come out ahead in terms of the performance you get + maybe a #2 through trade.
2)If you pick it up, you can't rely on him to be your #1 or #2. Assume he's a #4 or #5, then build your rotation accordingly.
I just think relying on him to be at the top of your rotation is not an effective formula for success.
Excellent points. It's bothersome to hear the "all we need is a replacement level player" at said position while failing to account for the likelihood of acquiring a player to reach that level. You can eventually do it however how many sub-par starts during this "tryout" period does it cost you while there being no guarantee you find this mythical player? A perfect example is those critical of the Panda signing (I'm one, I didn't like it)......I always tell my supervisors, "When you come to me with a problem be sure you also provide a solution." Same thing goes with Panda......same goes with slots in our rotation.Plympton91 said:
HomeRunBaker said:
I'm not sure I understand this. So your concern is the uncertainty/risk that a replacement player may not be able to perform to replacement level? And how is a replacement player "mythical"? By definition, it is kind of not..And I don't know that people are saying that you merely need to replace Buchholz with a replacement level player - rather that it is possible to approximate or improve on what Buchholz is giving you more or less for what you're paying him. Of course there's no guarantee that said player will do what they've done in the past. But based on track record (really all we've got), the probability that they will is likely similar to the probability that Buch will keep doing what he's always done, which is pitch like an ace, get injured, and suck. Not necessarily in that order. The Buchholz net value argument is a solid one, as has been acknowledged.
If people don't want him on the team, that's a valid point of view. In that case you trade him.
Picking up the option is absolutely not a question, though. (Unless he needs TJ, obviously)
Picking up the option is absolutely not a question, though. (Unless he needs TJ, obviously)
According to fangraphs Clay has been worth $21M, $12M and $25M the past three years even though he's had trouble staying healthy. A half season of elite pitching is still a very valuable commodity. So, in terms of valuation, unless he completely falls of a cliff or has TJ or something, it seems like paying him $13M is a good deal..
The other argument against Clay seems to be one of roster construction and needing to replace him when he inevitably goes down. I think in this day and age every team plans for starting pitcher depth down to 8-10 spots because every year multiple pitchers go down. And, the Sox have been no different, especially with a few good prospects knocking on the door plus a knuckleballer. Furthermore, this model has empirically shown that it can be successful because we used it to win it all in 2013 which we probably wouldn't have been able to do without Clay's contributions.
I drew the comparison with JD Drew because he provided good-elite production that more than earned his salary when healthy and was an important contributor to a world championship, yet his durability also frustrated a lot of fans who wanted him gone. Like Clay, JD had trouble staying healthy (he missed ~20% of games during 4 seasons). Clay has averaged 140 IP / season since he became a full-timer in 2010 which would be somewhere around 110th-115th in IPs among starters in most years, i.e., low-4th starter territory in durability (assuming 5 starters times 30 teams). JD Drew averaged 131 games per year in the 4 years he was a full-timer for the Sox which in most years would rank him about 55-60th in games played among outfielders in MLB, i.e., also solidly below average among starters (assuming 3 OFs times 30 teams).
I agree that if Clay is our "Ace" then we're in trouble. Otoh, if he's our #3 (like he was in 2013), and does what he typically does, then you sometimes get outstanding performance relative to that slot, and sometimes have to fill in when he goes down. Obviously works best if the #4 guy is decent and/or the #1-2 guys are durable and/or there is solid depth at #6-8.
The other argument against Clay seems to be one of roster construction and needing to replace him when he inevitably goes down. I think in this day and age every team plans for starting pitcher depth down to 8-10 spots because every year multiple pitchers go down. And, the Sox have been no different, especially with a few good prospects knocking on the door plus a knuckleballer. Furthermore, this model has empirically shown that it can be successful because we used it to win it all in 2013 which we probably wouldn't have been able to do without Clay's contributions.
I drew the comparison with JD Drew because he provided good-elite production that more than earned his salary when healthy and was an important contributor to a world championship, yet his durability also frustrated a lot of fans who wanted him gone. Like Clay, JD had trouble staying healthy (he missed ~20% of games during 4 seasons). Clay has averaged 140 IP / season since he became a full-timer in 2010 which would be somewhere around 110th-115th in IPs among starters in most years, i.e., low-4th starter territory in durability (assuming 5 starters times 30 teams). JD Drew averaged 131 games per year in the 4 years he was a full-timer for the Sox which in most years would rank him about 55-60th in games played among outfielders in MLB, i.e., also solidly below average among starters (assuming 3 OFs times 30 teams).
I agree that if Clay is our "Ace" then we're in trouble. Otoh, if he's our #3 (like he was in 2013), and does what he typically does, then you sometimes get outstanding performance relative to that slot, and sometimes have to fill in when he goes down. Obviously works best if the #4 guy is decent and/or the #1-2 guys are durable and/or there is solid depth at #6-8.
ALiveH said:
This is why current context is key imo, as that all seems to write out a lot better in theory then it's probably going to look as a whole while breaking camp next spring.
From a being competitive standpoint i really can't see how we would ideally want to go into 2016 with Porcello/Miley (who of everybody are not going anywhere) as anything other then our 3/4. So what +Buchholz rotation is anybody really projecting out atm where he is *not* being penciled in as your #1 or 2 guy?
Edwardo Rodriguez goes as part of a package for Sonny Gray? Sign Iwakuma or Kazmir as the #2. Owens and Johnson remain AAA depth; Kelly to the bullpen. That worries me with Gray and Iwakuma cing from extreme pitchers parks. But in that rotation Buchholz is slotted 3 to 5.MikeM said:
Plympton91 said:
Grey's splits actually indicate that he's less HR-prone on the road than at home. He's not giving up HR's anywhere, so why would Fenway be the exception? I get that the AL West has some pretty big parks, but over 419 IP Grey has given up 27 HR. Given that he generates an above average -> great number of ground ball outs, this doesn't seem too concerning.
foulkehampshire said:
It's not just home runs though. Oakland (and Seattle and Anaheim) provides cavernous foul territory whereas Fenway has almost none. The other dimensions of the park turning flyball outs into wall-ball doubles, etc...
Plympton91 said:
Being a pre-arby player i can't see any reason Beane moves Gray this winter. In fact, that his name keeps popping up as everybody's go to solution really does little more then put a highlight on the improbability of seeing the cost controlled ace fix (basically the King Felix dream revisited).
Edro in a deal for Hamels makes a little more reality sense imo. Of course signing a FA on top of that *and* keeping Buchholz pushes the total cost of the rotation up, while locking out the non-injury opportunity/possibility Johnson/Owens/Kelly/Wright (or whoever) steps up to create us some arguably needed financial flexibility on the back end.
Or we could not make the trade for Hamels, and simply go into the offseason looking to upgrade. Where even displaying an effort that was lacking last winter, it still probably ends with us being outbid in the offseason craziness that will surely surround Cueto/Price/Greinke. Likely leaving us targeting the solid guys a tier down, who while not coming cheap by any means might see a few fall into that Shields of last winter value category. One here doesn't push Buchholz down, so i guess that leaves us signing 2?
Like i said in another thread this whole debate on how much value Buchholz gives us is starting to take on a Nomar'ish 2004 tone imo. The more i try and play out an actual offseason scenario where Ben gets to attempt to pass off our rotation off as "fixed", the less i'm convinced Clay Buchholz will still be around once that dust clears.
#RedSox claimed RHP Jean Machi off waivers from SF. To make room on 40-man roster, RHP Clay Buchholz transferred to 60-day DL.
@PeteAbe
@PeteAbe
Not really surprising since the calendar is working against him. Most of the minor league seasons end in early September and Clay has been gone so long he would need almost another Spring Training. We saw how he looked in 2013 when he rushed back. Since there is no playoffs at stake, let him rest and come back in 2016 at full strength. Still kinda fustrating though. Would have liked to have seen him, EROD Miley Wright and Kelly perform well at the same time.
I guess they'll pick up his option, because it's relatively reasonable, and he may ultimately be relatively tradeable. But he's a tough guy to project in your plans for 2016.
Bob Montgomery's Helmet Hat said:
It's a tricky question, because on the one hand, the chances of getting $13M worth of value out of him in any given year are pretty decent. OTOH, that much money off the books might free up enough room for a Price or Cueto, or at least a more reliable #2 type in Zimmermann. Unfortunately they have to make the decision on the option first. So I think they'll pick it up, and then try to move him if they can sign one of the aces. They'd probably rather move Porcello in that scenario, but good luck with that.
Savin Hillbilly said:
At this point I think it's even more tricky then that.
I mean as an upside flyer type who's coming off missing half the season, which by default limits the potential interest he's going to generate (not every team can view $13m risks like we can), i would guess Clay's current open market value at right around his contract. So if you pick that up for the sole sake of looking to deal him, what's really the realistic return coming back on top of that without eating any salary? Keeping in mind DD is already coming in looking at a lot of potentially dead'ish money on the books, so a notion that we would be actively trying to tally up more there isn't really adding up imo.
IDK, just seems to be a case where Buchholz has value...but only if you plan to keep him around.
IpswichSox said:
Guessing that is a quote taken from Ben before being fired if they were talking per/year money, since he apparently also had Porcello walking out of this winter's pitching rich market making $20m+.
Color me extremely skeptical that Buchholz, with a rather inconsistent track record to fall back on, can miss half a season and still walk out of free agency with a guaranteed $45m. The potential for that type of reckless spending will dry up long before he sees a chance at it.
Justin Masterson came off an injury plagued year in which when healthy he was the worst starting pitcher in baseball and got $10 million. Edinson Volquez came off his first healthy and productive season in 5 years and got 2-$22. If his arm is really structurally sound, it doesn't seem crazy to think Buchholz could do better than 1-$13 with a team option for 2016. That additional option, to me, has a ton of value and people here aren't generally incorporating that in their analysis.MikeM said:
That said, if the Sox decline his option, that's a pretty strong signal that his arm is not structurally sound.
Those two pitchers got those contracts as FA. Clay could potentially be worth the equivalent of his 1/$13M option on the open market, but is any team going to give up anything of value to take a flyer on him, vs take a flyer on a similar player on the open market already? Even if a team DOES decide to give Clay a shot its not like they'll send anything of value back to the Sox, so the risk that no team wants to take a flyer on him and his money gets stuck on the Sox books when they have no intention of using him over other guys outweighs any potential benefit.Plympton91 said:
If the Sox are keeping him on the books, it should be with the expectation of them using him. If they plan on continuing to give the shot to the younger guys in Kelly/Wright/Johnson, they should cut bait. There is the chance Buchholz has a good season elsewhere - it happens - but there are already a lot of 'flyers' on this team and decisions need to be made because they all can't pitch effectively for this team in 2016.
timlinin8th said:
Again, it is ludicrous to think that Clay Buchholz (provided "healthy") is possibly not worth 1/$13 on the open market. Even with his craptacular start to the season (and caveats about valuation aside), FG has him worth $25m this year (which assumes $/WAR ~ $8m) in like half a season. He is still the 19th most valuable pitcher in 2015 (out of 690 to appear in an MLB game) and he hasn't pitched in a month.
Last offseason, Jake Peavy got 2/$24 after posting half of Buchholz's 2015 WAR in twice the innings last year. Yovani Gallardo got 1/$13 and his rates have been trending the wrong way for years. Brett Anderson got 1/$10 and he hadn't thrown more than 100 innings in FIVE YEARS. Clay Buchholz will have non-negligible trade value on a 1/$13 + option for 1/$13. As Plympton pointed out, he has even MORE value (aside from the 1/$13) tied up in the fact that a team has the OPTION of keeping him around at $13m in 2017 (i.e., it's either ends up being a cheap 1/$13 roll of the dice if he sucks, or a 2/$26 steal if he pitches anywhere close to what he did this season).
The Sox will pick up the option unless his elbow falls off. There is no reason not to. The Sox can then decide whether to keep or trade him, but that's a totally separate question.