The Union’s suggestion that the Court may reconsider the Commissioner’s analysis of the “law of the shop” is simply wrong. “A federal court may not second-guess” an arbitrator’s “conclusion that he was not bound by” a prior arbitration decision.
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1983);
see also Wackenhut Corp. v. Amalgamated Local 515, 126 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1997) (arbitrator has no “duty to follow arbitral precedent” and the “failure to do so is [no] reason to vacate an award”). That is because the law requires deference to the arbitrator’s consideration of the “law of the shop.”
Local Union No. 135 of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of Buffalo, N.Y., 391 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1968) (“The labor arbitrator is chosen because the parties presumably believe he has special knowledge of ‘the common law of the shop’ and an ability to weigh [the relevant] considerations . . . . No judge or aggregation of judges can do this.”). Every circuit court on record agrees, including the Eighth Circuit in a post-Peterson decision.
See SBC Advanced Solutions, Inc., v. Comm’cns Workers of Am., Dist. 6, No. 14-3351, -- F.3d --, 2015 WL 4528456, at *6-8 (8th Cir. July 28, 2015) (court “will not vacate” an award based on “inconsistency” or “disagreement” with a prior award because it is the arbitrator who “has the power to determine whether a prior award is to be given preclusive effect”).2
Because the Commissioner addressed the notice issue, the Union’s argument that he did not apply the “law of the shop”—meaning that he failed to adopt the Union’s interpretation of the Bounty and Ray Rice arbitration decisions—provides no basis upon which to vacate the Award. Nor is the Award in any way inconsistent with those decisions.
2 Accord, e.g.,
Int’l Union v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 557 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he preclusive effect of an earlier arbitration award is to be determined by the arbitrator” absent a contractual provision stating otherwise.);
El Dorado Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Union Gen. De Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 961 F.2d 317, 321 (1st Cir. 1992) (“It is black letter law that arbitration awards are not entitled to the precedential effect accorded to judicial decisions.”); accord IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1998); Hotel Ass’n of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 25, 963 F.2d 388, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Little Six Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Local Union No. 8332, 701 F.2d 26, 29 (4th Cir. 1983).