What, exactly, is the organization's approach to constructing a roster?

[Snodgrass'Muff]

People tend to cling to ideas, myself included, when they make sense. So we have posts in various threads discussing various factors that have gone into decision making for the Red Sox and what it all might mean for the team going forward. One thing we all tend to agree on is that they are looking for areas in which they can build an advantage over other teams either through new-ish concepts (pitch framing and catcher defense) or slightly unorthodox concepts like high OBP lineups even at the cost of high power (see the 2013 wOBA thread for a recent example). We have discussions about character being a major factor or up the middle defense being really important to them, having a second center fielder in right field, left handed hitters who go the other way to take advantage of the monster, or generating slugging percentage through doubles  (again, taking advantage of the monster) more so than home runs. At one point it was clear they were trying to "win the battle for the strike zone" from the pitching side through high strike out and low walk type pitchers (Uehara, Badenhop, Miller, Mujica in the pen going into last year). We see a lot of focus on building from within, as well.
 
So what is the organizational philosophy? What factors are more important than others? Is there a hierarchy or does the front office simply try to tick off as many check boxes as they can when making personnel decisions and then move on? Context is critical to understanding every move, like the A.J. Pierzynski signing that was referenced in the thread that inspired me to start this one. How many moves do they have to make in one direction before we consider a factor no longer terribly relevant to the team?
 
Does the value shift away from high OBP and extremely patient hitters (J.D. Drew types) to more aggressive hitters with power across the league mean we are going to see an adjustment with the Red Sox? Has that already begun with the addition of Cespedes? Are they going back to "pitching a defense" with a potential outfield of Cespedes, Betts and Castillo and talk of them signing an ace and potentially a second high quality starter? Do they have a specific plan or are they reformulating their approach now for the new landscape where money is being spent like it's growing on trees and offense is on the decline? I'm sure they are always adjusting their approach, but it's a strange new world out there and I'm sure there is a lot of uncertainty in most of the front offices across the league.
 
I imagine a thread like this will be a lot of spitballing and qualitative posting, and maybe it will die on the vine before it builds any momentum, but the discussion wouldn't really fit in any existing threads so I thought I'd start a new one and see if there is any interest in discussing it.

 

[Paradigm]

Great question. I'll just throw one thought out there: there are significant constraints to constructing a roster. A team is basically limited to:

• the players they can sign as free agents
• the players they can trade for (so that limits you to the players that fit your philosophy and teams are willing to move)
• the players they can draft and develop

Only so many. I sense that the team recognizes various strengths -- defense, speed, batting eye, a well-rounded game -- and then does their best to get them where they can. We haven't read their name in connection with Yasmani Tomas likely because he just does one thing well, but they were in on Rusney because he has a variety of skills even if no particular tool is considered elite.

 

[ALiveH]

They have to convert all that on-field stuff into dollar values and optimize it for factors like signability, injury risk, contract lengths, the building a strong farm system to generate low-cost talent.  Also preserving draft picks, e.g., spend the bucks when it "only costs money", except maybe this year when they have a protected pick.
 
I think they try not to be too dogmatic on any one factor because it would be too limiting.  The market is not that big or efficient, e.g, when there are only ~10 clearly above average starters at any one position and lots of them are under club control.
 
I give them high marks for seeming to be at the cutting edge in evaluating & finding great defensive talent, e.g., Vasquez & pitch-framing.  Also, there seemed to be a temporary market inefficiency that is probably going away in undervaluing relief pitching.  In today's game, it doesn't seem like enough to just have a lights out closer - the 2013 Sox had lots of great relievers they could run out there to shorten games.
 
On the other hand, I feel like the Sox clearly failed to predict what a dearth of power there would be in today's game & hence how valuable it would be.  They probably would have drafted, developed & acquired talent a bit differently if they knew that would be the case.  It feels like they have to play catchup and spend some of their surplus in resources to acquire another masher.

 

[kieckeredinthehead]

I think a lot of the angst this year was that "the plan" seemed so different from the plan the year before. And the plan last year was entirely different than the one before that. And before that. The management seems, more than anything, willing to try new things when something fails. Just going off recent memory..
 
2010: Pitching and defense
2011: Yankees-lite
2012: Bobby's World
2013: 3/39: Deep Depth
2014: The Kids are Alright
 
Each of those strategies was basically a reaction to the year before. Try something; if it doesn't work, learn from your mistakes and move on. The one thing Cherington said that keeps rattling around in my head about this season was the team's assumption that kids in AAA are basically ready for the majors. That belief clearly drove all of the decisions they made last offseason: JBJ was ready to take over for Ellsbury; Bogaerts was ready to take over for Drew; Vazquez and Swihart weren't quite there, so we needed a one year stopgap at catcher; don't re-sign Lester because you've got Webster, Workman and RLDR on the way. 
 
I think a lot of people took the Cespedes acquisition as a signal that the front office is now valuing SLG more than OBP. I think the fact that JBJ isn't really in the conversation for starting next year is a signal that they don't view every prospect in AAA as major league ready; I also suspect that they're thinking long and hard about how to put together a coaching staff that can meet the needs of veterans and rookies. 
 
They're going to come up with some slightly different strategy every year, and sometimes it'll work and sometimes it won't.

 

[The Boomer]

They have to convert all that on-field stuff into dollar values and optimize it for factors like signability, injury risk, contract lengths, the building a strong farm system to generate low-cost talent.  Also preserving draft picks, e.g., spend the bucks when it "only costs money", except maybe this year when they have a protected pick.
 
I think they try not to be too dogmatic on any one factor because it would be too limiting.  The market is not that big or efficient, e.g, when there are only ~10 clearly above average starters at any one position and lots of them are under club control.
 
I give them high marks for seeming to be at the cutting edge in evaluating & finding great defensive talent, e.g., Vasquez & pitch-framing.  Also, there seemed to be a temporary market inefficiency that is probably going away in undervaluing relief pitching.  In today's game, it doesn't seem like enough to just have a lights out closer - the 2013 Sox had lots of great relievers they could run out there to shorten games.
 
On the other hand, I feel like the Sox clearly failed to predict what a dearth of power there would be in today's game & hence how valuable it would be.  They probably would have drafted, developed & acquired talent a bit differently if they knew that would be the case.  It feels like they have to play catchup and spend some of their surplus in resources to acquire another masher.

 
Well said.  Also, the smaller market teams now in the World Series, the Giants and the Royals, provide examples for how to continuously replenish a major league system with player development from inside an organization.  The A's and Cardinals are also emblematic of this.  Don't waste too much money on expensively overpaid free agents, the least cost effective and arguably the least efficient way to acquire talent.  The criticism for letting Lester go last season is misplaced.  Whether they keep or trade him, Cespedes will still yield more in return than if Lester had played out last season before walking as a free agent.  Older pitching signed for too much and too long has its own risks.  If they could let Pedro go, they certainly could let Lester go if the market required it.  Better to give up some talent trading for a younger ace like Johnny Cueto (if you can get him) than spending too much money for declining pitching.

 

[mauf]

There's a lot less diversity in FO strategy than there was even a few years ago, let alone a decade ago. The most important insights of the "Moneyball" era are now part of the conventional wisdom. The new rules capping spending on amateur players cuts off a number of creative ways to acquire talent. There's also a consensus (at least in the AL) around a 12-man pitching staff, with a 5th starter who doesn't get skipped when the team has an off day. In this more homogeneous era, any sweeping statement about a given organization's "approach to constructing a roster" is likely to be overstated.
 
With that caveat, I would say our FO's strategy is distinctive in two ways:
 
1. They focus keenly on defense, as measured by advanced stats. (They have been in the top 3 in the AL in UZR 3 of the past 4 years. Defensive evaluations obviously have played a big role in key moves the past couple of years, such as the Napoli and Victorino signings, as well as the decision to let Salty walk.)
 
2. They value financial flexibility even more than the average club (as illustrated by the Punto Trade, and more recently the lack of serious efforts to retain Ellsbury and Lester).

 

[moondog80]

 
I think they try not to be too dogmatic on any one factor because it would be too limiting.  The market is not that big or efficient, e.g, when there are only ~10 clearly above average starters at any one position and lots of them are under club control.
 

 
 
This.  All things being equal they might prefer high OBP guys, but if the available options mean they can assemble a better team by getting guys whose value lies in SLG or defense or pitching, that's what they will do.  

 

[foulkehampshire]

 
 
This.  All things being equal they might prefer high OBP guys, but if the available options mean they can assemble a better team by getting guys whose value lies in SLG or defense or pitching, that's what they will do.  

 
OBP guys were a market inefficiency 10 or so years ago. That ended real quick. You think JD Drew was overpriced in 2006?
 
 
Choo's contract would be the floor of what he'd comparatively make in today's market. 

 

[moondog80]

 
OBP guys were a market inefficiency 10 or so years ago. That ended real quick. You think JD Drew was overpriced in 2006?
 
 
Choo's contract would be the floor of what he'd comparatively make in today's market. 

 
That's what I'm saying.  To put it in simple terms, there are a many different dimensions of value.  They go after the guys whose sum across all dimensions is the highest relative to acquisition cost.  A 3 win player is a 3 win player, regardless of whether the primary contributing factor is walks, defense, baserunning, or home runs. 

 

[ehaz]

The more I think about it, I truly believe that Chase Headley is target #1.  His BB% is elite, his defense is fantastic, and he's criminally underrated due to poor power (sans 2012) and contact skills compared to Pablo Sandoval who's hitting bombs national television.  Just offer 4/52 the first day of free agency and keep him away from MFY.

 

[ALiveH]

Chase Headley is my 3B binky too.  If we can get him for 52/4 it would be an absolute steal.  No-brainer.  It was underappreciated how good he was in SD, aka the worst hitting park in the majors.  With plus defense.

 

[jscola85]

 
Well said.  Also, the smaller market teams now in the World Series, the Giants and the Royals, provide examples for how to continuously replenish a major league system with player development from inside an organization.  The A's and Cardinals are also emblematic of this.  Don't waste too much money on expensively overpaid free agents, the least cost effective and arguably the least efficient way to acquire talent.  The criticism for letting Lester go last season is misplaced.  Whether they keep or trade him, Cespedes will still yield more in return than if Lester had played out last season before walking as a free agent.  Older pitching signed for too much and too long has its own risks.  If they could let Pedro go, they certainly could let Lester go if the market required it.  Better to give up some talent trading for a younger ace like Johnny Cueto (if you can get him) than spending too much money for declining pitching.

 
1. The Giants aren't a small-market team.  They were 7th in payroll at $154M.
2. Their infield is entirely homegrown but they traded for or signed a huge chunk of the rest of the roster: Pence, Pagan, Blanco, Morse, Hudson, Vogelsong, Peavy, Petit, Affeldt, Lopez, Strickland and Casilla
 
EDIT - spelling

 

[lxt]

I think we have return to baseball as it was prior to the PED era. Power hitting has once again return to a handful of gifted hitters with the rest of the league returning to "average" power levels (What that is, is yet to be determined). Not trying to take a stance here on PED or anything just specifying the new reality.
 
It seems solid pitching (six strong innings) with a superb pen (ending games in the seventh), speed on the base paths (not necessarily base stealing but the ability to get on base and to go from 1st to 3rd on a clean single), defense of all kinds (Framing pitches to "The Shifts") and OBP (always want people on base for those doubles and occasional HR) with a good dose of small ball and a club that can play together (The chemistry and character side of the game). The 2013 Sox had many of these components while the 2014 Sox did not.  
 
Whether a team is home grown, brought on the open market, traded for or a combination of all three does not matter. What matters is how well rounded the players are, the ability of the team to obtain many of the fore said capabilities and having the players actually enjoy themselves, the game and where they are (Remember Edgar Renteria).
 
The Sox are experiment all the time, good, bad, does not matter, is not the issue. What is important is the team they put on the field. Last year they over estimated the abilities of the young players (JBJ, Middlebrooks, The young arms) and did not have the depth need to compensate for those who could not meet expectations (again JBJ, Middlebrooks, Nava to start off the season) or to offset injuries to those they were counting on (Pedroia, Victorino & Napoli). In 2013 it all fell into place, magic.
 
What they do this year is yet to be seen. However, we all hope it turns out to be like 2013. They have a solid core (Ortiz, Pedroia, Napoli, Victorino, Cespedes ... you'll notice I did not mention pitching) and several young players (Betts, Bogaerts, Kelly, Vazquez and some of the young arms - I like Kelly, Webster & Layne). What they need is to augment those players with a solid 3B (Like Headley), some help in the pen (Would love to see Miller back) and a couple of solid, quality, veteran/experience starters (Like Lester & Samardzija ). They don't need a great deal just some fine tuning and a tad bit of luck (like 2013 when they had so few injuries and the depth if one came up).
 
So, whatever the Sox decide is their strategy/plan for this year is yet to be seen. I think, I know there are those out there ready to pounce)  they need to pull the last half dozen years of thinking together and add the missing pieces (3B, backup catcher (maybe), pen help and some veteran/experience starters) and allow the combination of talent veterans and young players to become a team and make magic in  in 2015.
 
My recommended experiment is going with 13 pitchers - Six starters and seven in the pen - feel free to jump on me on this one.
 
P.S. Actually this is a great idea ... thank you Sondgrass ... and people have keep it funny and not drowned us in statistics.

 

[snowmanny]

One piece of the "organization's (current) approach" that I wish I could understand better relates to John Henry's statement that players under thirty represent good value and players over thirty are more likely to be overpaid (paraphrasing).  On the one hand this is mind-numblingly obvious, since younger players are pre-free agency/cost-controlled and older players have the option to go to auction.  On the other hand, he clearly meant something by this in terms of the team's roster construction.  
 
Is it just that we should never expect a Carl Crawford signing again?  Or that it would take very unusual circumstances to offer a thirty-plus year old pitcher a contract
more than four years?  Or that they are planning to stockpile young talent and augment it with veterans on one or two or three year contracts, such as Victorino, Napoli, Dempster?  

 

[Mighty Joe Young]

One thing that I do think is possibly changing is the reliance on an OBP powered offense. The decline in batting averages (whether it's a changed strikezone or the absence of greenies) has made long sequence offense a lot less effective. It's obvious result is a low scoring team and leading the league in double plays. And is exacerbated by no speed.

This was part of Bill James' classic approach to predicting successful teams in the post season where long sequence offense is rarely successful. The idea is that it's hard to string a bunch of singles and walks against a great starter but it's a lot easier to hit the occasional bomb. Basically power and great starting pitching is the key. I'm not saying they will completely abandon it but a more balanced approach may be more desirable. As mentioned up thread guys like Castillo certainly fit this profile.

So I hope they follow James' philosophy and sign a couple of stud starters. Power will take a little longer.

 

[Hyde Park Factor]

One piece of the "organization's (current) approach" that I wish I could understand better relates to John Henry's statement that players under thirty represent good value and players over thirty are more likely to be overpaid (paraphrasing).  On the one hand this is mind-numblingly obvious, since younger players are pre-free agency/cost-controlled and older players have the option to go to auction.  On the other hand, he clearly meant something by this in terms of the team's roster construction.  
 
Is it just that we should never expect a Carl Crawford signing again?  Or that it would take very unusual circumstances to offer a thirty-plus year old pitcher a contract
more than four years?  Or that they are planning to stockpile young talent and augment it with veterans on one or two or three year contracts, such as Victorino, Napoli, Dempster?  

The answer is probably "yes" to all with the main thrust being the 3rd option you mention because that's the one of the three that gives the Sox the most control over the roster for several seasons going forward. A big free agent signing is dependent on who's available and what the needs of the team are, so it's more of a singular decision, if you will.

 

[jasail]

I think right now is a funny time for the Sox. I'm not sure they are in a position where they are constructing a roster to achieve a certain goal. I think that they recognize that they have many holes and instead are compiling assets (MLB talent, depth, payroll, farm system) that they can use to fill their holes. So I'm not sure what you see in October 2014 is a product of roster construction rather than asset accumulation. This will be an interesting topic to monitor as they transition from asset accumulation to roster building. 

 

[snowmanny]

I think Henry said that most of the overpaid players are over 30, and most of the underpaid are under 30. That's an important distinction from "all players over 30 are overpaid". I don't believe he ever said that he wouldn't sign a player over 30, and frankly his entire quote is kind of a "no shit" one. Of course players who haven't been able to hit free agency and the open market yet are underpaid.

You need a mix, don't you? When watching the highlights from the 04 ALCS, I was struck by how old those teams were. The average age of batters on that team was 31, pitchers were 33. Even the 07 team was 30 and 31.

The only significant contributors on the 04 team under 30 were Bellhorn, Kapler, Ortiz, Youkilis, Cabrera, and Arroyo.

Yes, of course.  What he said exactly was:
 

 
“To me, the most important thing this study shows is that virtually all of the underpaid players are under 30 and virtually all the overpaid players are over 30,” Henry says. “Yet teams continue to extravagantly overpay for players above the age of 30.”

Edit: link http://espn.go.com/blog/boston/red-sox/post/_/id/36278/henry-cites-value-of-inexpensive-players-bad-news-for-lester
 
I took it as implied that he was therefore going to try to adjust his roster management in some particular unspecified ways; it sounds as if you think he was just spit-balling.

 

[Bone Chips]

There's a lot less diversity in FO strategy than there was even a few years ago, let alone a decade ago. The most important insights of the "Moneyball" era are now part of the conventional wisdom.

This is where my head went when I saw this topic. The claim to fame of this ownership group was being ahead of the curve when it came to advanced metrics and predictive modeling. Seems like that ship has sailed and everyone is now using the same methodology. In my opinion, time to look for your competitive advantage elsewhere. Not sure I can support this opinion with any facts, but it seems like a good time for us to really ramp up our talent management (scouting, coaching, health management). In short, a return to old school baseball guys rather than number crunchers. Sounds simple, and it's not very sexy, but I think that's where we are at in 2014.

 

[plucy]

The Sox have remained true to the philosophy of developing a young core. However, the failure to build on the successful development of the first post 2004 wave ( Lester, Papelbon, Pedroia, Ellsbury, Buchholz) primarily due to the failure of the next wave (Westmoreland, Kalish, Reddick, Andersen, Navarro) to produce any impact players, even average MLB, has impacted roster building until now. The brief foray into superstar contracts failed, and now there is considerable roster churning every two years. That the correct mix of vets occurred for one year was not the goal (but I will gladly take it

If this generation of young players doesn't cut it, remember, they only have $30mm committed to 16. Which is why one large multiyear deal to a starter will not cripple them.

 

[Rovin Romine]

 
That's what I'm saying.  To put it in simple terms, there are a many different dimensions of value.  They go after the guys whose sum across all dimensions is the highest relative to acquisition cost.  A 3 win player is a 3 win player, regardless of whether the primary contributing factor is walks, defense, baserunning, or home runs. 

 
While this is true to an extent, there seem to be effects that trickle up and down the entire lineup. The most obvious of which might be if you field 9 very patient "3 win" hitters, opposing pitch counts will be driven up - with the result that some of those hitters could morph into "3.5 win" hitters.   On a smaller level, a high OBP base stealing threat will probably result in the following hitter in the lineup seeing more fastballs.  Or for a negative example, a lineup may have a handedness bias - you don't want your highest slugging "RBI" type players to have the same splits, so that a LOOGY or a roogy can deal with them one after the other.  
 
Right now I think the Sox are basically "stuck," for better or worse, with a core of players.  Even though the core members are individually volatile, I don't expect them to sell low and trade a lot of players.  I expect to see them trying to add complimentary/depth pieces in light of what they have, rather than systematically trying to acquire "types" of players, without regard to their current roster.  That said, sometimes the ideal complimentary piece does not exists, or, if a decent one does on paper (AJP) it may fall apart in real life.  
 
Perhaps the organizational philosophy is: how do we win with what we've got, without crippling us for the next decade?
 
(Actually, this off season, with all the question marks headed into next season, reminds me of the 2012 post-season.  It seems we had questions about every player.)

 

[HomeRunBaker]

My guess is that we are thinking way too rigidly about the strategy. Meaning, that an acquisition of Cespedes doesn't suddenly mean the team is abandoning players with high OBP's and is focusing on high SLG players, or signing Castillo doesn't mean that Cuban players are the new inefficiency. They are trying to build a winning team and you can do that in a lot of different ways. I'm not sure what the organizational strategy is- and I'm wondering if the Sox do either. I'm sure they have a list of players they'd love to have on next year's team...but there probably all kinds of players on that list.

I mean, I get that deep depth was a thing...but the idea of acquiring as many good players as you can is hardly some revolutionary or unique strategy- and it's not something they suddenly didn't attempt to do last year too.

Yes it seems like we are now more flexible in the AJ's, Cespedes and (possibly) Castillo's ability to balance our patient hitters which would not have occurred a decade ago. I see the focus less on a particular skillset and more on an individual players value.

A) Build from within
B) Buy out arb years to cost-control through their 20's
C) Allow market to overpay FA (Ellsbury, Lester) on long term deals.
D) Fill lineup with short year/high AAV (Vic, Nap, Cespedes, Drew, AJ)

 

[Savin Hillbilly]

C) Allow market to overpay FA (Ellsbury, Lester) on long term deals.
D) Fill lineup with short year/high AAV (Vic, Nap, Cespedes, Drew, AJ)

 
These two together boil down to minimizing risk and opportunity cost. If you're going to serially overpay short-term free agents at multiple positions, from a strictly cost/benefit POV that's no better than overpaying a long-term free agent. If, at the end of six years, I've paid $12M more than I should have at a certain position, what difference does it make whether I've paid that extra $2M a year to three guys or one guy? The difference is just that by spreading the risk out over three guys, I minimize the impact of any one guy falling drastically short of my projections, and by forcing myself to reload at that position every few years, I give myself more options and more freedom to respond to opportunities. The downside is that I have to work harder (more decisions to be made) and I increase the likelihood that I may be unable to fill a position with an outstanding player (since those players are less likely to be available for short-term stints).
 
It's a strategy that is completely joined at the hip to (A) and (B), i.e., with committing to strong player development and aggressive pursuit of pre-FA extensions.

 

[Drek717]

The Sox have remained true to the philosophy of developing a young core. However, the failure to build on the successful development of the first post 2004 wave ( Lester, Papelbon, Pedroia, Ellsbury, Buchholz) primarily due to the failure of the next wave (Westmoreland, Kalish, Reddick, Andersen, Navarro) to produce any impact players, even average MLB, has impacted roster building until now. The brief foray into superstar contracts failed, and now there is considerable roster churning every two years. That the correct mix of vets occurred for one year was not the goal (but I will gladly take it

If this generation of young players doesn't cut it, remember, they only have $30mm committed to 16. Which is why one large multiyear deal to a starter will not cripple them.

To be fair, it's not that the farm wasn't developing average or better ML players at that time, they just all play for the Dodgers, A's, and Cubs now.
 
Selling long term control of Hanley Ramirez and Anibal Sanchez for Beckett and Lowell is a deal that paid off because the Sox won a title, but that is where two of your Lester/Pedroia level guys went.
 
Trading Reddick for Bailey simply to stockpile the most volatile assets in baseball, relief pitchers, was a highly dubious move from the outset, likely borne out of strict adherence to the OBP uber alles philosophy the club used to work under, ignoring Reddick's plus OF defense and rare LH power.  He looks to now be maturing into a solid mid-.700's OPS corner OF with borderline gold glove D and the Sox gave him up for a relief pitcher who couldn't stay healthy at the time of the trade, so that sure didn't help.
 
But the really big screw up was the winter of 2010 when the Sox traded for Gonzalez and signed Crawford instead of paying Adrian Beltre and keeping Rizzo, Kelly, and Reymond Fuentes, a lottery ticket who looks to be paying off for SD.  You undo that and 3B wouldn't have been a black hole for the last several seasons, Youk might have made it another year or two before falling apart because (at least in my opinion) 3B beat the crap out of him physically precipitating his decline, and Rizzo would have followed behind him perfectly.  It also would have cost a ton less money.  That one winter with a lack of restraint sunk a large portion of their farm development up to that point.
 
I hope it serves as a lesson to the FO and Sox fans everywhere going into this off-season as to how to handle Betts, Bogaerts, etc..  The only time dealing legitimate near ML ready prospects for a few years of a veteran really pays off is if you win the WS at the end of the year.  Given all the other completely uncontrollable elements that go into winning a title it simply isn't good business to buy into that mindset at the expense of 5-6 years of high end production.
 
I would also hope that the trials and tribulations of Rizzo, Reddick, Brandon Moss, etc. in breaking in to the majors would serve as fair warning for Sox fans to be patient with guys like Bradley, Middlebrooks, Webster, De La Rosa, and to a lesser extent Bogaerts, Betts, etc..

 

[Super Nomario]

The problem now though is that the team needs so much help that they will either have to dive into the segment of the free agent market they want to avoid, or trade off young players. There's no easy answers here...but this team is in a strange spot. The core is guys who are clearly on the decline (Pedroia, Papi) or guys who are just beginning their careers (Bogaerts, Betts). The future core of the pitching staff is completely unclear.

They have almost nobody on the roster who is a major contributor and in the prime of their careers. Acquiring players like that will not be easy or cheap.

Their deadline moves indicate to me that they recognize this problem - Cespedes and Kelly are exactly the sort of prime-age talents they didn't have before, and even Craig is just 30 if he can bounce back. Castillo is another player who should be in his prime. 

 

[lxt]

One of the keys is to have well rounded players. That being guys who hit, get on base, run and play defense. Betts, Castillo and Bogaerts all fit that description. I know with Betts and Castillo we've had a limit view of what they can accomplish but I think it's easy to admit that they do look to have all these capabilities. All three have also shown a degree of position flexibility. They're all sort of players in the Pedroia model. Holt and to some extent Nava have also shown us these traits.
 
This strategy when combined with hitters such as Napoli, Ortiz and Cespedes can give you the offense and defense needed to compete. Other than 3B (Amen to Drek on Beltre) the position players seem solid for 2015. Now, 2016 may be a little touch but for next year they seem to be In a good place.
 
That leaves pitching. I understand the moves made to shore up the offense and to get a "power" bat or two (Craig when healthy can drive in runs) but the young arms, all having shown us moments of quality, is a different question altogether. I'm not sure their is a Lester among them (Pedro is high on RDLR and I like Webster) which creates a large "hole" in any strategy/plan.
 
I'm not a fan of acquiring older pitchers unless they have shown a degree of durability (Schilling did well when he first came here - 21-6). Lester has most certainly shown us that he is durable. If they go after an older pitcher then Ben's short but lucrative contracts seem the way to go (Shields for 2 or 3 at the most for a boatload of cash). Trading for a "stud" arm is expense but a "stud" is a "Stud" and can be well worth it (Beckett for at least two years was all we had hoped him to be). Guys who can give you innings are not worth it to me, let the young arms try and prove they belong instead.
 
The pen has become a key part of the game. It seems rare for a pitcher to get through the 6th inning. You need three to four "quality" short relievers to compete (St. Louis, KC and a few others have definitely shown this to be true). The one, two closings of just a few years ago has proven to be Not Enough in today's game.
 
Where am I going on all this rambling, to the fact the Sox need to look at getting a "shut down" pen that is three innings deep and can be there almost every night and a quality front-liner like Lester with a solid bunch of respectable starter is essential to being competitive (Bumgarner and company and to some extent Shields and the KC gang). They have the position players, well almost, now they need to focus on the arms and allowing the offense/defense to have a chance. Lester with guys like Kelly & Buchholz (if he can ever stay healthy) and the young arms (RDLR, Workman, Webster, Ranaudo, Wright, Wilson, Barnes, Ownes & Johnson) may have what is needed. The pen is what needs to be upgraded with two to three arms not just Miller.

 

[alwyn96]

One of the keys is to have well rounded players. That being guys who hit, get on base, run and play defense. Betts, Castillo and Bogaerts all fit that description. I know with Betts and Castillo we've had a limit view of what they can accomplish but I think it's easy to admit that they do look to have all these capabilities. All three have also shown a degree of position flexibility. They're all sort of players in the Pedroia model. Holt and to some extent Nava have also shown us these traits.
 
This strategy when combined with hitters such as Napoli, Ortiz and Cespedes can give you the offense and defense needed to compete. Other than 3B (Amen to Drek on Beltre) the position players seem solid for 2015. Now, 2016 may be a little touch but for next year they seem to be In a good place.
 
That leaves pitching. I understand the moves made to shore up the offense and to get a "power" bat or two (Craig when healthy can drive in runs) but the young arms, all having shown us moments of quality, is a different question altogether. I'm not sure their is a Lester among them (Pedro is high on RDLR and I like Webster) which creates a large "hole" in any strategy/plan.
 
I'm not a fan of acquiring older pitchers unless they have shown a degree of durability (Schilling did well when he first came here - 21-6). Lester has most certainly shown us that he is durable. If they go after an older pitcher then Ben's short but lucrative contracts seem the way to go (Shields for 2 or 3 at the most for a boatload of cash). Trading for a "stud" arm is expense but a "stud" is a "Stud" and can be well worth it (Beckett for at least two years was all we had hoped him to be). Guys who can give you innings are not worth it to me, let the young arms try and prove they belong instead.
 
The pen has become a key part of the game. It seems rare for a pitcher to get through the 6th inning. You need three to four "quality" short relievers to compete (St. Louis, KC and a few others have definitely shown this to be true). The one, two closings of just a few years ago has proven to be Not Enough in today's game.
 
Where am I going on all this rambling, to the fact the Sox need to look at getting a "shut down" pen that is three innings deep and can be there almost every night and a quality front-liner like Lester with a solid bunch of respectable starter is essential to being competitive (Bumgarner and company and to some extent Shields and the KC gang). They have the position players, well almost, now they need to focus on the arms and allowing the offense/defense to have a chance. Lester with guys like Kelly & Buchholz (if he can ever stay healthy) and the young arms (RDLR, Workman, Webster, Ranaudo, Wright, Wilson, Barnes, Ownes & Johnson) may have what is needed. The pen is what needs to be upgraded with two to three arms not just Miller.

 
I think there's an interesting thing going on with the growing acceptance of the importance of OBP and pitching. We're seeing starting pitchers going for shorter, more max effort outings - perhaps partly due to batters working longer counts (since hitters of that type are increasingly selected for by FOs) and the need to make more high stress pitches. But if the a team has a great 7th inning guy who can throw 95, being able to knock a starter out of the game early due to running up his pitch count doesn't really help you as much. You just see a new guy who's just as good or better than the starter anyway. Having a good OBP team is still important for scoring runs and stuff, but it seems like bullpens in general are deeper than they used to be, and I wonder if the added benefit of knocking a starter out early to feast on an inferior reliever isn't quite as relevant anymore.

 

[williams_482]

 
While this is true to an extent, there seem to be effects that trickle up and down the entire lineup. The most obvious of which might be if you field 9 very patient "3 win" hitters, opposing pitch counts will be driven up - with the result that some of those hitters could morph into "3.5 win" hitters.   On a smaller level, a high OBP base stealing threat will probably result in the following hitter in the lineup seeing more fastballs.  Or for a negative example, a lineup may have a handedness bias - you don't want your highest slugging "RBI" type players to have the same splits, so that a LOOGY or a roogy can deal with them one after the other.  

 
The real benefit of a high OBP lineup is that every player who gets on base is not only one more guy to be driven in, but one more plate appearance for someone else in the lineup. When that extra PA goes to someone else with a high OBP, it can produce yet another extra PA, and so on. This cascading effect is not going to be worth 4.5 wins except for in extreme cases (probably a team OBP in the .400-.500 range) but for a "normal" OBP heavy team something like 5 runs from the cascading effect alone is a reasonable expectation. 

 

[HriniakPosterChild]

 
The real benefit of a high OBP lineup is that every player who gets on base is not only one more guy to be driven in, but one more plate appearance for someone else in the lineup. When that extra PA goes to someone else with a high OBP, it can produce yet another extra PA, and so on. This cascading effect is not going to be worth 4.5 wins except for in extreme cases (probably a team OBP in the .400-.500 range) but for a "normal" OBP heavy team something like 5 runs from the cascading effect alone is a reasonable expectation. 

 
5 extra runs per season? per game? 

 

[williams_482]

 
5 extra runs per season? per game? 

Over a season, sorry for my lack of clarity. 
 
That comes from some simulations I ran with identical wOBA lineups with different OBP/SLG profiles. An approximately .340/375 OBP/SLG lineup would score roughly 5 more runs over 162 games than a .320/.400 lineup. That includes the benefit of the extra PAs and does not adjust for those lost extra bases hits, so the number could be on the low end, but a .340/.375 team is also bordering on unrealistic. 

 

[koufax37]

I think Henry said that most of the overpaid players are over 30, and most of the underpaid are under 30. That's an important distinction from "all players over 30 are overpaid".

 
26 and under, team control, low price
27-30, peak years, often with some team control
31+ start of the general performance decline in post-PED era, and when free agent contracts run, especially the back end of ones that are too long.
 
So yes, most overpaid players are over 30.  That doesn't mean you go sign 25 year old free agents, but is a reflection of the overall contract and labor structure, not a hint of inefficiency.  Probably a good vote towards doing 3/39s instead of 7/153s even when you like the second player better, but not really that astute an observatino.
 
Back to the original topic think that OBP is still one of the most valuable assets out there, but two things have changed since the OBP renaissance:
 
1) It is no longer undervalued by the market, both in terms of free agents but also within the draft.  So you can love the skill but not pick it up much, especially in the free agent market (see Choo).  As draft philosophies also level out a little (but more gradually) it is harder to find OBP heavy talented players who are passed on by other teams.
 
2) I think the big piece that is missing still is the OBP counter evolution.  This is the don't fall behind 1-0 to Wade Boggs and Bobby Abreu adjustment.  I think we are far enough from the start of the OBP revolution that it is being countered by increased early strike throwing tendencies.  OBP without SLG invites strike 1, while SLG makes strike 1 dangerous.  In the PED era the disciplined sluggers didn't offer an easy option, with SLG more feared than OBP.  Post-PED the same OBP skills with less fear of SLG and also more BABIP suppressing shifts, throwing strikes is less dangerous on two fronts, and I think we are seeing the first pieces of an evolution towards more strike throwing which will require a reaction by hitters to be more free swinging.
 
I'm not quite sure how to approach the measuring of some of my speculation in #2, since it is more than actual first pitch strike% and involves the intention and execution of a first pitch willing to catch some plate and not just nibble at the corners.  Any thoughts?

 

[SumnerH]

 
While this is true to an extent, there seem to be effects that trickle up and down the entire lineup. The most obvious of which might be if you field 9 very patient "3 win" hitters, opposing pitch counts will be driven up - with the result that some of those hitters could morph into "3.5 win" hitters.   On a smaller level, a high OBP base stealing threat will probably result in the following hitter in the lineup seeing more fastballs.

 
I know it's just spitballing, but the very limited studies I've seen seem to indicate that having a base stealer on 1st hurts the batter more than the pitcher (even taking one occasional strike that you might offer at to give him a chance to steal is going to hurt your AB's chances considerably, and messing up the batter's timing is every bit as important as messing up the pitcher's timing).

 

[williams_482]

 
I know it's just spitballing, but the very limited studies I've seen seem to indicate that having a base stealer on 1st hurts the batter more than the pitcher (even taking one occasional strike that you might offer at to give him a chance to steal is going to hurt your AB's chances considerably, and messing up the batter's timing is every bit as important as messing up the pitcher's timing).

MGL looked at the costs/benefits to a fast runner on 1st base here and found a very small negative effect overall, but a surprising amount of variability depending on the number of outs: "...  we find that with 0 outs there is no effect on the batter from a prolific base stealer starting on first base. With 1 out, there is a 24 point wOBA disadvantage to the batter, and with 2 outs, there is a 31 point advantage to the batter."
 
Given that a stolen base attempt is a near break even event for all but the very best base stealers and unlikely to be worth taking a good pitch for, I wonder what the results would be if teams told their batters to ignore whoever is on 1st base and behave the same way they would if it were David Ortiz ot Jose Molina running there. Of course it is entirely possible that most teams/players already do this.

 

[mauf]

MGL looked at the costs/benefits to a fast runner on 1st base here and found a very small negative effect overall, but a surprising amount of variability depending on the number of outs: "...  we find that with 0 outs there is no effect on the batter from a prolific base stealer starting on first base. With 1 out, there is a 24 point wOBA disadvantage to the batter, and with 2 outs, there is a 31 point advantage to the batter."
 
Given that a stolen base attempt is a near break even event for all but the very best base stealers and unlikely to be worth taking a good pitch for, I wonder what the results would be if teams told their batters to ignore whoever is on 1st base and behave the same way they would if it were David Ortiz ot Jose Molina running there. Of course it is entirely possible that most teams/players already do this.

 
SBs are only a break-even proposition because the attempted steal results in an out something like 25-30% of the time. Runners would have a much higher rate of success against a pitcher who didn't bother holding them on base.

 

[williams_482]

 
SBs are only a break-even proposition because the attempted steal results in an out something like 25-30% of the time. Runners would have a much higher rate of success against a pitcher who didn't bother holding them on base.

Oh, absolutely. A team that had their pitchers ignore base runners would have a real problem. 
 
As I understand it, a fast runner on first base is a distraction to the pitcher (because they have to worry about keeping them close) and the hitter (because they don't want to foul off a pitch and spoil a potential stolen base). If the batter made a conscious decision to ignore that possibility, perhaps most or all the distracting effect of having a speedy runner on first go against the pitcher and not the hitter. 

 

[lxt]

Oh, absolutely. A team that had their pitchers ignore base runners would have a real problem. 
 
As I understand it, a fast runner on first base is a distraction to the pitcher (because they have to worry about keeping them close) and the hitter (because they don't want to foul off a pitch and spoil a potential stolen base). If the batter made a conscious decision to ignore that possibility, perhaps most or all the distracting effect of having a speedy runner on first go against the pitcher and not the hitter. 

Having a fast base runner is more important for their ability to go from 1st to 3rd on a clean single, turn a double into a run or their ability to beat out and reaching 2nd on a poorly hit ball. Stealing bases, except as someone said the elite base stealers, does not gain the hitter much. If a team has a solid, strong-armed catcher the pitcher does not pay attention to the base runner. Throwing over to first is more of a time gather, thinking through the next pitch to a good hitter  strategy - a delaying tactic - than trying to throw out the base runner.

 

[HriniakPosterChild]

Over a season, sorry for my lack of clarity. 
 
That comes from some simulations I ran with identical wOBA lineups with different OBP/SLG profiles. An approximately .340/375 OBP/SLG lineup would score roughly 5 more runs over 162 games than a .320/.400 lineup. That includes the benefit of the extra PAs and does not adjust for those lost extra bases hits, so the number could be on the low end, but a .340/.375 team is also bordering on unrealistic. 

 
I recall a rule of thumb that 10 runs == 1 win.
 
Is that still valid? Because 1/2 a game doesn't seem like a huge payback for that high OBP.

 

[williams_482]

 
I recall a rule of thumb that 10 runs == 1 win.
 
Is that still valid? Because 1/2 a game doesn't seem like a huge payback for that high OBP.

Yep, that is a pretty good rule of thumb still, and yes, 0.5 wins is not very much. 
 
To be perfectly clear, that is 0.5 wins not captured in typical linear weight stats. All else being equal, a team with a high OBP (and thus a high wOBA or linear weights metric of your choice) will get a lot of benefit from simply being good at hitting, and a couple extra runs on top of that from this cascading effect. 

 

[Rovin Romine]

Oh, absolutely. A team that had their pitchers ignore base runners would have a real problem.
 
As I understand it, a fast runner on first base is a distraction to the pitcher (because they have to worry about keeping them close) and the hitter (because they don't want to foul off a pitch and spoil a potential stolen base). If the batter made a conscious decision to ignore that possibility, perhaps most or all the distracting effect of having a speedy runner on first go against the pitcher and not the hitter. 

 
The 2001 Sox under Williams/Kerrigan certainly de-emphasized the importance of preventing the SB at the expense of making quality pitches. 
 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1914&dat=20010731&id=8aZGAAAAIBAJ&sjid=6_MMAAAAIBAJ&pg=2557,4780668
 
My stat-lookup-fu is pretty weak though.   According to B-ref, they had 223 bases stolen on them and caught 51 runners, for a CS% of 19%.  The league average was 29%.

 

[kieckeredinthehead]

 
The 2001 Sox under Williams/Kerrigan certainly de-emphasized the importance of preventing the SB at the expense of making quality pitches. 
 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1914&dat=20010731&id=8aZGAAAAIBAJ&sjid=6_MMAAAAIBAJ&pg=2557,4780668
 
My stat-lookup-fu is pretty weak though.   According to B-ref, they had 223 bases stolen on them and caught 51 runners, for a CS% of 19%.  The league average was 29%.

 
Next most stolen bases allowed was 157 (BAL). Seems straightforward to estimate the benefit of not slide-stepping (the Kerrigan approach) versus allowing an extra 70 stolen bases.

 

[EdRalphRomero]

Oh, absolutely. A team that had their pitchers ignore base runners would have a real problem. 
 
As I understand it, a fast runner on first base is a distraction to the pitcher (because they have to worry about keeping them close) and the hitter (because they don't want to foul off a pitch and spoil a potential stolen base). If the batter made a conscious decision to ignore that possibility, perhaps most or all the distracting effect of having a speedy runner on first go against the pitcher and not the hitter. 

 
Your line of thought makes sense and is interesting (and I wonder if, as you suggest above, many teams already have figured this out and incorporated it).  The idea that hitters might have some counter-productive behaviors and using your above numbers, it would seem to make sense that the traditional idea of taking a pitch to give the runner a chance to steal second (or for that matter flailing at a bad pitch to delay the catcher's throw) might be both ingrained in many batter's approaches and not supported by the numbers when looking at what actions are actually more likely to produce a run.  You can't watch a batter take a crazy swing at a pitch a foot outside with a runner going and not wonder if the (presumed) decrease in the likelihood of throwing out the runner is worth the extra strike. 

 

[williams_482]

 
Next most stolen bases allowed was 157 (BAL). Seems straightforward to estimate the benefit of not slide-stepping (the Kerrigan approach) versus allowing an extra 70 stolen bases.

223 SB and 51 CS was worth 19.1 additional runs in 2001. That was worst in MLB by a huge margin (2nd worst was Minnesota with 9.6). 
 
If we assume that the Red Sox would have allowed an average number of SB/CS with the side step, they would have broken even if their pitchers allowed 19.1 fewer runs worth of batting events in 1448 innings and 6264 PAs, effectively 0.12 points of ERA. 
 
In 2014* non-pitchers had a .309 wOBA with the bases empty and a .322 wOBA with runners on. That works out to 0.011 runs per PA, or 31.4 runs in the 2858 PAs against Red Sox pitching with runners on base in 2001. Some of that is pitching from the stretch, some of that is the 1B and other defenders being out of position, and some of that is that the distribution of PAs with a runner on is probably skewed towards good hitters and poor pitchers. I don't see any easy way to isolate those factors, but at a glance Williams and Kerrigan look like they made a surprisingly reasonable tradeoff. 
 
*Fangraphs does not have baserunner splits for 2001, but it seems reasonable to assume the differences between runners on and bases empty are fairly consistent year to year.

 

[nattysez]

This is kind of where I am:
 

Commit to Bogaerts, sign Drew. Trade Lester, try to get him back. Value chemistry, sign Hanley. The #RedSox plan sure is flexible.
 

 
https://twitter.com/PeteAbe/status/536971448267849728
 
And I'd add to this litany:
(1) "never hire an overly-sensitive guy" after Crawford and Renteria's flame-outs, then sign Panda
(2) "don't lose sight of making cost-effective signings in pursuit of a ring" after the Punto trade, then Panda+Hanley+Lester (possibly)

 

[kieckeredinthehead]

I usually resign myself to sports writers being bad at their jobs, but it takes a special idiocy to not understand the reasoning behind trading Lester at the deadline while still hoping to sign him in the offseason.

 

[Snodgrass'Muff]

Abraham is being intentionally obtuse here, ignoring all of the context for a quick zinger. Drew was signed because Middlebrooks got hurt again, not because they wavered in their commitment to Bogaerts. Lester was traded because the season was lost already and he provided some value for retooling the roster. They made it clear they wanted to reengage him in the off season from the moment he went on the block. Hanley's chemistry issues amount to one incident five years ago and ignores that he has a great relationship with Papi and apparently really wanted to come to Boston.
 
As for your points, natty, they are paying market rate for Panda, below market rate for Hanley and haven't announced a Lester deal so it's impossible to say where that falls at this point. And I'm not sure what "over-sensitive guy" is supposed to me.
 
Abraham is a jackass and as usual, he's making his living trolling the lowest common denominator.

 

[67WasBest]

From that Abraham tweet, "flexible" is the word that applies most as it pertains to the thread title.
 
The Sox had a hole at 3B, they filled it.  They had a hole against RH pitchers, they filled that (Hanley has good RH splits).  So they now have a lineup that could be set for many years, but with Swihart, Marrero, Cecchini, JBJ, WMB, Margot and Devers they could also tweak the group.  Maximum flexibility!
 
On the pitching side of the roster, they have a tremendous amount of mid to late rotation guys who need more time.  The hole is the top of the rotation, and the hole could be there even after the kids mature.  Signing Lester partially fills the need and they could decide to see if they get any surprises in ST (Buchholz being an ace again) or trade after the start of the season for the 2nd top of the rotation starter.  Allowing Victorino and Craig to improve their trade value could only help.  Again, flexibility.
 
So I guess I see their philosophy as simply loading up at as many positions as the roster allows and using the entire 40 man roster to gain advantage.

 

[Cellar-Door]

I think the plan is to field a good team.
 
Having only one set way of doing things isn't particularly a good way to run a company in a competetive market.
 
As a note, trading Lester and trying to re-sign him aren't in any way contradictory. They get assets for half a year of performance a bad team didn't need, and still have the same chance to re-sign him they did before.

 

[67WasBest]

I think the plan is to field a good team.
 
Having only one set way of doing things isn't particularly a good way to run a company in a competetive market.
 
As a note, trading Lester and trying to re-sign him aren't in any way contradictory. They get assets for half a year of performance a bad team didn't need, and still have the same chance to re-sign him they did before.

I wonder of they trade Cespedes for Latos if any of the mediots will connect that Lester brought himself and Latos?

 

[nattysez]

I think the plan is to field a good team.
 
Having only one set way of doing things isn't particularly a good way to run a company in a competetive market.
 
As a note, trading Lester and trying to re-sign him aren't in any way contradictory. They get assets for half a year of performance a bad team didn't need, and still have the same chance to re-sign him they did before.

 
I agree re: Lester. I meant to add that to my post and didn't.
 
I agree that you need to be flexible in a competitive environment, but there's a difference between flexibility and refusing to learn from your mistakes.  

 

[flymrfreakjar]

Man, Dan Szymborski is shredding the Sox FO in his chat today. Not a fan of the direction they've gone at all. Seems to believe that this a clear sign that they're not going to play one of X or Mookie this season, or that they'll be sent in a trade (which he also thinks is a bad move). We all have to wait and see what trades happen, but I'm closer to agreeing with Dan than not. I'm still pretty confused as to why both Hanley and Sandoval needed to be added.