In this case, the defendant leased a two-bedroom apartment and sublet the bedrooms to two people he knew were dealing drugs; he slept in the living room. The living room had a door directly into the bedroom in which the drugs and equipment for packaging them were found. The photographs of the apartment show that the rooms were small. A police officer, who searched the apartment, testified that the living room was “[v]ery close, within a few feet” of the bedroom.
The defendant contends that he did not have custody or exercise dominion over the drugs because he was an addict and, as a result, his roommates did not trust him with the drugs. However, there was no evidence of any effort to secure the door from the living room into the bedroom where the drugs were found, or the door of the closet in which the drugs were found, or the suitcase containing the drugs. See State v. Saide, 114 N.H. 735, 739 (1974) (finding evidence that roommates had full access to each other’s bedroom when doors were not kept locked).
Furthermore, there was no evidence of drug use in the apartment or among the defendant’s possessions. Although the defendant argues that the spoon and digital scale found in his bureau “were equally indicative of drug use as they were of drug sales,” the spoon did not show burnt residue as would be expected had it been used for drug use. Instead, it showed white residue, consistent with spooning drugs for packaging, allowing a reasonable inference that the defendant had constructive possession of the drugs. The jury also could have found the scale more indicative of the regular need to measure drugs for sale rather than for personal use. If the jury found that the defendant was not a drug user, it could have reasonably inferred that he fabricated this to avoid a finding of constructive possession. Cf. State v. Laudarowicz, 142 N.H. 1, 5 (1997) (stating that jury can infer culpable mental state from defendant’s attempts to deceive police).
The defendant argues that the fact that he was aware that his roommates were selling drugs “does not establish that he constructively possessed the product they were selling.” However, a police officer testified that the defendant described that: (1) the drugs were driven from Lawrence, Massachusetts, in a blue “SUV”; (2) another person, who drove a red Hyundai vehicle, was part of the operation and would store money and drugs; (3) one roommate sent proceeds from the drug sales abroad each week; and (4) the most recent shipment of drugs was received the day before the police searched the apartment. The trier of fact could have reasonably inferred from this level of familiarity with the operation that the defendant was involved in it. See Francis, 167 N.H. at 598.
The defendant argues that: (1) the only evidence that he had access to the bedroom in which the drugs were found was a notice of eviction addressed to him, mailed approximately two weeks earlier, and affixed to the bedroom wall; (2) there was no evidence how close the notice was hung to the closet in which the drugs were found; (3) the notice was a public document; and (4) the fact that he was the primary lessee did not show that he controlled his roommates’ possessions. He also argues that he ran from the apartment when the police arrived to search it, not because he had control over the drugs, but because he was a drug user. However, none of these points compelled the jury to reach a different decision.
Accordingly, we conclude that, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that it excluded all reasonable conclusions except that the defendant constructively possessed the drugs. See Morrill, 169 N.H. at 718.