The New Math (I’ll gladly pay Justin Turner today not Bogaerts in 9 years)

[kieckeredinthehead]

We’re seeing something very different this off-season with the length of mega deals, and I wanted a space where everybody could actually wrap their minds around what’s going on. There’s a number of folks who have already explained it in some of the MLB forum threads and X deal, but I’m also seeing people still guffawing at the length of his contract. So, let’s discuss in one place so that those comments don’t get ignored and the new math can sink in.

The Yankees, Phillies and Padres have now committed to paying a player through their age 40(!) season or longer. Some are shocked at the length - there is no way Trea Turner will be worth $27 million at that age. The response is that teams are basically giving him more like an 8 year deal at $37 million / year, and writing off the final three years as a lost cause. This benefits the team in two ways - first, it lowers the annual value for luxury tax calculations; second, it reduces the total cost of the contract because of inflation. There have been a few articles written over the years on net present value, discount rates, etc., that people should check out (e.g. this one). This is essentially deferring payments while reducing the luxury tax implications. Call this the Albert Belle strategy. At some point, MLB is going to have to step in, but are there rules governing this? Why don’t teams start signing people to 50 year contracts? Where’s the line?

On the flip side, we’re also seeing more players take much shorter, higher value deals - call it the Greinke so we don’t have to bring in the blacklisted Dodger.

Just as people took a while to grapple with the reality of team, player, and mutual options that started up about 10 years ago, these two novel approaches are worth understanding. Why is this happening now? Is it because players are reaching free agency later and both sides are agreeing to just tack on some years to the end when everybody knows the player will be useless? Why are players willing to give up one last pay day and just concede they’re signing their last contract? Or, alternately, why do some players seem to be switching to a year-to-year mode? And to bring it closer to home, let’s make Devers a Red Sox for life - if you’re willing to go 10/300, what would a 15 year contract look like?

 

[Gdiguy]

I've been saying for a while that this was already happening; people are so focused on the '$ / WAR / yr' number that they were missing the fact that the total contract cost for top-tier talent was increasing because the # of guaranteed years was increasing. And at some level it makes sense - you have only 9 positions, so there's a huge premium in being able to go from say 5 WAR to 7 WAR within one of those 9 positions

I think some of what we're seeing now is also a backlash to the Marlins / Tampa Bay strategy of contenting, to be honest - that those models clearly worked in terms of successfully creating winning teams and even getting championships, but have been much less successful at building teams in a way that builds a strong fanbase with solid ticket sales, TV deals, etc. And San Diego in particular may have good actual data at this point about how having Tatis / Soto has increased team engagement, so it's very possible that they're seeing that in addition to on-field performance, there's actual tangible $ benefits to having 'star' players

 

[DeadlySplitter]

My observation - the 11+ year deals are equivalent to “dead money against the cap” in NFL. By doing these deals you are effectively lowering your future payroll available for useful players. The idea is inflation and/or a new version of the CBT by then will make this required downside of such a deal not hurt as much as it looks like it should today. But at some point I feel like even then this is eventually going to be bad business, and it’s hard to see any team being able to do more than one of these at a time, so you better get the player right that will give you good value now, or you’re really screwed.

 

[jon abbey]

I think this started with Bryce Harper’s 13/330 deal in 2019.

 

[kieckeredinthehead]

I think this started with Bryce Harper’s 13/330 deal in 2019.

Or you could go back to Pujols’ 10/$254 (through age 41) in 2011…or ARod’s 10/$252 (through age 42) in 2007. Weird that all of them are for almost exactly the same AAV (ignoring deferred payments and NPV) - $25.4, $25.2, Harper’s is $25.3, Bogaerts is $25.5. I guess I’m wondering why we didn’t see the length of these contracts coming this year?

 

[Daniel_Son]

I've been saying for a while that this was already happening; people are so focused on the '$ / WAR / yr' number that they were missing the fact that the total contract cost for top-tier talent was increasing because the # of guaranteed years was increasing. And at some level it makes sense - you have only 9 positions, so there's a huge premium in being able to go from say 5 WAR to 7 WAR within one of those 9 positions

I think some of what we're seeing now is also a backlash to the Marlins / Tampa Bay strategy of contenting, to be honest - that those models clearly worked in terms of successfully creating winning teams and even getting championships, but have been much less successful at building teams in a way that builds a strong fanbase with solid ticket sales, TV deals, etc. And San Diego in particular may have good actual data at this point about how having Tatis / Soto has increased team engagement, so it's very possible that they're seeing that in addition to on-field performance, there's actual tangible $ benefits to having 'star' players

But how much will that benefit continue when Soto + Tatis are old and no longer useful? Will people be lining up to buy Trea Turner Phillies jerseys when he's being paid $27 million to hit .100 at 39 years old? And that's accounting for a normal aging progression - what happens when one of these guys suffers a career-ending injury?

It doesn't seem like a particularly sustainable strategy.

 

[chrisfont9]

But how much will that benefit continue when Soto + Tatis are old and no longer useful? Will people be lining up to buy Trea Turner Phillies jerseys when he's being paid $27 million to hit .100 at 39 years old? And that's accounting for a normal aging progression - what happens when one of these guys suffers a career-ending injury?

It doesn't seem like a particularly sustainable strategy.

I agree, this can't go on for too long, but it comes following some contracted markets, especially around COVID, where spending hasn't always kept pace with revenue? I'd have to look up some stuff to be sure, but I know the Sox' revenue is close to pre-pandemic, even though the team has fallen from its 2018 greatness. Anyway, it may be a short-lived reaction, followed by a couple years of owners enforcing a bit more spending discipline, followed by another collusion lawsuit, followed by another spending free-for-all.

 

[Sausage in Section 17]

This is essentially deferring payments while reducing the luxury tax implications.

Doesn't it also simply defer the luxury tax implications? Bogaerts and Turner's contracts will still be on the books for luxury tax purposes for these clubs in 2034 (unless they get traded). The Sox in 2022 had $16M worth of David Price going into their tax threshold. $16M in last year's free agent market would have bought a year of Anthony Rizzo at 1B ( a Red Sox black hole), or allowed us to re-sign ERod. It will be nearly double that for X and Turner in 2034.

Both clubs are clearly in a "win it now" mode, and both seem to be throwing caution to the wind around the idea that their teams could be bogged down by these contracts. Those chickens will eventually come home to roost. Just look at this nugget in David Schoenfield's article for ESPN:

Since the start of the wild-card era in 1995, there have been just 17 players to play 100 games at shortstop, third base or second base in their age-38 to age-40 seasons. Only 38-year-old Wade Boggs in 1996 and 38-year-old Gary Gaetti in 1998 produced 3-WAR seasons (3.4 and 3.0). Over the past 10 seasons, the only regular at those positions age 38 or older was 40-year-old Derek Jeter in 2014. He produced minus-0.7 WAR during his final season. (He was better at age 38, hitting .316 and leading the league with 216 hits in 2012, although his range was so diminished, his overall value came in at just 2.2 WAR.)

At least the Padres still have Tatis ready to take over for Xander once he can't play the infield anymore.

 

[kieckeredinthehead]

Doesn't it also simply defer the luxury tax implications? Bogaerts and Turner's contracts will still be on the books for luxury tax purposes for these clubs in 2034 (unless they get traded). The Sox in 2022 had $16M worth of David Price going into their tax threshold. $16M in last year's free agent market would have bought a year of Anthony Rizzo at 1B ( a Red Sox black hole), or allowed us to re-sign ERod. It will be nearly double that for X and Turner in 2034.

Both clubs are clearly in a "win it now" mode, and both seem to be throwing caution to the wind around the idea that their teams could be bogged down by these contracts. Those chickens will eventually come home to roost. Just look at this nugget in David Schoenfield's article for ESPN:



At least the Padres still have Tatis ready to take over for Xander once he can't play the infield anymore.

Sure, but $27 million today will be about $18 million in 2032. Today the first penalty kicks in at $233; ten years ago it was $178.

 

[Petagine in a Bottle]

Are baseball revenues going to keep going up at the pace they have been, though? I’m somewhat skeptical that the TV money can possibly remain as robust as it has in a world in which cable subs are crashing and viewership is rapidly declining. Granted the current national tv deals run through 2028, but after that?

 

[Sausage in Section 17]

We went for it in 2018, and now we have that title forever. But in 2022, we spent $46M for 5.2 innings between Sale (I know he signed after the WS) and Price. The past caught up to the Red Sox. I'm guessing something worse will happen to all these teams looking to pay $25M+ to 40 year old position players.

 

[jon abbey]

The Sox in 2022 had $16M worth of David Price going into their tax threshold. $16M in last year's free agent market would have bought a year of Anthony Rizzo at 1B ( a Red Sox black hole), or allowed us to re-sign ERod.

Your point isn’t wrong, but these are bad specific examples. Rizzo really wanted to stay in NY and probably could have gotten more money elsewhere both of the last two winters, ERod signed a 5/77 deal that clearly Bloom didn’t want to go anywhere near.

 

[EpsteinsGorillaSuit]

Plus, the luxury tax system could be totally different 10 years from now, or there could be loopholes or other ways to work around it by then. It is much more certain that these super long "last contract of the player's career" will allow you to add additional players during the time that the player is expected to be good. So if nothing changes in the luxury tax, these contracts do reinforce a boom-bust cycle of picking a few-year championship window. But other aspects of player compensation already reinforce that cycle (plus the Red Sox seem pretty locked into a boom-bust cycle of their own accords).

 

[Petagine in a Bottle]

We went for it in 2018, and now we have that title forever. But in 2022, we spent $46M for 5.2 innings between Sale (I know he signed after the WS) and Price. The past caught up to the Red Sox. I'm guessing something worse will happen to all these teams looking to pay $25M+ to 40 year old position players.

While true, in 2021 they also had those guys on the books plus Pedroia’s deal….and made the ALCS.

 

[Marciano490]

Why are players willing to give up one last pay day and just concede they’re signing their last contract? Or, alternately, why do some players seem to be switching to a year-to-year mode? And to bring it closer to home, let’s make Devers a Red Sox for life - if you’re willing to go 10/300, what would a 15 year contract look like?

I imagine there most be a lot of comfort for some players in knowing they’ve signed their last contract, especially with a no trade. They’ve probably been living itinerant lives since their teens or younger, and now they have control over the next ten years of their lives, can plan schools and retirements, develop a different bond with fans and teammates and ownership. Plus, who knows how realistic these guys are. They see Brady and think they can start stretching and eating avocados and play to 46 too.

 

[Sausage in Section 17]

Your point isn’t wrong, but these are bad specific examples. Rizzo really wanted to stay in NY and probably could have gotten more money elsewhere both of the last two winters, ERod signed a 5/77 deal that clearly Bloom didn’t want to go anywhere near.

Absolutely. My point was simply that there were more valuable assets that could have been helpful to the Sox (certainly more than Price helped). I'm not saying they should have signed them.

 

[Sausage in Section 17]

Sure, but $27 million today will be about $18 million in 2032. Today the first penalty kicks in at $233; ten years ago it was $178.

I think your new math needs some revision. Even with a large chunk coming in the last 2 years from inflation in the wake of Covid, the dollar had 29% inflation over the last 10 years. For you to set the assumption of inflation at 50% over the next 10 years doesn't seem realistic. There are many other factors that influence the tax threshold, so that's probably even harder to predict.

edit- interestingly enough the tax threshold increased a a rate only marginally above 29%. So the luxury tax has basically run in synch with inflation for the last 10 years.

 

[kieckeredinthehead]

New article acknowledging that teams are increasing the length of contracts to lower the luxury tax burden, and that MLB might have stepped in if Judge had taken a 14/$400 deal from San Diego. But there are no firm rules about when they would do so.

 

[Max Power]

For these contracts to "work," teams will need the guts to actually release these players when they stop performing. You can say you're just spreading out the cost over more years, but if you won't get rid of a 38 year old Trea Turner who's putting up a .600 OPS because you still have to pay him another $75 million, you're only hurting yourself.

 

[sezwho]

For these contracts to "work," teams will need the guts to actually release these players when they stop performing. You can say you're just spreading out the cost over more years, but if you won't get rid of a 38 year old Trea Turner who's putting up a .600 OPS because you still have to pay him another $75 million, you're only hurting yourself.

Also possible the aging models prove overly conservative over the next decade and players are able to sustain performance deeper into their careers.

 

[NYCSox]

New article acknowledging that teams are increasing the length of contracts to lower the luxury tax burden, and that MLB might have stepped in if Judge had taken a 14/$400 deal from San Diego. But there are no firm rules about when they would do so.

I don't know if they need to step in unless the contract is so front loaded that the working assumption between club and player is the player will simply retire rather than play three seasons at a very lower salary. This is what the Devils tried to do with Ilya Kovalchuk and the league stepped in. But if it's fairly flat across the term of the deal I see no reason to get involved.

 

[OCD SS]

Also possible the aging models prove overly conservative over the next decade and players are able to sustain performance deeper into their careers.

It’s highly unlikely IMO. The last time people started floating the narrative that improved nutrition and training was an explanation for improved performance for players over 30, it turned out they were all using PEDs. Continued enforement and testing, plus treating the ban on stimulants seriously have performance primes of players trending younger. The idea that these years will include meaningful production is a fantasy for most players born out of an economic justification for the contract.

 

[sezwho]

It’s highly unlikely IMO. The last time people started floating the narrative that improved nutrition and training was an explanation for improved performance for players over 30, it turned out they were all using PEDs. Continued enforement and testing, plus treating the ban on stimulants seriously have performance primes of players trending younger. The idea that these years will include meaningful production is a fantasy for most players born out of an economic justification for the contract.

I’m not forecasting significant movement one way or the other really, but its funny I was thinking the opposite outcome but for the same reasons.

Those choices trade peak current performance for length. The more measured application of ‘supplements’ and reduction of amphetamine use, replaced with cutting edge body maintenance work may extend peak performance. They are certainly going to be in the spotlight as they age and are incentivized in that way alone.

 

[Philip Jeff Frye]

I’m not forecasting significant movement one way or the other really, but its funny I was thinking the opposite outcome but for the same reasons.

Those choices trade peak current performance for length. The more measured application of ‘supplements’ and reduction of amphetamine use, replaced with cutting edge body maintenance work may extend peak performance. They are certainly going to be in the spotlight as they age and are incentivized in that way alone.

Why are they incentivized? They've already signed what are pretty much lifetime deals.

 

[sezwho]

Why are they incentivized? They've already signed what are pretty much lifetime deals.

Yeah, I tried to qualify for the lifetime contract factor by saying typically the reason they got that contract is they are ‘face of the franchise’ types that will have enormous fan focus and expectations they will want to deliver on.

Some may be mercenaries of course, but I’m guessing some (like Xander) may think delivering value on his contract in the back 9 is a possibility, and work towards that goal in a different way (tb12 style for example instead of roids and greenies : ) but maybe that’s naive.

 

[cahlton]

Or you could go back to Pujols’ 10/$254 (through age 41) in 2011…or ARod’s 10/$252 (through age 42) in 2007. Weird that all of them are for almost exactly the same AAV (ignoring deferred payments and NPV) - $25.4, $25.2, Harper’s is $25.3, Bogaerts is $25.5. I guess I’m wondering why we didn’t see the length of these contracts coming this year?

Just pointing out that A-Rod signed the 10-year contract in 2000, prior to his age-25 season.

 

[jon abbey]

Just pointing out that A-Rod signed the 10-year contract in 2000, prior to his age-25 season.

Yes, but he opted out of that in 2007 and signed a new 10/275 deal to take him through age 42 (spoiler: he did not make it).

 

[joe dokes]

Plus, who knows how realistic these guys are. They see Brady and think they can start stretching and eating avocados and play to 46 too.

This can't be overstated. Not a single player 27 or over who has been consistently good believes that there's a realistic chance he will not deserve to play regularly before he hits 35.

 

[Yo La Tengo]

I think there are three ways that big market clubs can more effectively maximize their advantage: aggressively buy out their young players prime years, take on bad contracts in trades for young stars, and offer really big dollar/short year contracts.

I'd love to see the Sox do all three, including adopting the big dollars/short years approach to free agent signings. When a team is confident that it has players in the farm system who will contribute in the near future, blow through the luxury tax levels with a specific year lined up for a reset (once the young players will arrive and contribute).

I posted this elsewhere, but I'm curious what folks think about the concept of paying big dollar/short year contracts? Under the current CBA, signing a couple of huge contracts that expire in 2 or 3 years would seem doable for the Sox as they anticipate young players joining the team.

 

[simplicio]

I'd be in favor, but I think the problem currently is finding players worth those big short term deals who aren't looking at the market and thinking gargantuan lifetime deals instead. Correa doesn't want 150m now to hit the market again at 33 and try to find another payday, he just wants 350 now.

 

[Yo La Tengo]

I'd be in favor, but I think the problem currently is finding players worth those big short term deals who aren't looking at the market and thinking gargantuan lifetime deals instead. Correa doesn't want 150m now to hit the market again at 33 and try to find another payday, he just wants 350 now.

That's where the sales pitch has to be convincing: Mike Trout would make more money if he signed a series of 2 year deals AND he would have a much, much better chance of playing in a playoff game.

 

[Devizier]

Didn’t the Mets pioneer this with the Bobby Bonilla contract? My assumption is that this becomes the going order of things as more teams spend up to the cap/luxury tax level and need to get creative for signing players. We might not reach NFL levels because there are still franchises like the Marlins, but you could see salary structures getting closer to that.

 

[Yo La Tengo]

Didn’t the Mets pioneer this with the Bobby Bonilla contract? My assumption is that this becomes the going order of things as more teams spend up to the cap/luxury tax level and need to get creative for signing players. We might not reach NFL levels because there are still franchises like the Marlins, but you could see salary structures getting closer to that.

Teams are doing the opposite: signing players over many years to spread out the annual cap hit. My thought is that a big market team such as the Red Sox could take the opposite approach and offer short, very high dollar contracts for a few years while they wait for less expensive reinforcements from the farm system and thereby avoid paying players for lousy seasons in their late 30s/early 40s.

 

[Devizier]

Teams are doing the opposite: signing players over many years to spread out the annual cap hit. My thought is that a big market team such as the Red Sox could take the opposite approach and offer short, very high dollar contracts for a few years while they wait for less expensive reinforcements from the farm system and thereby avoid paying players for lousy seasons in their late 30s/early 40s.

Yeah, I'm actually agreeing with you, at least in diagnosing the situation. My post was unclear, though, apologies.

 

[EpsteinsGorillaSuit]

Didn’t the Mets pioneer this with the Bobby Bonilla contract? My assumption is that this becomes the going order of things as more teams spend up to the cap/luxury tax level and need to get creative for signing players. We might not reach NFL levels because there are still franchises like the Marlins, but you could see salary structures getting closer to that.

There wasn't a luxury tax when the Mets signed Bobby Bonilla, and he didn't get extra years/deferral for that reason.

The big deferral came from the Mets having money invested with Bernie Madoff that they thought would make 10%+ annually, so they deferred Bonilla's $6M in salary at 8% interest spread over 25 years.

In contrast, the deferrals built into these recent mega contracts are effectively interest free loans from the player to the team in return for higher total dollars.

 

[8slim]

Plus, the luxury tax system could be totally different 10 years from now, or there could be loopholes or other ways to work around it by then. It is much more certain that these super long "last contract of the player's career" will allow you to add additional players during the time that the player is expected to be good. So if nothing changes in the luxury tax, these contracts do reinforce a boom-bust cycle of picking a few-year championship window. But other aspects of player compensation already reinforce that cycle (plus the Red Sox seem pretty locked into a boom-bust cycle of their own accords).

If enough franchises are on the hook for one or two of these 10+ year deals, then they will absolutely change the rules if need be. The owners run the sport. The rules don't exist in a vacuum. And I can't imagine the MLBPA wouldn't be open to *increasing* caps on spending.

 

[OCD SS]

By the time we’ll get around to seeing these contracts end it won’t even be the next CBA, it will be the one after that, so anything is possible, but I doubt it. As a group the owners usually prevent a very indies front to cap spending. I get the sense there are several factions, but there is always downwards pressure on spending. Maybe the teams that are willing to spend money are just happy to have less competition, with only a third of the teams spending and the rest enjoying the joint revenue checks.

 

[Yaz4Ever]

Anyone want to venture to guess what Ohtani will be worth on the open market, barring something catastrophic this season? What would he or Trout get in trade value if the Angels made them available? If I were an Angels fan, I think I'd consider it malpractice not to shop them at this point.

I had just turned 13 and visited Cooperstown for the first time when Nolan Ryan signed a 4 year deal at $1M per season. Fast forward 43 years and a solid player like Correa, with concerns about his back, is able to earn $350M. I know 43 years ago is a long time, but wow. To put that into perspective, someone signing for $1M in 1979, like Ryan did, would be earning just over $4M in 2022 based solely on inflation.

 

[thestardawg]

Anyone want to venture to guess what Ohtani will be worth on the open market, barring something catastrophic this season? What would he or Trout get in trade value if the Angels made them available? If I were an Angels fan, I think I'd consider it malpractice not to shop them at this point.

I had just turned 13 and visited Cooperstown for the first time when Nolan Ryan signed a 4 year deal at $1M per season. Fast forward 43 years and a solid player like Correa, with concerns about his back, is able to earn $350M. I know 43 years ago is a long time, but wow. To put that into perspective, someone signing for $1M in 1979, like Ryan did, would be earning just over $4M in 2022 based solely on inflation.

Id Imagine Otahni will get a 12 year 500 million dollar contract.

 

[8slim]

Anyone want to venture to guess what Ohtani will be worth on the open market, barring something catastrophic this season? What would he or Trout get in trade value if the Angels made them available? If I were an Angels fan, I think I'd consider it malpractice not to shop them at this point.

I had just turned 13 and visited Cooperstown for the first time when Nolan Ryan signed a 4 year deal at $1M per season. Fast forward 43 years and a solid player like Correa, with concerns about his back, is able to earn $350M. I know 43 years ago is a long time, but wow. To put that into perspective, someone signing for $1M in 1979, like Ryan did, would be earning just over $4M in 2022 based solely on inflation.

I wonder what annual MLB revenue was 43 years ago, and how today compares? I suspect it's also a dramatically higher rate of increase than inflation.

 

[Yaz4Ever]

I wonder what annual MLB revenue was 43 years ago, and how today compares? I suspect it's also a dramatically higher rate of increase than inflation.

Absolutely. Just makes me feel old when I vividly remember the first $1M contracts coming out. Winfield's deal was such a big deal. Now? Meh.

 

[DeJesus Built My Hotrod]

I wonder what annual MLB revenue was 43 years ago, and how today compares? I suspect it's also a dramatically higher rate of increase than inflation.

I posted in the Correa thread but Forbes MLB Franchise values from last March are pretty telling. Inflation is tough to measure for a variety of reasons but if teams are appreciating 10-12% year over year, it tells you that some clubs are making a lot more than most know.

And if and Otahni were to hit the market, who knows what that looks like. I'd bet he susprises even the most aggressive estimates.

 

[Amos Otis regrets]

I had a little time on my hands today and tried to wrap my head around the recent spate of big dollar, long-term contracts. I decided to look back at what kind of production one can expect after age 28 from good young players.

I decided to limit the study to the last 50 seasons (1973-2022). In order to focus on good players, I chose a minimum standard of >20 WAR through the player’s age 27 season. I looked at both position players and pitchers. After eliminating active players, I had a group of 111 position players and 48 pitchers.

The full explanation of what I did, is really long. I've spoilered it here:

Spoiler

Looking first at position players, I found a group of 136 players with more than 20 WAR through their age 27 seasons. 25 of those players are still active; I eliminated them, getting us down to a group of 111 players. It’s a good group of players, the kind of players teams would be tempted to sign longterm, ranging from ARod and Junior Griffey at the top (63.6 and 59.2 WAR by the age of 27, respectively) to Austin Jackson and Jason Kendall at the bottom (20.2 and 20.1 WAR by age 27, respectively). The two median players are Chipper Jones and Dustin Pedroia (27.0 and 26.8 WAR). The mean for the group is 28.8 WAR by age 27.

Looking forward in time, what did the group accomplish from age 28 on? The top players after age 27 were Barry Bonds (112.5 WAR) and Mike Schmidt (70.7 WAR); Wade Boggs was third at 64.3 WAR. The median players in the group were Dale Murphy (25.8 WAR) and Ken Griffey Jr. (25.5 WAR). Way at the end of the pack are two former Red Sox: Grady Sizemore (0.3 WAR) and Pablo Sandoval (-1.4 WAR). The mean for the group is 27.3 WAR after age 27.

On the whole, the outcomes are not as bad as I had expected. For these excellent young players, just about 44% of their career value comes from age 28 on. 59% of the players (65/111) posted more than 20 WAR after turning 28.

I divided the group into five arbitrary sectors: excellent, good, solid, poor, and catastrophic failure.

Excellent return (>40 WAR): 23 players (20.7%), ranging from Bonds and Schmidt down to Ryne Sandberg (41 WAR) and Carlos Beltran (40.8 WAR).
Good return (30-39.99 WAR): 22 players (19.8%), ranging from Frank Thomas (39.6 WAR) to Andre Dawson (30.7 WAR).
Solid return (20-29.99 WAR): 20 players (18%), ranging from our newest Hall of Famer, Fred McGriff (29.9 WAR) down to Ryan Braun (20.9 WAR).
Poor return (10-19.99 WAR): 32 players (28.8%), ranging from Ted Simmons (19.6 WAR) to Travis Fryman (10.4 WAR).
Catastrophic failure (<10 WAR): 14 players (12.6%), ranging from Ryan Zimmerman (9.8 WAR) to the aforementioned Panda (-1.4 WAR).

What about pitchers? Using the same methodology, I found a group of 54 pitchers; 6 are still active, leaving a study group of 48 pitchers. Again, it’s a collection of pitchers who were very good when they were young. At the top of the list are Bert Blyleven, Clayton Kershaw, and Roger Clemens, who totaled 54.7, 48.1, and 45.9 WAR respectively through their age 27 seasons. At the bottom of the list are Freddy Garcia and Josh Beckett (20.2 and 20 WAR, respectively. The median pitchers are Mark Buehrle (25.5 WAR) and Cole Hamels (24.5 WAR).

When you look at what the pitchers did after age 27, the picture is not so rosy, with a mean score of just 19.9 WAR. The top pitchers after age 27 were Roger Clemens (93.3 WAR) and Greg Maddux (74.4 WAR). The median players in the group are Vida Blue (16.1 WAR) and Josh Beckett (15.7 WAR). The bottom of the list is downright ugly, with the trailers being Mark Mulder (-2.3 WAR), Jim Abbott (-2.8 WAR), and Tim Lincecum (-4.9 WAR).

As a group, the pitchers accounted for only 41.5% of their career value after their age 27 seasons. Only 40% of the pitchers (19/48) posted more than 20 WAR after turning 28. Looking at the same five categories (excellent, good, solid, poor, and catastrophic failure) yields this dispiriting picture:

Excellent return (>40 WAR): 5 pitchers (10.4%), ranging from Clemens and Maddux down to Pedro (43.4 WAR) and Roy Halladay (43.2 WAR).
Good return (30-39.99 WAR): 5 pitchers (10.4%), ranging from Bert Blyleven (39.8 WAR) to Tim Hudson (31.1 WAR).
Solid return (20-29.99 WAR): 9 pitchers (18.8%), ranging from CC Sabathia (29.9 WAR) down to Kevin Appier (20.3 WAR).
Poor return (10-19.99 WAR): 15 pitchers (33.3%), ranging from Jon Lester (19.2 WAR) to Mark Gubicza (10.1 WAR).
Catastrophic failure (<10 WAR): 14 pitchers (31.1%), ranging from Brandon Webb (9.9 WAR) to the aforementioned Lincecum (-4.9 WAR).

Not surprisingly, pitchers are a much riskier investment.

Here’s a summary:

Among the position players, 59% produced more than 20 WAR from age 28 on. Only 13% produced less than 10 WAR from age 28 on. The mean for the group was 27.3 WAR and the median was 27.0 WAR.

Pitchers are a riskier proposition. Only 40% of the pitchers produced more than 20 WAR from age 28 on. Almost one-third of the pitchers in the study contributed less than 10 WAR after their age 27 seasons. The mean for the pitchers was 19.9 WAR and the median was 15.9 WAR.

On the whole, it’s not as bleak as I expected. If you spread those position player averages over a 10 year contract, you get something like a 2.7 WAR player – not a star, but not an utter disaster.

Having done all of this, I think using ages 27 & 28 as a cut-off is a mistake. If I can find a couple of hours tomorrow, I’ll re-run this using 29/30 as the age division. My guess is that the results will change substantially.

 

[Petagine in a Bottle]

Really interesting stuff, thank you.

 

[CarolinaBeerGuy]

I had a little time on my hands today and tried to wrap my head around the recent spate of big dollar, long-term contracts. I decided to look back at what kind of production one can expect after age 28 from good young players.

I decided to limit the study to the last 50 seasons (1973-2022). In order to focus on good players, I chose a minimum standard of >20 WAR through the player’s age 27 season. I looked at both position players and pitchers. After eliminating active players, I had a group of 111 position players and 48 pitchers.

The full explanation of what I did, is really long. I've spoilered it here:

Spoiler

Looking first at position players, I found a group of 136 players with more than 20 WAR through their age 27 seasons. 25 of those players are still active; I eliminated them, getting us down to a group of 111 players. It’s a good group of players, the kind of players teams would be tempted to sign longterm, ranging from ARod and Junior Griffey at the top (63.6 and 59.2 WAR by the age of 27, respectively) to Austin Jackson and Jason Kendall at the bottom (20.2 and 20.1 WAR by age 27, respectively). The two median players are Chipper Jones and Dustin Pedroia (27.0 and 26.8 WAR). The mean for the group is 28.8 WAR by age 27.

Looking forward in time, what did the group accomplish from age 28 on? The top players after age 27 were Barry Bonds (112.5 WAR) and Mike Schmidt (70.7 WAR); Wade Boggs was third at 64.3 WAR. The median players in the group were Dale Murphy (25.8 WAR) and Ken Griffey Jr. (25.5 WAR). Way at the end of the pack are two former Red Sox: Grady Sizemore (0.3 WAR) and Pablo Sandoval (-1.4 WAR). The mean for the group is 27.3 WAR after age 27.

On the whole, the outcomes are not as bad as I had expected. For these excellent young players, just about 44% of their career value comes from age 28 on. 59% of the players (65/111) posted more than 20 WAR after turning 28.

I divided the group into five arbitrary sectors: excellent, good, solid, poor, and catastrophic failure.

Excellent return (>40 WAR): 23 players (20.7%), ranging from Bonds and Schmidt down to Ryne Sandberg (41 WAR) and Carlos Beltran (40.8 WAR).
Good return (30-39.99 WAR): 22 players (19.8%), ranging from Frank Thomas (39.6 WAR) to Andre Dawson (30.7 WAR).
Solid return (20-29.99 WAR): 20 players (18%), ranging from our newest Hall of Famer, Fred McGriff (29.9 WAR) down to Ryan Braun (20.9 WAR).
Poor return (10-19.99 WAR): 32 players (28.8%), ranging from Ted Simmons (19.6 WAR) to Travis Fryman (10.4 WAR).
Catastrophic failure (<10 WAR): 14 players (12.6%), ranging from Ryan Zimmerman (9.8 WAR) to the aforementioned Panda (-1.4 WAR).

What about pitchers? Using the same methodology, I found a group of 54 pitchers; 6 are still active, leaving a study group of 48 pitchers. Again, it’s a collection of pitchers who were very good when they were young. At the top of the list are Bert Blyleven, Clayton Kershaw, and Roger Clemens, who totaled 54.7, 48.1, and 45.9 WAR respectively through their age 27 seasons. At the bottom of the list are Freddy Garcia and Josh Beckett (20.2 and 20 WAR, respectively. The median pitchers are Mark Buehrle (25.5 WAR) and Cole Hamels (24.5 WAR).

When you look at what the pitchers did after age 27, the picture is not so rosy, with a mean score of just 19.9 WAR. The top pitchers after age 27 were Roger Clemens (93.3 WAR) and Greg Maddux (74.4 WAR). The median players in the group are Vida Blue (16.1 WAR) and Josh Beckett (15.7 WAR). The bottom of the list is downright ugly, with the trailers being Mark Mulder (-2.3 WAR), Jim Abbott (-2.8 WAR), and Tim Lincecum (-4.9 WAR).

As a group, the pitchers accounted for only 41.5% of their career value after their age 27 seasons. Only 40% of the pitchers (19/48) posted more than 20 WAR after turning 28. Looking at the same five categories (excellent, good, solid, poor, and catastrophic failure) yields this dispiriting picture:

Excellent return (>40 WAR): 5 pitchers (10.4%), ranging from Clemens and Maddux down to Pedro (43.4 WAR) and Roy Halladay (43.2 WAR).
Good return (30-39.99 WAR): 5 pitchers (10.4%), ranging from Bert Blyleven (39.8 WAR) to Tim Hudson (31.1 WAR).
Solid return (20-29.99 WAR): 9 pitchers (18.8%), ranging from CC Sabathia (29.9 WAR) down to Kevin Appier (20.3 WAR).
Poor return (10-19.99 WAR): 15 pitchers (33.3%), ranging from Jon Lester (19.2 WAR) to Mark Gubicza (10.1 WAR).
Catastrophic failure (<10 WAR): 14 pitchers (31.1%), ranging from Brandon Webb (9.9 WAR) to the aforementioned Lincecum (-4.9 WAR).

Not surprisingly, pitchers are a much riskier investment.

Here’s a summary:

Among the position players, 59% produced more than 20 WAR from age 28 on. Only 13% produced less than 10 WAR from age 28 on. The mean for the group was 27.3 WAR and the median was 27.0 WAR.

Pitchers are a riskier proposition. Only 40% of the pitchers produced more than 20 WAR from age 28 on. Almost one-third of the pitchers in the study contributed less than 10 WAR after their age 27 seasons. The mean for the pitchers was 19.9 WAR and the median was 15.9 WAR.

On the whole, it’s not as bleak as I expected. If you spread those position player averages over a 10 year contract, you get something like a 2.7 WAR player – not a star, but not an utter disaster.

Having done all of this, I think using ages 27 & 28 as a cut-off is a mistake. If I can find a couple of hours tomorrow, I’ll re-run this using 29/30 as the age division. My guess is that the results will change substantially.

Excellent post. Keep ‘em coming.

 

[Yo La Tengo]

Having done all of this, I think using ages 27 & 28 as a cut-off is a mistake. If I can find a couple of hours tomorrow, I’ll re-run this using 29/30 as the age division. My guess is that the results will change substantially.

I think you found the key question and I'm very interested to see the breakdown at age 30. It would also be interesting to breakout players who were proven to have used PEDs, as that would likely skew the data significantly.

 

[Amos Otis regrets]

Thank you for the kind words. I changed the dividing line from ages 27/28 to 29/30. To ensure that I selected a comparably talented group of players, I required a minimum of 28 WAR by the player’s age 29 season. Again, I limited it to the past 50 years.

As before, the details are long. They are spoilered here:

Spoiler

That yielded a group of 127 players; 28 were still active, leaving a study group of 99. It’s a really good group of players, largely the same as the leaders through age 27, but with a few changes. The leaders in WAR through age 29 were ARod (80.6 WAR) and Albert Pujols (73.8 WAR). The bottom two players are Adam Jones (28.6 WAR) and Rafael Furcal (28.1 WAR). The median players are Tony Gwynn and Eric Chavez, who both had 35.5 WAR. The mean for the group was 38.8 WAR. (The earlier study looking at players up to age 27, had a mean of 28.8, which means that in the two additional seasons, our “mean player” put up 10 WAR on average. That sounds like just the sort of player I wanted to look at this study.)

What happened next? From age 30 on, this same group of 99 players put up a mean of 21.3 WAR. At the top of the list is Barry Bonds (96.3 WAR after age 29); he’s 40 WAR ahead of the #2 player, Mike Schmidt (56.6 WAR). Yo La Tengo's suggestion of isolating the PED players looks like it might have merit. The median players were Will Clark (20.7 WAR) and Fred McGriff (20.5 WAR). The bottom of the list is Darryl Strawberry (1.9 WAR) and Edgardo Alfonso (-1.2 WAR).

These players put up 65% of their career WAR by age 29 and just 35% after that. Looking again at my five arbitrary categories:

Excellent return (>40 WAR): 8 players (8%), ranging from Bonds and Schmidt down to Paul Molitor (45.9 WAR) and Rafael Palmeiro (41.4 WAR).
Good return (30-39.99 WAR): 12 players (12%), ranging from Jim Thome (38.6 WAR) to Ryne Sandberg (30.2 WAR).
Solid return (20-29.99 WAR): 26 players (26%), ranging from Dave Winfield (29.7 WAR) down to Bernie Williams (20.4 WAR).
Poor return (10-19.99 WAR): 24 players (24%), ranging from Jack Clark (19.8 WAR) to Ted Simmons (10.6 WAR).
Catastrophic failure (<10 WAR): 24 players (24%), ranging from Don Mattingly (9.3 WAR) to Edgardo Alfonso (-1.2 WAR).

It’s a different picture than it was two years earlier. The rate of “poor return” or “catastrophic failure” has increased 16%, from 41.4% to 48%. Almost half of the players in the sample (48/99) produced less than 20 WAR after their age 29 seasons. But it’s still not as bad as I had expected. The mean player in this group would be expected to average 2.1 WAR over a 10-year contract, mediocre rather than a black hole.

Now let’s look at pitchers. There are 40 pitchers who qualify; seven of them are still active, leaving a study group of 33. At the top of the list are Clemens (62.6 WAR by age 29) and Blyleven (59.5 WAR). The two lowest pitchers are Andy Pettite (28.8 WAR) and Josh Beckett (28.3 WAR). The median pitchers in the group are Roy Oswalt (36.8 WAR) and Mark Buehrle (36 WAR). The mean for the group is 38.6 WAR by age 29. (This is 9.4 WAR higher than the mean for the study group that was two years younger. Another sign that we’ve identified a group of really good pitchers.)

And after that? The pitchers’ mean score is 19.3 WAR, ranging from Clemens (76.6 WAR) and Maddux (56.2 WAR) down to Matt Cain and Brandon Webb, who both posted -2.1 WAR from age 30 on. The median pitchers in this group are Frank Tanana (18.1 WAR)and Dave Stieb (14.3 WAR). As a group, they put up 2/3 of their career WAR by age 29, with just 1/3 after that.

Let’s look at the five arbitrary categories:

Excellent return (>40 WAR): 3 pitchers (9%): Clemens, Maddux, and Mike Mussina (45.1 WAR).
Good return (30-39.99 WAR): 5 pitchers (15%), ranging from John Smoltz (38.3 WAR) to Andy Pettite (31.4 WAR).
Solid return (20-29.99 WAR): 5 pitchers (15%), ranging from Pedro (26.6 WAR) down to Mark Buehrle (23.1 WAR).
Poor return (10-19.99 WAR): 8 pitchers (24%), ranging from CC Sabathia (18.9 WAR) to Doc Gooden (11.4 WAR).
Catastrophic failure (<10 WAR): 12 pitchers (36%), ranging from Kevin Appier (8.9 WAR) to Brandon Webb (-2.1 WAR).

Again, pitchers are substantially riskier, with 60% producing less than 20 WAR after age 29, but the results aren’t any worse than they were looking at the age 27/28 split. Perhaps the lesson here is that while some pitchers fall apart, the ones that don’t continue to produce for a long time.

To summarize: The results of this study haven’t changed as much as I expected. While these longterm contracts are risky, failure is by no means certain.

This group is two years older than the previous study. Position players now produce a mean of 21.3 WAR (22% less than the 27/28 group). The percentage of catastrophic failure (players producing less than 10 WAR) has nearly doubled, from 12.6% to 24%. The percentage of players producing an excellent return (more than 40 WAR) has been cut in half, from 20% to 8%. There’s still value there, but the risks are greater and the rewards are less. Spread over a 10-year contract, our “mean player” would produce 2.1 WAR per year.

For pitchers, the picture is remarkably unchanged from the earlier study. The younger group produced an average WAR of 19.9 WAR after age 27. This older group produces nearly the same average result: 19.3 WAR after age 29. The rate of catastrophic failure (less than 10 WAR) is only a bit higher; it was 31% for the younger group and is now 36%. The percentage of pitchers producing more than 40 WAR after the age cut-off is lower, but only marginally so (9% in the 29/30 group vs. 10% in the 27/28 group.)

I think Yo La Tengo’s suggestion of trying to weed out the PED players is a good one: Bonds, Clemens, Palmeiro, and other players from that decade appear prominently in the lists of the most successful older players. Hardly surprising, but worth noting.

 

[Yo La Tengo]

To summarize: The results of this study haven’t changed as much as I expected. While these longterm contracts are risky, failure is by no means certain.

This group is two years older than the previous study. Position players now produce a mean of 21.3 WAR (22% less than the 27/28 group). The percentage of catastrophic failure (players producing less than 10 WAR) has nearly doubled, from 12.6% to 24%. The percentage of players producing an excellent return (more than 40 WAR) has been cut in half, from 20% to 8%. There’s still value there, but the risks are greater and the rewards are less. Spread over a 10-year contract, our “mean player” would produce 2.1 WAR per year.

For pitchers, the picture is remarkably unchanged from the earlier study. The younger group produced an average WAR of 19.9 WAR after age 27. This older group produces nearly the same average result: 19.3 WAR after age 29. The rate of catastrophic failure (less than 10 WAR) is only a bit higher; it was 31% for the younger group and is now 36%. The percentage of pitchers producing more than 40 WAR after the age cut-off is lower, but only marginally so (9% in the 29/30 group vs. 10% in the 27/28 group.)

I think Yo La Tengo’s suggestion of trying to weed out the PED players is a good one: Bonds, Clemens, Palmeiro, and other players from that decade appear prominently in the lists of the most successful older players. Hardly surprising, but worth noting.

This is great info. My takeaway is that, while "failure is by no means certain," it is 6x more likely than an excellent return for batters and almost 7x more likely than an excellent return of pitchers. And that includes results from the PED crowd. Would it be possible to see the results without the known PED users? You likely don't need a homework assignment but I'm guessing the results would be pretty drastic.

For a general model, if the failure rate is above 50% for these older players, what is the failure rate for extending young, arbitration eligible players? I'm guessing quite a bit less than 50%. In both cases, getting the contract signed requires player buy in, but the benefits of a general framework of not pursuing uber-expensive contracts with 30 year olds seems undeniable.

 

[simplicio]

Petitioning to rename this thread into something that doesn't keep that damn song stuck in my head for 2 weeks straight.

Edit: thank you!

 

[HangingW/ScottCooper]

New article acknowledging that teams are increasing the length of contracts to lower the luxury tax burden, and that MLB might have stepped in if Judge had taken a 14/$400 deal from San Diego. But there are no firm rules about when they would do so.

Are we reaching a point in the next CBA where there are length of contract restrictions?