First, I know the horse is dead (figuratively), but we are left with a vexing question: does every dispute-resolution device get arbitral deference, whatever it's called, as WBV proposes, or are there some processes that are so unusual - either in design or in practice - that they fall outside the zone of limited review, as awallenstein suggests?
This is total guess work as I don't have the time or really the chops for in depth review, but for awallenstein's reading to prevail, it has to reflect an explicit underlying distinction between routine CBA cases and those that aren't a distinction that will not result in swamping the circuits with plain vanilla appeals. So, the question is whether this case lends itself to that.
One easy distinction is that this is a rare case where one of the parties to the dispute reserves the right to act as sole finder of fact and disciplinarian. We've been struggling to find other cases that are on point. Maybe this reflects the fact that this is an unusual practice.
We're also struggling with this question: Does the fact that the dispute arises under a CBA, and not a routine commercial or employment contract, make it different for some reason?
I can't answer the last question, but do suggest that every dispute resolution mechanism (to adopt WBV's reference) must procedurally meet minimum standards of fairness. I do not suggest that the outcome should be subject to judicial review, absent strong evidence of misconduct. I do suggest, however, that a court must always be free to determine if the process for addressing disputes within a CBA lends itself to an impartial resolution of the dispute. Most CBAs apparently concede that point by allowing for mixed or extrinsic arbitrators. This one doesn't, so the court could have disallowed this unusual if not unique process without opening the door to a gazillion others..
Fire away, folks - I happily concede I'm on unfamiliar ground.