It's the Little Things: Pick Your Favorite Unsung Effort From SB 51

[dbn]

On the final play, I think Jones (#45) and the safety Allen (#37) play it relatively well and almost make the stop. They are hustling like the Super Bowl was on the line. The guy covering Jules, CB Alford (#23) was weak. He kind of lingers a yard deep in the end zone and only makes an effort at the end. More desperation by Alford and they stop White short, I believe.

 

[dbn]

Re-watching some highlights, I'll have to agree with BigSoxFan in the opening post of the thread. Roberts was on the ground at least 15 yards away from Freeman when he caught the ball.

Link to video of play (14:11 on the video)

If Roberts hadn't gotten up and hustled to chase down Freeman, he would have easily scored, as Julio Jones appeared to have Malcolm Butler completely blocked out and there didn't seem to be anyone else left to beat once he got by Harmon.

Thanks for posting that. I love stuff like this. Huge effort/play, indeed.

 

[johnmd20]

On the final play, I think Jones (#45) and the safety Allen (#37) play it relatively well and almost make the stop. They are hustling like the Super Bowl was on the line. The guy covering Jules, CB Alford (#23) was weak. He kind of lingers a yard deep in the end zone and only makes an effort at the end. More desperation by Alford and they stop White short, I believe.

Alford was too busy watching the clip of him waltzing into the end zone on his INT.

 

[E5 Yaz]

It's been said across multiple threads, but Deion Jones is a player ... right up there with Julio and Alex Mack as Falcons I wish were Patriots

 

[Stitch01]

Not gonna get on Alford much for waltzing into the end zone. I thoroughly enjoyed it when Rodney Harrison did it against the Steelers in 2005.

 

[Lose Remerswaal]

I stopped the video right as White cuts back, you can see what the field would have looked like if Cannon gets outside Jones. So in that sense, the cutback brought a bunch of defenders in the play that wouldn't be there. And Jones probably hits him for a loss if he doesn't cut back. So again, great read, White just got it done.

Also great block by Malcolm at the bottom. Rook showed up.

Malcolm was holding on to his block's shoulderpads as hard as he could.

 

[Rook05]

There's so much to say about the game that I don't know where to start. But one highlight for me was Mike Lombardi on Bill Simmons' podcast in, like, Week fucking 1 that James White was essentially redshirted for his first few seasons. As recently as last year he just didn't have the strength to break tackles and get a tough yard. That was prescient.

Combine that with the fact that McDaniels definitely fooled the Falcons on the two biggest plays of the season by rushing White at the goaline. Here are his carries per game for the year: 1, 4, 3, 4, 5, 7, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 3, 0, 3, 1, 2, 0, 1...and 6 for the Super Bowl.

 

[The Big Red Kahuna]

Here's the vid for reference

I need a Shaq Mason-only camera for at least 30 seconds after the TD. Did he just keep meandering? I need to know.

 

[Devizier]

Not gonna get on Alford much for waltzing into the end zone. I thoroughly enjoyed it when Rodney Harrison did it against the Steelers in 2005.

As long as you don't get clowned like Leon Lett did, showboat away. I mean, once the play is over, you don't get the chance.

 

[Dollar]

Not gonna get on Alford much for waltzing into the end zone. I thoroughly enjoyed it when Rodney Harrison did it against the Steelers in 2005.

Seriously, no Pats fan should ever be allowed to complain about something like that.

I'm more surprised that Alford didn't pull the old Madden move and run along the goal line then just wait there and kill another 10 seconds off the clock waiting for someone to make him cross the line.

 

[jablo1312]

I think it's been said, but Eric Rowe played well (as far as I could tell). Helped the team get off the field in 3 plays on the 1st possession of the 2nd half. That seemed huge at the time, even though it just led to a Pats 3 and out. And then he was in picture perfect coverage on the luckily-not-so-infamous Jones catch. Considering that Cobi Hamilton was running past him 2 weeks ago, I thought he stepped up as much as anyone else.

-Chung had several nice tackles in space, caught the punt over his shoulder, and slapped the ball right out of Hooper's hands to force a 3rd and long on the fringe of field goal range. He had another very solid game.

 

[Oklahoma Jones]

After re-watching the second half a couple of times, the sheer amount of plays that the Patriots absolutely had to make (and did), combined with the Falcons failing to make that one play that would have allowed them to win, brings to mind the old chestnut:

"You come at the king, you best not miss."

Atlanta missed. Hail to the Patriots.

 

[DennyDoyle'sBoil]

A few more small things.

1) Check out Jules' block on White's TD with a minute left that makes it a two-point game.

2) Gostkowski's second field goal is terrifying close the right upright. Same distance as an extra point. On that extra point, I'd like to see the play from the side because it almost looked like the ball bounced on the snap and was tough to get down.

3) Something weird happened on Atlanta's first time out of the second half. They shouldn't have had much trouble there. It was after a penalty and it was third and long and it didn't look like a substitution problem. I think Ryan might have been having a problem with his helmet or its pads or something.

 

[dhappy42]

Nm. Wrong thread.

 

[Koufax]

A few more small things.

1) Check out Jules' block on White's TD with a minute left that makes it a two-point game.

2) Gostkowski's second field goal is terrifying close the right upright. Same distance as an extra point. On that extra point, I'd like to see the play from the side because it almost looked like the ball bounced on the snap and was tough to get down.

3) Something weird happened on Atlanta's first time out of the second half. They shouldn't have had much trouble there. It was after a penalty and it was third and long and it didn't look like a substitution problem. I think Ryan might have been having a problem with his helmet or its pads or something.

It has been reported that his communication system wasn't working.

 

[Norm Siebern]

Belichick's decision to kick the FG on 4th down to make it 28-12, instead of going for the first down and chasing the points missed on the XPAT.

This stands out to me b/c as we all know, last year in the AFCCG Belichick eschewed the FG attempts and went for the down conversions. At the end of that game a number of people wrote about Belichick's decisions and questioned them, wondering if he would have been better off kicking the FGs. As it turned out, he probably would have been better off.

Fast forward to this year. Same situations, and Belichick opts for the field goal. I know he was looking at the math (12 points puts us within two scores of tying), but I wonder if he remembered last year and how he had to chase the points of the forsaken FGs because he had gone for the first down on fourth downs. I wouldn't doubt that he was remembering last year in his steel trap mind.

 

[dhappy42]

Belichick's decision to kick the FG on 4th down to make it 28-12, instead of going for the first down and chasing the points missed on the XPAT.

This stands out to me b/c as we all know, last year in the AFCCG Belichick eschewed the FG attempts and went for the down conversions. At the end of that game a number of people wrote about Belichick's decisions and questioned them, wondering if he would have been better off kicking the FGs. As it turned out, he probably would have been better off.

Fast forward to this year. Same situations, and Belichick opts for the field goal. I know he was looking at the math (12 points puts us within two scores of tying), but I wonder if he remembered last year and how he had to chase the points of the forsaken FGs because he had gone for the first down on fourth downs. I wouldn't doubt that he was remembering last year in his steel trap mind.

Do you think Belichick is doing the math in his head or does he have an assistant evil genius up in a booth with an abacus?

 

[Stitch01]

Belichick's decision to kick the FG on 4th down to make it 28-12, instead of going for the first down and chasing the points missed on the XPAT.

This stands out to me b/c as we all know, last year in the AFCCG Belichick eschewed the FG attempts and went for the down conversions. At the end of that game a number of people wrote about Belichick's decisions and questioned them, wondering if he would have been better off kicking the FGs. As it turned out, he probably would have been better off.

Fast forward to this year. Same situations, and Belichick opts for the field goal. I know he was looking at the math (12 points puts us within two scores of tying), but I wonder if he remembered last year and how he had to chase the points of the forsaken FGs because he had gone for the first down on fourth downs. I wouldn't doubt that he was remembering last year in his steel trap mind.

Im personally thankful that we have a head coach who understands that these situations were nowhere near similar.

You are like the third person to mention not "chasing points" after the extra point and I still dont really have any idea what that means in this context. Ok, so its 28-10 instead of 28-9, why is the decision fundamentally different? Pats should be marginally more willing to kick down 18 rather than 19, but its pretty marginal.

Barnwell argues the Pats should have gone for it based on break even probabilities. WP charts moved the probability up 0.1% by kicking the field goal. I think kicking was right, but its a super marginal non-decision.

What does kicking a FG on 4th and 16 with 10 minutes left down 19 have to do with whether to kick a FG down 8 on 4th and 1 with 5 minutes or w/e left or to kick on 4th and goal down 8 with 2:30 minutes left?

This has been a common thread on here and Im generally befuddled. The Denver 4th down calls and the Atlanta 4th down call have almost nothing in common other than being on 4th down and the Patriots missing an extra point at some point earlier in the game. The idea that this was some sort of unsung decision were BB learned from a past mistake and that one call was correct and one call was incorrect is based entirely on the fact that the Pats made the 2 point conversion in the Super Bowl and didnt make a 2 point conversion in Denver.

Maybe Im the turd in the punch bowl, but this is supposed to be a fairly analytical board and the sloppy 4th down decision analysis bugs me.

 

[Bowhemian]

Do you think Belichick is doing the math in his head or does he have an assistant evil genius up in a booth with an abacus?

I'll take Pink Stripes for $1,000 Alex

 

[Norm Siebern]

Do you think Belichick is doing the math in his head or does he have an assistant evil genius up in a booth with an abacus?

I think someone on the staff has it written down like all coaches do.

 

[BigSoxFan]

Belichick's decision to kick the FG on 4th down to make it 28-12, instead of going for the first down and chasing the points missed on the XPAT.

This stands out to me b/c as we all know, last year in the AFCCG Belichick eschewed the FG attempts and went for the down conversions. At the end of that game a number of people wrote about Belichick's decisions and questioned them, wondering if he would have been better off kicking the FGs. As it turned out, he probably would have been better off.

Fast forward to this year. Same situations, and Belichick opts for the field goal. I know he was looking at the math (12 points puts us within two scores of tying), but I wonder if he remembered last year and how he had to chase the points of the forsaken FGs because he had gone for the first down on fourth downs. I wouldn't doubt that he was remembering last year in his steel trap mind.

And Gost nearly killed the comeback before it even started. That was a horrifying FG attempt to watch.

 

[Norm Siebern]

Im personally thankful that we have a head coach who understands that these situations were nowhere near similar.

You are like the third person to mention not "chasing points" after the extra point and I still dont really have any idea what that means in this context. Ok, so its 28-10 instead of 28-9, why is the decision fundamentally different? Pats should be marginally more willing to kick down 18 rather than 19, but its pretty marginal.

Barnwell argues the Pats should have gone for it based on break even probabilities. WP charts moved the probability up 0.1% by kicking the field goal. I think kicking was right, but its a super marginal non-decision.

What does kicking a FG on 4th and 16 with 10 minutes left down 19 have to do with whether to kick a FG down 8 on 4th and 1 with 5 minutes or w/e left or to kick on 4th and goal down 8 with 2:30 minutes left?

This has been a common thread on here and Im generally befuddled. The Denver 4th down calls and the Atlanta 4th down call have almost nothing in common other than being on 4th down and the Patriots missing an extra point at some point earlier in the game. The idea that this was some sort of unsung decision were BB learned from a past mistake and that one call was correct and one call was incorrect is based entirely on the fact that the Pats made the 2 point conversion in the Super Bowl and didnt make a 2 point conversion in Denver.

Maybe Im the turd in the punch bowl, but this is supposed to be a fairly analytical board and the sloppy 4th down decision analysis bugs me.

I think he was doing the math and saw that a FG would push the score to 12, and bring the team within two scores of tying. I also think he may have remembered last year, but regardless the math said kick the FG. So he did. Not b/c the situations were similar, but because the math told him it was the correct decision. In other words he wasn't swayed by countervailing opinions. I'm glad we have a coach who thinks like that as well.

 

[Stitch01]

Well, within two scores about 25% of the time and the math was pretty marginal, rough cut came out to break even with about a 9-10% chance of success on 4th down and that's probably close to
what their chances are on 4th down there.

But I agree. I dont think he kicks a FG down by 20 so Im glad he could figure out that cutting the deficit to 28-12 got the team within 16.

 

[Captaincoop]

I think he was doing the math and saw that a FG would push the score to 12, and bring the team within two scores of tying. I also think he may have remembered last year, but regardless the math said kick the FG. So he did. Not b/c the situations were similar, but because the math told him it was the correct decision. In other words he wasn't swayed by countervailing opinions. I'm glad we have a coach who thinks like that as well.

It never even crossed my mind that maybe he should go for the TD there. That was already desperation time, and you're just trying to crack open a possible path to winning the game. Making that field goal is a near-certainty and gives the ball back to Atlanta immediately with the Pats needing two touchdowns by the final gun. Going for a TD is far more of a gamble, and even if you get it, you're still giving the ball back to Atlanta with the Pats needing two touchdowns (sure you don't need conversions in this scenario, but you also have less time on the clock).

At that point, you're clinging to the edge of a cliff and just doing whatever prolongs your life, right? I know some of the analytics folks have said he should have gone for the TD, but I just can't wrap my head around it in the real world.

 

[Stitch01]

It never even crossed my mind that maybe he should go for the TD there. That was already desperation time, and you're just trying to crack open a possible path to winning the game. Making that field goal is a near-certainty and gives the ball back to Atlanta immediately with the Pats needing two touchdowns by the final gun. Going for a TD is far more of a gamble, and even if you get it, you're still giving the ball back to Atlanta with the Pats needing two touchdowns.

At that point, you're clinging to the edge of a cliff and just doing whatever prolongs your life, right? I know some of the analytics folks have said he should have gone for the TD, but I just can't wrap my head around it in the real world.

This is one of the most common errors on egregious 4th down decision errors (this obviously wasn't one of them, it was marginal either way), the idea of maximizing the time a team is "alive" in the game rather than maximize the chances of winning the game.

Lets change the scenario a bit, if its 4th and goal from the 1 yard line there do you kick a FG or go for the TD? Going for the FG guarantees getting to within "two scores" and "extending the game" but reduces your chances of actually winning the game.

I thought the Pats did a great job at decision making yesterday once they were down 28-3. The onside kick, the Edelman pass to try and pick up the cheap score, the Pat Chung misdirection punt return, going for it on 4th down in the 3rd quarter. Most of those didnt work, but so what, down 28-3 swing for the fences.

BTW, I think they kick a FG there if Brady isnt sacked, and its probably a small mathematical mistake not really worth worrying about, but bet they would have correctly gone for the TD if they were at around the 5 or so.

 

[cshea]

No way to know for sure, but I think they would've gone for it had they not taken a sack on 3rd down that made it 4th and goal at the 16.

Re: the Kevin Faulk play- The 2 big times I remember them using it was the Carolina SB that put them up 29-22, and then again in the '06 Divisional Round against San Diego. I remember a few times with Woodhead too, but it is amazing that the same play in the same huge situations still works.

 

[DennyDoyle'sBoil]

I don't think it was a mathematical decision. I mean, I think he understood the math well enough to know that it was very close to a 50/50 choice. It was a true Hobson's choice, in the correct sense of the idiom. It was a choice between two bad alternatives. I think it probably came down to feel, because you could justify either decision on "math".

The odds of converting a fourth and 15 on a 25 yard field and the odds of making a 33 yard field goal can't be measured just on tables. Nor can you do the same with 2 point conversions odds. They have to be decided based on game situation, what matchups you think favor you and whether they favor the possibility of making that conversion, whether you think the game flow makes 16 points an impossibility, whether you think based on what the other team has shown you in the game a 2 point conversion has a decent chance, whether you have enough in your playbook to potentially convert two of them.

You also need to take into account the magnitude of the game, the length of the game, and the potential impact that various score scenarios have on your team and on your opponent. Hearing Belichick and McDaniels after the game, I think they were very focused on the idea of trying to get the game to a one score game, and believing that doing so would give them the best chance to win. Both spoke about how the Falcons had not played under that kind of pressure for the entire game, and both seemed to think that was where they might get an opportunity to make a big play. It seemed clear to me that they were thinking about a turnover. As it turned out, the turnover came early, but the idea that a one-score game might cause some weird decision making actually did turn out partly correct.

In short, I think the math was close enough to a wash to put an experienced coach in position to make the decision based on feel factors, like the end of Super Bowl 49. If it had been a 60/40 decision or something like that then I wouldn't like that kind of analysis, but I think the "math" said "this is a shit spot," and though I will never know what was in his head unless he tells us on this year's version of Do Your Job, my instinct is that the tie breaker for Belichick was that the whole second half he wanted to see what would happen if they could just get it to a one-score game, and kicking the field goal made that a possibility with 9:44 left.

I sincerely hope he would not have made a legitimately suboptimal decision based on the fact that it feels better and more comfortable to have it be a 2 score game. But this was hardly a suboptimal decision. It was close enough to a coin flip to actually apply some coaching and experience to the situation.

Edit: Actually, it wasn't a Hobson's choice! It was actually what people think a Hobson's choice is but isn't.

 

[MuppetAsteriskTalk]

Read somewhere that Brady was not under pressure on his last 15 throws.

9 throws on the final drive of the 4th and 5 throws in OT if I added the play-by-play correctly.

Prior to those two drives he was still getting pressured constantly.

 

[DennyDoyle'sBoil]

It has been reported that his communication system wasn't working.

Interesting decision to call time out in a difficult spot for that. Time outs are so important in football. They are options. But, I guess the Falcons weren't too worried they would need them at that point in the game given the score.

 

[Captaincoop]

This is one of the most common errors on egregious 4th down decision errors (this obviously wasn't one of them, it was marginal either way), the idea of maximizing the time a team is "alive" in the game rather than maximize the chances of winning the game.

Lets change the scenario a bit, if its 4th and goal from the 1 yard line there do you kick a FG or go for the TD? Going for the FG guarantees getting to within "two scores" and "extending the game" but reduces your chances of actually winning the game.

I thought the Pats did a great job at decision making yesterday once they were down 28-3. The onside kick, the Edelman pass to try and pick up the cheap score, the Pat Chung misdirection punt return, going for it on 4th down in the 3rd quarter. Most of those didnt work, but so what, down 28-3 swing for the fences.

BTW, I think they kick a FG there if Brady isnt sacked, and its probably a small mathematical mistake not really worth worrying about, but bet they would have correctly gone for the TD if they were at around the 5 or so.

That's not changing the scenario "a bit", that's totally changing the scenario. The Pats' odds of scoring on 4th and goal from the 1, with their offense and the Falcons defense, have to be over 75%.

I'm certainly not advocating passing up a 70+% chance of getting rid of the need for the conversions, but the chances were nowhere near 70% given where the Patriots actually were.

 

[speedracer]

No way to know for sure, but I think they would've gone for it had they not taken a sack on 3rd down that made it 4th and goal at the 16.

Re: the Kevin Faulk play- The 2 big times I remember them using it was the Carolina SB that put them up 29-22, and then again in the '06 Divisional Round against San Diego. I remember a few times with Woodhead too, but it is amazing that the same play in the same huge situations still works.

The tying 2pc in San Diego on 2007 was the first thing that popped into my head when White motioned back into the backfield -- I told everyone within earshot that he was getting the direct snap and was going to score.

I'm guessing Belichick goes for it on 4th and goal if it's at the 10 or closer. Live I thought they should have gone for it from the 16, but probably a marginal call either way.

 

[In Vino Vinatieri]

Do you think Belichick is doing the math in his head or does he have an assistant evil genius up in a booth with an abacus?

It's legal to use an abacus in the booth, just not on the sideline

I'm not really understanding the talk about the FG, but it was a small moment that I appreciated. Down 28-9 means you need three scores, so he banked one of them on a high percentage play. In a game with more time, like in the first half, and without the sack, you might be tempted to go for more points in the long run since the score of the game is indeterminate. That wasn't the case here though -- the Falcons had 28 points and the Patriots needed the Falcons to score zero from that point on. Going for a TD on a 4th & goal or whatever makes sense sometimes when you know you need to score a TD at some point since it's easier to get into range of a long FG easier, but the Patriots weren't in that situation. They needed 3 TDs, or they needed 2 TDs + 2 2PA + 1 FG. Is it easier to score a third TD easier than it is to get two 2-point conversions?

As for other little things I was really hoping Quinn's early challenge on Edelman out of bounds was going to matter more, especially after Ryan had to waste a timeout on whatever that helmet issue was. He was clearly really frustrated with it on TV and it looked like he was told he'd have to just deal with it because I think they gave him the same helmet back. The Patriots definitely outplayed Atlanta with clock management, but it wasn't necessarily the gamechanger that it could have been. It's easy to look at Ryan's last drive as a futile attempt at the impossible, but with another timeout or two they have a scary chance of getting into FG range to win the game like New England did in 2001.

I also loved the "early" onside kick. They needed desperate stops or a turnover and knew it. It's a gamble you don't want to have to make but one of the things I really love about Belichick is knowing when he has to gamble.

 

[lexrageorge]

I think Belichick's decision to kick the FG and take the 3 points came down to a number of factors based on the specific game situation, factors that are not easily captured in a probability table. The Pats had a pretty horrible sequence of 3 plays leading up to the 4th down, and the chances of getting 15 yards were simply not good in that situation. A field goal helps: it makes it a 2 score game. I realize the math tables say it was marginal, but this is one case where I don't believe it was marginal at all. It is much, much easier to get 2 TD's with 9+ minutes left than it is to get 3, which is what likely would have happened had they attempted go for the TD.

The Denver game is a different scenario: there were only 6 minutes left, and they only needed a yard to keep the drive going. You do hope you can make the yard in that situation. As it was, the Pats likely put Denver in worse field position than if they had kicked the FG and then did a regular kick. If it was 4th-and-long, I would have argued for the FG.

On the Pats second drive, they were 4th-and-6 on the Denver 14. But with only 2:25 left, it's even harder to assume you can get the ball back after a FG. Even with a successful onsides kick recovery, the Pats would have been further from the end zone than they were, albeit with a fresh set of downs, and still needing a TD.

 

[PedroKsBambino]

Kicking field goals in the Denver game would have been super dumb, so dont think that's really a learning/adapting. They'd go for both 4th downs again in similar spots. They'd probably have gone for it Sunday if it wasn't 4th and 16, as it was the decision was pretty close.

I was not a fan of FG at the time in the Denver game, but in retrospect it's simply not true that they would have been dumb. That was, I assume tims4wins point. Obviously you need to make the decisions at the point in time you are at (and I agree with lexrageorge that it's a different situation) but it's not quite as cut and dried as described.

I think it's pretty clear they learned from the Seattle game, I'm surprised you don't think so. I thought the Seattle playcalling was bad so perhaps it is more that they screwed that up and recognized it than that they really learned anything. Down 8 vs 7 matters, but only so much...Pats likely view themselves as, what, 60% on 2pts and 95% on XPs and in neither game was there any realistic chance of seeing ball again if they didn't score.

 

[tims4wins]

I was not a fan of FG at the time in the Denver game, but in retrospect it's simply not true that they would have been dumb. That was, I assume tims4wins point.

Exactly. 3 FG = 21-20. In retrospect.

 

[Stitch01]

That's not changing the scenario "a bit", that's totally changing the scenario. The Pats' odds of scoring on 4th and goal from the 1, with their offense and the Falcons defense, have to be over 75%.

I'm certainly not advocating passing up a 70+% chance of getting rid of the need for the conversions, but the chances were nowhere near 70% given where the Patriots actually were.

Well that's my point. At the one yard line its an obvious go for it. So its not about prolonging your life.

Again, I would have kicked here. I just don't think it was a real important decision win equity wise and don't think the Denver game decisions are relevant at all here.

 

[Stitch01]

I was not a fan of FG at the time in the Denver game, but in retrospect it's simply not true that they would have been dumb. That was, I assume tims4wins point. Obviously you need to make the decisions at the point in time you are at (and I agree with lexrageorge that it's a different situation) but it's not quite as cut and dried as described.

I think it's pretty clear they learned from the Seattle game, I'm surprised you don't think so.

Yes it is true unless you think BB has a crystal ball. It would have been dumb to kick in 4th and 1 and catastrophically dumb to kick on 4th and goal with 2:25 to go. 4th and 6 in Denver they kick a FG.

Seattle wasn't the first time the Pats tried to kill the clock before scoring and it won't be the last. BB didn't "learn" anything, he played each individual situation the way he thought best as he always has. Pretty sure given his 50 years or so in the game he figured out that not scoring a TD was possible before he made the decisions he did in the Seattle game.

 

[PedroKsBambino]

Yes it is true unless you think BB has a crystal ball. It would have been dumb to kick in 4th and 1 and catastrophically dumb to kick on 4th and goal with 2:25 to go.

This is not about crystal balls, it is about probabilities and those are informed by data---which includes how things have gone in the past. The point made was that if they had kicked in the Denver game they would have been better off (looking at it with benefit of knowing how things went). That's simply a fact, whether you recognize it or not. Now, that being true in a past game is not a guarantee the same will happen in the future, but it is data that enters the analysis. Which was the point made, at least how I took it. If tims4wins was suggesting the conclusion is 'always take the FG' then obviously that's not the right takeaway...but I don't think that was the point.

 

[Captaincoop]

Well that's my point. At the one yard line its an obvious go for it. So its not about prolonging your life.

Again, I would have kicked here. I just don't think it was a real important decision win equity wise and don't think the Denver game decisions are relevant at all here.

Lazy phrasing on my part...but again, I don't see how he could have seriously considered going for that TD on Sunday.

 

[dhappy42]

It's legal to use an abacus in the booth, just not on the sideline

I'm not really understanding the talk about the FG, but it was a small moment that I appreciated. Down 28-9 means you need three scores, so he banked one of them on a high percentage play. In a game with more time, like in the first half, and without the sack, you might be tempted to go for more points in the long run since the score of the game is indeterminate. That wasn't the case here though -- the Falcons had 28 points and the Patriots needed the Falcons to score zero from that point on. Going for a TD on a 4th & goal or whatever makes sense sometimes when you know you need to score a TD at some point since it's easier to get into range of a long FG easier, but the Patriots weren't in that situation. They needed 3 TDs, or they needed 2 TDs + 2 2PA + 1 FG. Is it easier to score a third TD easier than it is to get two 2-point conversions?

As for other little things I was really hoping Quinn's early challenge on Edelman out of bounds was going to matter more, especially after Ryan had to waste a timeout on whatever that helmet issue was. He was clearly really frustrated with it on TV and it looked like he was told he'd have to just deal with it because I think they gave him the same helmet back. The Patriots definitely outplayed Atlanta with clock management, but it wasn't necessarily the gamechanger that it could have been. It's easy to look at Ryan's last drive as a futile attempt at the impossible, but with another timeout or two they have a scary chance of getting into FG range to win the game like New England did in 2001.

I also loved the "early" onside kick. They needed desperate stops or a turnover and knew it. It's a gamble you don't want to have to make but one of the things I really love about Belichick is knowing when he has to gamble.

I refuse to do the math, but at the time I favored going for a TD over the FG. I understand the "three scores, get one now" argument, but thought holding the Falcons to zero was unlikely. A TD there sets up a regulation-time win if Atl doesn't score, removes the need for two 2Pt. XPs, and you're still in it if Atl scores 3, which they should have done if not for the sack&hold.

 

[tims4wins]

This is not about crystal balls, it is about probabilities and those are informed by data---which includes how things have gone in the past. The point made was that if they had kicked in the Denver game they would have been better off (looking at it with benefit of knowing how things went). That's simply a fact, whether you recognize it or not. Now, that being true in a past game is not a guarantee the same will happen in the future, but it is data that enters the analysis. Which was the point made, at least how I took it. If tims4wins was suggesting the conclusion is 'always take the FG' then obviously that's not the right takeaway...but I don't think that was the point.

Right, it wasn't always take the FG. And I think more of this is being made than I meant. Obviously it was 4th and forever so there wasn't much chance of going for it. I just appreciated that they did kick it.

Also, let's not forget that something similar happened in the 2013 AFCCG in Denver. The Pats didn't kick a FG once or twice because they were down a bunch and ended up losing by 10. If they had kicked a FG earlier instead of failing on 4th they'd have made it a 1 score game and had a chance. So it was more than just last year actually.

 

[Stitch01]

This is not about crystal balls, it is about probabilities and those are informed by data---which includes how things have gone in the past. The point made was that if they had kicked in the Denver game they would have been better off (looking at it with benefit of knowing how things went). That's simply a fact, whether you recognize it or not. Now, that being true in a past game is not a guarantee the same will happen in the future, but it is data that enters the analysis. Which was the point made, at least how I took it. If tims4wins was suggesting the conclusion is 'always take the FG' then obviously that's not the right takeaway...but I don't think that was the point.

We have literally thousands of NFL games for data to use for conversion percentages. I think we should look at thousands of games rather than one when evaluating decisions. YMMV.

Or maybe the Falcons made a mistake not going for two after their 4th touchdown.

 

[PedroKsBambino]

For me, the most infamous non-FG attempt was the one in 2007. That's a very, very different situation, though.

Let me put it all this way---I'd be a little surprised if Pats were not regularly looking at their model for thinking about when to go for it, when to kick a FG, and when to punt. The effectiveness of the offense and the value of points vary year to year. As they do that, I do imagine they have looked their past tendencies and how those worked out. Which I doubt changed the FG decision Sunday, but likely is going on because that's how they do things.

 

[PedroKsBambino]

We have literally thousands of NFL games for data to use for conversion percentages. I think we should look at thousands of games rather than one when evaluating decisions. YMMV.

Or maybe the Falcons made a mistake not going for two after their 4th touchdown.

No one is suggesting using just one game, though.

 

[Stitch01]

No one is suggesting using just one game, though.

I guess "learning from the Denver game" or "learning from the Seattle game" have alternative fact meanings or was shorthand for "adjusted his model with the extra 1/2500th of data" .

I refuse to do the math, but at the time I favored going for a TD over the FG. I understand the "three scores, get one now" argument, but thought holding the Falcons to zero was unlikely. A TD there sets up a regulation-time win if Atl doesn't score, removes the need for two 2Pt. XPs, and you're still in it if Atl scores 3, which they should have done if not for the sack&hold.

Barnwell looked at the historical 3rd and goal conversion percentage and the break-even conversion percentage needed and the thing target it left the Pats aiming for and concluded they should go for it.

Given it was close and Brady had been sacked twice in three plays I was OK kicking even with the thin target. I think onside kicking after was a viable option.

Ultimately I think it was close enough to be a feel decision and either way seemed fine. This was different from in Denver where BB made the clear correct call on both decisions.

 

[dhappy42]

Yikes. Just watched the last three plays in OT. (Son was re-watching the 4th Q and OT and I just popped in for the finale.) Didn't realize how close the fade to Bennett was to being an intercepted.

 

[PedroKsBambino]

I guess "learning from the Denver game" or "learning from the Seattle game" have alternative fact meanings or was shorthand for "adjusted his model with the extra 1/2500th of data" .

You can keep setting up new straw men, but none will change what the poster was actually saying in the first place which was much simpler.

As noted before, I would be pretty surprised if the Pats did not have their own model, and if the assumptions were not a lot more nuanced than 'treat all games from forever the same' or 'assume 50% 2 pt' as Barnwell did. Like others here I look at those kinds of tools to try and get a rough sense of things, but the Pats are likely looking a lot deeper than that. For me, as we have done on the Main Board for years and years, we do best when we try to figure out what they might be doing and looking at rather than just assuming they were right and wishing away any complexity. I'd be surprised if they aren't self-evaluating decisions about situational stuff they same way they self-evaluate the offense and defensive tendencies. That doesn't mean any given game changes their model completely---and it also doesn't mean that they ignore the past when thinking about the next decision. Their assessment of their own decisions is a lot more relevant than some game 20 years ago that didn't involve Belichick and I suspect their model reflects that.

 

[Bellhorn]

Maybe Im the turd in the punch bowl, but this is supposed to be a fairly analytical board and the sloppy 4th down decision analysis bugs me.

You're certainly not alone there, and thanks for adding some rigor in this thread.

Regarding the game, maybe this was covered elsewhere, but kicking the XP after the first touchdown was unequivocally wrong (under the assumption of constant 2-pt success probability). Not a huge deal overall because the probability of a comeback was still so low, but certainly more of an issue than the coin-flip FG decision on the next drive.

One the other hand, maybe that was the ultimate "little thing" that ended up working out in the Patriots' favor. If we (fallaciously) assume that Ghost was going to miss an XP at some point anyway, better that it happened early enough that the two-pointers could make up for it. It would have been the ultimate nut punch to have (correctly) attempted and made the 2-pt after the first TD, only for Ghost to pull a John Carney after the last one.

 

[PedroKsBambino]

I thought I'd heard BB suggest that 2 pt attempts before the 4th quarter are rarely good strategy, largely because the range of possible outcomes for the remaining game is so wide that you can't really justify the reduced expected value of a 2 pt attempt.

That said, you raise an interesting point in that this game had a unique set of simplifying assumptions in place: you pretty much had to assume no more Falcons points (at most, maybe you assumed a chance of a FG) because you have very little chance of winning in any other scenario and thus its not worth worrying about. Once you assume the target is 28 (maybe 31) and you are at 9, does 10 vs 11 matter? I think you're right that 11 would set you up for two regular XPs with a field goal (to get to 28), whereas if you miss the 2 you need what actually occurred (2 tds, 2 2pts, and a FG)...but you know what to do each time.

I do suspect they had a level of concern about Ghost, but not enough to materially change the analysis of the XP try.

 

[Hendu At The Wall]

Barnwell looked at the historical 3rd and goal conversion percentage and the break-even conversion percentage needed and the thing target it left the Pats aiming for and concluded they should go for it...

This was different from in Denver where BB made the clear correct call on both decisions.

The other way to look at it is that Belichick sees these situations as not so different at all. He seems to have a strong bias for making decisions that assume the 2 point conversions percentages are favorable. More favorable than Barnwell's historical model, that is.

Of course Belichick is aware of the historical percentages, but he may believe the Pats can do better given the situation.

Also not factored into the 2 point conversion probability in Barnwell's historical model is the late game situation in both games. He knows that if they need the 2, the opponent (Denver or ATL) is exhausted and facing collapse. Belichik called out team conditioning as a deciding factor post-game, and probably felt his team would be stronger if they needed 2 to tie very late in the game.