OK, but correct me if I am wrong here---edmunddantes said:I think if we ever saw the privileged notes, there was probably a lot of massaging and lawyering to try and make this work. Sunk cost fallacy. We've come this far, spent $X and Y hours. Let's keep pushing it. What's the worse that happens? We lose independent arbitrator grounds? We've already lost that a couple of times. What's one more going to hurt?
Isn't this why your lawyers make the big bucks? They are supposed to recognize risk and advise how to mitigate it. The NFL outside counsel should have been telling the NFL to slow down and think, that Brady was not Incognito, and things can get out of your control when they get to federal court. Again, this risk was no surprise. Federal judges and arbitrators had chided Goodell in Bountygate, and in the Rice and Peterson cases. Maybe it seemed to laymen that they could keep counting on the same result, but I can't imagine how experienced litigators here can warn not to piss off federal judges, but Paul, Weiss partners didn't have enough foresight or self-confidence to lay that out. Their reputation was on the line.
Here's a concrete question: at what point, if you are Wells, do you start taking cautious action to protect your own reputation? Before the report is issued when you realize there is no evidence? Before the coached press conference? Before the appeal? Wells was swinging his ego around unnecessarily even during the appeal, when he had to know there were good odds the judge in the eventual suit would make the transcript public.
Edit: or never? Is Wells' only mistake that he took the work and after that he's gotta do what the client wants?