78 replies to this topic

[bombdiggz]

So of the seven players who have seen major league time or are about to, four were traded away and play positions that the Red Sox have had to fill this off season with reclamation projects or average but not exciting players.  If we had Masterson in the rotation and Kelly in AAA, Rizzo at first base and Reddick in right field, there would be a very different feeling about this team right now.

 

Reading this actually causes me an adverse physical reaction. Even if we had half of those players, especially Rizzo and Reddick, the feeling would be significantly different.

 

It's also a stretch to say they developed someone like Josh Reddick. If they expected him to do what he did last year, would they have traded him for a set up man? Corner outfield and first should theoretically be somewhat easy positions to fill, yet it seems quite likely that guys like Ryan Sweeney and Mauro Gomez will get lots of at bats this year.

 

Josh Reddick spent 5 years in the Red Sox organization. He totaled roughly 2,000 ml PA and 400 more with the big league team.

 

He then when on to amass 0 ml at bats for the Athletics, as he was starting from opening day onward.

 

Who do you credit with his development? Do you propose the A's developed him in spring training?

Edited by bombdiggz, 28 January 2013 - 12:23 PM.

[Rudy Pemberton]

Well, I think the A's figured out a way to get production out of Reddick that the Red Sox likely didn't think was possible (if they did, I don't think they flip him for a set up man). I think the A"s do get some credit for identifying an undervalued player and putting him a position to succeed (and being patient for that success). Whether it was coaching, environment, etc.; I don't know. I guess you can credit the Sox for developing him if it makes you feel better about the organization, but to date, where's the value? They never got any out of Reddick or the guy they traded him for.

[Super Nomario]

Well, I think the A's figured out a way to get production out of Reddick that the Red Sox likely didn't think was possible (if they did, I don't think they flip him for a set up man). I think the A"s do get some credit for identifying an undervalued player and putting him a position to succeed (and being patient for that success). Whether it was coaching, environment, etc.; I don't know. I guess you can credit the Sox for developing him if it makes you feel better about the organization, but to date, where's the value? They never got any out of Reddick or the guy they traded him for.

If the A's figured something out, they unfigured it out over the second half of last year, when Reddick hit .215/.256/.391.

 

He's always been super-streaky and he's usually shown good power. In Boston he flashed the streakiness but not really the power. Oakland got pretty ideal performance out of Reddick in the first half of last year; I'm not sure that's indicative of what you can expect going forward. He's got 791 AAA PA and 1076 major league PA and he's averaging exactly a .300 OBP in both.

[Savin Hillbilly]

I guess you can credit the Sox for developing him if it makes you feel better about the organization, but to date, where's the value? They never got any out of Reddick or the guy they traded him for.

 

First of all, Reddick was not, overall, a better player for the A's in 2012 than for the Sox in 2011. His wRC+ was essentially identical in both years: 107 then 108. His defensive numbers, likewise, were about the same. If you prorate his 2011 WAR (either version) to his 2012 playing time (about 2.5x), you'll see they're pretty much the same.

 

The big thing that changed (other than the big increase in playing time) was that his HR power took off, not a terribly surprising development for a 25-year-old. What kept his offensive value about the same as in 2011 was a drop in OBP resulting from a big dip in BABIP (predictable for someone moving from Boston to Oakland) and a minor spike in K rate.

 

The point is, Reddick wasn't some stalled problem child who magically turned into a good player in Oakland. He was a promising young player taking one more step toward fulfilling his promise. It doesn't make any sense to credit the A's for something that didn't even happen.

[Rudy Pemberton]

Reddick had more WAR last year than Bailey has had in his career. If what he did last season was expected, than I question why in the hell the Sox traded him for a relief pitcher. I get what you are saying about how his wRC+ being the same, but being able to maintain the performance in 2.5X the playing time is a huge deal- especially since Reddick had a 244 / 293 / 389 line in the second half of '11 (after a 1100 OPS In 70 first half PA's). Reddick had multiple quotes last year about how great the environment was in Oakland, when compared to Boston, so yes, I do think the organization should get some credit for giving him a chance and sticking with him as opposed to the one that dumped him after a lousy half year (and is now paying $13M+ for a replacement, while deciding the guy they got for Reddick isn't even good enough to close here).

 

Regardless, I think we can all agree that this is a big year for Reddick and how he does will determine how much we hate the Bailey trade going forward.

Edited by Rudy Pemberton, 28 January 2013 - 02:26 PM.

[absintheofmalaise]

Reddick had more WAR last year than Bailey has had in his career. If what he did last season was expected, than I question why in the hell the Sox traded him for a relief pitcher. I get what you are saying about how his wRC+ being the same, but being able to maintain the performance in 2.5X the playing time is a huge deal- especially since Reddick had a 244 / 293 / 389 line in the second half of '11 (after a 1100 OPS In 70 first half PA's). Reddick had multiple quotes last year about how great the environment was in Oakland, when compared to Boston, so yes, I do think the organization should get some credit for giving him a chance and sticking with him as opposed to the one that dumped him after a lousy half year (and is now paying $13M+ for a replacement, while deciding the guy they got for Reddick isn't even good enough to close here).

 

Regardless, I think we can all agree that this is a big year for Reddick and how he does will determine how much we hate the Bailey trade going forward.

 

While I do agree that this was not a particularly good deal for the Sox, no one was expecting Reddick to have the kind of year he had. That includes Billy Beane, based on an interview I saw with him after the season. 

 

I did want to mention that you can't really use WAR to compare an everyday player like Reddick and a pitcher like Bailey. The way FG and B-Ref compute WAR for positional players and pitchers have nothing in common. For positional they use offense  + baserunning + defense + positional + replacement value. For pitchers they use FIP and innings pitched. This is from FG - 

Based on how many innings a pitcher threw, FIP is turned into runs form, converted to represent value above replacement level, and is then converted from runs to wins.

 

 

I realize that this discussion is about Bailey right now, but would you have been a fan of Reddick for any closer trade? I'm asking because I looked up some WAR numbers on a couple of others. These are for their best years according to WAR. Rivera in 1996 4.4, Papelbon in 2006 3.2 and Kimbrel in 2012 3.6 

[Rudy Pemberton]

Fair enough, if we just want to look at WAR for position players, Reddick would have been the best player on the Sox last year (and a top 25 player in the league). He had a pretty good season, a great one depending on how one evaluates defense.

 

As far as whether I would have traded Reddick for a closer? Maybe, but it would probably have to be a guy I was confident in. Not a guy who I'd dump from the role after 15 mediocre innings. Ultimately, perhaps the team would have been better off with Papelbon & Reddick, as opposed to the process that got us to Victorino & Hanrahan / Bailey.

[Snodgrass'Muff]

The value Reddick had when traded has nothing to do with how the team values Bailey now and everything to do with how they valued him when they made the trade.  When they traded Reddick, they traded him for a closer with a track record of dominance and a complimentary outfielder.  That Bailey's value has dropped since then does not retroactively make the trade a "dump" of Reddick for a bullpen arm they aren't confident in.

[Rudy Pemberton]

The value Reddick had when traded has nothing to do with how the team values Bailey now and everything to do with how they valued him when they made the trade.  When they traded Reddick, they traded him for a closer with a track record of dominance and a complimentary outfielder.  That Bailey's value has dropped since then does not retroactively make the trade a "dump" of Reddick for a bullpen arm they aren't confident in.

That 15 mediocre innings completely changed their opinion on Bailey isn't a concern to you? Frankly, I think they overreacted to a lousy second half for Reddick, sold low, and then panicked when Bailey had a lousy fifteen innings and decided they had to have a proven closer like Hanrahan, despite the fact that Hanrahan's xFIP last year was substantially worse than any of Bailey's full seasons. 

 

If the Red Sox expected Reddick to do what he did last year, would they have traded him, especially for Bailey? I don't think so. I guess we can agree to disagree, but the sequence of events in dealing with the closer positions since Cherington took over has been especially puzzling.

[Snodgrass'Muff]

I think you're conflating the two separate situations.  Do I think they are overreacting to Bailey struggling when they came back by dealing for another closer?  Yes, I do.  Does that mean I believe they didn't value Bailey highly last year?  No, it doesn't.  They can absolutely have thought Bailey was a valuable piece last year when they traded for him and have changed their mind by now.

 

I just don't see any real evidence that they were dumping Reddick last year.  Guess we'll have to agree to disagree there.

[Savin Hillbilly]

I did want to mention that you can't really use WAR to compare an everyday player like Reddick and a pitcher like Bailey. The way FG and B-Ref compute WAR for positional players and pitchers have nothing in common.

 

The second of these statements in no way implies the first. Of course they're computed differently; the two data sets are completely different. But the whole point of using the same term for both numbers is that they should be, in theory, comparable. Whether this works--i.e., whether the methods used to compute the positional and pitching versions of WAR really do result in comparable numbers--is open to question, of course; but to suggest that the comparison is inherently off limits simply because the numbers are drawn from different data sets is begging the question.

[Rasputin]

That 15 mediocre innings completely changed their opinion on Bailey isn't a concern to you? Frankly, I think they overreacted to a lousy second half for Reddick, sold low, and then panicked when Bailey had a lousy fifteen innings and decided they had to have a proven closer like Hanrahan, despite the fact that Hanrahan's xFIP last year was substantially worse than any of Bailey's full seasons. 

 

If the Red Sox expected Reddick to do what he did last year, would they have traded him, especially for Bailey? I don't think so. I guess we can agree to disagree, but the sequence of events in dealing with the closer positions since Cherington took over has been especially puzzling.

 

I think you're projecting a lot. I don't see any reason to believe that fifteen mediocre innings have changed anyone's opinion about anything and I certainly don't think the front office has suddenly decided to buy into the notion of a Proven Closer TM after letting Papelbon walk.

 

I think the team looked at the recent history in baseball, saw that one of the better ways for an otherwise mediocre team to win a bunch of games is to have an outstanding bullpen and, knowing the bullpen arms are particularly volatile, picked up an extra one for fungible parts just because they could.

[twothousandone]

I think the team looked at the recent history in baseball, saw that one of the better ways for an otherwise mediocre team to win a bunch of games is to have an outstanding bullpen and, knowing the bullpen arms are particularly volatile, picked up an extra one for fungible parts just because they could.

And perhaps they also recognized the potential of gaining similar value as they gave up in a deadline trade for an extra bullpen arm. If the value is similar, then in exchange for salary dollars, they have purchased the option to keep a valuable arm if they are in the race, and "get their money back" if they fall out of the race, in this case, the "money" being Melancon, Pimentel and Sands.

[SMU_Sox]

The second of these statements in no way implies the first. Of course they're computed differently; the two data sets are completely different. But the whole point of using the same term for both numbers is that they should be, in theory, comparable. Whether this works--i.e., whether the methods used to compute the positional and pitching versions of WAR really do result in comparable numbers--is open to question, of course; but to suggest that the comparison is inherently off limits simply because the numbers are drawn from different data sets is begging the question.

 

In theory? I suppose - but even in theory you have to be very sure that those two sets of data can give you a comparable number. We're not talking about comparing efficiency in different factories using two different widget systems. WAR doesn't do a great job of looking at scarcity either. Sure fWAR has a way of incorporating for that (positional adjustments) - but it also has an arbitrary metric: the replacement player and not the average player.  

 

No they are not completely off limits for a comparison. Would I be hesitant to compare them though? Yes. A lot of this depends on how inaccurate you think WAR is for pitchers vs position players (and which WAR is more inaccurate).

 

I am not convinced that the two numbers are comparable and furthermore I think WAR is inherently flawed for both pitchers and position players. Therefore you are, at best, comparing two really flawed numbers. If you want a rough estimate or barometer I see why you could look at that. But should you? That's your call. I wouldn't. I love numbers, Savin. I play with them all day long. It's not like I'm some old school fan here. But methodology trumps convenience for a one-number-to-rule-them-all stat. And the methodology here is dubious at best and sufficiently flawed and misleading at worst.

[Rasputin]

In theory? I suppose - but even in theory you have to be very sure that those two sets of data can give you a comparable number. We're not talking about comparing efficiency in different factories using two different widget systems. WAR doesn't do a great job of looking at scarcity either. Sure fWAR has a way of incorporating for that (positional adjustments) - but it also has an arbitrary metric: the replacement player and not the average player.  

 

No they are not completely off limits for a comparison. Would I be hesitant to compare them though? Yes. A lot of this depends on how inaccurate you think WAR is for pitchers vs position players (and which WAR is more inaccurate).

 

I am not convinced that the two numbers are comparable and furthermore I think WAR is inherently flawed for both pitchers and position players. Therefore you are, at best, comparing two really flawed numbers. If you want a rough estimate or barometer I see why you could look at that. But should you? That's your call. I wouldn't. I love numbers, Savin. I play with them all day long. It's not like I'm some old school fan here. But methodology trumps convenience for a one-number-to-rule-them-all stat. And the methodology here is dubious at best and sufficiently flawed and misleading at worst.

 

So let me get this straight. We had a Shirley Jackson short story, interrupted it with numbers, and now we're interrupting the numbers to get all meta-existential on the numbers.

 

Just, you know, checkin'

[Rudy Pemberton]

Reports today suggesting he's out at least 6 months; so basically three lost years in a row. Dammit.

[Rasputin]

Reports today suggesting he's out at least 6 months; so basically three lost years in a row. Dammit.

Twitter be sayin' five, but, yeah. He just can't catch a break for nothin'.

[bosockboy]

Kalish and Westmoreland's unfortunate luck have had a pretty big dent on the major league club.

[maufman]

Kalish and Westmoreland's unfortunate luck have had a pretty big dent on the major league club.

 

Westmoreland's illness was truly a freakish thing. Kalish, not so much.

 

You're going to get guys from time to time who, like Kalish, never get a chance to fulfill their potential due to injury. I don't think the Sox have had an unusually large number of those.

 

Kalish's failure (and I don't think it's too soon to call it that) hurts the Sox particularly badly for three reasons:

 

1. Right about when they graduated their last great batch of prospects (Pedroia, Lester, Ellsbury, Buchholz), the Sox farm system shifted away from its focus on college players to a greater focus on younger talent. This placed an inordinate amount of pressure on the transitional generation of prospects, which was thin by design. Kalish was part of this generation.

 

2. The Sox anticipated that their pipeline of young talent would run a bit dry for a few years and signed Lackey, Crawford and Gonzalez to help bridge the gap. Needless to say, that didn't work out.

 

3. Among Kalish's developmental peers, the two guys who appear likely to generate the most value during their six cost-controlled years (Rizzo and Reddick) were traded away in deals that the Sox, with the benefit of hindsight, wish they hadn't done.

Edited by maufman, 01 February 2013 - 11:56 AM.

[lexrageorge]

Westmoreland's illness was truly a freakish thing. Kalish, not so much.

 

You're going to get guys from time to time who, like Kalish, never get a chance to fulfill their potential due to injury. I don't think the Sox have had an unusually large number of those.

 

Kalish's failure (and I don't think it's too soon to call it that) hurts the Sox particularly badly for three reasons:

 

1. Right about when they graduated their last great batch of prospects (Pedroia, Lester, Ellsbury, Buchholz), the Sox farm system shifted away from its focus on college players to a greater focus on younger talent. This placed an inordinate amount of pressure on the transitional generation of prospects, which was thin by design. Kalish was part of this generation.

 

2. The Sox anticipated that their pipeline of young talent would run a bit dry for a few years and signed Lackey, Crawford and Gonzalez to help bridge the gap. Needless to say, that didn't work out.

 

3. Among Kalish's developmental peers, the two guys who appear likely to generate the most value during their six cost-controlled years (Rizzo and Reddick) were traded away in deals that the Sox, with the benefit of hindsight, wish they hadn't done.

 

I have a minor nit:  if they didn't trade Rizzo, they don't get Gonzalez.  If they don't have Gonzalez, there is no way they would have been able to get rid of Crawford and Beckett. 

 

In general, I dispute the notion that Gonzalez "didn't work out".  He may not have worked as well as they had hoped, but there's no way he deserves to be mentioned in the same breath as Crawford and Lackey.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Twitter be sayin' five, but, yeah. He just can't catch a break for nothin'.

 

 

Catch a break? He's made out of crystal. He's not unlucky, he's Jed Lowrie redux. 3 years in a row? This is who he is.

[mwonow]

Catch a break? He's made out of crystal. He's not unlucky, he's Jed Lowrie redux. 3 years in a row? This is who he is.

 

+1 - and like Lowrie, I think Kalish would have been a plus player if he could have stayed on the field

[Savin Hillbilly]

He's not unlucky, he's Jed Lowrie redux.

 

Because, of course, we know with the deep certainty of Calvinist New Englanders that Jed Lowrie is not unlucky.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

You mean the guy who's yet to play in more than 100 games in a season, or to reach 400 PAs, because his body keeps exploding into a billion little pieces?

 

Yeah, I think we do know. He's not unlucky. He's brittle. How many years in a row must a player suffer a catastrophic injury that costs him nearly 1/2 a season before we realize he's injury prone? And these aren't the "getting run over by Adrian Beltre" injuries that Ellsbury has suffered either.

[Super Nomario]

1. Right about when they graduated their last great batch of prospects (Pedroia, Lester, Ellsbury, Buchholz), the Sox farm system shifted away from its focus on college players to a greater focus on younger talent. This placed an inordinate amount of pressure on the transitional generation of prospects, which was thin by design. Kalish was part of this generation.

Do you think this is true?

 

Ellsbury and Buchholz were both drafted in 2005.

 

In 2006, 8 of their first 10 picks were 4-year college guys. 4 never made the majors, 2 (Dustin Richardson and Aaron Bates) only nominally did, and the best player from that class (Justin Masterson) was traded. The 2 high school guys (Jason Place and Caleb Clay) were busts.

2007 was more high school-based, with 6 of their first 8 high schoolers. But the first pick - Nick Hagadone - was a college guy. Of the high picks, Middlebrooks and Rizzo are now breaking through.

In 2008, 3 of the top 5 and 6 of the top 9 draftees were 4-year collegiates.

 

It's too late to judge the more recent classes, but in 2010 the top 4 picks were all from college, in 2012 the top 3. I'm not seeing much of a shift towards younger talent; I think it just hasn't developed quite as well, with some key pieces (Rizzo, Kelly, Masterson) being traded away.

[SoxLegacy]

Catch a break? He's made out of crystal. He's not unlucky, he's Jed Lowrie redux. 3 years in a row? This is who he is.

 

I don't know, I am not so sure he's crystal, it seems more like bad luck to me. He's had one injury--the labrum--that resulted in two additional injuries/procedures--the bulging disk which I think was a result of the labrum tear, and now the follow-on surgery which was an arthroscopic procedure and labrum repair for the right shoulder. Hopefully he'll be back and able to contribute to the team in a meaningful way. According to this article, the surgery was successful. Performed by Dr. Yocum, hopefully assisted by Dr. Rudy Wells and the rest of the team that worked on Steve Austin. http://www.mlbinjury...-undergoes.html

Edited by SoxLegacy, 01 February 2013 - 05:13 PM.

[Papelbon's Poutine]

How would a labrum tear lead to a bulging disc? I'm not DRS or anything but that seems unlikely to me.

[SoxLegacy]

How would a labrum tear lead to a bulging disc? I'm not DRS or anything but that seems unlikely to me.

PP, If I recall correctly, I think it was mentioned somewhere that the bulging disk came about due to something he did during the recovery period. Of course, I could be wrong, and as I am not a doctor nor do I play one on tv, probably am.

[OCD SS]

Looking at how Kalish went into Carlos Santana, I don't think "made of crystal" is the right metaphor. He's always tried to play baseball like a football player.

 

Shoulder injuries can be career killers for pitchers, and really it's not much different for hitters. Even if he can come back, the development he's lost by not playing at a crucial age probably means he's not going to turn into meaningful long term solution for the Red Sox, which is too bad, but is the sort of attrition that always needs to be applied to even the most promising prospects.