730 replies to this topic

[Pumpsie]

And Don & Jerry were all on about how smart running for Adrian was because he would've been out on the bunt attempt. Well no...he shouldn't have been bunting in the first place and Pods should've been out too, Chen had plenty of time to go to 3rd.

If Adrian Gonzalez had been running, Chen WOULD have went to third. So, there's that.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

If Adrian Gonzalez had been running, Chen WOULD have went to third. So, there's that.

Of course, had Adrian been on second Darnell wouldn't have been bunting at all.

[glennhoffmania]

Four times this year, Valentine has made an in-game move that resulted in Punto or Podsednik hitting instead of Gonzalez or Middlebrooks with the team down a run in either the 8th or 9th inning.

I was about to respond to Lex but this sums it up. The point isn't how many times he's called for a bunt combined with a head scratching substitution. It's when and how costly those decisions were.

[glennhoffmania]

Of course, had Adrian been on second Darnell wouldn't have been bunting at all.

I wouldn't be so sure about that. Would you really have been shocked if he left Adrian in the game and still had Darnell bunt? I've stopped trying to figure out Bobby's thought processes.

[kieckeredinthehead]

First, with regards to sacrifice attempts: I echo the comments that I wouldn't read too much into the number of sacrifice hits or even attempts at this point in the season. For one, even at 17 attempts, that is still less than 1% of all plate appearances, so there will likely be significant bumps in the data due to sample size affects, even in September.

Last year, Boston was last in the AL with 22 sacrifice bunts. In 2010, they were second to last with 29 sacrifice bunts. In 2009, they were second to last with 19. This year they are tied for first. Your contention is that the change could be due to random noise, and not a change in managerial strategy?

[Plympton91]

Last year, Boston was last in the AL with 22 sacrifice bunts. In 2010, they were second to last with 29 sacrifice bunts. In 2009, they were second to last with 19. This year they are tied for first. Your contention is that the change could be due to random noise, and not a change in managerial strategy?

Sure, if you define "random noise" as Mike Aviles for Marco Scutaro, Marlon Byrd/Scott Podsednik for Jacoby Ellsbury, and Ryan Sweeney/Darnell McDonald for JD Drew.

Edited by Plympton91, 07 June 2012 - 12:52 PM.

[lexrageorge]

Last year, Boston was last in the AL with 22 sacrifice bunts. In 2010, they were second to last with 29 sacrifice bunts. In 2009, they were second to last with 19. This year they are tied for first. Your contention is that the change could be due to random noise, and not a change in managerial strategy?

They are tied for first in successful bunts, but 6th in attempts. The latter is much more important.

The difference between teams right now, at this point in the season, is fairly small. Only a handful of attempts seperate the top and bottom right now. So, random noise plays a huge part right now.

Is there a change in strategy? Probably. Is it better or worse than Francona's strategy? Unclear. I'm not a charter member of the "never bunt" crowd; there are situations where the bunt is justified. Francona probably could have sacrificed more often.

The 4 situations Laurila noted is less of an issue with sacrifice bunt attempts, IMO, than with game strategy around pinch running, etc. That is a concern, and the criticism is warranted.

[glennhoffmania]

Sure, if you define "random noise" as Mike Aviles for Marco Scutaro, Marlon Byrd/Scott Podsednik for Jacoby Ellsbury, and Ryan Sweeney/Darnell McDonald for JD Drew.

One could argue that two of those three swaps are upgrades.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Time to dig up Tango's tables again:

Run expectancy:

1st and 2nd, 0 outs: 1.556
2nd and 3rd, 1 out: 1.447

Chances of 1 run scoring in the inning:

1st and 2nd, 0 outs: .643
2nd and 3rd, 1 out: .698

So, Valentine gained a marginally better shot at scoring 1 run in the inning, but cost himself a chance overall runs scored. But he removed one of his best hitters (and again, while Gonzalez is struggling is there anyone who wanted Scotty Pods hitting in the 9th instead of Agon) to do so. And he did it in the 7th inning, which is usually considered too early to be playing for just one run.

[NDame616]

It's almost as if he doesn't learn from prior experiences!

The 7th struck me as far too early a time to execute a strategy of sacrifice and pulling one of your best hitters at the same time.

Gonzalez is 7th on the Red Sox in OPS

(runs and hides)

Seriously though, I'm assuming Bobby V knows how bad Gonzalez is hitting and that may factor in his choice to pull him. If he was batting .340 with a 950 OPS, he may be managing the pinch running situation differently.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Gonzalez is 7th on the Red Sox in OPS

(runs and hides)

Seriously though, I'm assuming Bobby V knows how bad Gonzalez is hitting and that may factor in his choice to pull him. If he was batting .340 with a 950 OPS, he may be managing the pinch running situation differently.

Again, everyone acknowledges that Gonzalez is struggling. But the question remains: would you rather have him or Pods up there in the 9th in a 1 run game?

[LahoudOrBillyC]

Time to dig up Tango's tables again:

Run expectancy:

1st and 2nd, 0 outs: 1.556
2nd and 3rd, 1 out: 1.447

Chances of 1 run scoring in the inning:

1st and 2nd, 0 outs: .643
2nd and 3rd, 1 out: .698

So, Valentine gained a marginally better shot at scoring 1 run in the inning, but cost himself a chance overall runs scored. But he removed one of his best hitters (and again, while Gonzalez is struggling is there anyone who wanted Scotty Pods hitting in the 9th instead of Adrian Gonzalez) to do so. And he did it in the 7th inning, which is usually considered too early to be playing for just one run.

These tables describe run expectancies for the average batter facing the average pitcher with average defense and average baserunners and the average of hitters coming up next. In other words, it describes a situation that never happens. The variance in run expectancies depending on the situation (Marlon Byrd vs. David Ortiz, CC Sabathia vs. John Lackey, etc.) are enormous, more than 2-to-1 differences.

While Tango's tables make it clear that one should not bunt in the "average" situation, they say nothing about whether one should bunt in this particular situation. If Bobby Valentine bunted ever single time in the game that he had a runner on first and zero out, there is enough data to make it clear that this is bad strategy. But what if he only bunted when a bad hitter was up in a low scoring game where one run is important? Tango's data does not answer this question. The run tables for Marlon Byrd batting are not remotely similar to the tables for the average batter.

[Rudy Pemberton]

But what if he only bunted when a bad hitter was up in a low scoring game where one run is important?

This seems to be precisely what he is doing; bunting with his crappiest hitters.

[Pumpsie]

The other thread has already illustrated that Bobby doesn't sacrifice any more than other managers like Maddon and Washington. The Sox are the best in the league at executing sacrifice bunts (15 of 17) which goes back to Bobby's focusing on such fundamentals in spring training. Apparently, it worked.

Someone else in the other thread also pointed out that Bobby bunts with his bad hitters which makes perfect sense. And, because of injuries, Bobby's had a lot of bad hitters to bunt with. There is almost no indication that Bobby would bunt if he had his better hitters (Ellsbury, Crawford, Ross, etc.) in the lineup instead of Byrd, Pods, Punto et al.

It seems as if a lot of people are just making mountains out of molehills here.

[glennhoffmania]

This seems to be precisely what he is doing; bunting with his crappiest hitters.

But the problem is that an even worse hitter was coming up next.

Edited by glennhoffmania, 07 June 2012 - 01:35 PM.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

The other thread has already illustrated that Bobby doesn't sacrifice any more than other managers like Maddon and Washington. The Sox are the best in the league at executing sacrifice bunts (15 of 17) which goes back to Bobby's focusing on such fundamentals in spring training. Apparently, it worked.

Someone else in the other thread also pointed out that Bobby bunts with his bad hitters which makes perfect sense. And, because of injuries, Bobby's had a lot of bad hitters to bunt with. There is almost no indication that Bobby would bunt if he had his better hitters (Ellsbury, Crawford, Ross, etc.) in the lineup instead of Byrd, Pods, Punto et al.

It seems as if a lot of people are just making mountains out of molehills here.

No.

Bobby gave up an out to allow Marlon Byrd to hit. There's no matrix or thought process in the world where that makes sense.

Bunting in general is a terrible idea. Bunting to give Byrd a chance to hit is a worse one. And bunting with Byrd hitting while taking out Gonzalez is worse still. And as Laurlia pointed out, such a strategy has already bitten the Sox in the ass 4 times this year.

[lexrageorge]

For one, it was Darnell McDonald, not Marlon Byrd batting.

Some of this comes down to McDonald's expectation of making an out. Career wise against LHP, McDonald's OBP is a respectable 0.342, or a roughly 66% chance of making an out in that situation. This season, his OBP has been 0.281, although the SSS caveat applies.

If the real likelihood is that McDonald has a 72% chance of making an out in that situation, the argument against bunting is a lot less clear cut. Valentine would be maximizing the productivity of the likely out. The scales tip, however, if you consider McDonald's career wise OBP.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

These tables describe run expectancies for the average batter facing the average pitcher with average defense and average baserunners and the average of hitters coming up next. In other words, it describes a situation that never happens. The variance in run expectancies depending on the situation (Marlon Byrd vs. David Ortiz, CC Sabathia vs. John Lackey, etc.) are enormous, more than 2-to-1 differences.

While Tango's tables make it clear that one should not bunt in the "average" situation, they say nothing about whether one should bunt in this particular situation. If Bobby Valentine bunted ever single time in the game that he had a runner on first and zero out, there is enough data to make it clear that this is bad strategy. But what if he only bunted when a bad hitter was up in a low scoring game where one run is important? Tango's data does not answer this question. The run tables for Marlon Byrd batting are not remotely similar to the tables for the average batter.

These are all fair questions. At the same time that's why Tango's tables cover 10 year intervals, to get massive sample sizes.

[TheoShmeo]

It's almost as if he doesn't learn from prior experiences!

The 7th struck me as far too early a time to execute a strategy of sacrifice and pulling one of your best hitters at the same time.

It's not a matter of not learning. He knows the risks. They're obvious. He just thinks that going for the runs earlier makes sense.

I think he's wrong, but again, it's not that he doesn't get that Gonzo's turn is coming up again in the batting order.

Frankly, with the way Adrian is hitting right now, I wasn't as exercised as others with him not being at the plate at the end.

Unrelated: When is Bobby going to insist that Lester stays on the bench for the entire inning after he gets pulled from a game? It's not the be all and end all, but starting pitchers normally do that and don't simply exit when "their" base runners have scored. This kind of stuff reminds me of September, and I don't think it's a positve for the team to have the starter scurry off after he's no longer part of the equation personally.

[glennhoffmania]

For one, it was Darnell McDonald, not Marlon Byrd batting.

Some of this comes down to McDonald's expectation of making an out. Career wise against LHP, McDonald's OBP is a respectable 0.342, or a roughly 66% chance of making an out in that situation. This season, his OBP has been 0.281, although the SSS caveat applies.

If the real likelihood is that McDonald has a 72% chance of making an out in that situation, the argument against bunting is a lot less clear cut. Valentine would be maximizing the productivity of the likely out. The scales tip, however, if you consider McDonald's career wise OBP.

The point is that he was giving up an out to allow Byrd a chance to drive the run in. If you have Darnell bunt to give Ortiz a chance, it's more defensible. Whether you use tables or common sense, I don't see how the better choice isn't to let both Darnell and Byrd have a shot to get a base hit as opposed to relying only on Byrd to either get a hit or SF.

[pvg44]

I think SJH's point was that MacDonald bunted and BV then let Byrd hit. I was listening to the game on the radio and thought I heard it wrong. Why he didn't pinch hit Nava or Sweeney (if there was a pitching change) there is a mystery and it compounded the bad decision. i was not surprised in the least when Byrd feebly struck out. Seeing those two pinch hit in the 9th against Johnson just made me angrier.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Unrelated: When is Bobby going to insist that Lester stays on the bench for the entire inning after he gets pulled from a game? It's not the be all and end all, but starting pitchers normally do that and don't simply exit when "their" base runners have scored. This kind of stuff reminds me of September, and I don't think it's a positve for the team to have the starter scurry off after he's no longer part of the equation personally.

I have seen many other pitchers from many other teams leave the bench if their reliever lets their last runner score. It's a complete non-issue and Valentine's right not to even give it one second of thought IMO.

[TheoShmeo]

I have seen many other pitchers from many other teams leave the bench if their reliever lets their last runner score. It's a complete non-issue and Valentine's right not to even give it one second of thought IMO.

Maybe I misremember but I don't think it's nearly as prevalent as you just described.

There are bigger fish to fry, I agree, but not sticking around isn't the complete nothing you're saying it is.

[Reverend]

Gonzalez is 7th on the Red Sox in OPS

(runs and hides)

Seriously though, I'm assuming Bobby V knows how bad Gonzalez is hitting and that may factor in his choice to pull him. If he was batting .340 with a 950 OPS, he may be managing the pinch running situation differently.

Again, everyone acknowledges that Gonzalez is struggling. But the question remains: would you rather have him or Pods up there in the 9th in a 1 run game?

Adrian Gonzalez with RiSP: .362/.414/.603/1.018

[trekfan55]

The other problem is that with the current system he has, Gonzalez, Youks and WMB are taking turns, and when Gonzalez plays RF he usuallu either takes over 1st with one of Youks or WMB leaving the game or leaves the game for a "real OF". So maybe that was part of the equation here too. Not that I agree with it though.

I also fail to see why not PH Nava for Byrd in that spot (after the bunt). Nava has more pop from the left side but he is a switch hitter and was facing a tiring lefty.

[joe dokes]

I understand the visceral reaction and strategic questions about bunting there; and to bunting ahead of !!Marlon Byrd!!!, but in some fairness to the manager, Byrd -- both this year (333/360/417 - 50PAs) and in his career (284/338/443) has been OK vs. LHPs. And certainly better than Nava.

Edited by joe dokes, 07 June 2012 - 03:33 PM.

[Plympton91]

I also fail to see why not PH Nava for Byrd in that spot (after the bunt). Nava has more pop from the left side but he is a switch hitter and was facing a tiring lefty.

There was still a LH on the mound; the one I would have like to see hit in that spot was Shoppach, but no manager does that.

Nava is .192 / .338 / .327 vs. lefties in his major league career; Byrd this season against lefthanders is hitting .333 / .360 / .416in 48 at bats. All of his considerable suckage has been against righthanders (348 OPS).

If one believed that Marlon Byrd is still hitting roughly at his career averages against lefthanders, then the decision to have McDonald bunt is much more defensible. It would be reasonable that to the extent Byrd has been damaged by the beaning last season, the effects are particularly acute against righthanded pitching whereas he's still able mentally and physically to hang in against lefthanders.

Edited by Plympton91, 07 June 2012 - 04:35 PM.

[twothousandone]

Someone in the booth Monday (Boone?) suggested that letting Beckett lead off the sixth, down 4-0, was a waise move to help conserve the bullpen. The suggestion was more about the long season that the Marlins series, and maybe a PH hits an HR, but it's looking as though it was a good move. Beckett didn't go over 100 pitches, Melancon got in a game that wasn't completely over, and everyone else was rested.

If one of Bobby V's weaknesses is he's eager to make a move just to feel as though he is doing something, then Monday night was a good decision to sit on his hands.

[trekfan55]

It worked out, but should he have PHd for Buchholz in the top of the 7th inning, with runners on 2nd and 3rd and 2 outs? Buchholz almost drove in both runs on a sinking liner, but still...

[ToeKneeArmAss]

So I know this is supposed to be about manager's decision (and presumably ours), but I saw some pretty head-scratching stuff tonight that didn't involve Bobby V.

First off, Royster sending Pedroia in the 6th on Papi's double to left. Sure, Davis had to make a spectacular throw to get him. But as a result you've got a runner at 2nd and 2 out (0.348 expected runs using Tango's 1993-2010 matrix) instead of runners at 2nd and 3rd and one out (1.447 expected runs). (If he scores, you've got a run plus 0.721 expected runs with 1 out and a guy on second).

By my math, that means you need to be above 80% sure before you send him. Struck me as a poor decision in a close game - and a bit of a slap in the face to on-deck hitter Cody Ross.

(BTW, Royster had me screaming a couple of weeks ago when he sent Punto down by 4 in the ninth with one out, challenging Bryce Harper's arm. Punto scored but my God - you need four, man, why risk it?)

And I was delighted and puzzled by John Farrell's decision to lift Luis Perez and bring in embedded Red Sox David Pauley with Lillibridge coming up. Everybody in the park knew that Bobby would counter with Nava - so now instead of lefty Perez pitching to righty barely above .400 OPS Lillibridge, you set up righty Pauley pitching to one of the hottest hitters in baseball's strong side (currently at 1.022 OPS from the left side).

Maybe Pauley plunked him to minimize the damage. Sure thought Farrell was smarter than that.

[reggiecleveland]

Of course this has to do with the pen pitching so well so Bobby has good options, but tonight seemed like a game where Tito would have left Dice in too long.

[Al Zarilla]

Of course this has to do with the pen pitching so well so Bobby has good options, but tonight seemed like a game where Tito would have left Dice in too long.

Dice-K has thrown 80, 93 and 101, and last night 100 pitches in his four starts. I imagine Tito would have gone easy on him too coming back from the TJS.

[Rudy's Curve]

I haven't seen this anywhere else, but what the hell is the reason for going to a six-man rotation to give Cook more starts? He's a career NL mediocrity whose two starts here have been unimpressive (that Hinske ball would probably be out in any other park). There are five clearly better starters and Cook will be lined up to face the Yankees who will likely crush him. Even with the doubleheader on 7/7, they don't need a sixth starter because of the off day on the fifth.

[lexrageorge]

Assuming a 5-man rotation, with Cook being the odd man out, you get the following:

Seattle: Morales, Beckett, Doubront, Dice-K
Oakland: Lester, Morales, Beckett
NYY: Doubront*, Dice-K*, Lester, Morales
* - Extra day of rest

I think, however, it's likely Cook gets one of those starts, for one of the following:

- Beckett is just getting off the DL, and there's always some uncertainty when it comes to DL trips due to shoulder issues.

- Morales hasn't started more than 2 games since 2008.

- Doubront has struggled a bit lately, and could be a candidate for a missed start. He could very well be a valuable (and cost-controlled) member of the rotation for the next few years, so giving him some time off right now may be prudent, even at the cost of having Aaron Cook start a game.

- Wouldn't be surprised if BobbyV wanted to give Lester an extra day either.

Valentine never said he was definitely going to a 6-man rotation; he only hinted that it could be a possibility once Beckett comes off. It's certainly not just to give Aaron Cook more starts. If Buchholz was healthy, Aaron Cook wouldn't be in the conversation right now. In Cook's defense, one of those unimpressive starts occurred when he got spiked.

[Rudy's Curve]

All valid points. Unfortunately they'll probably give Cook another start as long as he's halfway decent Friday, which shouldn't be too hard in Safeco.

[joe dokes]

Sometimes I think that an entire book could be wriiten about how managers manage late in tie games on the road. From pinch-running to pitcher usage. Its not just BV, but he's the guy we see the most. Whether you think that Atchison's performace is "real" or due for serious regresssion, isn't Padilla>Atchison? And Aceves>both. You'd think that with a margin of error of zero, you'd want the better guy, and if you need to bring in someone later to "save" the game with a lead, that guy has, by definition a margin of error >0.
Yet for some reason, on the road, managers go in some sort of weird reverse order and wont use the best guy until the 34th inning.

Like I said, its not just BV. But when a manager saves his "closer"™ in road extra innings for a "save situation"™ that may never come (due in part to the use of an inferior pitcher), I just want to run to the Rosehill Cemetery and Mausoleum in Chicago and punch Jerome Holtzman's corpse.

[BCsMightyJoeYoung]

Sometimes I think that an entire book could be wriiten about how managers manage late in tie games on the road. From pinch-running to pitcher usage. Its not just BV, but he's the guy we see the most. Whether you think that Atchison's performace is "real" or due for serious regresssion, isn't Padilla>Atchison? And Aceves>both. You'd think that with a margin of error of zero, you'd want the better guy, and if you need to bring in someone later to "save" the game with a lead, that guy has, by definition a margin of error >0.
Yet for some reason, on the road, managers go in some sort of weird reverse order and wont use the best guy until the 34th inning.

Like I said, its not just BV. But when a manager saves his "closer"™ in road extra innings for a "save situation"™ that may never come (due in part to the use of an inferior pitcher), I just want to run to the Rosehill Cemetery and Mausoleum in Chicago and punch Jerome Holtzman's corpse.

I couldn't agree more. I was reminded of this watching the Euro2012 penanlty shootout between Spain and Portugal. For some inexplicable reason the Portugese coach had slotted Ronaldo into the 5th spot - which, obviously, never occurred. Why can't managers learn this? There's no point in saving your best guys for last if you have to get there first!

Edited by BCsMightyJoeYoung, 29 June 2012 - 07:48 AM.

[mt8thsw9th]

So he used arguably the better pitcher of the two in a tie game, and you're saying he's too beholden to classic uses of a closer, evinced by not using the designated closer in a sudden death game?

[lexrageorge]

First, why is it automatically assumed that Padilla is better than Atchison? He actually went with the guy with the lower HR/9 this season, not a bad choice in a scoreless tie on the road. If you look at the stats, the differences between Aceves, Padilla, and Atchison aren't great enough to really get worked up about which one got used last night in the 9th.

[joe dokes]

So he used arguably the better pitcher of the two in a tie game, and you're saying he's too beholden to classic uses of a closer, evinced by not using the designated closer in a sudden death game?

In not using Aceves (and, I'm assuming, saving him for the save), yes.

First, why is it automatically assumed that Padilla is better than Atchison?

I guess I dont 'assume' either are better than Atchison. I 'think' they are. I love Atchison, and I hope I'm wrong, but I think he's a mirage. YMMV.

The bigger issue for me is saving Aceves. Seems like a really good pitcher is going to waste.

[j44thor]

In not using Aceves (and, I'm assuming, saving him for the save), yes.

I guess I dont 'assume' either are better than Atchison. I 'think' they are. I love Atchison, and I hope I'm wrong, but I think he's a mirage. YMMV.

The bigger issue for me is saving Aceves. Seems like a really good pitcher is going to waste.

Atchinson has better stats across the board except for K/9. He has pitched more innings than Aceves and has allowed fewer H/9, runs, HR and BB. In a 0-0 game why would you want to go with a pitcher that is more likely to surrender a run all things being equal?

Aceves would probably have been an equally as good option but you are really splitting hairs. Neither has a track record of dominance so it isn't like Mariano Rivera was being saved.

[lexrageorge]

In not using Aceves (and, I'm assuming, saving him for the save), yes.

I guess I dont 'assume' either are better than Atchison. I 'think' they are. I love Atchison, and I hope I'm wrong, but I think he's a mirage. YMMV.

The bigger issue for me is saving Aceves. Seems like a really good pitcher is going to waste.

I have to respond to this. Valentine is looking at a guy who's given up 1 HR & 9 BB in 41 IP this season, and has decided Atchison is a guy he can trust in high-leverage situations. He's based this on the stats so far this season, and what he and his coaches have seen on and off the field this season, not on some gut feel that he's a "mirage". That's what I want a manager to do.

[glennhoffmania]

Atchinson has better stats across the board except for K/9. He has pitched more innings than Aceves and has allowed fewer H/9, runs, HR and BB. In a 0-0 game why would you want to go with a pitcher that is more likely to surrender a run all things being equal?

Aceves would probably have been an equally as good option but you are really splitting hairs. Neither has a track record of dominance so it isn't like Mariano Rivera was being saved.

Isn't there a sample size issue in your analysis?

[joe dokes]

Atchinson has better stats across the board except for K/9. He has pitched more innings than Aceves and has allowed fewer H/9, runs, HR and BB. In a 0-0 game why would you want to go with a pitcher that is more likely to surrender a run all things being equal?

Aceves would probably have been an equally as good option but you are really splitting hairs. Neither has a track record of dominance so it isn't like Mariano Rivera was being saved.

Fair enough. Maybe it comes down to me just liking the other guys more in the highest possible leverage situation, for which YMMV. (That, and I'd have to see Atch pitch like 1000 innings like this for me to believe it's real. But I do understand that that's just me....)

[Pumpsie]

As per this Atchison/Aceves discussion, didn't Bobby V use Aceves in these non-save, high leverage situations earlier in the season and, IIRC, didn't it blow up in our faces a few times? And didn't a lot of people criticize him for NOT using other pitchers there? Atchison has been as solid as any reliever in baseball until this point, so I think it was a valid decision to go with him there. Going forward, maybe not so much. But maybe Bobby was thinking this could well be a 12-15-inning contest and didn't want to burn his end of the BP guys in game one of a road trip.

[Savin Hillbilly]

Isn't there a sample size issue in your analysis?

If you use career numbers instead of 2012 numbers, Atchison still comes out ahead of either Aceves, Padilla or both on the key peripherals:

BABIP, HR/9, BB/9, K/9
Atchison: .292, 0.9, 2.7, 7.1
Aceves:.243, 0.8, 2.8, 6.7
Padilla: .298, 1.0, 3.1, 6.4

In fact, expanding the sample size hurts both Padilla and (except on the BABIP front) Aceves. Bottom line is that there's not much to choose among the three of them; they've all been pretty similar, i.e. roughly average, pitchers over their careers.

And while I'm here, isn't it time for a word filter for "Atchinson"? Can we change it to "Topeka & Santa Fe" or something?

[j44thor]

Isn't there a sample size issue in your analysis?

There is a sample size issue for both pitchers since Aceves has 277 career professional innings compared to Atchison's 199.
The ironic thing is that Aceves beats Atchison in everything except K/9 when you take into consideration overall career #s. But again we are comparing two very effective relievers that are a notch or two below the dominant ACE caliber relievers.

[glennhoffmania]

Just to be clear, I'm not suggesting that the decision was clearly wrong. I'm just saying that only pointing to 2012 numbers as proof that it was right doesn't seem very persuasive.

[ToeKneeArmAss]

Just because I called Royster out the other day for doing his imitation of "Wave 'Em In Wendall" Kim, thought I should give him props for stopping Kalish at third on Pedroia's one-out single to RF in the 10th.

Not a hugely difficult decision with Suzuki's arm and with Ortiz coming up and a sac enough to take the lead, but it's gotta be tempting in that situation to go for the win in the moment.

[Philip Jeff Frye]

No comments on Lillibridge and his career .280 OBP in the leadoff spot yesterday?