27 replies to this topic

[Sprowl]

All of the people arguing for the firing of the training staff: Which specific injuries should they have been able to prevent?

OK, I'll bite.

First of all, I'm not advocating that any heads roll, yet. There will be plenty of time for that if the unlikely comes to pass and the team actually does miss the playoffs.

Second, I'm not sure whether "they" should refer to Tito, Curt Young or the MD staff, but "they" missed some obvious signs and pulled Matsuzaka, Buchholz and Bedard too late in three specific games. It was the subject of extended debate in the game threads, with enough supporting dot-chart evidence to make heads spin. If we can see it, "they" should too, or they should hire "us". Each pitcher was pulled at least two batters too late, and in Bedard's case, two innings too late.

Matsuzaka shredded his elbow against Seattle on April 29. It was clear by the fourth (Tek noticed it first), and there is no way he should have been pitching the 5th. Would an earlier hook have prevented the ultimate ligament tear? Maybe, but probably not. Still, the symptoms were recognized late in the dugout.




Buchholz went way overboard against Detroit on May 18. 127 pitches seems too many for Buchholz's rather lean frame, more than he had ever thrown before by a substantial margin, and he was visibly losing both velocity and command on the fastball in the 7th inning. I think that was the game that put the real strain on his back. Should he have been pulled earlier? Yeah, I think so, but he was pitching very well. I put it down to excessive reliance on the 330-pitch rule, on which there has been radio silence ever since.




Bedard injured himself by the 4th inning against the Rangers, but Tito let him pitch through the 6th, commenting during a dugout interview that he'd let Bedard pitch as long as he got outs. The lat injury accumulated during innings 4-5-6. Should Bedard have been pulled in the 4th? Absolutely: it was a no-brainer. Bedard was a playoff investment, and the resource should have been conserved.





I repeat: I do not think heads should roll -- no autopsies, trials or executions until confirmation of death. But there were a few pitcher management decisions that failed. If it comes to blame, I'd be inclined to blame not the manager or the medical staff, but pitching coach Curt Young, who is in the dugout watching every pitch as it is delivered.

[PedroKsBambino]

I repeat: I do not think heads should roll -- no autopsies, trials or executions until confirmation of death. But there were a few pitcher management decisions that failed. If it comes to blame, I'd be inclined to blame not the manager or the medical staff, but pitching coach Curt Young, who is in the dugout watching every pitch as it is delivered.

Gotta say, this seems like a real reach. You're making very significant assumptions about injuries that are not really based on anything (the data tells a partial story about effectiveness on a day, but not about injury, and not about the changes being unusual for that situation). Then, apparently based on that, you're also making assumptions about what was said (or not said) in the dugout and who has what input on pulling a pitcher.

I just don't think we end up in a good place for making these kinds of assumptions. I don't think we really have a good sense of what Curt Young did or didn't say or do around these situations, do we?

[Sprowl]

Gotta say, this seems like a real reach. You're making very significant assumptions about injuries that are not really based on anything (the data tells a partial story about effectiveness on a day, but not about injury, and not about the changes being unusual for that situation). Then, apparently based on that, you're also making assumptions about what was said (or not said) in the dugout and who has what input on pulling a pitcher.

I just don't think we end up in a good place for making these kinds of assumptions. I don't think we really have a good sense of what Curt Young did or didn't say or do around these situations, do we?

aron7 asked about specific preventable injuries. There are three where observation and data both told the same story in real time -- not in hindsight -- so to my mind, those are cases worth looking at. Does that mean they were preventable? It depends on the injury: muscle strains are preventable by ceasing the activity, while a fraying UCL will probably rupture sooner or later. Stress fractures of the lower back: I just don't know.

Does that mean that's when the injury occurred? For Bedard and Matsuzaka, yes, I think the evidence and observations were and are compelling. For Buchholz, it depends on how seriously one takes pitch count and the 330-pitch rule, but I thought at the time that Buchholz had lost all fastball command, and only got out of the inning because Austin Jackson chased a fastball above his shoulders.

No, Curt Young hasn't had much of a public profile, and doesn't give many interviews. The data tell us something about effectiveness, but they tell us much more about sudden and conspicuous velocity loss. That's the kind of thing that a pitching coach should be monitoring. Maybe Young, Francona, Varitek (or Salty, in the case of Buchholz), and the pitcher discussed these issues as they were happening, and maybe they didn't. But it's the pitching coach who should know when the data are ringing the alarm bells. If the manager then ignores the coach, that would be a different story, and different blame.

If the team makes the playoffs, this will all be forgotten. If the collapse continues, we'll probably hear about it all through Dan Shaughnessy. Boston's backstabbing aftermaths are truly Shirley Jackson material.

[PedroKsBambino]

aron7 asked about specific preventable injuries. There are three where observation and data both told the same story in real time -- not in hindsight -- so to my mind, those are cases worth looking at. Does that mean they were preventable? It depends on the injury: muscle strains are preventable by ceasing the activity, while a fraying UCL will probably rupture sooner or later. Stress fractures of the lower back: I just don't know.

Does that mean that's when the injury occurred? For Bedard and Matsuzaka, yes, I think the evidence and observations were and are compelling. For Buchholz, it depends on how seriously one takes pitch count and the 330-pitch rule, but I thought at the time that Buchholz had lost all fastball command, and only got out of the inning because Austin Jackson chased a fastball above his shoulders.

No, Curt Young hasn't had much of a public profile, and doesn't give many interviews. The data tell us something about effectiveness, but they tell us much more about sudden and conspicuous velocity loss. That's the kind of thing that a pitching coach should be monitoring. Maybe Young, Francona, Varitek (or Salty, in the case of Buchholz), and the pitcher discussed these issues as they were happening, and maybe they didn't. But it's the pitching coach who should know when the data are ringing the alarm bells. If the manager then ignores the coach, that would be a different story, and different blame.

If the team makes the playoffs, this will all be forgotten. If the collapse continues, we'll probably hear about it all through Dan Shaughnessy. Boston's backstabbing aftermaths are truly Shirley Jackson material.

On the 'data' we just have a different view of how much we should look at before considering the analysis complete; I don't see the clarity you do, but I generally am more conservative than you about drawing strong conclusions from Pitch FX which is fine.

I think it's a reasonable assumption that Young's responsibilities include monitoring pitch counts, pitcher health, etc....but how he would (and whether he did) pass along concerns about these guys is something we just don't have visibility into. At least I don't, and I haven't seen any from anyone here or elsewhere. Thus, my comment was it's a real reach to suggest he's the guy to point the finger at, and I think you acknowledge this above.

[Sprowl]

On the 'data' we just have a different view of how much we should look at before considering the analysis complete; I don't see the clarity you do, but I generally am more conservative than you about drawing strong conclusions from Pitch FX which is fine.

I think it's a reasonable assumption that Young's responsibilities include monitoring pitch counts, pitcher health, etc....but how he would (and whether he did) pass along concerns about these guys is something we just don't have visibility into. At least I don't, and I haven't seen any from anyone here or elsewhere. Thus, my comment was it's a real reach to suggest he's the guy to point the finger at, and I think you acknowledge this above.

Nobody would consider the analysis 'complete' -- at this point, we are looking for evidence more substantial than pure supposition, and almost anything is better than nothing at all. It's important to consider, however, that the data confirm real-time observation. This is not hindsight:

Matsuzaka's injury begins about here. Lots of people noticed it.

Buchholz's loss of command and high pitch count begin about here.

Bedard's injury begins about here. Alarm bells are unmistakable in the 4th, yet he pitches through the 6th.

[wade boggs chicken dinner]

I repeat: I do not think heads should roll -- no autopsies, trials or executions until confirmation of death. But there were a few pitcher management decisions that failed. If it comes to blame, I'd be inclined to blame not the manager or the medical staff, but pitching coach Curt Young, who is in the dugout watching every pitch as it is delivered.

Sprowl - you seem like a pretty reasonable person. But . . . .

Are you seriously suggesting that the scope/nature of these injuries would have been materially different if these pitchers didn't pitch three or four innings at the end?

And are you seriously suggesting that it's the job of the pitching coach to be able to tell this - much less look out for this?

Have we all really stooped to this level?

[Sprowl]

On the 'data' we just have a different view of how much we should look at before considering the analysis complete; I don't see the clarity you do, but I generally am more conservative than you about drawing strong conclusions from Pitch FX which is fine.

I think it's a reasonable assumption that Young's responsibilities include monitoring pitch counts, pitcher health, etc....but how he would (and whether he did) pass along concerns about these guys is something we just don't have visibility into. At least I don't, and I haven't seen any from anyone here or elsewhere. Thus, my comment was it's a real reach to suggest he's the guy to point the finger at, and I think you acknowledge this above.

Nobody would consider the analysis 'complete' -- at this point, we are looking for evidence more substantial than pure supposition, and almost anything is better than nothing at all. It's important to consider, however, that the data confirm real-time observation. This is not hindsight:

• Matsuzaka's injury begins about here. genivive noticed first, but lots of people noticed it before he was pulled.
• Buchholz's loss of command and high pitch count begin about here.
• Bedard's injury begins about here. Alarm bells are unmistakable in the 4th, yet he pitches through the 6th.

edit: this is a revised version, to include the right link in the Matsuzaka game.

[Snodgrass'Muff]

Matsuzaka's injury begins about here. Lots of people noticed it.

Buchholz's loss of command and high pitch count begin about here.

Bedard's injury begins about here. Alarm bells are unmistakable in the 4th, yet he pitches through the 6th.

These examples are not equal, of course, but how often do pitchers go through periods, within a game, where they lose command, or their release point starts wavering or their mechanics get out of whack for an inning or two and it doesn't mean an injury? It seems like it would be easy to look back at these three examples and see these deviations from normal sound mechanics or velocity as clear warning signs that an injury was there and about to get worse, but without knowing how frequent or infrequent these deviations might be, does it really tell us all that much?

[Sprowl]

Sprowl - you seem like a pretty reasonable person. But . . . .

Are you seriously suggesting that the scope/nature of these injuries would have been materially different if these pitchers didn't pitch three or four innings at the end?

And are you seriously suggesting that it's the job of the pitching coach to be able to tell this - much less look out for this?

Have we all really stooped to this level?

1) Yes, in the case of Bedard. Probably, in the case of Matsuzaka. Possibly, in the case of Buchholz.

2) Yes, the pitching coach should be monitoring the delivery, the data and the reports of the catcher and pitcher.

3) What level do you have in mind? Be clear about what you're suggesting, so that I can spend my wrath well.

These examples are not equal, of course, but how often do pitchers go through periods, within a game, where they lose command, or their release point starts wavering or their mechanics get out of whack for an inning or two and it doesn't mean an injury? It seems like it would be easy to look back at these three examples and see these deviations from normal sound mechanics or velocity as clear warning signs that an injury was there and about to get worse, but without knowing how frequent or infrequent these deviations might be, does it really tell us all that much?

Losing command is frequent, and usually is worth pitching through, except after 118 pitches. Losing velocity in multiple-MPH declines in the 4th inning is not common at all. They are not comparable as warning signs.

[Kremlin Watcher]

Are you seriously suggesting that the scope/nature of these injuries would have been materially different if these pitchers didn't pitch three or four innings at the end?

Almost any injury caused by straining muscles, ligaments and tendons is made progressively worse by additional strain. If you are running and feel your hammy going, and you keep running, it will almost certainly get worse. A pitcher's arm is no different - if there is a minor injury present, any continued pitching will make it worse. Three or four innings - potential for major damage. Very basic exercise physiology.

[wade boggs chicken dinner]

3) What level do you have in mind? Be clear about what you're suggesting, so that I can spend my wrath well.

That level where we are so pissed that we are looking for scapegoats.

Look, I don't know what you believe the job description of an average pitching coach should be, but I am assuming that there is nothing medically-oriented on any description you might come up with.

Maybe I"m naive or something, but it seems to me that we have not yet reached the stage where we have any kind of impact on athletic injuries. I mean look at the Orioles. I think Peter Angelos personally looks at the medical history of every potential player and that hasn't stopped the Os from having their fair share of injuries.

[wade boggs chicken dinner]

Almost any injury caused by straining muscles, ligaments and tendons is made progressively worse by additional strain. If you are running and feel your hammy going, and you keep running, it will almost certainly get worse. A pitcher's arm is no different - if there is a minor injury present, any continued pitching will make it worse. Three or four innings - potential for major damage. Very basic exercise physiology.

Yes, but the point is that while additional activity will make it marginally worse - there is still an injury there to begin with.

Maybe they shouldn't have pitched that additional two or three injuries. But as they were already hurt to begin with, the best that could have been said is that their rehab would have taken marginally less time.

Plus you are talking about athletes here. How many athletes do we personally know who don't think that they can gut out aches and pains? And for this you want to blame - of all people - the pitching coach?

I'm sorry, I just don't get it.

[Snodgrass'Muff]

Losing command is frequent, and usually is worth pitching through, except after 118 pitches. Losing velocity in multiple-MPH declines in the 4th inning is not common at all. They are not comparable as warning signs.

I don't know if that's true, though. Look at Lester's last start...




It looks like after pitch 41 or so his fastball velocity drops a couple miles per hour. This is one start, so it doesn't prove anything, which is why I'm asking if the examples you cite are immune from confirmation bias. I don't think a drop in velocity as a starter gets into the 4th or 5th inning is necessarily that rare. From what data are you making the claim that it is? At least, to the degree that you can be certain someone is hurt by monitoring it and juxtaposing it against command and mechanics?

[Sprowl]

That level where we are so pissed that we are looking for scapegoats.

I just specified twice that I think it would be premature for heads to roll, so save your sanctimony.

Look, I don't know what you believe the job description of an average pitching coach should be, but I am assuming that there is nothing medically-oriented on any description you might come up with.

Maybe I"m naive or something, but it seems to me that we have not yet reached the stage where we have any kind of impact on athletic injuries. I mean look at the Orioles. I think Peter Angelos personally looks at the medical history of every potential player and that hasn't stopped the Os from having their fair share of injuries.

That says more about Peter Angelos being out of his league than anything about injury risk.

It doesn't require an orthopedic surgeon to identify precipitous velocity decline, nor to interpret it (although it's nice to have Dave Roberts' Shoes around when it happens), and a pitching coach should be conversant with basic mechanics and kinesiology. Curt Young may be all those things and more, and I am not calling for his head to roll. Neither am I calling for Francona to be fired, nor for the medical staff to be replaced. If there is any question in that area, it would be why it took multiple weeks for Buchholz's sore back to be diagnosed -- were there delays in obtaining imagery of Buchholz's spine?

I am saying, however, that there were three identifiable incidents in 2011 when the management was late to pull the trigger. It's a game of unknowns and percentages, so no manager, coach and medical consultant will be perfect. Nevertheless, should they have known better in these three cases? Yes.

[Sprowl]

I don't know if that's true, though. Look at Lester's last start...




It looks like after pitch 41 or so his fastball velocity drops a couple miles per hour. This is one start, so it doesn't prove anything, which is why I'm asking if the examples you cite are immune from confirmation bias. I don't think a drop in velocity as a starter gets into the 4th or 5th inning is necessarily that rare. From what data are you making the claim that it is? At least, to the degree that you can be certain someone is hurt by monitoring it and juxtaposing it against command and mechanics?

In my opinion, no -- there is an important diagnostic difference between a precipitous and a gradual velocity decline. Lester throws only 2 four-seam fastballs in the inning, and the first of them was a get-me-over first pitch (those are usually a little slower). Furthermore, Lester's curve and cutter also show a very gradual decline. Contrast this chart with the charts of Matsuzaka and Bedard, and there is a qualitative difference.




edit: also, the velocity decline identified in this game occurs around pitch 85 and in the 6th inning, when it is to be expected.

[P'tucket, rhymes with...]

OK, I'll bite.



I repeat: I do not think heads should roll -- no autopsies, trials or executions until confirmation of death. But there were a few pitcher management decisions that failed. If it comes to blame, I'd be inclined to blame not the manager or the medical staff, but pitching coach Curt Young, who is in the dugout watching every pitch as it is delivered.

I think the question here would be how meaningful these data are when you're interpreting them on the fly during a game. A bunch of interesting studies to be had in looking at game charts for pitchers in the four or five starts prior to going on the DL, how often you see these kinds of charts in pitchers who finish games/don't turn out to be injured, and how effective they are in predicting subsequent injury. I would guess that if Tito et al see a guy is off on any given night but have no data from the medical staff forewarning them about potential damage, they're most likely to attribute it to something more benign that the pitcher has a chance of working past during the game.

Edited by P'tucket, rhymes with..., 22 September 2011 - 08:44 PM.

[Snodgrass'Muff]

I don't know. I mean, we're talking about a guy who had missed most of the season with an inning by inning drop in velocity. It's not like he was at 96 for three innings, then dropped to 91. The chart looks more like he was running out of gas quickly, to my untrained eye. Now, I get that you were right when you predicted his drop in velocity was troubling. So I'm not saying you were seeing phantoms or anything. But I'm just not sure how you can be so confident that a drop in velocity like this can be so rare that it almost assuredly means an injury. Do you have data that supports that position? Or is it mostly observational?

[Snodgrass'Muff]

I think the question here would be how meaningful these data are when you're interpreting them on the fly during a game. A bunch of interesting studies to be had in looking at game charts for pitchers in the four or five starts prior to going on the DL, how often you see these kinds of charts in pitchers who finish games/don't turn out to be injured, and how effective they are in predicting subsequent injury. I would guess that if Tito et al see a guy is off on any given night but have no data from the medical staff forewarning them about potential damage, they're most likely to attribute it to something more benign that the pitcher has a chance of working past during the game.

This is what I've been trying to say, only it's said far better than I've been saying it. And to extrapolate a bit, how often do pitchers have minor aggravation of muscle groups that can be worked through and are expected to be worked through that might set off similar warning signs? How often do these circumstances mean a trip to the DL versus a period of less effectiveness that can be overcome without missing starts?

[wade boggs chicken dinner]

I just specified twice that I think it would be premature for heads to roll, so save your sanctimony.

Sanctimony? I think you must have confused me - or my drink - with someone else. It's strictlly sangria tonight.

But at any rate, maybe one of the medical people can state otherwise, but I'm going to go out on a limb right now and guess that Dice-K's elbow was already shredded and wouldn't have gotten materially worse if he hadn't pitched those three innings. I don't think anyone could be surprised given his usage that Dice-K ended up with an arm injury.

in addition, Clay's back injury seems to be one that develops over time and wouldn't be influenced by a few innings here or there.

I understand that you said that you didn't think heads should roll and we have common ground on that. I guess I'm not sure exactly when people started believing that anyone or any training regimen can have a broad effect on the occurrence of injuries.

[Kremlin Watcher]

Yes, but the point is that while additional activity will make it marginally worse - there is still an injury there to begin with.

Maybe they shouldn't have pitched that additional two or three injuries. But as they were already hurt to begin with, the best that could have been said is that their rehab would have taken marginally less time.

Plus you are talking about athletes here. How many athletes do we personally know who don't think that they can gut out aches and pains? And for this you want to blame - of all people - the pitching coach?

I'm sorry, I just don't get it.

I'm not blaming Curt Young, although I agree with Sprowl's point that precipitous velocity declines and changes in mechanics during a game should set off serious alarm bells with the pitching coach and at the very least call for a visit to the mound.

But I still think you are missing the point: pitchers who get injured aren't necessarily "hurt to begin with". In the case of the ulnar collateral ligament tear, there may be the pre-conditions for an injury, but it's not injured until it's actually injured. There's maybe a micro-tear or a structural weakness, pitcher gets a bit fatigued, mechanics get a little off, and there goes the UCL. Now it's injured, followed by a drop in velocity and command. And then, yes, the pitcher should stop throwing immediately, because every additional pitch will make it worse, potentially a lot worse. Throwing with a torn UCL will just keep tearing it, making it harder to repair and requiring more rehab and a more uncertain comeback. So, no, the best that can be said is that throwing two or three innings on a torn UCL is not that it may marginally increase their rehab time, but may destroy their arm and their pitching career. Similar issue with Bedard - he seems to have issues with muscular fitness in his core and you absolutely do not want him going through the pitching motion at full speed when he injures those muscles - he needs to stop throwing and start healing, because every pitch makes it worse. And as muscles get more injured, they become less and less able to protect themselves from further injury, so it really does have the potential to spiral out of control.

That athletes are not trained to recognize injuries sufficiently well to pull themselves from the lineup when they are injured is as old as professional sports and clearly very difficult to solve - the Red Sox don't do that any better or worse than any other organization as far as I can tell. But we should at the very least have coaches and trainers that are able to spot the outward manifestations of an injury (like a marked drop in velocity or a significant change in release point) and get out to the mound to prevent it from getting worse.

[absintheofmalaise]

Broke this off from the "Heads Will Roll" thread.

[behindthepen]

Interestingly, this exact issue was addressed by Theo in the latest edition of Sports Illustrated, where they profile the Sox relative to the release of Moneyball.

Moneyball ended the hidden value of OBP, what Beane called a market inefficiency. "I've been giving the same answer for years," Epstein says of the next inefficiency. "It's keeping pitchers healthy, and it's better drafting.

Anecdotally, they have been ahead of the curve in arm/shoulder programs, and keeping tabs on whether or not their pitchers' arm strength is staying consistent.

But I agree with Sprowl here, there is real-time, in-game data that would indicate that they are not co-ordinating this during the game. Certainly none of these graphs is conclusive evidence that the pitcher was injured at that exact point in the game, but if you see that data and you don't even ask the question, then you're being naive and/or irresponsible.

[Max Power]

But I agree with Sprowl here, there is real-time, in-game data that would indicate that they are not co-ordinating this during the game. Certainly none of these graphs is conclusive evidence that the pitcher was injured at that exact point in the game, but if you see that data and you don't even ask the question, then you're being naive and/or irresponsible.

Are you suggesting the Red Sox have someone looking at this real time in game data and signaling to Terry Francona to remove the pitcher from the game? Is that legal? You're not allowed to have someone outside the field of play stealing signs, but you are allowed to notify the manager if a player has been traded and to remove him from the game. This would seem to fall in the middle. If it's not allowed, then you have to rely on Francona or Young to be able to determine velocity and release point changes from a single poor viewing angle in the dugout. And like P'tucket said, how does that look different than an uninjured pitcher who just doesn't have it that day?

[Rudy Pemberton]

The Rays have been doing this for years, and their pitchers have remained remarkably healthy. Read "The Extra 2%" if you haven't there's a whole chapter devoted to this...how the Rays hired a Pitchf/x expert to spot changes in release point, etc. and to determine subtle changes that may indicate fatigue or injury. The idea was that someone who could break down the minutae of a pitcher's delivery this way could save the team millions, and yet be paid very little.

Are the Sox doing something like this? I would suspect so; but they have had a lot of injuries, which suggests they haven't been doing it that well, or else it isn't really something you can do (and perhaps the Rays have simply been lucky).

[P'tucket, rhymes with...]

The Rays have been doing this for years, and their pitchers have remained remarkably healthy. Read "The Extra 2%" if you haven't there's a whole chapter devoted to this...how the Rays hired a Pitchf/x expert to spot changes in release point, etc. and to determine subtle changes that may indicate fatigue or injury. The idea was that someone who could break down the minutae of a pitcher's delivery this way could save the team millions, and yet be paid very little.

Are the Sox doing something like this? I would suspect so; but they have had a lot of injuries, which suggests they haven't been doing it that well, or else it isn't really something you can do (and perhaps the Rays have simply been lucky).

They may be luckier; they've also been dealing with a much younger sample of pitchers. I'd be surprised if the Sox weren't doing something of this nature.

To be optimally effective, you would also want to implement this sort of system at every level of the minors as well. However good or bad the Sox medical and training staff may be at keeping the ML pitchers healthy, they've been handicapped a bit by the team's willingness to take on guys with injury histories (e.g., Bedard, Lackey, Hill) and heavy use (Matsuzaka). The homegrown guys (Lester, Buchholz, Bard, Papelbon) have actually done pretty well.

Edited by P'tucket, rhymes with..., 25 September 2011 - 10:50 AM.

[Savin Hillbilly]

Are you suggesting the Red Sox have someone looking at this real time in game data and signaling to Terry Francona to remove the pitcher from the game? Is that legal? You're not allowed to have someone outside the field of play stealing signs, but you are allowed to notify the manager if a player has been traded and to remove him from the game. This would seem to fall in the middle.

I'd be surprised if there's any rule against monitoring in-game PitchFX data. This is nothing remotely like stealing signs. You're not trying to intercept the other team's communications, you're just accessing objective, publicly available information about your own players' performance.

[OttoC]

I'd be surprised if there's any rule against monitoring in-game PitchFX data. This is nothing remotely like stealing signs. You're not trying to intercept the other team's communications, you're just accessing objective, publicly available information about your own players' performance.

There was a major-league rule forbidding electronic equipment in the dugout but I'm sure a work-around could be easily found. I do admit to wondering whether Red Sox starters are tipping their pitches. For all of them to do so, you'd have to look at the catcher or surmise pitch analysis came up with patterns. I wonder what would happen if you ran neural network on software on pitches by pitcher and game situations (including handedness, etc.).

[PedroKsBambino]

The problem with assigning blame in this thread continues to be that we have no idea what the Sox do and don't already do.