48 replies to this topic

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Hi all,

Rob should be stopping by in a few minutes to chat about his book Rob Neyer's Big Book of Baseball Blunders. The new book is another in a proposed series of Big Books that began with Rob's Big Book of Baseball Lineups.

We'll be talking about other baseball topics as well. Stop on by and check it out.

EDIT: Guys, please don't post your questions directly in the thread. PM me with them if you have some. Thanks.

Edited by Smiling Joe Hesketh, 04 May 2006 - 01:12 PM.

[Rob Neyer]

I'm here, and as ready as I can be for this tough crowd...

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Rob, The term "blunder" is usually associated with wacky on-field mistakes. However, your book is not about on-field play, but front office and management misdeeds. Tell us a bit about the book and how you define the term "blunder".

[Rob Neyer]

I go to some lengths in the introduction to differentiate "blunder" from "blooper". A blooper is something you see on the big screen at the ballpark between innings. A blunder is something that somebody actually thought about, for a few minutes at least. And the blunders in the book generally have to satisfy two other criteria: 1) a reasonable person might have "first-guessed" the move, and 2) the result was significantly damaging to a franchise or (in a few cases) MLB in general.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Certain bloopers are in the book that you don't think are as bad as is generally perceived. For example, you don't think the Red Sox selling of Babe Ruth is as bad as is generally thought. Can you explain how you used contemporary accounts in your assessments of these bloopers?

[Rob Neyer]

It's easy, after the fact, to say the Red Sox shouldn't have sold Ruth. What I wanted to know, regarding most of the blunders in the book, is what motivated the move in the first place. And when you put yourself in the place of the owner or the general manager or the owner, quite often you find that the decision was not so unreasonable at the time, or at the least was not considered unreasonable at the time.

And the sale of Ruth is a fantastic example. In the 1920 Spalding Guide, editor Francis Richter -- then one of the game's great pundits (not that anybody called him that then) -- described the Yankees' purchase of Ruth as a "desperate gamble" and wrote, "We question the judgment of the New York club in buying another player who has no respect for his obligations, who is not a team player in any sense of the word, and who is a constant trouble-maker..."

There's also the whole myth about No, No, Nanette, but I'm sure you know about that...

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

We sure do.

Let's talk about Grady. Where does Grady's 2003 blunder rank all-time? Can you put together a viable explanation for what he did?

[Rob Neyer]

I haven't attempted to rank blunders -- it's a good idea, obviously -- but I think that Little's blunder is, in a sense, the Perfect Blunder because it satisfies all the criteria perfectly.

Did he think about it beforehand? Check.

Did we first-guess him while it was happening? Check.

Was there a signficantly negative result? Check.

Oh, and there's a bonus qualification: he got fired.

Personally, I can't justify the move, or rather the non-move. But if you want to see a heroic attempt, check Bill Deane's essay at my Website.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Game 6, 1986. In the blurb for the book, it's mentioned that you don't consider MacNamara's decision to leave Buckner out there to be his most egregious error that night. Can you give us some insight as to how else Mac blundered? For example, did Mac blunder by letting Schiraldi pitch a 3rd inning?

[Rob Neyer]

I didn't get into the bullpen stuff in that chapter, perhaps because the complexity involved was just too much for me. But I think McNamara's other error in that game was far more serious than not replacing Buckner with Stapleton in the tenth inning.

Yes, that might have cost the Red Sox the game (the game was already tied when the ball went through Buckner's legs, so they might well have lost anyway). What's more, while of course it did happen, the chance of using Buckner instead of Stapleton making a difference was -- until it happened -- exceedingly small (which of course is what makes it so painful).

To me, the truly stupid move happened two innings earlier, when McNamara let Buckner bat against Jesse Orosco while Don Baylor rotted on the bench. Buckner was terrible enough by that point in the season, but facing a lefty-killer like Orosco was essentially impossible for him. The Red Sox were only one run ahead of the Mets, and McNamara should have been doing anything he could think of to score more runs. But instead he just sat on his hands. He let sentiment get in the way. And as Ban Johnson wired Bucky Harris after the 1925 World Series, "You put up a game fight. This I admire. Lost the Series for sentimental reasons. This should never happen in a World Series.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Did you include the Sox' long-time refusal to sign black players and/or the infamous decision not to sign Robinson or Mays when they had the chance in your book as a blunder? Have there been other decisions made at the organizational level by other teams that were similarly damaging?

[Rob Neyer]

I did not, because that same blunder was essentially committed by many other teams. A blunder I certainly could have explored, but didn't, was the Red Sox's unconscionable delay of integration. I suppose I made a conscious decision to avoid this subject, probably because it's just so distasteful and complicated. But the truth is that I really should have written about integration, and I didn't.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

SoSHer Rough Carrigan asks:

Did the White Sox' choice to trade away a ton of young talent before the 1960 season in order to try and win right away (with the result that those players all peaked with other teams) make the cut for the book?

[Rob Neyer]

Absolutely. I think it's one of THE great (mostly) forgotten (except in Chicago) blunders. Bill Veeck traded young players Johnny Romano, Norm Cash, Johnny Callison, Earl Battey, and Don Mincher within a few months, and got a bunch of veterans in return. The veterans did not bring the White Sox even one pennant, and the loss of all those young players cost the White Sox two pennants, and perhaps as many as five.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Can you talk about Gene Mauch pitching Jim Bunning and Chris Short on two days rest multiple times in the final weeks of the season in 1964? Did Mauch have realistic options besides Bunning and Short?

[Rob Neyer]

Well, Mauch certainly knew things that we don't. And when it comes to situations like this, there are always crazy rumors floating around (I just heard one about one of the Phillies' pitchers last week). But yes, Mauch had options, the best of which was don't panic. Mauch was a good manager, generally, and it's incredibly difficult to remain calm while your team looks like it wants to blow a huge lead in September. But that's the manager's job, right? To keep his wits about him? And overworking your two best starters in late September just wasn't the right move.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

In the excerpt from the book that was posted here last week, you wrote that you didn't think Don Zimmer's decision to start Bobby Sprowl against the Yankees was a terrible idea, given his options. Can you give us your thoughts on some of the other decisions Zimmer made in 1978 that were blunders?

[Rob Neyer]

Gee, where to start...

I go into great detail in the book. Getting rid of Carbo, burying Bill Lee, letting Hobson make all those errors . . . these were all key mistakes. But I ran across another one, familiar to you I'm sure, but something I'd forgotten about (if I ever knew in the first place . . . On August 28, Dwight Evans was beaned by Seattle rookie Mike Parrott. Evans's batting helmet was smashed, and he was out of the lineup for nearly a week. But then Zimmer put him back in the lineup, and in 20 September games Evans made a bunch of errors -- he couldn't track fly balls -- and batted .184 with virtually no power. Evans simply shouldn't have been playing, at all. And I think that's the single biggest, least-defensible mistake that Zimmer made. And overall it's one of the worst seasons any manager ever had.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Rob, it seems that egregious trading blunders are still happening today. Bagwell for Andersen happened 16 years ago, and yet the Kazmir/Zambrano trade seems to indicate that teams are still making terrible mistakes.

When something like the Kazmir/Zambrano trade happens, where are the internal brakes? Shouldn't be there somebody that stops such deals?

[Rob Neyer]

I don't fault the Mets for trading Kazmir. They knew him better than anybody else, and they apparently concluded -- for whatever reasons -- that Kazmir was not going to become a good major league pitcher in their organization. For all we know (and we'll never know), they were right. After all, they should have known Kazmir and themselves better than we ever could.

I do fault the Mets for getting Victor Zambrano. They did not know more about Zambrano than everybody else. They couldn't have. Kazmir was a valuable commodity around baseball, and the Mets should have received a valuable commodity in return. Which they didn't.

Of course, these are pitchers weren't talking about. Pitchers are inherently unpredictable, and there's a not-insubstantial chance that Zambrano will eventually have a better career than Kazmir. I didn't write about any recent trades in the book, because trades have a way of turning out differently than we expect.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Rob, now that we've gone over some of the rich variety of historical Red Sox blunders, how about cleansing our palates with your version of the Yankees' worst blunder?

Edited by Smiling Joe Hesketh, 04 May 2006 - 02:12 PM.

[Rob Neyer]

Well, Casey Stengel probably cost the Yankees another World Series in 1960 with his mishandling of the pitching staff, and the Yankees would have won a fifth straight pennant in 1940 if they'd brought up a minor leaguer or two. But more recently (in 1982) they traded Fred McGriff, Mike Morgan, Dave Collins and $400K to the Blue Jays for Tom Dodd and Dale Murray. That's one of the most lopsided trades ever, though I'm not convinced it actually cost the Yankees even one division title.

And for all you Yankees fans reading, I should say that in the posts above we've not come close to exhausting the Red Sox blunders... :blowup:

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Ouch.

Rob, did you look at Joe McCarthy's decision to pitch Denny Galehouse in the 1948 playoff game? What was he thinking?

[Rob Neyer]

Yeah, that one's in the book. I don't want to give too much away, but essentially I concluded that McCarthy didn't make a mistake. Or rather, that while perhaps he made a mistake, it's a mistake that many of us might have made, too. It was a complicated situation, and I probably spent as much time researching and writing that chapter as anything else in the book. There are things about that game we still don't know and might never know, and McCarthy did so many things right over the years that when I'm in doubt, I tend to figure he knew what he was doing.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Last question:

Rob, I've gotten several questions for you regarding the trade of Pierzynski for Nathan, Bonser, and Liriano. Do you see that trade perhaps going down in history as a blunder for the way it might affect the SF and Minnesota franchises?

Edited by Smiling Joe Hesketh, 04 May 2006 - 02:27 PM.

[Rob Neyer]

You bet. That one looks already looks absolutely awful, and is only going to get worse over the next decade-plus. And that's if Bonser doesn't develop (he might).

I've got to catch a bus, but this has been a lot of fun, and I'm grateful for the opportunity to participate in this, the greatest of all fan forums. I suppose everybody can figure this out for themselves, but for more information about the book, check out RobNeyer.com. Thanks, and like you I'm pulling for the Sox (mostly because of Bill James and Tim Wakefield, and Fenway).

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Thanks so much for your time, Rob.

[Tangotiger]

Here's Dewey in 78:

http://www.retroshee...d0020071978.htm

I don't remember much, seeing that I was 10, and I only caught the weekend games on UHF 22 in Montreal. I do remember that final BFD game vividly though.

Dewey had 2 errors by Aug 28, and he came back 5 days later to DH, and then the next day in RF. Within the next week, he made 4 errors, two of which were catching errors, and two were on hits (meaning he overthrew, or bobbled the ball). He was taken out early in a blowout on Sep 8, didn't play the field until the 13th (with two DHs in between). In his last 6 games, he had 47 innings and 4 putouts (typically, you would get 2 per 9, or an expectation of 11 or so here).

His BA/OBP/SLG was .161/.277/.268, with 19 Ks to 9 BB in 65 PA. His season totals has his BB+K per PA at 33%, while this Sept period is 43%. His K/BB ratio was 2:1 in either case.

All this supports most of what Neyer is saying.

However, they didn't have many other options did they?

[sfip]

What's more, while of course it did happen, the chance of using Buckner instead of Stapleton making a difference was -- until it happened -- exceedingly small.

I wish more people realized this. Although I agree that Baylor should have pinch hit for Buckner in the 8th and that putting in Stapleton for defensive purposes was the smarter move, I've seen and heard an awful lot of people talk as though they knew not putting in Stapleton in the 10th would hurt them to the extent that it did.

[Tudor Fever]

However, they didn't have many other options did they?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

They gave, er, traded away their outfield depth (Bernie Carbo) in June. In September, though, either Garry Hancock or Sam Bowen wold have been much better options than Evans.

[ilikedonuts]

Wow- Bill Deane's argument on Grady Little's behalf is just horrible

The essence of which is:
a ) You've got the best pitcher in the AL on the mound
b ) your alternative is a reliever on a hot streak due for reversion to the mean
and
c ) the evidence that says Pedro falls apart after pitch 100 is invalid because of small sample size

A ) Pedro was one of the best pitchers in the AL on an ERA basis BECAUSE you took him out of the game in the 7th or 8th when he got close to the 100 pitch mark

B ) what are the odds that Embree, Timlin, and Williamson are going to collectively revert to the mean before they get 6 outs. Better or worse or a push with Pedro falling apart late in the game, late in the season. Which decision has more downside risk?

C ) great time to test that theory

Bill Deane also ignores the most maddening part of the whole saga- that Little didn't have the opportunity to pull Pedro once. He had the opportunity at least 4 times before the score was tied

YANKEES 8TH: Johnson popped to shortstop;
Jeter doubled to right;
Williams singled to center [Jeter scored];
Matsui doubled [Williams to third];
Posada doubled to center [Williams scored, Matsui scored];

EMBREE REPLACED MARTINEZ (PITCHING); Giambi
flied to center;
TIMLIN REPLACED EMBREE (PITCHING); SIERRA
BATTED FOR WILSON; Sierra was walked intentionally; BOONE RAN
FOR SIERRA; Garcia walked [Posada to third, Boone to second];
Soriano forced Garcia (second to shortstop); 3 R, 4 H, 0 E, 3
LOB. Red Sox 5, Yankees 5.

Excuse me while I go post something in the 2003 Game threads. [Dammit the hate filled 2003 Game Thread was lost ]

Edited by ilikedonuts, 04 May 2006 - 03:35 PM.

[Tangotiger]

They gave, er, traded away their outfield depth (Bernie Carbo) in June.  In September, though, either Garry Hancock or Sam Bowen wold have been much better options than Evans.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Hancock's 78 line and his career line are both terrible. How is Bowen even an option?

[Eddie Jurak]

Bill Deane also ignores the most maddening part of the whole saga-  that Little didn't have the opportunity to pull Pedro once.  He had the opportunity at least 4 times before the score was tied

I think the most maddening part of the whole saga was the ropes the Yankees were hitting off of Pedro in the 7th. He was lucky to gut his way out of that inning unscathed, and it was obvious to everyone but grady that he had nothing left.

[Tudor Fever]

Hancock's 78 line and his career line are both terrible.  How is Bowen even an option?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Not sure what you mean by "How is Bowen even an option?" He was in the system and could have been called up, so he was an option. (?)

Both of them were very good players in AAA, both offensively and defensively. As you said, Evans was, at that moment, completely incapable of playing offense or defense. I have no doubt that their MLEs greatly exceeded what little Evans could bring to the table at that point.

Edited by Tudor Fever, 04 May 2006 - 04:37 PM.

[LahoudOrBillyC]

I think the most maddening part of the whole saga was the ropes the Yankees were hitting off of Pedro in the 7th.  He was lucky to gut his way out of that inning unscathed, and it was obvious to everyone but grady that he had nothing left.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Exactly.

F*ck pitch counts. I watched the game with a few people who wouldn't know a pitch count if it bit them in the ass. My friend's wife was saying, "why are leaving that poor man in the game?" I would have taken him out in the 7th. I would have fired Little just based on his starting the eighth, let alone allowing what happened.

The last nine batters he faced went 7 for 9, with three doubles and a home run.

You can not defend that.

[trekfan55]

OK, so there is actually someone out there to logically defend Grady Little's leaving in Pedro? And to further reinforce ilikedonuts's argument, not only were there 4 chances for Little to take him out, but even further he actually visited the mound (I think before Matsui's at bat) and at that point I'm thinking "Finally!!" and yet he LEAVES HIM IN! OK, OK enough rant, it just blows my mind that there is anyone on this planet that can actually defend or justify this decision.


BTW afterwards we learned that Pedro thought he was done when he exited the 7th inning (even doing his famous point to Heaven gesture). And BSG points out in his book that Grady was under strict instructions to pull Pedro at 100 pitches or the 7th inning, whichever came first (both did at the same time).

2 things jump to my mind in that game:

1. Watching it on Panamanian TV, the English broadcast was barely audible (don't get me started on that) and I heard "Pedro is coming back out for the 8th" and I was screaming at the TV.
2. Timlin and Embree looking from the bullpen and porobably saying "What the hell is Little thinking?"

[Tangotiger]

I agree that as a fan, I felt that Pedro should have been pulled in the previous inning.

My problem with these "numerical analysis" is the reliance on the small sample size. Quoting someone's 31 PA as if it means anything is silly. What told you he was done were our eyes. We didn't need numbers to tell us that. All those articles that popped up with the numbers did the whole thing a disservice. The same with Prior in that fateful game. He was getting creamed all over the place.

[PedroKsBambino]

Wow- Bill Deane's argument on Grady Little's behalf is just horrible

I thought the same, I don't understane why Neyer has it up there---it's hideously poor analysis.

My problem with these "numerical analysis" is the reliance on the small sample size.

This is a double-edges sword though...there's no numerical analysis which suggests Pedro should be left in, either, as it has the same sample-size issues as to the specific decisions (i.e. using splits or or post-100 pitch samples). I think it's always important to set the baseline as "no decision" as opposed to "leave him in"

So what we have is:

1. Very small sample numbers indicating pulling him was the better move, albeit a very uncertain conclusion

2. Nothing indicating he should be left in numerically

3. A very clear observational message that he was done

4. A very strong and ready bullpen providing a clear alternative

Edited by PedroKsBambino, 05 May 2006 - 09:45 AM.

[Rudy Pemberton]

I think the only possible defense of leaving Pedro in is the "momentum" one. Relievers in Pedro games fared far worse than they did in relieving other pitchers...I theorize that getting Pedro out of a game was a victory in itself that led to a huge shift in momentum.

HOWEVER- this defense is not applicable here because Grady told Pedro he was out. At that point, you simply cannot change your mind. I believe that once a pitcher believes he's out of a game, he mentally shut its down.

AND THEN...there's no defense for leaving him in nearly as long as he was that inning.

I was among the staunchest Grady supporters and once I heard he told him he was out, I don't think there's any defending what he did.

[HillysLastWalk]

Quoting someone's 31 PA as if it means anything is silly.

What you can gain from those 31 PA is that this was something that Pedro virtually hadn't done all year (pitch past the 105 pitch mark). Now, in the most important game of the season, you want to test those waters? Ludicrous.

I wish I had the article and someone help me out here:

I thought I read somewhere that in that type of situation (wheter it was the lead or what I forget) they would typically position Trot Nixon differently in right field. And if Grady had stuck to that plan -- what they had done all year -- Trot Nixon would be standing in the perfect spot to catch Jeter's double.

You cannot defend Grady Little's managing of that 8th inning.

Edited by HillysLastWalk, 05 May 2006 - 05:00 PM.

[David Laurila]

this was something that Pedro virtually hadn't done all year (pitch past the 105 pitch mark).  Now, in the most important game of the season, you want to test those waters?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I've never seen a seasonal chart of his pitch-count, but I was at a game that summer where Pedro threw 130 pitchers in a complete game and K'd the last batter he faced.

[sfip]

In HLW's defense, he did say, "virtually".

To counter HLW's defense, Pedro threw > 105 pitches 4/22, 5/3, 6/26, 7/7, 7/25, 7/31, 8/6, 9/10, 9/16, 9/21 and 10/1 (game 1 ALDS), for a total of 11 times in '03 before that night (link).

Edited by sfip, 05 May 2006 - 05:26 PM.

[HillysLastWalk]

I've never seen a seasonal chart of his pitch-count, but I was at a game that summer where Pedro threw 130 pitchers in a complete game and K'd the last batter he faced.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The article states that there were 31 PA's over the course of the whole year (after 105 pitches). That doesn't seem like a lot. And I think they purposefully pulled him at or soon after 105. Therefore Pedro was conditioned to be that type of pitcher all year. Now, in the biggest game of the season, you want to stray from that? Ludicrous.

EDIT: yes, that's what I meant by virtual.

Edited by HillysLastWalk, 05 May 2006 - 05:42 PM.

[smnookin]

I've never seen a seasonal chart of his pitch-count, but I was at a game that summer where Pedro threw 130 pitchers in a complete game and K'd the last batter he faced.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

August 6. It was another example of where Pedro should have been taken out an inning earlier. Going into the 9th, Pedro had a 4-1 lead. An error, a double, a single, and a HBP made it 4-2 with runners on first and third before he got Salmon looking to end the game. I'm sure it was fun to witness but even at the time I thought it was a dumb move.

Even less explicable were the 3 straight starts of 115+ pitches in September. Or the 130 pitches he threw in the playoff opener in Oakland. By game 5 of the ALDS, he'd thrown 115+ four times since mid-September after only have done so four other times all season long. In that game, he didn't even make it past 100, and the last handful of those almost cost the Sox the game, and the series: he let in a run in the Oakland 8th before finally being pulled for Embree.

[Tangotiger]

What you can gain from those 31 PA is that this was something that Pedro virtually hadn't done all year (pitch past the 105 pitch mark).  Now, in the most important game of the season, you want to test those waters?  Ludicrous.

I wish I had the article and someone help me out here:

I thought I read somewhere that in that type of situation (wheter it was the lead or what I forget) they would typically position Trot Nixon differently in right field.  And if Grady had stuck to that plan -- what they had done all year -- Trot Nixon would be standing in the perfect spot to catch Jeter's double.

You cannot defend Grady Little's managing of that 8th inning.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Did you not read at all what I wrote? I said I would pull him. But, I would not justify that decision based on 31 PAs, which is completely irrelevant. I would justify it by my eyes.

[HillysLastWalk]

Did you not read at all what I wrote?  I said I would pull him.  But, I would not justify that decision based on 31 PAs, which is completely irrelevant.  I would justify it by my eyes.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

My fault, I wasn't debating your point. I was just leap-frogging off of the 31 PA thing to make my own point. I should have made that clear.

Edited by HillysLastWalk, 06 May 2006 - 01:03 PM.

[Otis Foster]

My recollection of the 7th was that Pedro was consistently up in the strike zone, and even to my uneducated eyes, looked like he was wearing down badly. As much as I respect what one can garner from statistics, as others have said, some visual evidence is irrefutable.

Also, didn't Stottlemeyer keep turning to Torre in the 8th and say "They're going to take him out now, aren't they?"

[David Laurila]

I would justify it by my eyes.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Which, of course, is what Grady did. He justified it differently, but the method was the same.

[Tangotiger]

Which, of course, is what Grady did.  He justified it differently, but the method was the same.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Yes, exactly. That's why you fire the blind manager. The move, or not, was a pure observational and gut instinct decision.