[Dogman2]

If not for a blown umpire call, and a good defensive play on a rocket, Ellsbury could have gone 4-4 tonight.

He's really been playing well recently. This pleases me.

The stolen base attempt with nobody out in the 8th of a 1 run game was completely stupid. He doesn't need third in that situation.

[Harry Hooper]

The stolen base attempt with nobody out in the 8th of a 1 run game was completely stupid. He doesn't need third in that situation.

You've got to be able to go into 3B standing to try and steal with nobody out.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

You've got to be able to go into 3B standing to try and steal with nobody out.

It was an incredibly dumb decision on Ellsbury's part and could have easily cost the Sox the game. Common sense should have told him that attempting it was a dumb idea.

I have to wonder if Tito will take off the green light for Ellsbury for any base but first from now on. That was just such a stupid idea on every level tonight.

[roundegotrip]

Of course, without a green light to steal at will, we would be short one very tremendous highlight from this season.

It's a double-edged sword, but I'd say the benefits of turning Ellsbury loose on the bases have far outweighed the drawbacks so far.

[Dogman2]

Of course, without a green light to steal at will, we would be short one very tremendous highlight from this season.

It's a double-edged sword, but I'd say the benefits of turning Ellsbury loose on the bases have far outweighed the drawbacks so far.

That isn't really the point. The in-game situation should give Jacoby some idea when it is more favorable to try and take a bag. In tonight's situation, a leadoff double with the heart of the order following hardly calls for him to attempt to steal especially given the score and number of outs. Irrespective of Dustins's base hit, he never should have been going. He ran into an out, which as SJH said, could have contributed to losing the game.

[roundegotrip]

That isn't really the point. The in-game situation should give Jacoby some idea when it is more favorable to try and take a bag. In tonight's situation, a leadoff double with the heart of the order following hardly calls for him to attempt to steal especially given the score and number of outs. Irrespective of Dustins's base hit, he never should have been going. He ran into an out, which as SJH said, could have contributed to losing the game.

I agree, absolutely, it was boneheaded. My point is that he's done more good than harm in his steal attempts, and rather than restrict him after a mistake, I'd prefer to have him (hopefully) learn from his mistake and continue to be a potential threat to steal at any time, just using more sound judgment.

[Eric Van]

It was an incredibly dumb decision on Ellsbury's part and could have easily cost the Sox the game. Common sense should have told him that attempting it was a dumb idea.

I have to wonder if Tito will take off the green light for Ellsbury for any base but first from now on. That was just such a stupid idea on every level tonight.

Well, there's three posters in a row (and eventually four or five) making a common-sense guess about the risk / benefit tradeoff of a strategy and coming down brutally hard based on that guess. But common-sense guesses about baseball strategy are often wrong. As evidenced by the continued use of the sac bunt.

In this case, you need to succeed 72% of the time to break even*. That's with average hitters coming up next against an average pitcher. With Ortiz in the hole and B.J. Ryan on the mound, the actual break-even point is probably very close to that. So it's not a bad gamble at all.

The mistake was not the idea of stealing 3B, but not recognizing that his jump was bad. More of a physical than a mental error.

*Present WP = .901
With runner on 3B: .923
If out at 3B: .845

You are trying to gain an extra 2.2% chance of victory at the potential cost of 5.6%. So you need to succeed 5.6 / (5.6 + 2.2) percent of the time. Or in the classical formula:

(.901 - .845) / (.923 - .845) = .718

[DieHardSoxFan1]

Well, there's three posters in a row (and eventually four or five) making a common-sense guess about the risk / benefit tradeoff of a strategy and coming down brutally hard based on that guess. But common-sense guesses about baseball strategy are often wrong. As evidenced by the continued use of the sac bunt.

In this case, you need to succeed 72% of the time to break even*. That's with average hitters coming up next against an average pitcher. With Ortiz in the hole and B.J. Ryan on the mound, the actual break-even point is probably very close to that. So it's not a bad gamble at all.

The mistake was not the idea of stealing 3B, but not recognizing that his jump was bad. More of a physical than a mental error.

*Present WP = .901
With runner on 3B: .923
If out at 3B: .845

You are trying to gain an extra 2.2% chance of victory at the potential cost of 5.6%. So you need to succeed 5.6 / (5.6 + 2.2) percent of the time. Or in the classical formula:

(.901 - .845) / (.923 - .845) = .718

I quite genuinely find this analysis interesting, but I'm afraid you've overlooked the most pressing question. Which of the following situations is most likely to result in a run scored: a runner on 3rd base and one out, or the bases empty and one out? Because if Ellsbury does the prudent thing and keeps his butt on 2nd base, there's a very high probability that Pedroia advances him to 3rd with a grounder to the right side. Which is exactly what happened on the very next pitch.

[Eric Van]

I quite genuinely find this analysis interesting, but I'm afraid you've overlooked the most pressing question. Which of the following situations is most likely to result in a run scored: a runner on 3rd base and one out, or the bases empty and one out? Because if Ellsbury does the prudent thing and keeps his butt on 2nd base, there's a very high probability that Pedroia advances him to 3rd with a grounder to the right side. Which is exactly what happened on the very next pitch.

The analysis doesn't overlook that scenario at all; it includes it, at its average rate of occurrence, just as it does every other scenario. How about Ellsbury stays on 2B, Pedroia hits a decently deep fly ball, and Papi strikes up, pops out, or hits a one-hopper at a drawn-in infielder? That happens a lot, too, and that's why stealing the base adds to your chance of winning the game.

Unless you want to argue that Pedroia has an extraordinarily higher rate of "productive outs" than the average player -- but there's no evidence that that's true.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

The analysis doesn't overlook that scenario at all; it includes it, at its average rate of occurrence, just as it does every other scenario. How about Ellsbury stays on 2B, Pedroia hits a decently deep fly ball, and Papi strikes up, pops out, or hits a one-hopper at a drawn-in infielder? That happens a lot, too, and that's why stealing the base adds to your chance of winning the game.

Unless you want to argue that Pedroia has an extraordinarily higher rate of "productive outs" than the average player -- but there's no evidence that that's true.

It appears to me that this analysis doesn't seem to take into account the increased difficultly of stealing 3rd base, or the CS% of the catcher (Barajas has caught 26% of runners stealing this season and 33% over his career).

In general making the first out of the inning at 3rd base is considered a very poor play. Is the CW wrong in this case?

Looking at Tango's RE charts,, and if I'm reading them correctly, a runner on second with no one out results in a run expectancy of 1.123. A runner on 3rd with no one out results in a run expectancy of 1.37. But with no runners on and 1 out, the RE drops all the way to 0.243. It seems to me (if I'm reading this correctly) that Ellsbury was risking losing nearly a full run's worth of expectancy in that situation for what appears to be a pretty marginal payoff.

Let's ignore RE and look at the chances of scoring just 1 run, which is really what the Sox were looking for in the 8th. With a runner on 2nd and 0 outs, the chances of scoring exactly 1 run appear to be 35.7% according to the chart. With a runner on 3rd and 0 out, that figure increases to 55.2%. But with no one on base and 1 out, the percentage of scoring 1 run drops all the way down to 9.4%.

Seems like a poor percentage play to me, at least based on Tango's RE charts.

[GreyisGone]

It was a pretty dumb play by Ellsbury - especially once he stumbled at the start. With that said, the pitch itself was pretty much the perfect pitch for a catcher trying to throw out a runner at 3rd. If Ryan throws that over the plate Ellsbury is probably safe.

[AlNipper49]

breaking discussion out

[Trautwein's Degree]

Fangraphs has it a -.056 WPA.

The risk clearly did not justify the reward. Especially, given Ellsbury's speed there's a chance he could have scored on Pedroia's single.

[Toe Nash]

It appears to me that this analysis doesn't seem to take into account the increased difficultly of stealing 3rd base, or the CS% of the catcher (Barajas has caught 26% of runners stealing this season and 33% over his career).

Chavez was catching at that point as they had pinch run for Barajas. But he's even better in limited sample: 29/57 caught in the last 4 years.

I think what is catching people with the WE thing is that when you're up 2-1 in the 8th inning at home, you already have a pretty good chance of winning. As Eric noted once Ellsbury was caught the WE was still 84.5%. With a closer like Paps (especially since he had good stuff last night) that percentage is higher.

If the Sox were on the road or it was earlier in the game I expect there would be more to lose, and stealing third with no outs would be less wise.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Oops. Thanks for "catching" my mistake regarding who was in the game at the time. I thought it was still Barajas.

[86spike]

The other very obvious point is that Ellsbury is very fast and can be expected to score from 2B on any base hit out of the infield.

He quite simply did not need to take 3B to get a better meaningfully chance to score a run.

[DaughtersofDougMirabelli]

The other very obvious point is that Ellsbury is very fast and can be expected to score from 2B on any base hit out of the infield.

He quite simply did not need to take 3B to get a better meaningfully chance to score a run.

Pedroia had attempted a bunt on the first pitch thrown to him. It seemed as though Francona (unless Pedroia decided on his own) really wanted Ellsbury at 3rd. Was there really that little confidence in the 2-4 hitters last night that they felt the need to have Ellsbury at 3rd rather than 2nd? Once Ellsbury saw the failed bunt attempt he may have decided, 'hey I can get over there myself and not waste an out' which of course he inevitably did.

[Eric Van]

It appears to me that this analysis doesn't seem to take into account the increased difficultly of stealing 3rd base, or the CS% of the catcher (Barajas has caught 26% of runners stealing this season and 33% over his career).

Those do not affect the break-even point of 72%, just the probability that you can succeed that often.

In general making the first out of the inning at 3rd base is considered a very poor play. Is the CW wrong in this case?

The CW in general is tremendously conservative about aggressive baserunning. I have a lot of problems with Mike Scioscia as a manager, but he gets that right.

Looking at Tango's RE charts,, and if I'm reading them correctly, a runner on second with no one out results in a run expectancy of 1.123. A runner on 3rd with no one out results in a run expectancy of 1.37. But with no runners on and 1 out, the RE drops all the way to 0.243. It seems to me (if I'm reading this correctly) that Ellsbury was risking losing nearly a full run's worth of expectancy in that situation for what appears to be a pretty marginal payoff.

Based on RE the breakeven point is (1.123 - .243) / (1.37 - .243) or 78%. It is 72% in this score and inning situation (i.e, based on WP) because there is no time when one run is more valuable than up a run with your closer about to take the mound in the ninth.

Let's ignore RE and look at the chances of scoring just 1 run, which is really what the Sox were looking for in the 8th. With a runner on 2nd and 0 outs, the chances of scoring exactly 1 run appear to be 35.7% according to the chart. With a runner on 3rd and 0 out, that figure increases to 55.2%. But with no one on base and 1 out, the percentage of scoring 1 run drops all the way down to 9.4%.

(.357 - .094) / (.552 - .094) = 57%. A very low break-even point. It's lower than the 72% because making an out absolutely kills your big-inning chances, and a big inning almost guarantees the win.

He quite simply did not need to take 3B to get a better meaningfully chance to score a run.

Mr. Sacrifice Fly says "hi."

If we are fine-tuning the odds based on individual player tendencies, Dustin Pedroia has been hitting a ton of deep fly balls. His outs since coming back from his injury: 8 fly balls deep enough to get a run home, 0 ground balls to the right side.

In terms of the single likeliest scenario, it was successful SB, sac fly, kudos and splooge. Which is why it was actually a very smart play; his error was not in thinking the SB then and there was smart, but in thinking he had an adequate (i.e., 72%) chance of success given the start-and-stop bad jump he got.

[86spike]

Mr. Sacrifice Fly says "hi."

if there was one out... sure, get over there.

there were no outs.

[Smiling Joe Hesketh]

Based on RE the breakeven point is (1.123 - .243) / (1.37 - .243) or 78%. It is 72% in this score and inning situation (i.e, based on WP) because there is no time when one run is more valuable than up a run with your closer about to take the mound in the ninth.

I'd guess a tie game in the bottom of the 8th, or a tie game in the bottom of the 9th, are times when 1 run is more valuable than the situation you describe.

(.357 - .094) / (.552 - .094) = 57%. A very low break-even point. It's lower than the 72% because making an out absolutely kills your big-inning chances, and a big inning almost guarantees the win.

They weren't looking for a big inning there. They were looking for 1 run.