I’ve tried to include each player that was intended to be a significant part of the Sox roster. All of the faceless bit players that came and went were ignored. Each player is listed with several pieces of data.
Years – the length of the contractual commitment. A “+” indicates an option year. If the option vested on the basis of player performance, then I eventually rolled that option into the original contract. If the team picked up a club option, then I considered that a second commitment.
Total – the total guaranteed portion of the contract in millions.
Cost – what each player cost each season. Usually. I think I ended up using AAV for Renteria and Varitek for some reason (probably because 10 is such a nice round number). The distinction doesn’t matter for players who have finished their contracts, which is most of them. It’s primarily an issue with Foulke and Clement who have back loaded contracts. Their first years look like better values than they really are.
VORP – is an easy to use context adjusted measure of player value.
$10/VORP – is the cost of 10 VORP. If 10 VORP = 1 win, then it’s the cost of one win. This is one measure of cost efficiency.
WARP1 – is another BP metric. Unlike VORP it includes defensive value. It’s necessary to compute a valuation using a method recently published by Nate Silver.
BPVal – is a measure of the value of WARP1 production in the free agent market.
Diff – is the difference between BPVal and Cost. Positive numbers are good values for the team.
I’m going to split the players up in two different ways. The first is just by season. The second is by the season that the contract was signed. For example, the Sox made a 3+ year commitment to Schilling in Nov of 2003. Each season is grouped separately as “2004” and “2005”, but the whole contact is considered as a single commitment as a “2003/04 Transaction”.
I also split players by pitcher or position player, because, well, they’re different.
2003
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Walker 1 3.45 3.45 28.2 1.22 2.1 1.78 -1.67 Mueller 2+ 4.2 2.1 65.2 0.32 6.8 12.57 10.47 Millar 2+ 5.3 2.0 28.6 0.70 4.9 7.08 5.08 Giambi 1 2.0 2.0 0.4 50.0 0.3 0.14 -1.86 Ortiz 1 1.25 1.25 48.5 0.26 4.9 7.08 5.83 Jackson 1 0.625 0.625 -2.3 neg 0.0 0.0 -0.63 Total 16.825 11.425 168.6 0.68 19.0 28.66 17.23
Epstein’s first year produced tremendous value in the short-term position player market. Mueller was a tremendous pickup at a bargain price. Both Millar and Ortiz were also very good pickups. The other pickups didn’t amount to much, but those misses are overwhelmed by the three big hits.
The VORP unit cost of 0.68M per “win” is pretty exceptional.
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Wake 3 13.02 4.34 30.8 1.41 5.6 8.93 4.59 Mendoza 2 6.5 2.9 -5.9 neg 0.8 0.46 -2.44 Embree 2+ 5.5 2.75 11.3 2.43 2.1 1.78 -0.97 Kim 1 2.0 2.0 15.7 1.27 4.5 6.12 4.12 Timlin 1 1.85 1.85 19.7 0.94 3.8 4.6 2.75 Suppan 1 0.625 0.625 1.6 3.91 1.2 0.79 0.16 Williamson 1 0.6 0.6 -1.2 neg 0.2 0.09 -0.59 Sauerbeck 1 0.517 0.517 -2.7 neg 0.0 0.0 -0.52 Fox 1 0.35 0.35 2.2 1.59 0.9 0.53 0.18 Lyon 1 0.310 0.31 7.0 0.44 2.6 2.48 2.18 Total 31.272 16.242 78.5 2.07 21.7 25.79 9.54 Total 48.097 27.677 247.1 1.12 40.7 54.4 26.78
Wakefield is an ambiguous inclusion. He had a contract for 2003 for about the same cost. However, Epstein signed him to a new three-year deal that replaced his 2003 contract. I’m giving Epstein full credit for Wakefield’s entire contract, but obviously with any extension of an inherited player there is some aspect of “credit sharing” that is necessary.
Wakefield, Kim and Timlin were the key players in terms production. Those three and a very inexpensive Lyon drove the “Diff” column into strongly positive territory. There were some definite misses both in terms of on field production (mostly from the pen) and financial value, but the misses were generally only moderately expensive and as a result easily washed out by the successes.
In total, the Sox spent 28M on these players and received 41 WARP that would be valued at roughly 54M. That’s a net gain of roughly 27M in 2003.
2004
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Nixon 3 19.0 6.33 13.1 4.83 1.4 0.98 -5.35 Ortiz 1 4.588 4.588 71.3 0.64 6.4 11.29 6.7 Millar 2+ 5.3 2.65 37.6 0.7 4.2 5.44 2.79 Mueller 2+ 4.2 2.1 21.8 0.96 3.9 4.81 2.71 Cabrera 1 2.0 2.0 14.7 1.36 1.3 0.88 -1.12 Reese 1 1.0 1.0 -7.3 neg 1.1 0.7 -0.3 Meintk 1 0.933 0.933 -4.5 neg -0.2 -0.07 -1.01 Burks 1 0.75 0.75 -1.3 neg -0.1 -0.04 -0.79 Kapler 1 0.75 0.75 1.2 6.25 0.9 0.53 -0.22 Bellhorn 1 0.49 0.49 37.6 0.13 5.0 7.33 6.84 Roberts 1 0.325 0.325 1.7 1.91 0.7 0.39 0.06 Total 39.336 20.915 185.9 1.18 24.6 32.24 10.33
In 2004 the biggest decision was to give Nixon a reasonably large three year deal. He subsequently got hurt and has badly under performed his contract. In terms of positive performance and value standpoints the key players were Ortiz, whose one year contract was a residue of the previous decision to sign him and his service time, and Bellhorn. Millar and Mueller continued to contribute positively, but at reduced levels in comparison to 2003.
The new additions aside form Bellhorn did not contribute much in terms of statistical performance or value.
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Schilling 3+ 39.5 14.0 72.9 1.92 10.2 26.24 12.24 Foulke 3+ 22.5 4.5 35.9 1.25 7.3 14.27 9.77 Wake 3 13.02 4.34 9.4 4.62 3.7 4.4 0.06 Kim 2 10.0 4.0 -3.0 neg 0.0 0.0 -4.0 Mendoza 2 6.5 3.6 9.4 3.83 1.4 0.98 -2.62 Williamson 1 3.175 3.175 14.0 2.27 1.2 0.79 -2.39 Embree 2+ 5.5 2.75 8.5 3.24 1.6 1.19 -1.56 Timlin 1+ 2.5 2.5 18.3 1.37 3.2 3.47 0.97 Adams 1 0.56 0.56 -1.2 neg 0.3 0.14 -0.42 Arroyo 1 0.333 0.333 24.7 0.13 4.6 6.35 6.02 Myers 1 0.18 0.18 3.5 0.51 0.6 0.32 0.14 Leskanic 1 0.15 0.15 8.3 0.18 1.8 1.41 1.26 Total 103.918 40.088 200.7 2.0 35.9 59.56 19.48 Total 143.253 62.003 386.6 1.6 60.5 91.81 29.8
The BPVal methodology breaks down at high WARP levels. Schilling was great both in terms of production and value, but probably not as good as his listed “BPVal”. The second major pitching staff addition, Foulke, was also excellent. However, his “Diff” is boosted by the comparison to an artificially low 2004 “Cost”. Arroyo, who had been picked up on waivers in 2002/03 was also a key contributor in terms of production and value. Kim, Mendoza and Williamson were disappointments.
In total, the Sox spent 62M on these players and received 61 WARP that would be valued at roughly 92M. That’s a net gain of roughly 30M in 2003. Even if you do a rough correction for Schilling and Foulke of 10M or so, the Sox still would have received a sizable 20M net gain.
2005
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Renteria 4 40.0 10.0 26.7 3.75 1.8 1.41 -8.59 Varitek 4 40.0 10.0 45.4 2.2 6.2 10.67 0.67 Nixon 3 19.0 6.33 21.7 2.92 4.3 5.66 -0.67 Ortiz 2+ 12.5 5.25 85.8 0.61 8.0 16.83 11.58 Millar 3 8.8 3.5 14.8 2.36 3.9 4.81 1.31 Bellhorn 1 2.75 2.75 4.9 5.61 1.7 1.3 -1.45 Mueller 1 2.1 2.1 32.3 0.65 5.2 7.85 5.75 Payton 1 1.75 1.75 3.6 4.86 0.8 0.46 -1.29 Mirabelli 2 3.0 1.5 4.8 3.13 1.3 0.88 -0.62 Olerud 1 0.75 0.75 8.7 0.86 1.9 1.53 0.78 Graff 1 0.65 0.65 13.8 0.47 1.6 1.19 0.54 Total 131.3 44.58 262.5 1.7 36.7 52.6 8.02
Renteria is Epstein’s first very large bust. A pbp defensive system like UZR that perhaps values his defense more highly than BP’s method would boost his production. That would cut into the magnitude of his negative “Diff”, but it was a very bad first year any way you look at it. In the first year of a contract extension signed during the 2004 season, Ortiz was tremendously productive at a bargain cost. Mueller also bounced back and had a very good season. Varitek was a very good performer, but basically did so at full market value. The rest of the players produced at a rate roughly commensurate with their compensation.
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Schilling 3 39.5 12.5 1.3 96.15 2.2 1.92 -10.58 Wells 2 13.0 9.0 24.1 3.73 5.2 7.85 -1.15 Foulke 3+ 22.5 7.0 -0.7 neg 1.6 1.19 -5.81 Clement 3 25.5 6.5 21.6 3.01 4.8 6.83 0.33 Kim 2 10.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -6.0 Wake 3 13.02 4.34 32.9 1.32 6.5 11.6 7.26 Embree 3 8.5 3.0 -8.8 neg -0.1 -0.04 -3.04 Timlin 2 5.25 2.75 28.6 0.96 5.6 8.93 6.18 Arroyo 1 1.875 1.875 16.9 1.11 4.7 6.59 4.72 Miller 1 1.5 1.5 5.9 2.54 1.9 1.53 0.03 Halama 1 1.0 1.0 -4.9 neg 0.2 0.09 -0.91 Mantei 1 0.75 0.75 -3.1 neg 0.1 0.04 -0.71 Bradford 1 0.7 0.7 5.0 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.0 Myers 1 0.6 0.6 10.0 0.6 1.8 1.41 0.81 Papelbon 1 0.325 0.15 10.9 0.14 1.7 1.3 1.15 Total 144.02 57.665 139.7 4.13 37.3 49.94 -7.72 Total 275.32 102.245 402.2 2.54 74.0 102.25 0.30
As good as Schilling and Foulke were in 2004, they were just god awful in 2005. Combined they were basically replacement level pitchers at a cost of 19.5M. Add in the 6M obligation to Kim and the Sox received nothing for 25M.
Wakefield, Timlin and Arroyo were bright spots, but in this case the large misses overwhelmed the hits.
In total, the Sox spent 102M on these players. With a payroll of roughly 130M this was the first time that players Epstein acquired accounted for more than 50% of the Sox payroll. In return, the Sox received 74 WARP that would be valued at roughly 102M. The Sox basically broke even on Epstein acquired players in 2005.
These are the three year totals.
Player Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff 3yr Hit 76.741 588.8 1.30 78.2 111.72 37.25 3yr Pitch 113.904 418.9 2.72 94.9 135.29 21.30 3yr Total 190.645 1007.7 1.89 173.1 247.01 58.54
Overall, the Sox spent 191M on Epstein players and received roughly 247M in value. That’s a net gain of 59M. I wouldn’t take any of these precise numbers too seriously for a variety of reasons, but that’s a good idea of what kind of value Epstein’s players have returned in comparison to their cost.
I think this kind of summary is more interesting looking at every contract as a single unit. Let’s reorder these player seasons by the season their contract was signed.
2002/2003 Transactions
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Walker 1 3.45 3.45 28.2 1.22 2.1 1.78 -1.67 Mueller03 2+ 4.2 2.1 65.2 0.32 6.8 12.57 10.47 Mueller04 2+ 4.2 2.1 21.8 0.96 3.9 4.81 2.71 Millar03 2+ 5.3 2.0 28.6 0.70 4.9 7.08 5.08 Millar04 2+ 5.3 2.65 37.6 0.7 4.2 5.44 2.79 Millar05 3 8.8 3.5 14.8 2.36 3.9 4.81 1.31 Giambi 1 2.0 2.0 0.4 50.0 0.3 0.14 -1.86 Ortiz 1 1.25 1.25 48.5 0.26 4.9 7.08 5.83 Jackson 1 0.625 0.625 -2.3 neg 0.0 0.0 -0.63 Total 19.7 242.8 0.81 31.0 43.71 24.04
The nice thing about doing it this way is you can see how a player’s production and value varies during the course of a multiyear deal. Mueller saw a significant drop in production from 2003 to 2004, but his cost stayed very, very low and as a result he was a solid bargain even in his decline season. Somewhat surprisingly, Millar’s three year decline is pretty gentle by WARP. Since his salary only went up in small increments from a very low base he remained a decent value even in 2005. Those two players and Ortiz made this a tremendously productive off-season of transactions.
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Wake03 3 13.02 4.34 30.8 1.41 5.6 8.93 4.59 Wake04 3 13.02 4.34 9.4 4.62 3.7 4.4 0.06 Wake05 3 13.02 4.34 32.9 1.32 6.5 11.6 7.26 Mendoza03 2 6.5 2.9 -5.9 neg 0.8 0.46 -2.44 Mendoza04 2 6.5 3.6 9.4 3.83 1.4 0.98 -2.62 Embree03 2+ 5.5 2.75 11.3 2.43 2.1 1.78 -0.97 Embree04 2+ 5.5 2.75 8.5 3.24 1.6 1.19 -1.56 Embree05 3 8.5 3.0 -8.8 neg -0.1 -0.04 -3.04 Kim 1 2.0 2.0 15.7 1.27 4.5 6.12 4.12 Timlin 1 1.85 1.85 19.7 0.94 3.8 4.6 2.75 Suppan 1 0.625 0.625 1.6 3.91 1.2 0.79 0.16 Williamson 1 0.6 0.6 -1.2 neg 0.2 0.09 -0.59 Sauerbeck 1 0.517 0.517 -2.7 neg 0.0 0.0 -0.52 Fox 1 0.35 0.35 2.2 1.59 0.9 0.53 0.18 Lyon 1 0.310 0.31 7.0 0.44 2.6 2.48 2.18 Total 34.3 129.9 2.64 34.8 43.92 9.65 Total 53.947 372.7 1.45 65.8 87.63 33.69
Wakefield bounced from good to solid/break even to very good during the course of his contract. Again, some chunk of that credit has to be considered inherited. Wakefield represents about half of the on field productivity and essentially all of positive “Diff”. Mendoza was a pretty big bust. I think people may be surprised to see how poorly Embree is rated by these measures, but he was never especially productive and he was always relatively expensive for his role. He had some very good stretches for the Sox, but ultimately he wasn’t a very good signing.
All of these contracts have now expired so we can make a complete accounting of Epstein’s first off-season. He committed the Sox to spend 54M and these players produced 66 WARP with a free agent valuation of 88M. That’s a net gain for the Sox of nearly 34M.
2003/2004 Transactions
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Nixon04 3 19.0 6.33 13.1 4.83 1.4 0.98 -5.35 Nixon05 3 19.0 6.33 21.7 2.92 4.3 5.66 -0.67 Ortiz04 1 4.588 4.588 71.3 0.64 6.4 11.29 6.7 Ortiz05 2+ 12.5 5.25 85.8 0.61 8.0 16.83 11.58 Cabrera 1 2.0 2.0 14.7 1.36 1.3 0.88 -1.12 Reese 1 1.0 1.0 -7.3 neg 1.1 0.7 -0.3 Meintk 1 0.933 0.933 -4.5 neg -0.2 -0.07 -1.01 Burks 1 0.75 0.75 -1.3 neg -0.1 -0.04 -0.79 Kapler 1 0.75 0.75 1.2 6.25 0.9 0.53 -0.22 Bellhorn 1 0.49 0.49 37.6 0.13 5.0 7.33 6.84 Roberts 1 0.325 0.325 1.7 1.91 0.7 0.39 0.06 Total 28.745 234.0 1.23 28.8 44.49 15.75
The significant multiyear deals in this group are the three year deal to Nixon and the contract extension to Ortiz that took effect after his one year deal for 2004. Over the first two years of Nixon’s deal the Sox are down about 6M. The Sox are obligated for one more year as well. If Nixon stays healthy he can make up some of that deficit, but the Nixon contract will end up as a surprising net negative.
The two contracts given to Ortiz in this period have been major successes both in terms of on field production and value. They represent more than the total positive “Diff” for this group of player transactions.
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Schill04 3+ 39.5 14.0 72.9 1.92 10.2 26.24 12.24 Schill05 3+ 39.5 12.5 1.3 96.15 2.2 1.92 -10.58 Foulke04 3+ 22.5 4.5 35.9 1.25 7.3 14.27 9.77 Foulke05 3+ 22.5 7.0 -0.7 neg 1.6 1.19 -5.81 Kim04 2 10.0 4.0 -3.0 neg 0.0 0.0 -4.0 Kim05 2 10.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -6.0 Williamson 1 3.175 3.175 14.0 2.27 1.2 0.79 -2.39 Timlin04 1+ 2.5 2.5 18.3 1.37 3.2 3.47 0.97 Timlin05 2 5.25 2.75 28.6 0.96 5.6 8.93 6.18 Adams 1 0.56 0.56 -1.2 neg 0.3 0.14 -0.42 Arroyo 1 0.333 0.333 24.7 0.13 4.6 6.35 6.02 Myers 1 0.18 0.18 3.5 0.51 0.6 0.32 0.14 Leskanic 1 0.15 0.15 8.3 0.18 1.8 1.41 1.26 Total 57.648 202.6 2.85 38.6 65.02 7.38 Total 86.393 436.6 1.98 67.4 109.52 23.12Looking at contracts as a single group has a huge effect here as the awful second seasons from Schilling and Foulke wipe out much of their first season value. Flags fly forever and all that, but from a simplistic value perspective those contracts which had been great values may end up as busts. Schilling has 2 years at 26M left and Foulke has 1yr+ a mutual option at 11-15M. If they don’t bounce back, they’ll significantly reduce the overall positive “Diff” for this set of player transactions.
We also pick up all of Kim’s terrible contract. The two bright spots are Timlin, mostly in his second season, and Arroyo. And I probably should have pushed Arroyo back to 2002/03 when he was claimed. He has signed new contracts each subsequent season, but ultimately his price is set by the CBA and his production and that all flows from the good decision to claim him on waivers. If you push all of Arroyo’s value back to Epstein’s first off-season, then you exacerbate the fact that most of Epstein’s high value moves were already from that first off-season.
Mostly on the strength of Ortiz, the Epstein players as a group have been very good values. That may or may not still be true by the time the Schilling and Foulke deals expire.
2004/2005 Transactions
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Renteria 4 40.0 10.0 26.7 3.75 1.8 1.41 -8.59 Varitek 4 40.0 10.0 45.4 2.2 6.2 10.67 0.67 Bellhorn 1 2.75 2.75 4.9 5.61 1.7 1.3 -1.45 Mueller 1 2.1 2.1 32.3 0.65 5.2 7.85 5.75 Payton 1 1.75 1.75 3.6 4.86 0.8 0.46 -1.29 Mirabelli 2 3.0 1.5 4.8 3.13 1.3 0.88 -0.62 Olerud 1 0.75 0.75 8.7 0.86 1.9 1.53 0.78 Graff 1 0.65 0.65 13.8 0.47 1.6 1.19 0.54 Total 29.5 140.2 2.10 20.5 25.29 -4.21
The year one return on this group of position players hasn’t been very good. Varitek and Mueller had very productive seasons, but only Mueller was a good bargain because Varitek is basically paid full market rate. Renteria’s first year is a big drag on the overall group. Most of the rest of the players were role players who didn’t have much of an impact on things either way.
As a good value player, Varitek is likely to decline. Renteria is something of a mystery at this point. In total, they represent a pretty iffy 60M commitment.
Player Years Total Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff Wells 2 13.0 9.0 24.1 3.73 5.2 7.85 -1.15 Clement 3 25.5 6.5 21.6 3.01 4.8 6.83 0.33 Arroyo 1 1.875 1.875 16.9 1.11 4.7 6.59 4.72 Miller 1 1.5 1.5 5.9 2.54 1.9 1.53 0.03 Halama 1 1.0 1.0 -4.9 neg 0.2 0.09 -0.91 Mantei 1 0.75 0.75 -3.1 neg 0.1 0.04 -0.71 Bradford 1 0.7 0.7 5.0 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.0 Myers 1 0.6 0.6 10.0 0.6 1.8 1.41 0.81 Papelbon 1 0.325 0.15 10.9 0.14 1.7 1.3 1.15 Total 22.075 86.4 2.55 21.5 26.35 4.27 Total 51.575 226.6 2.28 42.0 51.64 0.07
All of the new pitcher acquisitions were right around their financial break even point. Only Wells and Clement had solid seasons. In terms of the positive overall “Diff”, that is solely dependent on Arroyo. Again, if you push him back to 2002/03 then the pitcher group would be negative as well.
Wells is still owed 4-9M and is at best someone who can come close to hitting his financial breakeven point. Clement is owed 19M over two years on his back loaded contract. It’s likely that he’ll fall short of his break even point.
Overall, last off-season was right at the break even point in terms of value with some significant risk going forward.
Here are the summary tables.
Year Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff 2002/03 offense 19.7 242.8 0.81 31.0 43.71 24.04 2003/04 28.745 234.0 1.23 28.8 44.49 15.75 2004/05 29.5 140.2 2.10 20.5 25.29 -4.21 Total 77.945 617.0 1.26 80.3 113.5 35.6
Overall, Epstein did a fantastic job putting together an excellent offensive team. However, most of the great value signings were in his first off-season and the subsequent extension to Ortiz.
Year Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff 2002/03 pitching 34.3 129.9 2.64 34.8 43.92 9.65 2003/04 57.648 202.6 2.85 68.6 65.02 7.38 2004/05 22.075 86.4 2.55 21.5 26.35 4.27 Total 114.023 418.9 2.72 94.9 135.29 21.3
This looks like a better, more consistent performance by Epstein than it is. About half of that 21M “Diff” is from Wakefield and a good chunk of the rest is from the likely overvaluation of Schilling’s 2004 season. Epstein has been closer to break even on his pitching acquisitions than this table suggests. All things considered, that’s probably not bad – it may even be above average – but it’s a much different record than for his position player acquisitions.
The overall, overall…
Year Cost VORP $/10 VORP WARP1 BPVal Diff 2002/03 53.947 372.7 1.45 65.8 87.63 33.69 2003/04 86.393 436.6 1.98 67.4 109.52 23.12 2004/05 51.575 226.6 2.28 42.0 51.64 0.07 Total 191.915 1035.9 1.85 175.2 248.79 56.88
There is a steady decrease in cost efficiency as represented by $/10 VORP. The overall value of 1.85M/10 VORP is probably quite good though. The tremendous performance of the players from 2002/03 – the position players in particular – was largely unsustainable for a number of reasons. One overlooked reason is that the move from mostly signing complementary players for 2-3M to signing foundation players for 6-12M makes it much harder to maintain high cost efficiency or value scores. No player will be so bad and yet still get a lot of playing time that he’ll produce significant negative value. That creates an effective floor for every player. A 2M player can only be overpaid by 2-3M. However, that same player has a virtually unlimited ceiling and every year you see a 2M player produce 10-12M in value. As long as a GM or team is mostly signing cheap players their efficiency and value scores will be skewed positively by that. Once you start to deal with more expensive players, those players have much greater room for financial downsides (see Renteria, 2005) and much smaller room for upside even while enjoying very successful seasons (see Varitek, 2005). Once Epstein and the Sox moved from mostly signing cheap complementary players to sometimes signing expensive building blocks it was essentially guaranteed that the efficiency and value ratings would go down. And as long as the productivity stays high, that’s not a problem.
There is also a rather noticeable (and steep) decline in the “Diff” column. Why if that trend continued, we should be thrilled Epstein is gone. Or something. Part of that is due to mistakes that Epstein made, but a lot of it is reflective of the changing needs of the team.
Despite the fact that he had such a short tenure, Epstein has really been in charge through three distinct phases. In the first, he inherited a talented, expensive and under performing team. His ask mostly involved adding inexpensive complementary players. That phase was mostly a huge success. The bullpen was under resourced and he should have fired Little as a condition of taking the job, but phase one was a success.
In the next phase he was given significant payroll space to acquire two stud pitchers to try to make one last run in the Pedro window. That worked out pretty well too. The sudden health problems of those two pitchers leaves the medium and long term wisdom of those moves in doubt, but a championship is a championship.
In phase three, Epstein was asked to expand the championship window while building a bridge of younger core players to the hoped for eventual next generation of home grown players. That’s a much more diffuse goal and it’s probably not much of a surprise that the moves made in this phase are the least impressive. Varitek and Wells performed ably in their roles, but Renteria and Clement really didn’t establish themselves as the kind of prime age bridge players that the Sox had hoped.
And that’s the end of the story. There seems to be some controversy about how willing the organization will be about trying to go young in a fourth phase, but reportedly that’s the direction that Epstein wanted to move. To some extent, despite the championship, Epstein’s tenure has to be considered incomplete. The next phase – transitioning young players onto the roster as part of a sustainable long term winning organization – is what really separate the great GMs from the good and lucky ones. We’ll get a chance to see how Epstein’s prospects develop, but we won’t really get a chance to see how Epstein might have managed that transition of the organization.
