88 replies to this topic

[Frisbetarian]

In conjunction with the release of the 2007 Hardball Times Annual, THT author David Gassko has graciously agreed to answer questions from SoSH members. David will respond to your previously submitted queries in this thread. I ask that you save any follow-up questions or new questions until he has completed the initial round.

Thanks to David for taking the time and effort to respond, and to all who participated.

Ok .....lets open this back up for new questions and follow-ups.

Edited by Frisbetarian, 03 December 2006 - 09:15 AM.

[DSG]

Alrighty, let's get started...

[DSG]

Given the understanding of defense you gained from developing your own metric, can you critique Dewan's plus/minus system?  What is similar with your own metric and what is different?

Also, given the rescources, how would you develop your "ideal" defensive metric?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Dewan’s plus/minus is essentially UZR-lite. He doesn’t adjust for certain important things, such as the batter’s handedness, base-out situation (though he does for first basemen, weird that he doesn’t do it for all positions), park, and the groundball tendencies of the pitcher. For many players, these things don’t add up to much, but for a rather substantial amount, they make for a large adjustment.

What’s more important to me is that Dewan uses very small zones, which makes for some crazy probabilities, especially in the outfield. There are some zones that won’t see more than a few balls in play, which obviously can’t tell you much about the true probability of an out being made.

There’s one more thing I don’t like about the plus/minus system, which is that if a play is made, no fielder is charged for not making an out. For example, if on a given ball in play, there’s a 40% chance that the shortstop will make an out, a 20% chance that a third baseman will make an out, and a 40% chance the ball goes for a hit, and the shortstop makes the play, he’ll get a +.6 in Dewan’s system, and the third baseman will get a 0. I know why Dewan does this, and it might even make sense to do it on outfield fly balls (and it definitely makes sense to do it on infield flies), but the issue is that in this case, the individual ratings will not add up to the overall team rating. I don’t like that. It’s clearly the wrong approach for infielders, IMO.

Anyways, I sound much more critical than I should. It’s great to have all the data Dewan has presented, and The Fielding Bible contains enormous amounts of great information. I wholeheartedly recommend it.

My “ideal” defensive metric would be pretty simple. Have a camera on each fielder, plus a camera measuring the speed and trajectory of the batted ball. From there, it’s simple to construct a model that would give you a fielder’s exact probability of catching a ball based on the fielder’s positioning, its trajectory, and its speed. In fact, you could even break down each rating into a “fielding ability” and “positioning” to show which players do a good job of positioning themselves, and which players don’t, etc. It wouldn’t be that difficult, and I bet MLB Advanced Media does something like this within the next decade. At least I hope they do.

[DSG]

Same question as OCD's but with respect to Bill James's Relative Range Factor metric in his chapter in the Dewan book. Or BP's FRAR/FRAA.

More generally, how come these metrics keep getting run out there, but then there's no place to actually check them? Not really a Gassko question I guess.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Relative Range Factor and FRAA are pretty similar. They’re okay, but not the best of non-PBP metrics (that would either be my Range or Michael Humphreys’ DRA. Humphreys, by the way, has written a book on evaluating fielding throughout major league history, and when it comes out, I recommend that everyone buy it. Michael’s work is beyond spectacular.) One issue is that both count putouts for infielders, which makes absolutely no sense. FRAR is a ridiculous metric, because there’s no such thing as a replacement-level fielder; there are replacement-level players.

This is a big sticking for me, actually. Some replacement-level players are average hitters and terrible fielders (Matt Stairs comes to mind, though he’s actually an above-average hitter). Some are average fielders (or better) and terrible hitters (think Craig Grebeck). Actually, the “average” replacement-level player is a bad hitter and a slightly above-average fielder. But how exactly he makes his living doesn’t really matter—what matters is that a replacement-level player is going to be about -17 runs per 150 games below average.

Here’s a trick for calculating quick-and-dirty runs above replacement: Take batting runs above average and add to that fielding runs above replacement. FRAR includes a de facto positional adjustment, so this works pretty well.

I don’t really get the second part of your question. If you mean that there are no checks on their accuracy, I suggest you read these two articles by me:

http://www.hardballt...the-evaluators/
http://stats.mostval...ensive-metrics/

[DSG]

Do you ever get sick and tired with people only asking you about defense?  Would you rather just talk about offense sometimes?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Defense is fun! I don’t really think there are too many questions about evaluating offense at this point, but there’s still a lot to discover about defense, and no, I don’t get tired of it.

[DSG]

I have a non defense question.

David, I see that you are writing an article on the 100 greatest pitchers of all time for the upcoming annual. How much of your evaluation was based on longevity vs shorter spans of brilliance, and why?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The rankings I did were just based on wins above replacement, so longevity played a big part (Koufax, for example, was around #60. Pedro, on the other hand, was in the top-20). You know, I’ve thought about doing another set of rankings that balances peak and longevity, but every system I have experimented with so far has shown very similar results to just using WAR. I’m not sure that, objectively, you can argue that a Koufax had more value than Nolan Ryan. Might he have been a better pitcher? Sure, but that’s a much more subjective question (unless you want to rank everyone based on ERA+ or something, which I guess is legitimate).

[DSG]

I just read your article on the economics involved with winning the Daisuke Matsuzaka bid.  My question is where do you think the market goes from here?  Will Japan become the next 'development of the farm system', where teams like the Mariners, Yankees, and Red Sox just completely bury the teams that aren't quick to get involved in the Asian market? 

Also, if Boras holds Matsuzaka out , do you think that will lead to the MLB to pressure the Japanese leagues to change the posting system to make it easier for pre-free agent talent to flow into America?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I think the second question is kind of a moot point because I can’t possibly see Matsuzaka returning to Japan. I know Scott Boras is his agent, but

(1) Matsuzaka has already had a farewell ceremony and everything. He is clearly intent on leaving, and Seibu wants him to leave too.

(2) The Red Sox have a lot invested in this as well. If Matsuzaka holds out, the Sox will have ruined their relationship with Japanese leagues, Bud Selig won’t be happy, the offseason will be sunk, etc. I think this makes too much sense for both sides for this not to happen.

(3) Scott Boras is a tough agent, but he’s not impossible. It looks like the Sox are on the verge of signing one of his clients, JD Drew, and they’ve dealt with Boras before. Boras wants to make money, and if Matsuzaka has to go back to Japan, I doubt he retains Boras as his agent which will mean no money for him. Boras isn’t evil, he’s just a tough negotiator—there’s nothing wrong with that.

I don’t think Japan will become a farm system for MLB teams because the posting rules are so strict, and I don’t see them changing. I doubt Bud Selig wants to deal with possibly pissing off the Japanese leagues by altering the rules, and who knows how the anti-trust stuff would hold up in an international forum—there’s just too much risk and not enough reward to justify changing the rules, especially when baseball is expanding into the Asian market and garnering huge new revenue streams.

Recent history shows us that a star emerges out of Japan only once every few years, so I don’t see the Japanese market being some huge boon for the Yankees/Red Sox/Mariners. But I do think that with MLB inflation, and financial problems in the Japanese leagues, you will continue to see one or two good but not great Japanese players posted every off-season. These guys are simply worth much more to MLB teams than they are to Japanese teams because each extra win is worth a lot more in revenues in America than it is in Japan.

For example a marginal win in the MLB might be worth $3 million, but only $1 million in the NPB. So a Japanese team might opt to post some guy who will be worth two wins above replacement in the MLB and maybe three wins above replacement in Japan. He’s worth $6 million a year in the MLB and $3 million a year in Japan, so the MLB team can pay him 3 years, $12 million, which is $1 million more a year than he would make in Japan, and then send back a $6 million posting fee to the Japanese team. Then, the Japanese team can sign three MLB replacement-level players (one win above replacement in the NPB) for $1.67 million a year ($1.3 million more than they would make in the major leagues).

In the end, everything is in equilibrium. The Japanese team wins no fewer games while paying out the same amount of money, the MLB team pays fair price for the wins, and the players all make more. The Japanese team can probably offer a little less (say $1 million a year) and the MLB team can probably give less of a posting fee (say $4 or $5 million), in which case they end up winning as well.

What all that math shows is that the posting system can benefit everyone, especially in the case of good but not great players, which is why I think you’ll see a lot more guys like Akinori Iwamura getting posted. And of course, any team can win the posting for a guy like that; the Rays, not a financial powerhouse by any standard, got Iwamura.

[DSG]

From reading your writings, you quite clearly have a good sense of baseball and the business aspect of baseball. Have any major league teams shown any interest in hiring you? Is working for a major league team something you'd be interested in doing?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Pass.

[DSG]

Given the spike in the AAV of free agent signings this offseason, would you revise your estimated contract values for Daisuke Matsuzaka? Or would you hold steady on your estimates from two weeks ago?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Well, my estimates were based on the potential revenue that signing Matsuzaka could bring, not how crazy baseball front offices decide to act…so no. Certainly, if you’re a Red Sox fan whose only interest is seeing the team win, you should be happier about the bid today than you were a week ago, because the Red Sox did get a better value in light of the current market.

[DSG]

How much of a problem in comparing pitchers across eras is the diminishment and now disappearance of pitchers pacing themselves?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

You know, it’s funny: I’ve done a few dozen versions all-time pitchers rankings, using all kinds of different methods, and almost every time I’ve found that baseball has any amazing propensity to remain very stable over time. For example, pitchers these days throw many fewer innings, but they also have lower ERAs relative to the league. In terms of seasonal value, pitchers from the past quarter century suffer, but in terms of career value, they actually do better because their careers are extended. For the most part, everything is pretty even.

I make one era adjustment in my system (and it’s pretty steep, though much less steep than Clay Davenport’s), but even if I didn’t, the career rankings would be pretty balanced.

[DSG]

Going back to your "fair market estimates" of Matsuzaka's value, how do you see the constraints of the posting process affecting his contract?  Ichiro (and even Hideki Matsui as a free agent) signed deals for less than fair market value; other than the Boras factor is there any reason to think that he would somehow escape this trend?  How much do you think the recent salary inflation in FA contracts  will affect what he ultimately gets?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I think he’ll get less than he would on the open market; as I’ve said, I don’t think Matsuzaka wants to go back to Seibu (and I don’t think Seibu wants him back), so that should drive his price down. His incentive to leave is probably greater than the Red Sox’s incentive to sign him, so that might work against him. On the other hand, we’re operating in a crazy market and Matsuzaka has Boras as his agent…overall, it’s a wash. I think he’ll get about what everyone expects: Maybe four years, $50 million.

[DSG]

I've noticed in your writings that you seem to be a strict WPA adherent.  Have you been able to isolate enough consistency in WPA numbers to believe that there are consistent trends with individual players in terms of WPA over long periods of time?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Am I? I like Win Probability Added for evaluating manager moves and looking back at a season. It has practically no predictive power, especially over a single season, though as Andy Dolphin showed in The Book and Nate Silver showed in Baseball Between the Numbers, clutch ability does exist on a very small level. However, as both showed, you don’t really know who the clutch players are until their career is over, so using WPA to prove a point about a player’s clutchiness is kind of silly.

Like I said, WPA is perfect for MVP-type discussions. But it’s pretty much useless for anything else.

[DSG]

Coco Crisp - what's your best assessment of him defensively? UZR and Dial both have him in the "worst defensive CF in the league" territory, while PMR has him as among the best CFers in baseball last year, at least on a rate basis. The speculation is that possibly PMR deals with Fenway park issues better than UZR or Dial do, but does this hold water?

Also, could you give a quick and dirty assessment of the state of defensive metrics in general today? Specifically, I'm looking for a comparison to offensive stats. If offensive stats, like XR or LWTS, are getting maybe 95% of overall offensive value, where would you say that UZR, or the Fielding Bible slot in? Just as a point of comparison, on the low end, where would batting average slot in offensively? Would it be fair to say that UZR gives you at least as good a defensive assessment overall as batting average does for offense? Or is even that pushing it?

Sorry for both questions being so heavy on the defensive stuff - but that's where the fun is.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Crisp is a tough one. I think he’s pretty good, but his numbers are all over the place. His UZRs the past five years have been:

-10 runs in CF in 2006. (-14 per 150 games.)

+28 in LF in 2005. (+31 per 150 games.)

+13 in LF and +3 in CF in 2004. (+57, +5 per 150 games.)

+7 in LF and 0 in CF in 2003. (+26, 0 per 150 games.)

+3 in CF in 2002. (+16 per 150 games.)

Certainly, he is not a bad fielder, but he may not be as great as he looked prior to this season. For now, I think that his injury really affected him, and I would expect Crisp to be around +10 next season, which is very, very good. But who knows, right?

In my opinion, UZR is to defense what OPS is offense. I say this for three reasons:

(1) A lot of what you hear about the inaccuracy of defensive metrics is untrue. Yes, there’s a lot of random variation in a defensive metric, but there’s about as much in offensive metrics as well. So when people say, “you need to two years of fielding data before you can make any judgment call on this player,” that’s true, but that applies to offense as well. So it’s really kind of irrelevant. You need two years of data, period.

(2) UZR is about as consistent from year-to-year as OPS is. Certainly, it has its potential issues, but those issues are generally mitigated for one reason or another. The biggest potential issue is park effects, and I actually prefer the way PMR (for those that don’t know, that’s David Pinto’s metric that he publishes on Baseball Musings) handles parks, though it’s possible that the PMR method does not provide a large enough sample size. I’d have to look at play-by-play data to answer that question.

(3) It is true, however, that UZR is not as granular as we would like. There are certain issues that do end up hurting the accuracy of the metric in a few very specific cases. Unfortunately, we don’t really know what those cases are, we just know they exist. It’s sort of how OPS correlates very well with linear weights, but is occasionally pretty far off for a guy like Kevin Youkilis or Bill Mueller.

On a side note, even though David Pinto is a very smart guy, and I really like the framework for PMR, I wouldn’t trust those numbers too much. First of all, for infielders, David includes fly balls and line drives, which screws all those numbers up. And secondly, I don’t like how he handles distance for outfielders, though at least now he’s handling it. A lot of those numbers are screwy, and right now, frankly, I think I’d prefer Zone Rating to PMR. David has to make just two adjustments to his model to make it damn near perfect.

Edited by DSG, 01 December 2006 - 03:13 PM.

[DSG]

OK, David, here goes.

Can a left fielder at Fenway be fairly evaluated by current defensive metrics or does the proximity and height of the wall make it an exercise in futility?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Yes, it is very much possible. Mitchel applies an extensively researched and accurate park factor in UZR, “Chone” Smith has developed some cool park factors for Zone Rating (http://home.comcast....at/ofzonepf.htm). PMR uses park as one of its parameters, which is probably the best method as long as the sample size is big enough (and I’m not sure it is the way PMR is done now).

Now the issue with metrics not named PMR is that if an unusually high number of balls go off the wall in a season, the fielder will be unnecessarily penalized. But if a player’s ratings in Fenway’s left field are continually bad, the metrics are right.

[DSG]

On the defensive metric side, most defensive stats double-penalize a fielding miscue by charging a fielder for the out he should have gotten plus the hit he
allowed than an average fielder would not have.  That sort of double-penalization exists to some extent with baserunning too, but do you think that this practice - while seemingly logical, overinflates fielding statistics and creates a gap between good and bad fielding that is too large to be viable?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Why would they be over-inflated? The run value of an out simply tells you the difference between the run expectancy at the beginning of the play and the run expectancy at the end of the play, adjusted for the probability of making an out. It’s the same thing as linear weights: Is that wrong too?

[DSG]

Can you weigh in with your beliefs on the significance of BABIP in reference to both hitting and pitching?  Although it is most often attributed to luck, certain players show consistency in BABIP over time, suggesting that some pitchers do have control over poor contact and that certain hitters consistently display hard contact.  Is this a case where league average pitchers and hitters display a certain entropy in their contact skills, while others rise above or below the haze?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

BABIP is a skill just like anything else…it’s just subject to a lot of randomness and there isn’t as great a spread in BABIP skill among players as there is in say strikeout rate. That lowers the year-to-year correlation of BABIP, and its usefulness for both pitchers and hitters. But all players have different BABIP skill levels, which are distributed about normally. If you want to understand BABIP more, I’d suggest you buy The Hardball Times Annual 2007, where I have an article analyzing both pitcher and hitter control over batted balls, as well as these pieces:

http://www.hardballt...cle/dips-again/
http://www.tangotige...solvingdips.pdf

[DSG]

In either the Manny or Offseason Thread, the point was raised that if a deal for Manny to LAD can be done quickly, BOS might try to include as part of the deal, even if it's only on a handshake level, the agreement that LAD wouldn't offer arb to either Lugo or Drew, thus preserving BOS's first round pick.

Care to put a dollar value on retaining that pick in this year's rather plump draft.......?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

A few million dollars? This is an issue that deserves more research…Rany Jazayerli has done some good stuff with this as has Philly on this board.

[DSG]

I don't really know if this is up your alley, but you seem like a bright guy, so I'll run it by you...

One of the more interesting things for me right now is whether consistency is a real phenomena by players, specifically by pitchers. Given identical overall statlines, inconsistent pitchers are apparently generally slightly better, but is there evidence to suggest that this is a real difference in skillsets rather than just the result of a random distribution?

How about for hitters? First of all, is it real? Second, unlike for pitchers, I haven't seen any evidence as to whether consistency among hitters is good or bad. I'd suspect in the case of hitters, since they have so much less impact on an individual game than a pitcher, consistency is a positive for them, but I don't know.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I wrote about this here for pitchers:

http://www.hardballt...e-old-same-old/

Sal Baxamusa had a good piece on this for hitters (well, offenses):

http://www.hardballt...ne-first-draft/

An inconsistent pitcher is probably a little better than a consistent one, so the opposite would go for offense. However, what I found in my article is that pitchers don’t seem to have any control over their consistency and Sal wrote that he doubted his findings were statistically significant as well.

Really, given that (a) consistency is either not a trait or a very small trait, and ( b ) even (unrealistically) great in/consistency has little impact on a team’s overall performance, this isn’t an issue anyone should be worried about.

Edited by DSG, 01 December 2006 - 03:17 PM.

[DSG]

I wanted to ask a question or get your opinion really on the value of LOOGYs/ROOGYs.

I see in WPA that these guys can appear to be very valuable, but I believe there's a tradeoff in IP and flexibility.

I'd like your take, thanks.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

They can be quite useful, especially LOOGYs, because the platoon split for left-handed batters is greater. There is indeed a tradeoff in flexibility, and whether or not its worth it is really dependent on the team. If you have a team that doesn’t really need a deep bench (everyone is at least an okay hitter and fielder), they’re well worth it. If you have a team of Adam Everetts and Manny Ramirezes, you might need a bigger bench, so your relievers will have to be more flexible. Generally, I like bringing in a LOOGY, because the platoon splits can make a mediocre pitcher into a good one, but it’s definitely team-dependent.

[DSG]

Something like this was touched on, but what is your opinion about the welter of available statistics? How do we priortize which stats and when?

For example, WPA is great for retrospective value, but not so much for future value or talent estimation. OPS+ is okay, but under-weights OBP and doesn't account for time. VORP seems pretty solid, but neglects defense. Is it the best of the commonly available measures of offensive performance? WARP is a nice aggregate estimation, but people generally regard BP's fielding stats as sub-par (why?). Win shares is another total estimate, but people immediately object when it gets used.

I know there are issues of when certain stats get applied, but how would you rank then, and when would you use them?

VORP
MORP (nice non-linearity)
WARP (1&3)
Win Shares
OPS+
WPA
WXRL (same as WPA?)
lwts
UZR (not available?)
Dewan
PMR
FRAA (BP -- what is it doing?)
Bill James Relative Range factors (does anyone do this? why not?)
I could see groups of stats:

rate offense ("who would be better if..."): OPS+
aggregate offense ("who was better assuming..."): VORP, RARP
defense: uzr, pmr, relative range factors, FRAA (B-P)
total value (adding it up...): win shares, warp
contextual value ("what was done and when"): wpa, wxrl

How do we think about assigning value? What do you like?

Sorry, kind of a mess of a question -- just interested in whatever insights you have here. How do we determine value? When someone asks, is player x better than player y, where do you turn first?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I like to use wins above replacement, though not BPs definition (WARP is a junk stat, frankly). WPA, as I mentioned earlier, is only a backwards-looking stat, so I wouldn’t use it for anything but MVP discussions.

For wins above replacement, all you have to do is take linear weights, some kind of fielding runs above average stat, base running if you can get it, and a positional adjustment and add them all together, then divide by a runs per win number.

My favorite publicly-available fielding stat is zone rating, or better yet, .67*ZR + .33*Range (that’s my metric).

“Chone” Smith (http://lanaheimangelfan.blogspot.com/) has done a whole set of projections for 2007 using all the parameters I mentioned (though he just gives you runs above replacement, instead of wins—same thing, really). I suggest you check them out.

[DSG]

Are you satisfied with how park factors are currently calculated and applied?  Assuming that your answer is probably something between yes and no, can you explain how you think their calculation and application can be improved?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Ooh, this is a tough one. Park factors are done about 90% right even in their simplest form. The issue is that those last ten percent are very difficult to make up. I had a few thousand word discussion with some of the best forecasters in the business about park factors here: http://www.hardballt...ndtable-part-2/

I think Mitchel Lichtman’s comment was the best:

“Park adjustments can be tricky and unreliable for many reasons, but they can be done, if you do them right. Some of the keys for doing good park adjustments are using multiple year data and the right regressions, and not using the “multiplicative method” that you mention. There are other “keys” which I am not at liberty to divulge (until 10 years after my death).”

I’m working on my own set of projections (that’s the first time I’ve announced that, I think…another SoSH exclusive ), and the park factors are a bitch. First of all, you cannot use the multiplicative method (which is what everyone uses, i.e. a player will hit 20% more home runs in Coors). The additive method (a player will hit 4 more home runs a year in Coors) is closer, and closer still is the additive method if you’re using batted ball information (a player will hit .003 more home runs per fly ball in Coors). The totally correct way is using something called the odds-ratio method, but that’s a bitch.

Park factors also have to be properly regressed, a different amount for each component, and its better to regress to an expected park factor based on the park’s dimensions, altitude, location, lighting, etc. than it is to zero. But of course calculating that expected park factor is very difficult as well.

Then you have the issue of left/right park factors. I’ve come to the conclusion that the difference between left/right park factors isn’t terribly significant, and that you might be better off lumping them together to increase your sample size. On the other hand, I also don’t quite have all the data I would like to calculate better left/right park factors: I suspect part of the reason the difference is not particularly significant is that in a park like Fenway, left-handed hitters will actually try to hit more fly balls into left field. So they might end up with about the same home run park factor as right-handed batters, but a lot more fly outs or something like that.

And of course, you have to choose what data to include in your sample and what not to include. For example, the Bill James Handbook discards data from interleague games in its park factors. That makes the sample somewhat smaller, but it might make the park factors better.

There’s just a lot of stuff going on when it comes to calculating a *perfect* park factor, though the thing is that even a very basic one (like what Baseball Reference has) will get you most of the way there.

Edited by DSG, 01 December 2006 - 03:19 PM.

[DSG]

Are UZR ratings available yet based on 2006 stats? I'm curious know how many of the Gold Glove winners were actually among the best rated at their position. Do you agree that the best defensive players don't always get the award?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

UZR ratings have not been publicly available since 2003, but Mitchel has calculated the 2006 UZR numbers.

The best players don’t get the award probably half the time. My winners probably would have been: I-Rod, Mientkiewicz, Hill, Inge, Uribe, Crawford, Patterson, and Rios in the AL, and Molina, Hatteberg, Valentin, Rolen, Everett, Roberts, Beltran, and Giles in the NL. Two of those guys (Rolen and Beltran) actually won a Gold Glove (to be fair, I also agree with the pitcher selections, though those are kind of difficult to judge).

Adam Everett was especially robbed; he’s the best shortstop since (and maybe including) Ozzie Smith and yet he has no Gold Gloves. That’s complete bull. Omar Vizquel is a very good fielder (especially considering his age), but he’s not Adam Everett.

According to Chris Dial (who doesn’t rate pitchers), this year’s Gold Glove winners were an average of +3 runs above average. My winners averaged +12 runs. Gold Glove winners have access to the same information I do—they just keep making poor decisions. Gold Gloves are pretty meaningless, IMO.

And by the way, it’s a pet peeve of mine, but I think it’s ridiculous that they continue to choose three center fielders instead of a left fielder, center fielder, and right fielder for the Gold Glove. Why can’t they just choose four shortstops, instead of an infielder at each position, in that case?

[DSG]

As an appendix to WTE's question on the various stat categories, I have a related philosophical question:

Do you think that the current generation of new statistics, particularly the BP stats (VORP/WARP), the "plus" stats and Win Shares have become too abstract?  It seems that sometimes these stats deal more with the question of who is better than whom and their relative value, rather than telling us detailed information about the players themselves.

Also, are you bothered that the formula for these and other relativistic stats (such as PECOTA, UZR etc) are based on proprietary formulae that require users to basically "trust" their calculations?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Well isn’t our ultimate interest to know how good a player is?

I think the black box problem can be a serious one, though I wouldn’t say that UZR really is a black box. MGL was pretty clear on what he does with UZR in his original two articles, and you could pretty much re-create it if you wanted to. The issue is that the data to calculate UZR costs five figures, and it would take dozens of hours to program the whole thing. If you came into full Stats or BIS play-by-play data, do you really think you’d do anything with it?

As for PECOTA, it sucks that we don’t really know what Nate does with it, but more because we could probably pitch a lot of ideas for improving PECOTA than anything else. Look, BP is running a business, and I understand that they can’t just give away all the details. You can really only judge PECOTA based on its final results, because it is what it is. And the final results are pretty good.

You know, when Bill James was writing in the 1980s, there was a lot of stuff that could just be expressed in a formula or a simple study. Baseball research has long passed that point, and most things just aren’t that simple anymore. That’s just the reality of it.

[DSG]

The  contents of the annual can be found here:

2007 THT Annual

Here are few questions based on the articles that David wrote.

1.  You mentioned over at BTF that pitchers have a very high success rate after TJ surgery.  Does your study include minor league pitchers?  If so, I'm curious how you judged a successful return.  For a Sox specific example, Delcarmen went from a pretty good A ball starting prospect to potentially a solid late inning releiver.  Is that a success despite his move from a high value role to a lower value role?

If minor leaguers weren't included, would you expect a lost year of playing time during what should be a growth phase to be a bigger impediment to future success than the surgery itself?

2.  Is your scheme for predicting breakout players intended to identify young brreakout major league players or does it include minor leaguers as well?  Would you expect there to be different indicators for minor leaguers vs major leaguers?

And what the hell, toss out a couple of names as teasers.

3.  Are you aware of any research on using medical data to help generate more accurate medium and long term playing time projections or at this point is simple Marcel-like projections with an aging correction good enough?

More specifically to the Sox, JD Drew played ~600 games from ages 26-30 how does that impact the number of games he should be expected to play in his age 31-35 seasons?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I could only look at pitchers with major league experience both before and after the surgery in my study. It’s possible that the results don’t apply to all pitchers because of that issue, though I am not sure that this is the case, either. If Delcarmen throws a hundred innings in the major leagues, that’s a success because for most good A-ball prospects, that just doesn’t happen. Look at it this way: Edwin Jackson out-dueled Randy Johnson in a major league baseball game…and now he’s pretty much done. Just making to the majors for any prolonged period of time is a great accomplishment and a success. Just ask Steve Lomasney.

For the breakout article, I too looked only at major league players. I’d guess the indicators should be pretty similar for minor leaguers, but who knows? Here are the odds of some Sox hitters having a breakout year next season (average for batters is around 13%):

Wily Mo Pena – 37%
Coco Crisp – 9%
David Ortiz – 0%

Only Pena has above average odds among Sox hitters (he’s also fourth among all batters).

(I guess that's not such an exclusive since Gordon Edes somehow got his hands on the numbers in the Globe today:

http://www.boston.co...ox_nixon_in_07/

Sig Mejdal did some really good research in predicting injuries for the 2005 Bill James Handbook, I believe. Unfortunately, he now works for the St. Louis Cardinals, so anything he does with that is owned by the Cards. I guess Will Carroll might have his own system, though I’m unsure. Predicting injuries is one of the great next frontiers. Actually I had an article up at The Hardball Times yesterday related to that question:

http://www.hardballt...r-after-effect/

Without really having any data to back it up, my guess would be that Drew will average 130 games a year over the next five seasons.

[DSG]

Has the efficiency of positioning increased with all this study of zones (by others)?  And do you have an opinion in regard to the frequency of using shifts?  They seem to be almost solely employed against the greats of the game like Big Papi.  Yet guys like Trot Nixon seem to never hit balls to the left of second base and yet never faced shifts.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I agree that teams probably don’t shift enough. If it works against Papi, it should work against Nixon. Though the one issue there is that opportunity cost for Papi to try to hit it down the third base line is greater than it is for Nixon. If Papi alters his swing, he’s taking away the biggest threat he has—the home run. Nixon is just going for a single to a different field than usual. It’s kind of like the intentional walk, which might be a good play against Ortiz but not Nixon.

I doubt positioning has improved much with the study of zones, mainly because there’s one manager in all of baseball who to my knowledge cares at all about all the statistical research out there. Most managers just don’t care, so no matter how much research we do, they’re just going to go by “The Book” (and not “The Book” written by Tom Tango, Mitchel Lichtman, and Andy Dolphin, unfortunately).

[DSG]

1. In your research for the 100 Most Valuable Pitchers article in the forthcoming Annual, did you reach any conclusions about pitcher usage?  Specifically, 5-man rotations vs 4-man rotations, pitch counts, optimum days rest, the use of "Sunday Pitchers, bullpen usage, etc" 

Do you think the current philosophy of pitcher usage is close to optimum, or will it evolve further, and if so, into what?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

This is a difficult question to answer. What I found was that pitchers’ careers seem to be extended quite a bit by the conservative pitch counts and five-man rotations we see today. The authors of “The Book” looked into this with much more detail and found that pitchers performed better on four days rest than three, so much so that a four-man rotation would not be better than a five-man rotation, even though better pitchers would get more innings that way. I tend to agree with that for non-statistical reasons.

But baseball is an always-evolving game. It’s very possible that someone will try something different next year, it will work, and a bunch of copycats will spring up. I have no idea what that idea will be...bullpen-by-committee?

[DSG]

Care to comment on any of the recent specific defensive value debates on SoSH?

For SS, debate rages as to whether Alex Gonz is great and Lugo mediocre, or the two are almost even. Somehow, THE question of how awful Micheal Young is keeps edging into this one.

For 3B, the question is if Lowell is much better than Youk. Some have claimed that Lowell was 2 wins better than Youk over all in 06 due to his defensive excellence (and he starts in a hole due to being worse on O).

For OF, many questions swirl. If Manny as awful as many/most systems suggest? Can drew make up the difference between their bats with defense?

What do you make of guys like Crisp and Wily Mo who seem to be much better in one slot than another (ie, Crisp is great in LF, lousy in CF; Wily Mo is not great in Cf but excreable anywhere else).

EDIT: one letter wrong, and I said the opposite of what I meant...

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Gonzalez and Lugo are about even; both are above average fielders. Gonzalez might be a little better. Offensively, Lugo is obviously far superior. Young sucks.

Lowell is a better fielder than Youkilis, but not by too much. I like Youks, personally—I think he’s about an average fielder and Lowell is clearly above average but at an age where he should be declining. The difference between the two is probably half-a-win, maybe a win, certainly not two.

Manny is pretty much terrible. A -15 to -20 fielder, IMO. “Chone” Smith’s projection has Manny and Drew exactly equal in total runs above replacement (both are +33), so yes, I would say that Drew’s defense could make up the difference between their offensive abilities. Of course, people will hate it even if he does because no one will realize that our improved pitching will be due partly to trading Ramirez for Drew (essentially).

Center field is a more difficult position than right (actually, it isn’t. There are just more balls hit into center, so teams put better fielders there, which in turn makes the average center fielder a much better fielder than the average corner outfielder), and a few hundred innings from Wily Mo Pena or Coco Crisp is not going to make me change my position (especially when Crisp was injured last season). I can’t imagine how one outfield position would be much easier than another.

[DSG]

In the absence of a Henderson or a Raines, there is a still a tendency of managers to prefer speedy leadoff hitters with relatively low OBPs (the Crisp, Soriano model) over slower but high OBP hitters (Youkilis Boggs).  Two questions regarding this:

1.  Statistically, how many runs would you estimate that such a decision (say, Coco over Youkilis) costs over the course of a season?

2.  Specifically, how many runs would you estimate it cost the Nationals last year to have Soriano hitting leadoff instead of in a power slot, provided his performance were to be unaffected by such a change?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

No more than a few runs (for both your questions). Even if you put together the worst lineup order possible (worst hitters at the top, best at the bottom), it wouldn’t cost you more than one or two wins. Lineup construction is overrated, it’s just annoying when a manager costs his team runs for no reason whatsoever.

[DSG]

There is much discussion lately about the consequences for David Ortiz if Manny Ramirez is traded; it sometimes is said that Ortiz will suffer because Ramirez won't be there to protect him in the lineup.  I invite your comment on that particular question, or on the general issue of whether a player's hitting is affected by the strength of the player hitting behind him.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I suggest you order “The Book” (http://www.insidethebook.com/).

The authors show that protection is largely a myth: In fact, hitters do a little better (though the result is not statistically significant) without protection than they do with protection. (That sentence sounds strangely dirty, doesn’t it?) I wouldn’t worry about Ortiz’s performance if we don’t keep Manny.

[DSG]

Regarding the defensive systems you mention in your Feb 3, 2006 article on THT (and any defensive metric, for that matter):

In your discussion of PMR, you mention that it takes into effect how "hard" a ball is hit. I'm sure that some of the other systems attempt to do something similar... but how?

It's my understanding that, for the most part, the descriptive play-by-play elements of defensive metrics are subjective; i.e., an observer notes whether or not a ball in play is a fly ball, line drive, bloop, etc.

Are there any attempts to quantify how hard a ball is hit? Could a ball in play be timed from the moment it is struck until the moment it hits the ground, to determine how "hard" it was hit? Presumably, two balls that reach the same spot in the OF, in the same amount of time, would share a similar arc, right?

A tangible value that combines location measurement with time measurement would provide fairly reliable data on the difficulty of defensive plays in relation to others, and could be invaluable in the sort of probability studies that are already out there. Yes/no?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Both Baseball Info Solutions and Stats Inc. label every ball in play as “hard,” “medium,” or “soft.” Mitchel Lichtman has always used those definitions in UZR. As I said earlier, ideally, instead of all these somewhat subjective designations, we would simply time how long each ball was in the air and its trajectory. Actually, Greg Rybarczyk does that already for home runs at Hit Tracker Online: http://hittrackeronline.com/.

So…yes.

[DSG]

Based on your reasearch for your series 'Does Size Matter', what do you think we can expect from our little man, Dustin Pedroia?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I think Pedroia will be a Bill Mueller type. Pretty good defensively, doubles power, pretty good batting average, very good walk rate. He’s certainly not the top prospect some thought he was a couple years ago, but I still think he’ll be pretty good. I think .290/.360/.420 next year and .300/.390/.440 at his speak sounds pretty realistic, which is very good for a second baseman.

[DSG]

Interpreting your bump as a call for further questions ...

Another BABIP question, related to my last.  No matter how tight BABIP numbers may seem, the "BA" part of the acronym implies one dimension - hit or
out, with no real value to the actual quality of the contact (an infield single being the same as a 500-foot HR.  So BABIP doesn't really have a direct relationship to run production (or runs allowed for pitchers).  Can you comment on this, and if you haven't already done so in responses to other questions, elaborate on what exactly you feel BABIP can tell us.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

BABIP is a very complicated subject. I have an article on the relationship between defensive independent numbers and BABIP that I have to write up for The Hardball Times which comes to some interesting conclusions, and it’s really a subject that can be endlessly researched. What you seem to be suggested has often been discussed, which is to look at slugging average on balls in play instead of batting average.

But here’s the thing: Fly ball pitchers allow less hits on balls in play but more extra base hits on balls in play, so what happens is that they end up with just about the same slugging average on balls in play as groundball pitchers.

BABIP is a skill but there’s so much noise there, and so much evens out, that it’s not a terrible mistake to assume that no pitcher has any skill balls in play whatsoever. It’s not optimal, but it won’t make a huge difference either.

[DSG]

Theo Epstein receives a lot of praise from mainstream and online obserevers alike.  What are the main weaknesses of the Epstein front office?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

There aren’t many. The bullpen obviously hasn’t performed too well, but I’ve liked a lot of the bullpen moves the Sox have made. Chad Fox gave us a 4.50 ERA in 2003, then moved on to Florida that same year and gave them a 2.13 ERA. Rudy Seanez had an awful year for us after two very good seasons in a row. Byung-Hyun Kim fell apart for no apparent reason. Foulke has battled injuries the past couple of years. None of these were very predictable events. The Red Sox just haven’t had the upper minor league talent needed to fill in holes in the bullpen that some teams have. I think that’s changing.

The Red Sox have been a little too quick to give up on some players, but who knows how much of that is the fault of the media and talk radio especially. Manny should have been gone years ago (he’s my favorite current Red Sox, BTW, but he really is just terrible in the field), but I’m not in the front office—it’s possible they couldn’t do that without taking on a substantial part of his contract, which would negate the whole reason for trading him in the first place.

Overall, I think Theo has done a tremendous job and if the prospects he’s drafted work out for us (and that’s one thing you just never know), we’ll really start to see the fruits of his labor in the next five years. A scary thought when you remember that Epstein already brought us one World Series victory.

[DSG]

So much of the analysis of free agent signings is based on a presumed average value of an expected marginal win of production and yet everybody realizes that each organization will generate an organization specific amount of revenue for each marginal win.  Given the wide range of revenues that he will probably never truly understand the finances of these private companies, do you think that analysists have gone too far grading the financial impact of player moves with such a blunt instrement as the average value of a marginal win?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Somewhat, yes. But only somewhat. I’m currently working on a big project trying to determine the value of a marginal win, taking into account everything I possibly can. It’s a difficult process, and you’re right, we can never really know for sure, but we sure can get a pretty good idea.

I can’t possibly see how you would defend Carlos Lee’s contract…a guy like Gary Matthews Jr. would be more difficult to evaluate given our various uncertainties.

Nate Silver did some good stuff in “Baseball Between the Numbers” that addresses many of your concerns, and Vince Genarro has too. Vince is writing a book, but he published some of his research on the Hardball Times:

http://www.hardballt...thors/vgennaro/

One warning: Their numbers are going to be off because they both use BP’s WARP. What’s important about their research is not the numbers, but the ideas.

[DSG]

What metrics do you feel are most effective for assessing performance of starting pitching? In conjunction with this, what metrics are best for predicting future pitching performance?

Also, I have never seen linear weights used in conjunction with starting pitchers. Why is this?

Thanks

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

As I told you at MIT, the reason people don’t use linear weights for pitchers is because (a) Until recently, we haven’t had 1B/2B/3B information for pitchers, and ( b ) While a batter has little impact on his run environment, a pitcher has 100% control over it, so Johan Santana should have a completely different set of linear weights than Jaret Wright. A walk against Santana might be worth .20 runs, against Wright, it might be .40 runs. You could use custom linear weights, but then you need to use BaseRuns to generate that, so why not just calculate component ERA (which is like using linear weights, actually) with BaseRuns?

What metrics are best for assessing starting pitching? I like to use a few years of data, regress each component individually, weight each year appropriately, and well then you have a projection! Or do you mean for assessing value? In that case, I’d obviously use my Pitching Wins system.

Edited by DSG, 01 December 2006 - 03:29 PM.

[DSG]

The Red Sox for the last few years have pretty consistency underperformed their runs allowed expectations by just about every projection system I can think of, be it ZiPS, PECOTA, or Marcel.

Why do you think this is?

One theory off the top of my head would include bad luck in the form of injuries, or unforeseeable performance regression, both of which can hit for several years in a row just on chance.

Another theory, and probably the one favored by MGL, would be that the Red Sox just have an unbelievably awful defense(which he said cost the Sox about half a run per game in 2006 relative to average - which is of course, a world of hurt in the long run).

The most damning theory would be that the Red Sox, being a sabermetrically friendly organization, are going to tend to select for players who do well by computerized projection systems, but if the projection systems are systemically missing something, then the Red Sox pitching staff will do the same. Because of this, computer projection systems will always overrate organizations like the Red Sox.

These are just three theories, and of course there are others. Obviously it's likely that there's a multitude of different factors at play, so what I guess I'm looking for is your best guess of the ranking of factors.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

This is something that deserves more research than I’m going to give it. I think your third theory is an intriguing one, though obviously I’m a pretty big believer in sabermetric tenets, so I’ll put it last.

I’m not sure you can blame the Red Sox defense. Based on The Hardball Times fielding stats, they’ve been average or better (once you adjust for the left field park factor, which we don’t at THT) each of the past three years. Looking at my UZR files, the Red Sox were -58 runs in 2005 and -20 in 2004. I don’t have 2006 data yet, but obviously that doesn’t jive with our numbers. I trust UZR more, but the THT team-level data is pretty damn good. I don’t really know what to say…the only possibility I can see is that our pitchers have been giving up really easy-to-field balls in play (soft line drives, lazy fly balls).

Bad luck definitely sounds about right. As I said earlier, the Red Sox have had a lot of bad luck with the bullpen, and it hasn’t been better with the starters (Schilling in 2005, Wells, Wakefield, Beckett, and Clement last year). Maybe that’s the issue, but I don’t really know. Maybe we’re just cursed.

[DSG]

How well do you think baseball FOs in general do, at the moment, in calculating the value of defense in the contracts they sign with players? How much range is there between the FOs that do this well and those who do it less well? Are teams better at measuring the D of position players, or the dependence on team D of pitchers for these purposes?

IOW, Is defense still a market ineffiecency to be exploited by the "smarter" teams?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Yes, yes, and yes. Did you see the Carlos Lee contract? Do you think the Astros have any idea that his defense negates his offensive value (essentially)? A lot of teams just don’t buy the defensive metrics, and of those that do, many don’t really pay any attention to them. You might see a lot more teams hiring stat guys, but many just do it because you’re supposed to have one, stick him in a dark office somewhere, and don’t listen to anything he has to say.

Defense is still a huge market inefficiency and a big part of the reason that the A’s can continue to win.

[DSG]

What is a baseball contract option worth? How well could current option pricing models be applied?

So, a team offers a player 4 Years/$40M+Team Option @ $10M (or whatever).

How much is that option worth, from the team's perspective?

How much less valuable is the contract from the player's perspective, as opposed to the inclusion of no option, a mutual option, vesting option, or player option?

Of course, I'm don't mean to ask for an exact $value. I'm more interested in the approach you would take to the issue.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I think options are ridiculous. A player or team will rarely exercise an option unless the player’s market value is much higher (if it’s a team option) than the option or much lower (if it’s a player option). So really, when either side agrees to an option that the other side can exercise, they’re saying, “yeah, you can screw me, it’s alright.”

So I think the option is always a bad thing for the team if it’s a player option and a good thing if it’s a team option. By how much? Depends how much the player over- or under-performs.

[DSG]

Alright, thanks for all the questions guys. If you want to read my articles, they're all located here:

http://www.hardballt...uthors/dgassko/

Again, if you’re interested in the Annual, an article outlining the contents is available here:

http://www.hardballt...es-annual-2007/

They just started shipping it out yesterday, so if you order now, it’ll get there soon. If you like the work we do at The Hardball Times, this is best way to support us (and if you can afford to, please buy it through our link and not through Amazon. We make much more money that way).

Gordon Edes must have gotten his hands on an advanced copy, and he mentioned on of my articles in the Annual in the Globe today:

http://www.boston.co...ox_nixon_in_07/

(It’s about three-quarters of the way down. I know I already mentioned this in the chat, but c'mon, it's freaking cool for me, so give me a break.)

I’ve read the whole thing, and in my obviously biased opinion, it’s awesome. If you got last year’s Annual, this one is a step above (and I loved last year’s), if you didn’t, just imagine the greatest thing that has ever happened to you, and multiply that feeling by ten.

I’ll stick around for a couple hours to answer follow-up questions.

Thanks guys, it’s been fun.

[Frisbetarian]

I would like to once again thank David for the informative responses, and would also like to put in my plug for the 2007 Hardball Times Annual. Last year's annual was outstanding and I'm expecting more of the same. If you are interested in current baseball research and metrics, you will not find a better source.

Now, lets get some follow-up questions.

[DSG]

I would like to once again thank David for the informative responses, and would also like to put in my plug for the 2007 Hardball Times Annual. Last year's annual was outstanding and I'm expecting more of the same. If you are interested in current baseball research and metrics, you will not find a better source.

Now, lets get some follow-up questions.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I'd just like to add that even if you're not interested in research or metrics, you'll find plenty to enjoy in the Annual. We at THT all believe in the importance of stats, but many of the Annual's writers are not stats guys at all, like Will Leitch or Mac Thomason.

[Frisbetarian]

Center field is a more difficult position than right (actually, it isn’t. There are just more balls hit into center, so teams put better fielders there, which in turn makes the average center fielder a much better fielder than the average corner outfielder), and a few hundred innings from Wily Mo Pena or Coco Crisp is not going to make me change my position (especially when Crisp was injured last season). I can’t imagine how one outfield position would be much easier than another.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The ball slicing off the bat of a right handed hitter, coupled with the longer throw to third, make right field a much more difficult position than left. The center fielder is generally responsible for the largest part of the park and, as you state, center field sees more fly balls than the corner positions. Playing this position well requires better instincts and more speed than the corners. I think center field is the most difficult outfield position, with right a close second, and left a distant third. Would you please elaborate on your statement above.

[Drocca]

I'd like to press a little harder on the Theo question. You(and I would agree for the most part) suggest that he has done and is doing a fantastic job as the GM of the Red Sox. When asked about his struggles(which every GM has) you mention his bullpen record which most can agree on and then giving up on players too soon.

In regards to giving up on players too soon and your comment about the media/fans are you suggesting that the media and/or fanbase has dictated certain moves? I guess I'm looking for a clarification on that comment.

[Todd Benzinger]

Follow up on two things... Care to name names?

Is Tony LaRussa the one manager who really gets stats?

and, which FOs are the best at exploiting the market ineffiency in defense, other than the As, and I would guess the Cards?

EDIT: what I should have started with... thanks so much!

Edited by Todd Benzinger, 01 December 2006 - 03:58 PM.

[DSG]

The ball slicing off the bat of a right handed hitter, coupled with the longer throw to third, make right field a much more difficult position than left. The center fielder is generally responsible for the largest part of the park and, as you state, center field sees more fly balls than the corner positions. Playing this position well requires better instincts and more speed than the corners. I think center field is the most difficult outfield position, with right a close second, and left a distant third. Would you please elaborate on your statement above.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Yeah, the center fielder does have more ground to cover. That doesn't make the position tougher, per se (maybe it does), it just means there's more room for variance. If a center fielder sees 1.25x more balls than a corner outfielder, his defense will be 1.25x more (or less) valuable. The slicing thing isn't really a big deal because about 40% of all at-bats go to lefties, so left and right fielders see a pretty equivalent amount of slicing.

[DSG]

I'd like to press a little harder on the Theo question. You(and I would agree for the most part) suggest that he has done and is doing a fantastic job as the GM of the Red Sox. When asked about his struggles(which every GM has) you mention his bullpen record which most can agree on and then giving up on players too soon.

In regards to giving up on players too soon and your comment about the media/fans are you suggesting that the media and/or fanbase has dictated certain moves? I guess I'm looking for a clarification on that comment.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The Bard for Mirabelli trade, certainly. Giving up on Chad Fox as well. The Boston media is tough, and when people don't like a player, the front office hears about it.

[Drocca]

The Bard for Mirabelli trade, certainly. Giving up on Chad Fox as well. The Boston media is tough, and when people don't like a player, the front office hears about it.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Shouldn't a good F.O. and G.M. not listen to local media and instead treat roster construction based on the facts at hand and the plan? And if, as you allude to, this has not always been done in the past would this not be one of the weaker attributes of this F.O. and GM?

[DSG]

Follow up on two things... Care to name names?

Is Tony LaRussa the one manager who really gets stats?

and, which FOs are the best at exploiting the market ineffiency in defense, other than the As, and I would guess the Cards?

EDIT: what I should have started with... thanks so much!

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I meant Francona. He's a very sharp guy.

The A's, Cardinals, Mets, and Padres have all done good jobs building their defenses.

[DSG]

Shouldn't a good F.O. and G.M. not listen to local media and instead treat roster construction based on the facts at hand and the plan? And if, as you allude to, this has not always been done in the past would this not be one of the weaker attributes of this F.O. and GM?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

It's possible. Then again, you kind of need to have fan support to make money. I wasn't in on any of those decisions, obviously, so I have a hard time really knowing what went into them.

[PedroKsBambino]

Yes, it is very much possible. Mitchel applies an extensively researched and accurate park factor in UZR, “Chone” Smith has developed some cool park factors for Zone Rating (http://home.comcast....at/ofzonepf.htm). PMR uses park as one of its parameters, which is probably the best method as long as the sample size is big enough (and I’m not sure it is the way PMR is done now).

Now the issue with metrics not named PMR is that if an unusually high number of balls go off the wall in a season, the fielder will be unnecessarily penalized. But if a player’s ratings in Fenway’s left field are continually bad, the metrics are right.

There's an implicit assumption in your final sentence that only an unusually high number of balls will cause a skew, e.g that we know what 'unusually high' really is. I question this, and note that different very sharp people who study fielding apply extremely different adjustments to the Wall (or, in mgl's case, no specific adjustment at all for the wall). To me, the variation in valuation of Manny's defense after applying specific park/wall factor between -15 and -45 per 150 games suggests that, in fact, the metrics haven't solved the problem yet. Or at least, they have such different solutions to the problem that we can't really say which is doing so accurately.

Is that unfair, or no?