John Farrell, Base Running and the Organizational Philosophy

[Snodgrass'Muff]

First, there is already a thread to talk about whether John Farrell should be or will be fired.  This is not that thread.  That said...
 
There was some incredible information shared by those who went to last year's Sabermetrics, Scouting and Science of Baseball event with some wonderful insights into the front office and that thread can be found here: http://sonsofsamhorn.net/topic/79125-what-i-learned-at-the-3rd-saber-seminar-red-sox-edition/
 
If you haven't read through it, do yourself a favor and dig in.  It's a great read.  The reason I'm pointing it out is that there is another debate about Farrell's managerial skill (or lack thereof) in tonight's game thread and it seems a lot of things get thrown at him with the assumption that they are his burden to bear and his alone.  I have a hard time believing that, considering what we do know about this front office.  For example, the "aggressive" base running has gotten under the skin of a lot of posters.  The team isn't great at base stealing, which isn't surprising given the loss of Jacoby Ellsbury and Shane Victorino who were both regulars in 2013.  They attempted 176 stolen bases last year.  This year they have 74, good for 16th in the majors. They are on pace for about 128 attempts on the year, which is a significant scaling back and makes sense given the different personnel.  Even still, people think they are being too aggressive, and maybe that's true (the CS rate this season is atrocious).  But even if it is, is that all on Farrell?  Here's what Rev shared about base running in last year's thread.
 

he addressed the base running thing. And yes, he is intentionally taking an aggressive approach on the base paths as we all know. What's interesting is that he said that they make the running decisions based on working with Tippett and analytics, and they account not just for who the base runner is and the next match-up, but ball park effects for that match-up. So it's not just the straight up probability-linear weights thing some of us in that thread have been talking about but they factor in the probabilities of the match-up for the specific ball park.

 
The team has, understandably, rolled back their aggressiveness on the base paths a bit.  In addition to the lower rate of stolen base attempts, they are making outs while attempting a base running play less often than last year, at least relative to the rest of MLB.  In 2013 only 6 teams made more outs this way than the Red Sox.  In 2014 there are 11 teams with more outs made this way.  You can play with base running stats here.  Most ways you look at it, they are being less aggressive and are making less mistakes.  It may not feel that way because we are losing so much, but the data don't support the idea that they are being just as aggressive or that they are making more mistakes on the base paths this year.  This is especially true with outs at home where they were second worst in the majors last year.  This year?  10th best.  Clearly an adjustment has been made and chances are, it was made by more than the manager.
 
Base running decisions are a top down process.  In fact, pretty much every decision that gets made is based on an enormous amount of data collected and analyzed by a bunch of really smart people.  Rev's general impression of Farrell...
 

First off, he says he works closely and extensively with Tippett and baseball analytics. This is a far cry from Valentine who famously said at last year's conference that he had never used a single thing Tippett had given him. Also, it is very, very clear that he does as while he didn't refer to specific numbers or info, many of his answers were very much embedded in a lot of the other statistics and other analytical stuff being discussed. (I should note here that this movement is way beyond just new statistics at this point which is why they talk in term of analytics, as they are really nailing down things like the physical tendencies of the ball coming off the bat for different pitchers and batters and stuff at this point.) It was also very clear that the team has stuff that's orders of magnitude more advanced than the stuff from FanGraphs or BRef that people throw around on the board--though many of the presentations were about more sophisticated than the basic numbers too and what is done with the data.

 
It's become en vogue after losses to rip on Farrell and pick apart all of the decisions he made that went wrong.  It's even progressed to the point where some are calling him possibly the worst in game manager they've ever seen in the Red Sox dugout. Yeah, they are game threads and there is a lot of emotion flowing there.  I'm not calling anyone out here, just pointing out that the general sentiment about Farrell has deteriorated considerably over the last few months.  Considering how deeply the information he's working with is flowing from the front office, is it really fair to lay the blame for all of these tactical decisions at his feet?  Should we be looking at the front office more closely?  Or should we be blaming the players more?  At some point, the players need to go out there and perform and so far this season, they clearly have not.  Some of that is due to the lineup being shortened considerably by the absence of Shane Victorino.  I think it's pretty obvious how important he was to their success last year and the need for him might be even greater this season with Ellsbury gone.  The Pierzynski signing hurt as well, and maybe more than we can really know...
 

Farrell seems to have a ton of respect for Cherington. He also said that a big part of the strategy was to bring in ball players for whom baseball was one of the top three things in their life and talked about players who might be good where that is not the case. He later said top two--baseball and family--which is funny because the third thing is obviously religion and we assume he didn't want to go there, hence the amending of his comments from "top three things" to "top two things." But yeah, apparently the "character" things was not overblown; they wanted ball players.

 
AJ didn't live up to expectations at the plate and was as bad or worse behind it as we were fearing.  Perhaps worse than that, he apparently didn't buy into the organizational philosophy of building a team out of ball players... guys who lived and breathed the game, who never stopped thinking about it or talking about it.  There was a gap in the fabric of the clubhouse.  I don't think removing AJ suddenly makes this a playoff caliber team.  They bet on a lot of progress from the kids and that process is taking longer than we'd like.  We also have David Ortiz in what looks like the beginning of his decline phase, Pedroia having a fairly poor first half that may be due to a nagging injury, and Stephen Drew has been worse than bad.  Add in Victorino's injury and Farrell is left with a very incomplete lineup and not much he can do with it.  I'm not arguing he's a particularly strong tactician or anything, but I think we need to be looking at more than just John Farrell when mistakes are made during games.
 
So where did the organization fall short this past winter?  Where are they falling short now?  How much of this is unrealistic expectations on our part about the kids?  I'd chalk up AJ Pierzynski to a front office gaffe.  He was clearly not the right player for this team, though they may have been trapped into it when the Salty door closed and Ruiz unexpectedly re-signed with the Phillies.  Even still, he was a deviation from the plan that worked in 2013.  What else has changed?  What else should have changed?  There are a ton of directions this thread can go in.  I'm sure there will be a lot of looking at platoon uses, match up advantages that weren't taken advantage of, L/R splits ignored, shifts employed in strange or extreme ways, bullpen usage, ect.  With all of these things, Farrell is pulling the trigger, but the decisions are coming from much deeper in the organization than the manager.  Maybe we'll just end up spinning our wheels here, but I think it could be more productive than more debating about the likelihood of him being fired or his historical ranking among Red Sox managers.

 

[kieckeredinthehead]

The baserunning this year has been atrocious. The number of times that Pedroia + Ortiz have been thrown out at second after hitting one off the Monster is absurd.The story about the advanced analytics is a nice one, but there is simply no way that Butterfield is capable of calculating that stuff in his head with a guy rounding third. At an organizational level, sure - maybe even as they're preparing for a series. I tried to keep track of all the weird decisions Farrell made re:baserunning in the other thread, but couldn't keep up. The fact is, there have been a ton of failed bunt attempts, failed hit-and-runs, and missed signs this year. Analytics are nice, but the players have to execute.

 

[Adrian's Dome]

The baserunning this year has been atrocious. The number of times that Pedroia + Ortiz have been thrown out at second after hitting one off the Monster is absurd.The story about the advanced analytics is a nice one, but there is simply no way that Butterfield is capable of calculating that stuff in his head with a guy rounding third. At an organizational level, sure - maybe even as they're preparing for a series. I tried to keep track of all the weird decisions Farrell made re:baserunning in the other thread, but couldn't keep up. The fact is, there have been a ton of failed bunt attempts, failed hit-and-runs, and missed signs this year. Analytics are nice, but the players have to execute.

 
My general feeling on the analytics is this - if the strings are really being pulled from behind the stage, then why even have a manager in the first place? I highly doubt the front office is encouraging the baserunning (this was a major complaint against Farrell in Toronto, as well,) and I would find it very hard to believe Cherington and the player evaluation machine envisioned having basic splits ignored and/or downplayed when factoring in 25-man spots for players like Nava, Gomes, Carp, Drew, AJP, and Ross who all have very clear and straightforward strengths and weaknesses.

 

[Toe Nash]

 
The team has, understandably, rolled back their aggressiveness on the base paths a bit.  In addition to the lower rate of stolen base attempts, they are making outs while attempting a base running play less often than last year, at least relative to the rest of MLB.  In 2013 only 6 teams made more outs this way than the Red Sox.  In 2014 there are 11 teams with more outs made this way.  You can play with base running stats here.  Most ways you look at it, they are being less aggressive and are making less mistakes.  It may not feel that way because we are losing so much, but the data don't support the idea that they are being just as aggressive or that they are making more mistakes on the base paths this year.  This is especially true with outs at home where they were second worst in the majors last year.  This year?  10th best.  Clearly an adjustment has been made and chances are, it was made by more than the manager.

The data doesn't say "less aggressive" to me. Last year they made more outs on the bases but they were on base a heck of a lot more often. And is the difference between 7th in MLB and 12th that big, anyway? Given that their OBP has fallen from 1st to 10th (and their SLG from 1st to 26th, which may suggest fewer opportunities to run wild on the bases) I would expect a decline in outs on the bases and am a bit surprised it's not greater. For outs at home, they have dropped from 26 to 8, so great. But from that same chart, they have only scored from 1st on a double 15 times, 28th in the league, and scored from 2nd on a single 65 times, tied for 10th in the league. Last year they were 10th and 2nd in these two categories.
 
I think Fangraphs BsR tries to capture all this and separates out the stolen bases, but their site is only working intermittently for me right now. But I think those numbers would provide another data point to see if the Sox really are getting more or less value on the basepaths this year.

 

[Rovin Romine]

 
So where did the organization fall short this past winter?  Where are they falling short now?  How much of this is unrealistic expectations on our part about the kids?  I'd chalk up AJ Pierzynski to a front office gaffe.  He was clearly not the right player for this team, though they may have been trapped into it when the Salty door closed and Ruiz unexpectedly re-signed with the Phillies.  Even still, he was a deviation from the plan that worked in 2013.  What else has changed?  What else should have changed?  There are a ton of directions this thread can go in.  I'm sure there will be a lot of looking at platoon uses, match up advantages that weren't taken advantage of, L/R splits ignored, shifts employed in strange or extreme ways, bullpen usage, ect.  With all of these things, Farrell is pulling the trigger, but the decisions are coming from much deeper in the organization than the manager.  Maybe we'll just end up spinning our wheels here, but I think it could be more productive than more debating about the likelihood of him being fired or his historical ranking among Red Sox managers.

 
I'm not sure this is entirely true.  I'd expect that the GM is going to have a lot of say in terms of which players are on the 25, and how they're supposed to be used when they're there.  For example, if the instructions are to stretch a pitcher out so they can give long relief or transition into a starter, you'd expect the field manager (FM) to begin using that pitcher in such a way.  Another clear example is when there's a medical restriction - no back to back to backs for Koji, etc.  
 
However, there's also got to be discretion at the FM level for in-game decisions.   A player may pull up sore during a game, or start to get the flu.  A pitcher may be having an exceptionally easy outing (with a comfy lead) close to their pitch count limit.  Conversely that pitcher may have no feel for their pitches early in a tight game.  There is no "deeper in the organization" philosophy that can adequately address those kinds of situations.  The FM has to make a decision about what to do.  
 
The cliche is that the FM has to balance the long run through the season against the optimal configuration for each game - you can't play your best position players 162 games on the year.  There's certainly truth to this.  While the GM can provide statistical information on how to use and play certain players, there's always going to be discretion with the FM, based on the standings and the circumstances of any particular game.  
 
My point is that ultimately, a lot of the decisions people lay at the feet of Farrell should be laid there.  No one is blaming Farrell for playing AJP over Ross (or vice versa) when both players clearly suck and there are no better options.  I'm sure the FM and the GM and the entire organization bring their opinions to the table re: what should be done about the situation.  We'll never know if the FM was agitating for change from the get go, or if the FM was insisting that AJP be retained and played right up to the bitter end. 
 
What we do know is that the Red Sox running game changed with Farrell's hiring.  Maybe he brought something to the attention of the front office, but clearly Farrell instigated the change, and clearly the front office defends it to a degree (they wouldn't retain Farrell if they thought his decisions were going to actually cost them a post season berth - more to the point they'd instruct Farrell not to run his guys so much).
 
We also know that the PH decisions are Farrell's, absent some kind of medical mandate regarding a player.  There may be a hidden reason not to pinch hit a player, but, for example, last night's decision seems indefensible.  1) a player with a long track record has no historical skill and much recent failure doing X.  2) multiple bench players with the skill are unused.   This would be like using Ortiz as a pinch runner.  There is no deep mandate from the organization to make stupid in game decisions.  
 
I think your short list is good for what an in game manager does.  As someone pointed out in the game threads, managers can lose individual games.  Or, more accurately, they can certainly reduce the chance of winning an individual game.  Sometimes, there are good reasons to reduce the chance (not playing your starters 162), but sometimes the FM makes a stupid decision in a key moment.  
 
I can't speak to things like base running - perhaps there's a series by series adjustment made there.  Regardless, it seems like they ran into too many outs in the beginning of the season.  A younger faster team full of rookies may be what is needed for that strategy to work. 

 

[Toe Nash]

OK, here are the Fangraphs component stats:
 
  [tablegrid= Red Sox Baserunning ]Year UBR Rank wSB Rank BsR Rank 2013 -0.4 17 11.7 2 11.3 5 2014 -6.5 30 -5.0 30 -11.5 30 [/tablegrid]
 
1. UBR is "ultimate baserunning," which is a baserunning value based on the linear weights of everything on the basepaths that is NOT stolen bases and caught stealings. wSB is the value of steals and CS. Both are converted to a run value and are context-neutral, I believe -- so a steal with 2 out is no different than one with 0 out (I could be wrong on this and a quick search didn't confirm or deny). BsR is just the two added together.
 
1a. Because these numbers are context-neutral, it is possible the Sox are more aggressive in situations that matter more and are getting more value than their BsR, though I don't think anecdotally that makes sense.
 
2. These aren't adjusted for the speed of the team, so clearly losing Ellsbury and Victorino is going to affect them a ton by themselves. That actually just makes the Sox 2013 look worse though. Ellsbury was worth 11.4 BsR last year (3.2 UBR, 8.2 wSB) and Victorino was worth 3.0. So basically those two were the whole reason that the Sox were 5th last year, though they have dropped off more than just JE and SV's values.
 
3. Not captured in these numbers is any "pressure" that being aggressive puts on the opposing defense and pitching. I think this value is real and it's possible the Sox have quantified it and decided that being aggressive and "putting pressure" on the D is worth it even if it gives you a bad BsR. This would be similar to the sabermetric idea that you should bunt every so often just to keep the defense honest even if it's not a good play by the win expectancy charts. That said, you would think that this would mostly show up in the numbers -- if you try to take an extra base, it's captured here. 
 
So on the surface, it doesn't look good, though I agree that from what JF told us that they do have their reasons for being aggressive. Or maybe he was just bullshitting us.
 
Other thoughts?

 

[iayork]

How does the value of base running change in the low-offense environment? Is the marginal value of moving up a base higher in 2014 than it was in 2005? What era are the FanGraphs values based on?

 

[Toe Nash]

How does the value of base running change in the low-offense environment? Is the marginal value of moving up a base higher in 2014 than it was in 2005? What era are the FanGraphs values based on?

Yes, it would be, but I believe the FG values are adjusted for the current environment as best they can.
 
A couple other thoughts:
 
1. I read that thread last year and it's nice that there is advanced work happening and they have stuff we don't know about. But there are a couple problems. One has been mentioned -- you can do all the preparation in the world, but in many situations you just don't have the time to analyze how fast Michael Brantley or whoever can throw a ball from the Monster and you have to go with your gut (either the player's or Butterfield's).
 
The second is that while I don't doubt that the FO has smarter people than I doing more than just looking at Fangraphs, how much further is there to go, really? Is there something out there like pitch framing that we haven't quantified that is worth a win or two? FieldFX, maybe. But even if so, I feel like it's not going to make a ten-win difference to the team. It's not like we're 100% wrong when we look at Papi being thrown out at second and say "That was a stupid play." And the stupid plays seem to happen a lot -- maybe a few of them were actually good decisions, but I'm skeptical.
 
Additionally, I think a lot of the criticisms are of things we have a pretty good idea about (like baserunning). I don't see people criticizing shifts and other defensive positioning because it's clear that the team has a lot better knowledge of that than we do. And with most playing time decisions it's the same -- Farrell is with the players and knows if they need a day off or whatever. And often he gives good explanations postgame. But when Farrell names Gomes his starter because the team has more "energy" with him in the lineup I think skepticism is warranted.
 
2. On the character thing, I find JF's comments honestly silly. What major league baseball player doesn't have baseball as one of the three most important things in his life? Every single guy has to work incredibly hard to become one of the 500 best people in the world at playing baseball, even AJ Pierzynski. If you're not committed I think 99% of guys get weeded out in college if not sooner. Character judgments should absolutely be part of player acquisition and surely there is more, but that reasoning is relatively simple, honestly.
 
3. Related to the first two: we have heard things like this about the Sox for the last ten years, and while they have achieved a lot of success, there have been enough baffling decisions too that when something doesn't smell right, it's very fair to question it. Off the top of my head, we heard they followed Crawford around to get a handle on his character and that was completely off. They hired Valentine. They signed AJP. They thought Drew could be worth more than negative WAR without a spring training. Now maybe all of these can be blamed on Lucchino, or people ignoring what the analytics people say, or other extenuating circumstances, but that is their record and I don't think a bunch of nice stories change it too much.
 
Finally, even with Bobby V who supposedly paid 0 attention to the analytics dept, they had a winning record and were more or less in the hunt before they traded everyone. Players are going to play according to what is ingrained in them and are by far the most important thing.

 

[Snodgrass'Muff]

The baserunning this year has been atrocious. The number of times that Pedroia + Ortiz have been thrown out at second after hitting one off the Monster is absurd.The story about the advanced analytics is a nice one, but there is simply no way that Butterfield is capable of calculating that stuff in his head with a guy rounding third. At an organizational level, sure - maybe even as they're preparing for a series. I tried to keep track of all the weird decisions Farrell made re:baserunning in the other thread, but couldn't keep up. The fact is, there have been a ton of failed bunt attempts, failed hit-and-runs, and missed signs this year. Analytics are nice, but the players have to execute.

 
Your perception of their ineptitude while trying to advance to second base is backed up by the data.  They lead the majors with 16 outs on base running plays at second base so far, with 16.  Last year they led the majors with 20, so they are on pace to eclipse that by an uncomfortable margin.  Another number that speaks to their aggressiveness versus last year is their extra bases taken percentage (XBT%).  Last year's rate was 39% (good for 18th in the majors) and this year's is 42% (good for 12th).  It may just be that they are picking their spots to be aggressive more carefully this year, or it could be, as Toe Nash suggests, that they aren't being less aggressive relative to opportunities.  As far as I can tell, this isn't tracked specifically, so to give us a crude idea of how this is playing out, we can look at OBP as a percentage of total plate appearances.  In 2013 it was .349 of 6,382, or about 2,227. This year they are at .321 of 3,620, or about 1,162.  Then we can take OOB (outs on base) and add it to CS (caught stealing) to find out how many outs they've made as base runners total, and then look to see how they are doing as a percentage of the rough count of times on base.
 
In 2013 they had 59 OOB and 19 CS for 78 base running outs.  In 2014 they have 33 OOB and 20 CS for 53 base running outs.  The ratio of base running outs to the rough estimate of times on base in 2013 was 0.03502 or about 3.5%.  In 2014 it is 0.04561 or about 4.6%.  So yeah, it appears that a closer look suggests they are seeing failures on the base paths more frequently this season.  In order to look at how aggressive they are being we can add BT (bases taken) and OOB to SBA (stolen base attempts) and use that number the same way.  In 2013 they had 173 BT, 59 OOB and 176 SBA for a total of 408 base running plays.  In 2014 they have 88 BT, 33 OOB and 74 SBA for 195 base running plays.  That's a ratio of .183206 or about 18.32% for 2013 and .167814 or 16.78%.  So they are being less aggressive on average but are making mistakes more often when they do attempt to take an extra base or steal one.  And an argument can certainly be made that they haven't reduced the frequency of attempting these plays by enough given the changes in personnel.

 

[Snodgrass'Muff]

 
I'm not sure this is entirely true.
 
--snip--

 
Just to clarify, I'm not arguing that John Farrell isn't making decisions on the field or that he's just a proxy for Ben and the analytics team.  I'm saying that the decisions he does make are very likely based on organization-wide thinking.  Of course the manager has the autonomy to make decisions in individual moments, but it seems that the Red Sox spend a ton of time preparing for those moments so that the gut feeling decisions are as informed as they possibly can be.  And none of this is meant to suggest that Farrell isn't making mistakes.  He is.  In fact, I don't even disagree with the opinion that he's not a great in game tactician.  One of the things I'm wondering, however, is whether the advances in the science of baseball we've seen over the last couple of decades have reduced the impact of great tacticians?  On the flip side, how much have they reduced the impact of poor tacticians, making good personnel and preparation managers more appealing to teams even if they are more checkers than chess guys?
 

Yes, it would be, but I believe the FG values are adjusted for the current environment as best they can.
 
A couple other thoughts:
 
--snip--

 
Going point by point...
 
1. I addressed this earlier in this post in my response to RR, but just to be absolutely clear, I'm not arguing that Farrell or the coaches are doing calculations on the field in real time.  It's about preparation informing those gut reactions.
 
2. I don't think it's silly at all, or simple.  There are a lot of ways to work hard at something.  They apparently want a roster full of guys who are constantly talking about baseball with each other.  They want players who will sit down with each other between innings and talk about tendencies they are noticing with the opposing starting pitcher, or who will sit on a plane while travelling from one city to another to break down someone's swing or a pitcher's delivery.  They want guys who buy into their analytics driven approach and think about the game in specific ways.  The anecdote from the seminar thread I linked in the original post about the pitcher who said he doesn't see the strike zone anymore, he sees blue and red is a perfect example of what I'm talking about.  There are a lot of ways to be really good at something.  The Red Sox are building a clubhouse culture on a specific approach and want players who fit in well within that approach.
 
3. Yeah, we've heard stuff like this a lot and in that span they've won more titles than any other team.  Sure, they've had some down years, but maybe that's just going to be the price the pay for pushing boundaries and exploring new ways of thinking about the game.  Sometimes things will go badly and a readjustment will need to be made.  And no matter how good this front office is, they are still being run by human beings and human beings are prone to things like bias and making mistakes.  You listed a few here, but what about the successes?  They made a lot of bets that paid off in 2004 and 2013.  They assembled one of the most efficient Red Sox teams ever in 2007.  They've had an enormous amount of success in developing their own players.  I can make any GM in the game look like a moron by pulling out all of their recent mistakes and laying them out without any context.  Shit happens.  The overall record of this front office, however, looks pretty good to me and I'm more than happy to suffer through brief down periods and unpopular and/or difficult to understand individual decisions given the amount of success they've had around those mistakes.

 

[DJnVa]

 
In 2013 they had 59 OOB and 19 CS for 78 base running outs.  In 2014 they have 33 OOB and 20 CS for 53 base running outs.  The ratio of base running outs to the rough estimate of times on base in 2013 was 0.03502 or about 3.5%.  In 2014 it is 0.04561 or about 4.6%.  So yeah, it appears that a closer look suggests they are seeing failures on the base paths more frequently this season.  

 
Do we know at what point season to season baserunning numbers like this move out of "small sample size"?
 
In other words, if the underlying decisions are backed up by the numbers, that still doesn't mean they work every time, and if they trust the underlying numbers, at what point would you expect them to change their minds on that?
 
I mean, the numbers say if the Sox are up by 1 moving to the 9th, you bring in Uehara. That doesn't mean he's not going to blow one once in a while, and we understand that. Based on your numbers, if they only had 8-10 fewer outs on the bases, we'd be around last season's numbers (a little higher, but I'm spitballing here). Do we want to abandon whatever metrics they are using because of 8-10 instances (essentially one every week and a half)? Do you feel safe saying that's enough to scrap what they are trying to do?
 
(and I'm not arguing here, I'm asking)

 

[Snodgrass'Muff]

My honest answer is, I don't know.  If I did, I probably wouldn't be taking a rudimentary look at it on a message board.
 
I suspect that the slightly lower rate of aggressive plays is probably within the amount of variation you could expect given the number of ways in which individual games can and do play out.  And this may well still fall into small sample size, so deviating from last year's strategy might not be the right choice.  Then again, maybe it is.  One of the reasons I started this thread is that I think there will be some insightful opinions on that and there have already been a few.

 

[kieckeredinthehead]

 
I mean, the numbers say if the Sox are up by 1 moving to the 9th, you bring in Uehara. That doesn't mean he's not going to blow one once in a while, and we understand that. Based on your numbers, if they only had 8-10 fewer outs on the bases, we'd be around last season's numbers (a little higher, but I'm spitballing here). Do we want to abandon whatever metrics they are using because of 8-10 instances (essentially one every week and a half)? Do you feel safe saying that's enough to scrap what they are trying to do?

 
You don't make a lot of outs on the bases (hopefully) if you're up big or you're losing big. It doesn't seem like a large difference, but one out on the bases per week is a lot if they represent a critical run. Take the July 6th game, which is fresh in memory:
 
Bottom of the 9th, tied 6-6 with one out. Pedroia on 1st, Ortiz at bat. Pedroia is caught stealing. Then in the 12th, down 7-6, Ortiz is thrown out at second with one out and a lefty pitching (Napoli on deck). In both cases, they were the only runner, so the pitcher is moving from the stretch (league average 729 OPS) to the wind-up (705 OPS). 
 
The Ortiz one in particular wasn't even close. It wasn't like, okay, let's push the envelope and make the outfielder make a perfect throw. He was out three or four steps standing from the bag. It was a truly idiotic baseball move, and it would be sad to find out that Beyeler was thinking about the data on aggressive baserunning when (if) he told Ortiz to go. 
 
Now, the whole point of using larger datasets is that I'm not including all the times that a Red Sox runner took an extra base, which may be just as valuable on a positive side than making an out is on the negative. So, sure, maybe the team has calculated exactly how risky they need to be. But outs on bases tend to come in really crucial times, they're events where the outcome of the game may hang on that particular out. It's not just a random 8-10 outs, it's specific runners that really matter in each game.
 
edit: and none of this has address the double plays, which seem like a complementary problem. Too many hitters trying to do too much, and Farrell waffling between way too many hit-and-runs and not enough. 

 

[Snodgrass'Muff]

 
edit: and none of this has address the double plays, which seem like a complementary problem. Too many hitters trying to do too much, and Farrell waffling between way too many hit-and-runs and not enough. 

 
Well, last year they were tied for the 10th highest percentage of GIDP by opportunity at 11%.  This year they are tied for 5th worst at 12%.  So it's not appreciably better as a percentage, but they had a total of 137 GIDP last year and currently have 87 this year, which puts them on pace for 150.
 
Edit2: This does not include the 5 GIDP they have today (so far).
 
Edit: Unrelated but not really worth it's own post...
 
Another interesting stat B-R.com has is Ptn% (percentage of plate apperances with platoon advantage).  This one backs up the perception that Farrell is utilizing platoon advantages less often as the rate has dropped from 61% in 2013 to 54% in 2014.
 
You can play around with it here: http://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/MLB/2014-situational-batting.shtml

 

[joe dokes]

The Ortiz one in particular wasn't even close. It wasn't like, okay, let's push the envelope and make the outfielder make a perfect throw. He was out three or four steps standing from the bag. It was a truly idiotic baseball move, and it would be sad to find out that Beyeler was thinking about the data on aggressive baserunning when (if) he told Ortiz to go.
 

 
How much is the first base coach responsible for a veteran batter trying for two on a ball to left at Fenway? I'm guessing that one (and most others) is Ortiz (and the batter) all the way. On a ball to teh Wall, is the batter even sighting the 1B coach?

 

[Rovin Romine]

 
How much is the first base coach responsible for a veteran batter trying for two on a ball to left at Fenway? I'm guessing that one (and most others) is Ortiz (and the batter) all the way. On a ball to teh Wall, is the batter even sighting the 1B coach?

 
But, cue the John Farrell It was aggressive and we like that, being aggressive as it puts pressure on the defense, yada yada yada.
 
If he was honest he'd say, It was aggressive, but stupid; encouraging Ortiz (or any player) to run in a situation where they're not going to be successful is just plain ridiculous with out current lineup and record.  Bone-headed moves like this actually take pressure OFF the defense and the pitching.  Shit, the way we're hitting, it puts pressure ON our own offense.  It worked when we had legitimate base stealing threats in our lineup, but now the best we can say for it is that opposing fielders don't have time to clean their nails after catching the ball, knowing our runners will be station to station.  Instead, they have to take their time before they throw our over-eager runners out by a mile. 
 
Nevertheless, we've thought of doing other aggressive things to put pressure on the other team.  Like forfeiting an out every so often. Or sending up guys to the plate with disadvantageous splits - opposing pitchers will be totally *confused*!  Or randomly bunting! - who expects bunts now-a-days, especially from players who don't look like they don't even know how to bunt?

 

[Toe Nash]

 
3. Yeah, we've heard stuff like this a lot and in that span they've won more titles than any other team.  Sure, they've had some down years, but maybe that's just going to be the price the pay for pushing boundaries and exploring new ways of thinking about the game.  Sometimes things will go badly and a readjustment will need to be made.  And no matter how good this front office is, they are still being run by human beings and human beings are prone to things like bias and making mistakes.  You listed a few here, but what about the successes?  They made a lot of bets that paid off in 2004 and 2013.  They assembled one of the most efficient Red Sox teams ever in 2007.  They've had an enormous amount of success in developing their own players.  I can make any GM in the game look like a moron by pulling out all of their recent mistakes and laying them out without any context.  Shit happens.  The overall record of this front office, however, looks pretty good to me and I'm more than happy to suffer through brief down periods and unpopular and/or difficult to understand individual decisions given the amount of success they've had around those mistakes.

I don't think anyone in the game threads or here are discussing the macro approach. Obviously that approach is a good one as the results attest. But for some smaller questions that seem to have a pattern like "Is being aggressive / sac bunting so much / other tactic a good idea?" or "Does the focus on character really work?" or "Are they being smart by eschewing long-term FAs?" it's not enough to just say that we heard Farrell talk about it and he was convincing and dreamy so I think the team has the right approach.