Can we talk about the kicker? Or BB's decision...

[tims4wins]

This post has almost nothing to do with the missed FG or the missed PAT.

For a 2nd time in a Super Bowl, BB passed up a 52 yard field goal, indoors. Gostkowski was 4-4 this year from 50+. For his career he is 23-30, 76.7%.

The game situation was Phily leading 9-3. It was the beginning of the second quarter. While Gost had missed the FG attempt, that clearly wasn't on him. It was 4th and 5.

And yet, when facing 4th and only 1 on the previous drive, BB had them kick it.

This has probably been discussed in the game thread, as well as the GOAT thread. Wanted to break it out since there are a shit ton of posts in both.

Does BB not trust his kicker? Why? And should / will the Pats find a new one?

 

[Leather]

Where was the 4th and 1 kick from.

I think it has more to do with not wanting the possibility of missing the kick and giving the Eagles good field position.

 

[tims4wins]

Where was the 4th and 1 kick from.

I think it has more to do with not wanting the possibility of missing the kick and giving the Eagles good field position.

The 8? I was shocked the Pats didn't go for it since it would have left Philly with a long field

 

[JokersWildJIMED]

Where was the 4th and 1 kick from.

I think it has more to do with not wanting the possibility of missing the kick and giving the Eagles good field position.

If that is the thinking then that is ridiculous. Going for it and not making it saves you 8 yards.

 

[Ralphwiggum]

I wished they would have gone for it the first time. Worst case they are pinned deep if you don't get it.

I was OK with them going for it the 2nd time. I believe Philly had already converted a fourth down by then. Just felt like one of those games where field goals were not going to be good enough, and the offense had been moving the ball pretty well all game. I don't see that as an issue of trust with Ghost.

 

[moondog80]

In the Giants SB, they passed up the kick to go for it on 4th and 12. That seemed crazy and still does. But 4th and 5, the way the offense was moving, against a 52 yard FG? Haven't seen any hard numbers but off the top of my head, I could go either way.

 

[slamminsammya]

I loved the aggression. A good team should convert 4th and 1 a very good percentage of the time.

 

[mauf]

For a 2nd time in a Super Bowl, BB passed up a 52 yard field goal, indoors. Gostkowski was 4-4 this year from 50+. For his career he is 23-30, 76.7%.

The telling stat there isn’t the percentages; it’s that Ghost has only attempted 30 field goals of 50+ yards in more than a decade as the Patriots’ placekicker — and he has been an undisputed top-5 PK for most of that time.

I don’t know if BB dislikes long FGAs more than most coaches, or if it’s just that the alternative is letting a TB12-led offense GFI, but this is a longstanding pattern.

H/T to @Deathofthebambino for pointing this trend out during a game thread earlier this season. I hadn’t noticed it previously.

 

[DeadlySplitter]

the 4th & 5 playcall to go deep to a double covered Gronk was more of an issue

 

[lexrageorge]

Trick plays are typically feast or famine, without much middle ground. My guess is that once Patricia McDaniels decided to dial up the Amendola pass at 3rd-and-5, they had already made the decision to go for it on 4th-and-5 in case the play failed, probably figuring they could get a good matchup with Gronk. I didn't like the trick play call there, but I don't blame them for going for it on 4th down.

EDIT: The fact that they kicked at 4th-and-1 earlier is totally irrelevant when deciding what to do on 4th-and-5 later on. Game situation is different by that point.

EDIT2: Glad someone caught my slip.

 

[j44thor]

I loved the aggression. A good team should convert 4th and 1 a very good percentage of the time.

Except they didn't go for it on 4th and 1, they did on 4th and 5.

 

[tims4wins]

The telling stat there isn’t the percentages; it’s that Ghost has only attempted 30 field goals of 50+ yards in more than a decade as the Patriots’ placekicker — and he has been an undisputed top-5 PK for most of that time.

I don’t know if BB dislikes long FGAs more than most coaches, or if it’s just that the alternative is letting a TB12-led offense GFI, but this is a longstanding pattern.

H/T to @Deathofthebambino for pointing this trend out during a game thread earlier this season. I hadn’t noticed it previously.

Yes it is telling but the guy is over 75% and it was indoors. Part of the reason for the only 30 attempts is NE weather in November and later (plus Buffalo, Jets, etc.)

 

[tims4wins]

I wished they would have gone for it the first time. Worst case they are pinned deep if you don't get it.

I was OK with them going for it the 2nd time. I believe Philly had already converted a fourth down by then. Just felt like one of those games where field goals were not going to be good enough, and the offense had been moving the ball pretty well all game. I don't see that as an issue of trust with Ghost.

It was 9-3. It was the 3rd drive of the game. If it was 4th and 1 from the 35 sure.

 

[Ale Xander]

I really hate short field goals when it's 4th and 1 or 2 just for the reason that if you fail, it gives opponent a long field. Which is just as good as 3 points for most teams/defense, since you just get it back on the next possession.

the 4th and 1, and 5, doesn't make sense in a combo. On their own, maybe they're defensible, but not both together.


Also to your original point, kickers are like air filters, you need to change them every so often just to breathe a new life. Unless you have the best in Adam or something.

 

[Ralphwiggum]

It was 9-3. It was the 3rd drive of the game. If it was 4th and 1 from the 35 sure.

It was 4th and 5 and the Pats had been moving the ball easily on every drive (until the red zone issues). It's a defensible call there, as noted upthread not like the 4th and 12 in Arizona which I have never understood. It's a totally defensible call that I don't think has anything to do with BB not trusting the kicker.

 

[tims4wins]

It was 4th and 5 and the Pats had been moving the ball easily on every drive (until the red zone issues). It's a defensible call there, as noted upthread not like the 4th and 12 in Arizona which I have never understood. It's a totally defensible call that I don't think has anything to do with BB not trusting the kicker.

As Ale Xander just said, in isolation it can be defended. But how do you defend it after NOT going for 4th and 1 from the 8 the previous drive? It was also a 9-3 game at that point to, and with the ball at the 8, even if you fail it is a long field.

 

[Ralphwiggum]

As Ale Xander just said, in isolation it can be defended. But how do you defend it after NOT going for 4th and 1 from the 8 the previous drive? It was also a 9-3 game at that point to, and with the ball at the 8, even if you fail it is a long field.

Well, what if BB fucked up by not going for it the first time around, and recognized it. I don't understand the thought process behind saying because he kicked on 4th and 1 from the 8 he should therefore also kick it from 4th and 5 later on. He should have gone for it the first time around, and he wasn't going to have that poor decision limit what he was willing to do in a separate situation later in the game.

 

[Saints Rest]

I really hate short field goals when it's 4th and 1 or 2 just for the reason that if you fail, it gives opponent a long field. Which is just as good as 3 points for most teams/defense, since you just get it back on the next possession.

the 4th and 1, and 5, doesn't make sense in a combo. On their own, maybe they're defensible, but not both together.


Also to your original point, kickers are like air filters, you need to change them every so often just to breathe a new life. Unless you have the best in Adam or something.

I felt like your first statement is a large part of why Philly went for it on the Foles TD. Worst case is that you give the ball back inside the 10 with minimal time.

 

[tims4wins]

Well, what if BB fucked up by not going for it the first time around, and recognized it. I don't understand the thought process behind saying because he kicked on 4th and 1 from the 8 he should therefore also kick it from 4th and 5 later on. He should have gone for it the first time around, and he wasn't going to have that poor decision limit what he was willing to do in a separate situation later in the game.

That's fair, I guess. I hated both decisions in real time.

But let me point out that the failed 4th down play actually came after the Patriots had gotten their first stop on D. One argument I don't buy is that at that point in the game BB was thinking "FGs won't win this". Again it was the 3rd drive of the game and it was 9-3. Every point matters in these games. If the Pats had 3 more (or possibly 6-7 more if they didn't screw up the other kicks) on the board it might have ended differently. But probably not since the Eagles were likely to score as many as they needed to win anyway, the D was that bad. So whatever. Probably doesn't matter.

 

[pappymojo]

Were there concerns about the field condition?

 

[Ale Xander]

They forgot to put the hashmarks until really late, IIRC. For a kicker, that may be a big deal.

Were there concerns about the field condition?

 

[Bowhemian]

Were there concerns about the field condition?

During the broadcast, IIRC it was during an extra point kick that CC mentioned that the paint where the LII logo was, was slick. That painted logo happened to be where the ball was placed for XP kicks.

 

[garlan5]

Trick plays are typically feast or famine, without much middle ground. My guess is that once Patricia decided to dial up the Amendola pass at 3rd-and-5, they had already made the decision to go for it on 4th-and-5 in case the play failed, probably figuring they could get a good matchup with Gronk. I didn't like the trick play call there, but I don't blame them for going for it on 4th down.

EDIT: The fact that they kicked at 4th-and-1 earlier is totally irrelevant when deciding what to do on 4th-and-5 later on. Game situation is different by that point.

I'm not a pats fan but isn't Patricia the DC

 

[luckiestman]

Were there concerns about the field condition?

At one point, they said he logo, LII, was slick

 

[pappymojo]

They forgot to put the hashmarks until really late, IIRC. For a kicker, that may be a big deal.

During the broadcast, IIRC it was during an extra point kick that CC mentioned that the paint where the LII logo was, was slick. That painted logo happened to be where the ball was placed for XP kicks.

I don't recall where I heard it, and I'm too scared to try to google it now (mainly because I don't want to read a million articles about the super bowl), but I had heard that the reason the hashmarks were painted on late was that there were other problems with the field that had to be addressed prior to applying the paint.

I have no idea if this is true.

 

[mauidano]

I don't recall where I heard it, and I'm too scared to try to google it now (mainly because I don't want to read a million articles about the super bowl), but I had heard that the reason the hashmarks were painted on late was that there were other problems with the field that had to be addressed prior to applying the paint.

I have no idea if this is true.

They simply forgot to paint them on where the logos were on the field. Epic brain freeze.

 

[Ale Xander]

They simply forgot to paint them on where the logos were on the field. Epic brain freeze.

If this is a Hawaii s***ts on Minny dig, well done!

 

[williams_482]

Lets run some numbers!

The Patriots had 4th and 5 from the Eagles' 35. In the past 10 years, Teams have converted 3rd or 4th and 5 in "normal football" situations (1st or 3rd quarter, score within 14, between the 20s) 46.1% of the time. The Patriots, in the same situations over the same timespan, are 27/48 (56.3%). Field goals from the opponent 34 to 36 yard line over the same timespan have been successful 64.1% of the time. That rises to 67% (205/306) if we use the past 5 years, and falls back to 64.3% (73/113) if we use the last two years. Teams hit 69.5% of all 50+ yard FGs this most recent season, and Ghost has hit a selective 23/30 (76.7%) in his career.

If the Patriots convert, they have the ball at the Eagles' 30, worth +3.6 Expected points for NE. If they fail, Philadelphia has the ball at their own 35, worth -1.3 expected points for NE. Thus, the total value of a conversion attempt with an average offense and defense (which is and was obviously not the case) is 0.46 * 3.6 + 0.54 * -1.3 = +0.95 expected points for NE. If we use the 56.3% conversion rate (which I think is probably high), then the value of a conversion attempt is 0.56 * 3.6 + 0.44 * -1.3 = +1.4 expected points.

If the Patriots hit a FG, that would be worth +2.5 expected points (3, minus 0.5 for field position on the kickoff). If they miss, Philadelphia has the ball at their own 42, worth -1.7 expected points for NE. If we choose 64% as the (conservative) chance of the kick being good, then the FG attempt is worth 0.64 * 2.5 + 0.36 * -1.7 = +0.99 expected points for NE. If we instead go with Ghost's very high (and likely generous) career average, the attempt is worth 0.77 * 2.5 + 0.23 * -1.7 = +1.5 expected points.

In short, this was a breakeven decision, with the correct call swinging either way depending on how much you like the Patriots chances on the FG or the conversion attempt. This is also a down/distance/spot on the field where every coach should at least think about going for it, and the attempt should not be taken as some kind of indictment of Gostkowski.

I posted in the other thread that the earlier 4th and 1 FG attempt was definitely a bad call, but this one was far too close to get worked up about.

 

[BaseballJones]

I am not a capologist but I wonder what the cap hit is for cutting Ghost. I think he's generally pretty terrific, but Philly just won the Super Bowl with a rookie kicker. There are plenty of guys out there that can kick, for a lot less money than Ghost, and the fact is, the Pats need to put a ton of resources towards defense. But it may not be worth it because maybe his cap hit would be too much.

 

[Ale Xander]

I am not a capologist but I wonder what the cap hit is for cutting Ghost. I think he's generally pretty terrific, but Philly just won the Super Bowl with a rookie kicker. There are plenty of guys out there that can kick, for a lot less money than Ghost, and the fact is, the Pats need to put a ton of resources towards defense. But it may not be worth it because maybe his cap hit would be too much.

Especially considering how Ghost came to be.

 

[lexrageorge]

I am not a capologist but I wonder what the cap hit is for cutting Ghost. I think he's generally pretty terrific, but Philly just won the Super Bowl with a rookie kicker. There are plenty of guys out there that can kick, for a lot less money than Ghost, and the fact is, the Pats need to put a ton of resources towards defense. But it may not be worth it because maybe his cap hit would be too much.

Ghost would have a $5M cap hit next year. They can save $3.5M by releasing him at the start of the league year. Some of that savings would have to go to a replacement, but that could still free up between $2-3M.

Not the worst idea. But Bill values the kicking game higher than most here do, so it's in the "we'll see" category.

http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/new-england-patriots/cap/

 

[PedroKsBambino]

Well, what if BB fucked up by not going for it the first time around, and recognized it. I don't understand the thought process behind saying because he kicked on 4th and 1 from the 8 he should therefore also kick it from 4th and 5 later on. He should have gone for it the first time around, and he wasn't going to have that poor decision limit what he was willing to do in a separate situation later in the game.

Agreed---the mistake was the first decision, not the 'inconsistency'

If I were guessing, they have a matrix of score and game time remaining that they use, and for whatever reason the (theoretically) certain early points were valued more than the extra potential points from going for it and succeeding. I can only say that if so, I question the matrix in the context of this game.

 

[Bellhorn]

Lets run some numbers!

If the Patriots convert, they have the ball at the Eagles' 30, worth +3.6 Expected points for NE. If they fail, Philadelphia has the ball at their own 35, worth -1.3 expected points for NE. Thus, the total value of a conversion attempt with an average offense and defense (which is and was obviously not the case) is 0.46 * 3.6 + 0.54 * -1.3 = +0.95 expected points for NE. If we use the 56.3% conversion rate (which I think is probably high), then the value of a conversion attempt is 0.56 * 3.6 + 0.44 * -1.3 = +1.4 expected points.

Good post overall, but the bolded is an illegitimate assumption - to be fully accurate, you need to consider the average yards actually gained by the successful 4th down plays. This makes the "go for it" case - which is already fully defensible, as you correctly observe - that much stronger.

 

[williams_482]

Good post overall, but the bolded is an illegitimate assumption - to be fully accurate, you need to consider the average yards actually gained by the successful 4th down plays. This makes the "go for it" case - which is already fully defensible, as you correctly observe - that much stronger.

This is a surprisingly significant factor, as offenses gained an average of 14.1 yards on successful 3rd/4th and 5 conversions, and lost an average of 0.3 yards on failures.

Using the Eagles 21 yard line as the point they would reach on a conversion (still imperfect, as the distribution and intended play call would be very relevant here) makes a successful conversion worth +4.2 expected points, and the conversion attempt (using league averages) worth 0.46 * 4.2 + 0.54 * -1.3 = +1.2 expected points for NE.