The LAAA Are Baserunning Idiots, and Should Be Hobbled (Update thru ALCS 5) Options

[Joe D Reid]

I am about sick to death of these idiots running into outs on the basepaths, and I am past sick to death of hearing about what fantastic, aggressive baserunners they ‘ve been with Scioscia’s blessing. No. The Angels are baserunning arsonists. A reasonable manager would not be encouraging this; a reasonable manger would decimate them like a misbehaving Roman legion.

My irritation reached the point where I felt compelled to go back through the B-Ref game logs of every Angels playoff game since they won the WS in ’02, and note every significant baserunning event I could find. This includes SB, CS, and any outs made on the bases. To be fair, it does not include the Angels’ mythic first-to-third jaunts. However, (1) as I’ll show below, the SB/CS/O numbers are so bad that they dwarf any positive plays, and (2) I couldn’t care less about being fair to these pigeonfuckers. In fact, let’s reiterate that—I am not trying to be fair. I don’t pretend that the below is super scientific; I just think Torii Hunter is a douche and want to express that feeling in chart form. Anyway, in the below table, WPA numbers are from B-Ref; Expected Run numbers are from Tango’s chart:

The Los Angeles Angels of Dumbass

YEAR	SERIES/GAME	INN	ON	OUT	STATE	EVENT	WinPA	ExpRun
2009	ALCS 3	3	1	2	-1	SB	0.02	0.093
2009	ALCS 3	4	1	1	-2	CS	-0.05	-0.456
2009	ALCS 3	8	0	0	0	Abreu picked	-0.05	-0.892
2009	ALCS 2	5	1	1	-1	SB	0.02	0.152
2009	ALDS 3	2	1	1	0	SB	0.02	0.152
2009	ALDS 3	8	1	2	-1	Paps pickoff	-0.06	-0.251
2009	ALDS 2	7	1	1	0	SB	0.05	0.152
2009	ALDS 2	7	1	2	1	SB	0.01	0.093
2009	ALDS 2	8	1	1	3	CS	-0.01	-0.456
2008	ALDS 4	9	1	1	0	Missed Squeeze	-0.28	-0.854
2008	ALDS 3	2	1	2	1	SB	0.01	0.093
2008	ALDS 3	3	1	2	-2	SB (3B)	0	0.043
2008	ALDS 3	9	0	0	0	Out stretching 1B to 2B	-0.06	-0.656
2008	ALDS 1	8	1	0	-1	Youk nails Vlad	-0.08	-0.72
2007	ALDS 2	3	1	2	1	Out advancing to 3B on GB	-0.06	-1.00
2007	ALDS 2	3	1	1	1	SB	0.01	0.152
2007	ALDS 2	5	1	1	1	SB	0.01	0.152
2007	ALDS 2	8	1	2	0	SB	0.03	0.093
2007	ALDS 2	8	1	2	0	SB (3B)	0.01	0.043
2005	ALCS 3	2	0	2	-3	Out stretching 2B to 3B	-0.01	-0.344
2005	ALCS 1	7	1	1	1	SB	0.02	0.152
2005	ALCS 1	8	1	1	1	SB	0.02	0.152
2005	ALDS 4	4	1	0	0	CS	-0.06	-0.251
2005	ALDS 4	4	0	2	0	Out stretching 1B to 2B	-0.03	-0.251
2005	ALDS 3	2	1	2	3	CS	-0.01	-0.251
2005	ALDS 2	3	1	0	-1	CS	-0.07	-0.656
2005	ALDS 1	6	1	2	-4	CS	0.02	-0.251
2005	ALDS 1	9	1	1	-3	SB	0.03	0.152
2004	ALDS 2	4	1	1	0	CS	-0.03	-0.456
2004	ALDS 1	4	1	1	0	SB	0.03	0.152
						Total	-0.55	-5.919

So by these numbers, the Angels have cost themselves nearly 6 expected runs in 30 playoff games; extrapolated out they would be on pace for -29.5R/150G . Let’s put that in perspective. If you take that -29.5 and divide it by 9 to get the Angels’ average suckitude on a per player basis, you end up with about -3.2 runs per man. For perspective, you know who was running right around that pace this year, at -3.4R/150G? (At least according to BP’s Equivalent Baserunning Runs (and yes, I know that expected runs and equivalent runs aren’t necessarily the same thing. Again, I am being unfair.)) Mike Godblessed Lowell. The playoff Angels have essentially run like an entire lineup of ’09 Mike Lowells on the bases.

Now, while we giggle at that, we need to again acknowledge the unfairness of my numbers. I capture most if not all of LAA’s downside, but miss the non-SB portion of their upside. This is a fair point, good and true. If LAA are amassing all kinds of non-SB baserunning success, they probably aren’t as bad as the above table makes them look. Is there a way to correct for that?

Not really, but kinda. Go back to the BP numbers again; they break out SB runs from the various types of non-SB runs. For LAA to have broken even, they need to make back those -3.2 runs, plus a little extra. Going by the BP non-SB EQBRR numbers, that would mean you’d need a field a team of nine guys slightly better than Carl Crawford (+3.0/150) to come out ahead. I’m sorry, but there’s just no way the Angels have been doing that.

So, in substance, my rant is that Mike Scioscia is an idiot, that everyone who has ever written an article about how well the Angels baserunning plays in the playoffs is an idiot, and that Torii Hunter is still a douche. Tell your friends and neighbors, especially if one of them is a playoff announcer.

Of course, I still hope they beat the Yankees.

This post has been edited by Joe D Reid: Oct 23 2009, 08:42 AM

[Lose Remerswaal]

You didn't even mention Mathis not scoring in the 10th inning last night on Figgins ground out to Teixeira where Teixeira had to leave his feet towards the foul line to snare the ball. You GOTTA send the runner in that case.

[DukeSox]

You didn't even mention Mathis not scoring in the 10th inning last night on Figgins ground out to Teixeira where Teixeira had to leave his feet towards the foul line to snare the ball. You GOTTA send the runner in that case.

Perhaps the Angels have run into SO MANY outs the last few years, they are now subconsciously hesitant in "the heat of the moment" about running into ANOTHER out...so he didn't go.

I know if my teammates have been getting blasted for making stupid plays, the last thing I'd want to do is make another of the same type. Similarly, for the base coach, the last thing he wants is yet another baserunning throw out, even if it was the correct play.

Did the Angels' aggressiveness actually turn them conservative here, when they shouldn't have been?

[Harry Hooper]

You didn't even mention Mathis not scoring in the 10th inning last night on Figgins ground out to Teixeira where Teixeira had to leave his feet towards the foul line to snare the ball. You GOTTA send the runner in that case.

Yeah, the exception that proves the rule. Scioscia lets players run wild, but then gives Aybar the red light. Check out Verducci's column:

I was particularly taken with the Angels' turn at bat in the 10th inning, when I thought manager Mike Scioscia nearly mismanaged his team right out of the game. But when I ran through the inning with Scioscia afterward, I better understood what he was thinking. It turned out that what I regarded as his mistakes were just more reasons why Mariano Rivera is so great that he changes the way a manager manages the game.

With no outs against Rivera, the Angels had Jeff Mathis on third and Erik Aybar at first. (Forget about a pinch-runner for Mathis. Mathis runs well enough for a catcher, and Scioscia, a former catcher, is not entrusting a tied, extra-inning, nearly-must-win playoff game to a seldom used third catcher, Brian Wilson.) Chone Figgins was the next hitter. The Yankees brought their infield in and did not bother holding Aybar on at first; they were giving him second base. But Scioscia ordered Aybar to hold at first.

I would have sent Aybar on the first pitch to Figgins. Why? With runners at second and third, you can put the "contact" play on for Mathis at third base. Mathis takes off running on any grounder instead of waiting to see if it passes through the infield. Even if Mathis gets thrown out at the plate, you still have the same situation in hand: the winning run, in this case Aybar, at third base with fewer than two outs.

By keeping Aybar at first, Scioscia could not run the contact play, because if Mathis gets thrown out, the lead runner is only at second base, not third. Sure enough, Figgins hits a grounder that first baseman Mark Teixeira stops with a dive to his backhand side and turns into an out at first. If Mathis is running on contact, he probably scores. But because Scioscia kept Aybar at first, there was no contact play and Mathis doesn't score.

So why didn't Scioscia let Aybar take second? Rivera.

"He jams so many guys and gets those weak little pop-ups, I can't risk what I have," Scioscia said. He meant he could not risk a double play, which would take away the advantage of a runner at third and fewer than two outs.

"But why not just let Figgins take the first pitch and let Aybar take second?" I asked.

The answer again was the same: Rivera.

Rivera is so good, Scioscia said, that he couldn't afford to tell Figgins to take one pitch. It might be the only decent pitch Figgins got to hit in the at-bat.

Wow. Now that's respect. Scioscia wasn't willing to trade one pitch from Rivera for a more advantageous base-running scenario.

Verducci is being too kind here to Scaredy Cat Scioscia. Figgins doesn't need to get a base hit to drive in a run, just put the ball in play.

[zeraza]

Scioscia-ball seems to be predicated on the fact that because the same formula worked in 2002, it must work all the time... but as we all know, some times winning it all is just having everything fall into place at the right time, and that was what 2002 was. Other than that year, it's been a horrible formula but hey, the MSM loves kissing up to it

[David Laurila]

Angels' bench coach Ron Roenicke discussed this recently with BP:

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=9669

DL: A criticism in recent years is that your team has gotten somewhat older and slower, yet it remains just as aggressive on the basepaths. Is that something you and Mike have discussed?

RR: I’ve never heard that criticism. What we hear from other teams is, "Boy, we like the way you guys are aggressive running the bases, and that’s what we’d like to do." That’s what we hear more of, so I don’t know what the criticism would be. You know more than I do, obviously.

DL: I wouldn’t say that; I just know what I’ve read.

RR: Well, what you read sometimes isn’t the way it is.

DL: You don’t feel that you’ve ever been too aggressive for the team you’ve had on the field?

RR: No, I don’t. I think that at times it’s easy to say that somebody is too aggressive when they’re thrown out in a situation where you don’t want somebody to get thrown out. That’s easy to see. But what you don’t see is the 20 times when we’re safe, when other people would have stopped and not gone to that extra base. Obviously, I’d rather have more guys in scoring position and on third base, rather than them having stopped on second base or having never even got to second.

[Joe D Reid]

Angels' bench coach Ron Roenicke discussed this recently with BP:

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=9669

I will give you $14.46 (everything I have on me right now) if you email him the above chart.

This post has been edited by Joe D Reid: Oct 20 2009, 06:01 PM

[BrooklynJM]

In the interest of fairness...

I went through the Angels playoff games this year and look to see how they did with the three main "plus baserunning situations" - first to third on a single, second to home on a single, or first to home on a double. This way we can see what other "good" baserunning things they've been doing

Game 3 vs NYY: 0/0 - amazingly with all those baserunners they never had an opportunity for any of those 3 situations
Game 2 vs NYY 2/2 - went second to home on a single twice
Game 1 vs NYY: 1/1 - went second to home on a single once

Game 3 vs BOS: 2/3 - second to home on a single, went from first to third on a double (the miss), and and second to home on a single
Game 2 vs. BOS: 2/2 - first to third on a single, second to home on a single
Game 1 vs BOS: 2/4 - first and second to second and third on a single (2 misses), second to home and first to third on a single

That would put them at 9/12 in terms of taking the extra base this playoffs. Does that make up for the lack of production shown in the OP? I doubt it, but it is something to look at.

[Harry Hooper]

Angels' bench coach Ron Roenicke discussed this recently with BP:

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=9669

DL: A criticism in recent years is that your team has gotten somewhat older and slower, yet it remains just as aggressive on the basepaths. Is that something you and Mike have discussed?

RR: I’ve never heard that criticism. What we hear from other teams is, "Boy, we like the way you guys are aggressive running the bases, and that’s what we’d like to do." That’s what we hear more of, so I don’t know what the criticism would be. You know more than I do, obviously.

Roenicke a little testy there, I'd say.


Check out this later question:

DL: As did Mike, you played with the Los Angeles Dodgers. From your perspective, how differently was that organization run than the Angels are now?

RR: Well, I think the running part is more Mike. Mike really believes in, not just the basestealing, but taking the extra base when you have that chance. That is strictly from Mike.

[Eric Van]

Every year the Angels score lots more runs than their hitting stats would dictate. +24 in 2008, +40 this year. Some of that has to be baserunning.

According to BP, in non-SB runs they were +11.0 in 2007 (2nd in MLB to the Dodgers), +7.3 in 2008 (6th in MLB), and +8.3 in 2009 (7th).

In SB runs (already reflected in expected runs scored), they were -7.9 (5th worst), -2.0, and -7.0 (7th worst).

So they have been an excellent though somewhat overrated run-the-bases club in the regular season, which they have mostly offset by being a bad basestealing club.

I think the aggressive baserunning works in the regular season where it's natural and unforced and has bit them in the ass in the post-season because everyone is thinking that they "have to be" aggressive to win.

BTW, there are only two teams in MLB which have been positive basestealing clubs three years in a row despite being negative run-the-bases clubs: the Yankees and the Red Sox.

[Worst Trade Evah]

If stealing bases pays off at 80-85% success rates, then why not run baserunners for extra bases on hits until they start getting thrown out, say, 10% of the time? It might make sense to do that, but if people were watching 10% of baserunners getting thrown out stretching bases, they'd probably go nuts.

That said, that was a tremendous OP -- really great stuff. Thanks!

[bob burda]

I think the aggressive baserunning works in the regular season where it's natural and unforced and has bit them in the ass in the post-season because everyone is thinking that they "have to be" aggressive to win.

Well, yes - but I'd paraphrase something Bill James said in I think the 1984 Abstract, in commenting on the way the '83 White Sox ran themselves out of the 1983 ALCS with the Orioles - which is that taking an extra base and forcing the issue works great against the A's, Royals, Indians and the like, but not quite so well against teams like the Red Sox and Yankees who have good advance scouting, veteran players, and play decent defense. For all I know the Sox and MFYs have bad defensive #s this year, but for the most part the better teams are NOT going to get spooked by the fleas on the basepaths the way you see with 2nd division clubs.

As I think about this, the 2004 Red Sox were a team that I remember Theo talking about in midseason as "not matching up well" with the Angels and their aggressive play. With the OCab/Minky/Nomar deal the defense seemed to change and the issue went away. The 2002 Yankees however, were a lousy defensive club and had their hands full with the 2002 Angels. I can't recall whether it was a factor in 2005.

[DieHardSoxFan1]

2007 ALDS 2 3 1 2 1 Out advancing to 3B on GB -0.06 -1.00

Question about this calculation: Garrett Anderson began the 3rd inning with a double (1.189 runs), but was thrown out at 3rd base on Macier Izturis' grounder to shortstop. Had Anderson simply remained at 2nd, we could rightly assume Lugo throws out Izturis 6-3, leaving Anderson at 2nd with 1 out (.725 runs). Instead, Izturis was at first base with 1 down (.573).

So, Anderson's mistake cost his team -.152 runs, correct?

[Joe D Reid]

Question about this calculation: Garrett Anderson began the 3rd inning with a double (1.189 runs), but was thrown out at 3rd base on Macier Izturis' grounder to shortstop. Had Anderson simply remained at 2nd, we could rightly assume Lugo throws out Izturis 6-3, leaving Anderson at 2nd with 1 out (.725 runs). Instead, Izturis was at first base with 1 down (.573).

So, Anderson's mistake cost his team -.152 runs, correct?

As I recall the play, the ball was in the hole such that there likely would have been no out at 1B. So by running he moved the needle from 1st&2d/0 out (1.573) to 1st/1 out (.573). However, I could absolutely be wrong about that.

[troparra]

So why didn't Scioscia let Aybar take second? Rivera.

"He jams so many guys and gets those weak little pop-ups, I can't risk what I have," Scioscia said. He meant he could not risk a double play, which would take away the advantage of a runner at third and fewer than two outs.

"But why not just let Figgins take the first pitch and let Aybar take second?" I asked.

The answer again was the same: Rivera.

Rivera is so good, Scioscia said, that he couldn't afford to tell Figgins to take one pitch. It might be the only decent pitch Figgins got to hit in the at-bat.

This sounds like intimidation to me. Scioscia dresses it up as thoughtful strategy, but in reality he is so fearful of what awful things can happen when Rivera pitches - weak little popups, the first pitch being the only pitch a player will be able to hit - that it has negated the aggressiveness that supposedly makes the Angels such a good team.

They are backing down, essentially. If that's not intimidation, I don't know what is.

[Harry Hooper]

This sounds like intimidation to me. Scioscia dresses it up as thoughtful strategy, but in reality he is so fearful of what awful things can happen when Rivera pitches - weak little popups, the first pitch being the only pitch a player will be able to hit - that it has negated the aggressiveness that supposedly makes the Angels such a good team.

They are backing down, essentially. If that's not intimidation, I don't know what is.

He let Aybar steal tonight with Rivera in, but then the hyperagrressive running Angels hill hold Willits on third instead of making Swisher throw him out. Absurd.

[HriniakPosterChi...]

He let Aybar steal tonight with Rivera in, but then the hyperagrressive running Angels hill hold Willits on third instead of making Swisher throw him out. Absurd.

Swisher was not deep in RF at all when he caught that ball. He was charging in (nearly overran the ball and had to leap to make the catch), and he had all of his momentum taking him toward a play at the plate. The ball went into Posada's glove on the fly, and Posada didn't even have to reach to make the catch. 3B coach "HearNo/SeeNo/DiNo" Evil did the right thing on that play, as far as I can tell.

[Joe D Reid]

On the one hand, oh my sainted Christ they did it again, with Torii Hunter getting caught going home with what I guess was the contact play on. On the other, it didn't actually hurt them that much, and their overall baserunning actually helped their Expected runs. The update:

The Los Angeles Angels of Mild Cognitive Disability

YEAR	SERIES/GAME	INN	ON	OUT	STATE	EVENT	WinPA	ExpRun
2009	ALCS 5	3	1	1	+4	SB	0.01	0.152
2009	ALCS 5	3	1	1	+4	Hunter out on contact play; Vlad to 2B	-0.02	-.043
2009	ALCS 5	8	2	1	+1	SB	0.01	0.224
						Total	0.00	+0.333

This post has been edited by Joe D Reid: Oct 23 2009, 08:45 AM

[Rough Carrigan]

The thing that really got me about game 5 was when they were down 6-4 and got two men on with no outs whereupon, the yankees put in possibly their worst pitcher, Marte, to which the Angels responded by having Figgins bunt.

[David Laurila]

On the one hand, oh my sainted Christ they did it again, with Torii Hunter getting caught going home with what I guess was the contact play on. On the other, it didn't actually hurt them that much, and their overall baserunning actually helped their Expected runs. The update:

The Los Angeles Angels of Mild Cognitive Disability

YEAR	SERIES/GAME	INN	ON	OUT	STATE	EVENT	WinPA	ExpRun
2009	ALCS 5	3	1	1	+4	SB	0.01	0.152
2009	ALCS 5	3	1	1	+4	Hunter out on contact play; Vlad to 2B	-0.02	-.043
2009	ALCS 5	8	2	1	+1	SB	0.01	0.224
						Total	0.00	+0.333

When I look at these charts, I see WinPA and ExpRun calculated (negatively) every time a runner gets thrown out trying to advance an extra base, but what about when the runners advance an extra base safely (home to second, first to third, second to home)? That was Roenicke's primary defense of the team's aggressive baserunning -- that it happens far more frequently than the outs and ultimately leads to more runs.