Well, before Kim. He helped solidify things. Or maybe I'm just remembering incorrectly because everyone was crying about how closer by committee didn't work. It didn't work because our bullpen sucked or they pulled the plug after a bad start.
The Craig Kimbrel Thread
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Looking at the numbers, the 2003 Redsox were 36/57 in save attempts. Kim was 16/19, the rest of the team was 20/38. I have no clue how to find splits by month for 2003 though.
edit: They are on espn.com actually. The bullpen was pretty brutal outside of Embree until Kim came aboard. Of course they tried him as a starter initially too.
edit: They are on espn.com actually. The bullpen was pretty brutal outside of Embree until Kim came aboard. Of course they tried him as a starter initially too.
I think you need to look deeper than saves/blown saves, keep in mind that relievers can get blown saves in situations where they would never be in line for an actual save.
Looking at the numbers last year for the Sox Kimbrel was 31/33 and the rest of the team was 12/28 and that includes Koji who was 7/9.
This year is odd, Kimbrel has obviously been great but the rest of the team has only had 4 "save opportunities" and one was converted by the immortal Ben Taylor.
I'm not taking a stand one way or another on the overall question, I'm just saying if you want to you need to look a bit deeper than blown saves.
Looking at the numbers last year for the Sox Kimbrel was 31/33 and the rest of the team was 12/28 and that includes Koji who was 7/9.
This year is odd, Kimbrel has obviously been great but the rest of the team has only had 4 "save opportunities" and one was converted by the immortal Ben Taylor.
I'm not taking a stand one way or another on the overall question, I'm just saying if you want to you need to look a bit deeper than blown saves.
Good point. Either way, by the end of May, it looks like the Redsox had 1 MR who had an era under 4 and that was Alan Embree. Granted an era of 4.00 was an ERA+ of like 110 in 2003 so that's skewing my opinion a bit too.
They started April 18-8 despite the bullpen blowing 3 of the first 6 games. May they went 13-14 and it prompted the Shea Hillenbrand trade. They traded for BHK at the end of May and went 16-10 In June, 16-11 in July, 15-14 in August and 17-9 in September.
Kim's first usage was all over too, They had him pitch in the bullpen on 6/1, start a game on 6/4, pitch in the pen on 6/7, start on 6/10. He then made 3 more starts until becoming the full time closer on July 1st.
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They (specifically Grady Little) pulled the plug on closer by committee after Opening Day because a) the personnel was less than ideal (but adequate if used properly) but more importantly, b) the manager had no idea what the fuck he was doing.
That early season pen had Alan Embree and Mike Timlin...guys who had track records, were the backbone of a stellar postseason pen that year and then had strong seasons in 2004 as well. But were either tapped to close when Little just had to have guys in "defined" roles? Nope, co-closers were named Brandon Lyon and Chad Fox, who collectively had twp career saves (both by Fox).
Little ignored scouting reports and sabotaged the committee experiment before it could be truly tested in the process. Once Kim was acquired (as a starter, remember), Little became transfixed with the idea of Kim as a closer mainly because he'd been one once before. He got his way, at the expense of the rotation, then rode Kim into the ground even after Theo acquired a more than adequate re-enforcement in Williamson, and Embree and Timlin emerged as reliable options as well.
I'd place about 75% of the blame for the bullpen troubles of that season on Grady Little and about 25% on the personnel. And even that is generous to Little since part of the problem with the personnel was the way it was used.
You're doing apple-and-oranges here. You cite wOBA here, which is defined, but then you also talk about 8s and 9s for a relief pitcher, which aren't defined other than the implication that the higher number is better.
I was trying to keep things simple with the 8s and 9s, but apparently that backfired. What I'm trying to say is this: the higher the average level of performance, the more valuable a given difference in performance within the elite range becomes. If pitcher A is performing at level x, and pitcher B is performing at level x+y, the market value of y should be higher in a league where the average performance level is .9x than in a league where the average performance level is .5x. Does that make sense? And do you agree?
His time as closer was really only a very short period. Specifically, our memories of his dominance were from the postseason.
No he was very bad in 2003 and in 04. However, in the 2003 postseason he was balls, only giving up 1 run (a HR to Ruben Sierra)
After he came over from the Reds he had a 2.93 FIP for the Sox in 24 outings. His ERA is bloated from two outings where he gave up a combined 9 runs in one combined inning pitched. He wasn't lock down, but I think it's tough to say he was very bad in 2003.
I think you should look less at average, and more at standard deviation. It doesn't matter if you get a pitcher who is one standard deviation above average in terms of performance, in a normal distribution 1 in 6 pitchers should be like that. They shouldn't be that rare. If you have a guy performing 3 std deviations above, you're talking about 1 in 650 major league pitchers. That is special. More pitchers performing at a high level will increase the standard deviation and reduce the rarity of the outlier, no matter the average.
I don't think I am disagreeing with your premise; I am simply trying to understand what you think measures the level of performance for a closer. To use an exaggerated argument, let us say that one closer strikes out every batter he faces while another gets every to pop up. Is there a difference in level of performance? One certainly is more spectacular but both get the job done. Or for a silly argument involving starts, let have one wh pitches a perfect game every even numbered start and allows 10+ runs every odd numbered start. You basically have a .500 pitcher who could be considered for the Hall of Fame.
I think the save rule can be ridiculous.
Rule 10.19(d)(2) -- He enters the game, regardless of the count, with the potential tying run either on base, or at bat or on deck (that is, the potential tying run is either already on base or is one of the first two batters he faces).
The closer could come in with the bases loaded, two outs and an 0-2 count on the batter, with his team up by five runs and get a save. If the save is going to be an official stat then it should be leveraged.
I photographed a Brown Booby today.
Your example is actaully a good thing. This might be called a save since the tying run is on deck at least. (Why would a manager change a pitcher mid AB with an 0-2 count absent injury is another question).
What bothers me about the save rule is the 3 run clean last inning, where the tying run is not even close to coming up. Not because of the save stats, but because of managers' misuse of the best relievers in such a case. Farrell has at least shown felxibility in bringing up Kimbrel in the 8th to put out a fire rather than saving him for a clean ninth, but saving the closer (if he indeed is the best reliever) for the clean 3 run 9th when the game may get away in the 8th is the resason the save rule is stupid. Also, the "genius" that was Showalter in not using Britton in an elimination game because he was waiting for a lead. Or San Diego not using Hoffman in the 2007 Play In game (and when they got a lead and used him he blew it, or did he? With instant replay the Padres might have won that game, but that's another story for anither time).
Interesting article about Kimbrel's awesomeness
https://www.si.com/mlb/2017/06/19/craig-kimbrel-boston-red-sox-closer
https://www.si.com/mlb/2017/06/19/craig-kimbrel-boston-red-sox-closer
I just finished that. Has some good explanation of why his 99 is unhittable and (impliedly) why, for example, Kelly's might not be.
Sounds like Kimbrel and Kelly are buds. They play catch and Kelly has to tighten the strings on his glove after. That's funny. Don't look away when Craig is throwing it back! Maybe some of the Pterodactyl is rubbing off on Kelly this year.
They were once called firemen, brought into the game to "put the fire out." Then some sportswriter decided that these pitchers should receive recognition for their work and invented the "save." It beame an official stat and pitchers with lots of saves began getting lots of money and managers decided that they should become CLOSERS. Once those pitchers who became closers realized that was where the money is, they didn't want to get holds. Holds are an unofficial stat (Quick, which pitcher leads in lifetime holds?) and simply require a pitcher to hand over a lead. A pitcher could come into the game to start the 9th with a 1-run lead, walk three and get pulled. The next pitcher gets three outs without allowing a run, game over, and one pitcher gets a hold and the second one, a save.
Just wait until the hold becomes an official stat and then there will be pitchers who won't want to enter the game when their team is tied or trailing because they won't be able to get a hold. Money makes the world go round...that clinking, clanking sound....
Remember just a few years ago...CLOSER BY COMMITTEE -- Sean MacAdam, Jan 8, 2003 http://www.espn.com/mlb/columns/story?id=1489225
Just wait until the hold becomes an official stat and then there will be pitchers who won't want to enter the game when their team is tied or trailing because they won't be able to get a hold. Money makes the world go round...that clinking, clanking sound....
Remember just a few years ago...CLOSER BY COMMITTEE -- Sean MacAdam, Jan 8, 2003 http://www.espn.com/mlb/columns/story?id=1489225
In an era where basically every team is using advanced metrics, now apparently going so far as to preach stuff about angle of swing to get more home runs, why has the concept of closer continued? Could it be that people think that it actually works?
Teams are ruthlessly seeking advantages. If there was a real world advantage to the "Jamesian relief ace," wouldn't somebody have tried that by now? Wouldn't the obvious advantage they gained then be copied by others?
Baseball has shown no reluctance to adopt non-traditional approaches like the shift or to largely abandon strategies that don't pay off well like the sacrifice recently. Why is the closer the only shibboleth to endure?
Teams are ruthlessly seeking advantages. If there was a real world advantage to the "Jamesian relief ace," wouldn't somebody have tried that by now? Wouldn't the obvious advantage they gained then be copied by others?
Baseball has shown no reluctance to adopt non-traditional approaches like the shift or to largely abandon strategies that don't pay off well like the sacrifice recently. Why is the closer the only shibboleth to endure?
Isn't this just Andrew Miller, c. 2016?
It happens, but I think you're right that it mostly happens on teams that have two closer types: i.e. Teams adopt it to complement a closer, not replace one.
Wasn't Miller really just the set-up guy in Cleveland, who sometimes went more than an inning?
Thank you, Mr. Francona, for bringing Foulke into ALCS games 4 and 5 in non-save situations.
Hey, didn't we say that about Koji in 2013?
Maybe, but we'd be stretching the definition of set-up role pretty far. His usage pattern wasn't really what people think of when you say set up, which I think would be something like single-inning relief pitcher who pitches the eighth (or maybe the seventh — which I have seen described as set up, but also as middle relief) when the team has the lead.
In the 2016 postseason, he appeared 10 times, pitching 27 2/3 IP. He only entered in the 8th once, and in that instance he finished the game. He entered in the 5th three times, the 6th twice, and the 7th four times.
But he pitched the eighth six times, so in that sense he was like a set-up man. I guess what I'm trying to say is that Miller and Francona found a new usage pattern that is poorly described by the old vocabulary, but might be better described as a relief ace.
As charlieoscar pointed out, money and the human element that goes in to it.
Completely changing something that is commonly done but doesn't really work, and completely changing something that works 90%(?) of the time, is ultimately two different types of uphill battles. For everybody involved once the media has their say at that, not just the relief pitchers themselves who's value assessments coming out of those advanced metrics really isn't all that much less primitive then the save stat itself beyond a basic understanding that you ideally want your best guys pitching when it matters most.
Cafardo explains in a way that only Nick could
http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/redsox/2017/06/24/cody-bellinger-aaron-judge-could-make-rookie-history/wisE0pcoBZZ76r3xHXatnO/story.html
He pitched 19 1/3 innings, not 27 2/3 innings in the 2016 postseason.
In September, he appeared 12 times, pitching 12 2/3 innings, never entering earlier than the 7th inning. I think it's tough to point to post-season usage to describe a new usage pattern. Post-season is different.
That's only relevant in dinosaur arbitration figures there, Nick. It will not affect his salary in free agency one iota if he has the greatest relief season in history. If his agent still thinks his save totals matter, then he needs a new agent.
He's got a year and a half to go to get there though.
The saves will have an effect more so then a random 8th inning appearance on his top end earning potential imo, especially the higher he manages to push the total. Unless we are ready for fork over the extension that probably already starts at Jansen/Chapman $$$, I honestly wouldn't be looking to routinely push out of the comfort zone either.
Thanks for the IP correction. That was his number for his post-season career. And I see your point about usage patterns.
So maybe the question gets a bit more complicated. It seems — based on postseason usage — that teams actually *do* like the strategic advantage of a relief ace. So the question is then: why not in the regular season, too?
No they really won't. If Dellin Betances were on the market next year he would make more than a middle of the road closer. Times have changed.
So what, his agent is just supposed to take you on your word with that?
"Don't worry, times have changed. We aren't going to back this up with any money, but rest assured none of this will impact your situation a year and half from now".
Pass.
No, a good agent would tell him that he is more valuable as both a closer and fireman, rather than just a 9th inning guy. 5 saves over the course of the year from pitching the 8th instead of the 9th isn't going to affect his salary.
That's your own speculation based almost entirely off the contract of one select guy.....who Kimbrel is already out earning btw. If the goal here is to reach Jansen/Chapman $$$ and beyond, which I'm strongly guessing it is, then there is already a much more established and proven path in place to get there. One that doesn't involve banking on that hypothetical speculation your going outside the box requires either.
As the saying goes talk is cheap. Until this "you are worth more doing this" is supported by a much stronger track record of teams backing that up with actual money, which nobody has really been brave enough to do yet, the players aren't going to be the first ones to buy in there.
His whole premise is off. The clamor is rarely about non save situations. It's about not 9th inning. I believe people ask him about usage. I don't believe he's being asked why kimbrel doesn't come in in the 7th inning. This week's KC game was the first time where that was even a possibility of a thing.
Nick mentions the time on the road (i thought there was another?) where he came into the game in the 8th, got out of the jam and didn't pitch the 9th because the Sox scored big. Is St. Nick suggesting that kimbrel was pissed that he wasn't left in a 6 run game to get the save?
There no possible way that a few less saves would make him less money. Sure, if he went from 35 to 10, some GM's might try lowballing, but even under Nick's fake theory he'd pile up the saves.
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Yes, depending on what "it actually works" means. If the primary reason why teams are sticking to it is because pitchers have a cognitive commitment to it and disrupting it tends to disrupt their performance, then it could be simultaneously true that a relief ace system would, in the abstract, produce better results, and also that sticking to the closer system works better in real-life applications.
This could also be a bit like batting order issues. Obviously you would not want your best reliever pitching the sixth in blowouts any more than you would want your best hitter batting ninth. But just as the advantage of an optimized order over a traditional order is quite small--because even a traditional order tends to put the best hitters in the top half--so the difference between the current inning-based usage system and an optimized, leverage-based system may also be quite small, because the better relievers are already tending to pitch higher-leverage innings on the whole. In both cases, there's a legitimate question of whether the advantage is large enough to justify the effort spent getting player buy-in.
Has anybody tried to quantify the effects of relief pitcher usage systems in the same way people have quantified batting order effects? I would think somebody must have, but Google isn't turning anything up.
The going rate of a win is still going to drive the market like it always does. A reliever who regularly blows batters away in pitching in the highest leverage situations is going to earn the most WAR. There is no metric that I am aware of that values $$ earned per save.
Who between Cody Allen or Andrew Miller would earn more money if they became a free agent right now?
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Of course those 2 would get more money today, based on inflation rates alone. That said there really isn't any supporting evidence that they would be getting paid the same or more then an upper echelon 9th inning only guy by deviating off the beaten path. Could making the same end up being the case? Sure, but you are still currently dumping the entirety of any risk that they don't there solely on the player.
Kind of ironic you are entering WAR as a value here too, which until very recently has been more of the cornerstone advanced metric argument against paying relief pitchers big money then something that was dictating what they were or were not getting on the open market. Which coming from that perspective kind of begs the question here: If you dumped a Jansen/Chapman extension in Kimbrel's lap tomorrow under the condition that he was more open to pitching whatever inning you wanted him to...he probably doesn't care. Why aren't you supporting your stance here with a suggestion that we extend him for market value money?
Again and coming strictly from the player/agent perspective, hypothetical value talk is cheap if it's not coming out of the guy willing to back it up with a check.
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Value also comes from being willing to pitch in a high leverage 8th inning situation instead of perhaps requiring to only pitch in the 9th inning due to comfort factors.
Managers like not having to worry about potential divas.
Managers like not having to worry about potential divas.
I have no idea what that has to do with anything but we're not going to agree so I'm dropping it.
Kimbrel is not going to be pitching in the 8th inning for a while. So...
http://www.weei.com/blogs/rob-bradford/why-craig-kimbrel-isnt-pitching-8th-inning?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
That's correct. I think we can assume that for the typical 2017 game, Farrell will behave like a typical 2017 manager, and not use him earlier and leave the 9th to someone else.